TC AO TE TIME TO ACT

IMT

HOw THE EU CAn lEAd On ClIMATE

CHAngE And MIgrATIOn

The inter-linkages between climate change and migration are

The time has come to translate research evidence and recom-

complex and at times hard to grasp. Addressing migration in

mendations into policy practice. The European Union (EU)

the context of climate change presents new challenges for policy

could act as a leading political force and should begin to de-

makers at both international and national levels.

velop a holistic policy approach that addresses climate change

and migration.

However, the complexity of the challenge should not be used as

an excuse for not addressing the issue. There is already ample

This report debunks some common myths and provides an un-

evidence that environment-related migration and displacement

derstanding of key characteristics of migration in the context of

is occurring and that it will increase in the future. Research

climate change. With a focus on EU policies and legal frame-

projects have provided a better understanding of the phenom-

works in the area of migration and asylum, the report presents

enon and of corresponding legal and policy gaps.

a series of recommendations in order to proceed towards a coher-

ent EU approach on climate change and migration.

Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, European Union, Brussels – 15 Rue d’Arlon – B-1050 Brussels – Belgium

T +32 2 743 41 00 F +32 2 743 41 09 E info@eu.boell.org w www.eu.boell.org TIME TO ACT

How the EU can lead on climate

change and migration

2 TIME TO ACT – How tHe eU can lead on climate cHange and migration

Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung

Commissioned and published by the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, European Union

Authors: Margit Ammer, Monika Mayrhofer, Alex Randall, Jo Salsbury

Coordination and final editing: Silvia Brugger

Printed in Belgium, June 2014

English proofreading: Stephen Glennon

Production: Micheline Gutman

Cover Picture:

Pablo Tosco/Oxfam International

d/2012/11850/3

This publication can be ordered at:

Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, European Union, Brussels – 15 Rue d’Arlon – B-1050 Brussels – Belgium

T +32 2 743 41 00 F +32 2 743 41 09 E info@eu.boell.org W www.eu.boell.org

COnTEnTs

Introduction

4

PART I: Defining the challenge – Myths and facts about climate change and migration

7

1. The relationship between climate change and migration

8

1.1 Vulnerability to climate change

8

1.2 Slow and rapid onset events, forced and voluntary migration

8

1.3 the significance of climate change and migration for europe

9

2. How the interplay between other factors and climate change shapes patterns of movement 10

2.1 the Horn of africa

10

2.2 the Sahel

11

2.3 Pakistan

12

2.4 the arctic

13

2.5 Bangladesh

13

2.6 Pacific island States

14

3. some facts about movement with a climate change dimension

15

4. Framing and communicating climate change and migration

18

4.1 Problems with terminology

18

4.2 climate-linked migration as a new security threat?

20

4.3 migration as an adaptive response to climate change

20

5. summary of key characteristics of climate-linked migration

22

Part II: Tackling the challenge – Policy recommendations to the EU

23

1. Policy responses by the EU so far

24

1.1 initiatives by the european Parliament

24

1.2 First steps undertaken by the eU High representative and the european commission

25

1.3 Stockholm Programme and commission Staff working document

25

2. shortcomings of current policy responses

26

2.1 Keeping a low profile or taking a leadership role?

26

2.2 adopting a comprehensive approach and re-framing the issue of environment-related migration 27

2.3 adopting a human rights approach and taking vulnerable groups into account

28

3. Looking more closely at EU asylum and migration policy

29

3.1 the internal dimension: asylum policy

29

3.2 the internal dimension: migration as adaptation through eU labour migration policies?

32

3.3 the external dimension

34

Policy recommendations to the European Union

36

Conclusions

38

list of abbreviations

39

references

39

Picture credits

45

Short biographies

47

4 TIME TO ACT – How tHe eU can lead on climate cHange and migration

InTRODUCTIOn

Climate change will increase migration flows,

about the terminology. Terms like environmental

in particular from the world’s poorest and most

or climate ‘refugee’ have been questioned, both in

crisis-prone countries. The links between climate

the academic and political sphere. It is necessary

change and migration are complex and difficult

to keep in mind that the choice of words also has

to identify. In spite of disagreement about how to

important legal and policy implications. ‘People

identify climate as a causal factor in migration, the

who move in the context of environmental change’

policy challenges posed by the movement are real.

and related notions are considered to be adequate

to describe the phenomenon and therefore used in

Even though climate change and environ-

this report. Even though a categorisation of ‘move-

mental degradation have a significant impact on

ments in the context of environmental change’

population movements worldwide, at present,

is extremely difficult, this report will distinguish

there is no coherent policy approach from the

between ‘displacement’, ‘migration as an adapta-

European Union (EU) on how to respond to the

tion measure’ and ‘planned relocation’ for the

phenomenon of environmentally-induced migra-

purposes of this analysis.

tion/displacement. People who move because of

some long-term environmental change are seen

With this report, the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung

as voluntary or economic migrants with no enti-

European Union wants to raise awareness that

tlement to protection, while those moving after

there is already a great deal that we know about

sudden environmental disasters often qualify for

climate change and migration. The time has come

short-term humanitarian aid, but no longer-term

to translate research evidence and recommen-

support. The result is that people who move in the

dations into policy practice: what role can and

context of climate change go unregarded within

should the EU play to adequately respond to

the international humanitarian and refugee law

the challenge of climate change and migration?

and EU migration policy. Different policies and

responses are needed at each stage of environ-

The first part of the publication ‘Defining

ment-related migration, ranging from actions

the challenge – Myths and facts about climate

to mitigate climate change, the offer of protec-

change and migration’ provides an understand-

tion during the phase of displacement and (re-)

ing of key characteristics of movement in the

integration or resettlement measures in the final

context of climate change on the basis of a wide

stage. Environmentally induced migration inter-

range of case studies and research results. The

sects development, adaptation, humanitarian

experts from the Climate Outreach Information

and migration policies, which leads to difficulties

Network and the UK Climate Change and

in responding adequately to the phenomenon.

Migration Coalition also provide an adequate way

of communicating the phenomenon, which is

Several European policy documents, includ-

critical to debunking some common myths about

ing the European Commission’s Staff Working

climate change and migration.

Document ‘Climate change, environmental deg-

radation, and migration’ from April 2013, have

The second part ‘Tackling the challenge –

highlighted the need for further analysis. The issue

Policy recommendations to the EU’ focuses on

has received increasing attention in recent years:

EU policies and legal frameworks in the area of

research projects have provided a better under-

migration and asylum and builds upon the results

standing of the phenomenon and of corresponding

of the research project ClimMig (May 2011-June

legal and policy gaps. Discussing climate change

2013), which was led by the Ludwig Boltzmann

and migration also implies a considerable debate

Institute of Human Rights, together with the

5

Institute for Sustainable Development and In-

a matter of development cooperation or humani-

ternational Relations (IDDRI). The researchers

tarian assistance. This report therefore mainly

identify gaps in legal, normative and institutional

focuses on how to adapt the legal framework to

frameworks of relevance to climate-related mi-

address the challenge of climate change and

gration and displacement and establish recom-

migration. However, this should not disregard

mendations addressed to European policy mak-

the importance of other EU policy areas such as

ers on how to overcome these gaps.

development cooperation, which should take cli-

mate-linked migration much more into account.

Several EU policies, including e.g. develop-

ment cooperation, humanitarian aid, climate

We hope that this publication can raise aware-

change, foreign policy, migration, disaster risk

ness, stimulate debates and provide policy makers

reduction, conflict prevention and peace-build-

with a sound basis for further decision-making –

ing, are addressing environmentally-induced

and thus enable the EU to lead on climate change

migration/displacement in some way. On the

and migration.

whole, there are shortcomings when it comes

to the actual protection of environmentally dis-

placed persons as well as to the promotion of

Silvia Brugger

migration as adaptation. A further problematic

Director Climate and Energy Programme,

point is the framing of the issue as being solely

Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, European Union

PART I:

Defining the challenge – Myths and facts about

climate change and migration

By Jo salsbury & Alex Randall

ock

erst

© Shutt

8 TIME TO ACT – How tHe eU can lead on climate cHange and migration For example, two cities could be exposed

to very similar hazards, but one city could be

1. The relationship

more sensitive as, for example, its physical sea

between climate

defences might be weaker. Whether a particular

disaster causes people to move will also depend on

change and migration a number of other important factors including lev-

els of economic development and preparedness.

The relationship between climate change and

Further, two countries could be exposed to simi-

migration is far from simple. To understand this

lar risks and have comparable vulnerabilities but

multi-dimensional phenomenon, it is necessary to

one country might be better able to adapt to the

explore the causal links between climate change,

impacts.2 Thus, the way in which a country adapts

disasters, socio-economic factors and general

or does not adapt to climate change will also have

drivers of migration. Across the globe, countries

important implications for the movement of peo-

and regions face varying degrees of vulnerability

ple. Vulnerability to the impact of climate change

to climate change. Climate-linked disasters may

is further differentiated between people in the

unfold instantly or over a number of years and

same location. Men and women may be affected

as such these differing events will lead to vary-

differently, with women commonly the more vul-

ing migratory responses. People may be forced to

nerable. Other members of the population may

move to ensure their immediate survival, or they

also be especially vulnerable to the effects of cli-

may have some choice about when and where

mate change by virtue of their age, disability or

they move to. Exploring various scenarios assists in

by reasons of discrimination. These differences in

understanding the complex relationship between

vulnerability have an impact on whether and how

climate change and migration, and highlights that

people move in the context of climate change.

climate change may be one of a number of reasons

for migration.

1.2 slow and rapid onset events, forced

and voluntary migration

1.1 Vulnerability to climate change

The effects of climate change are not pre-

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate

dicted to happen at the same pace, and a useful

Change (IPCC) defines vulnerability as the extent to

distinction can be made between slow onset and

which a system will be disrupted by the impacts of

rapid onset events. Slow onset events unfold grad-

climate change.1 Vulnerability to climate change is

ually, perhaps over a number of months or years.

made up of three key elements:

Examples include drought, desertification and

sea level rise. Rapid onset events unfold almost

exposure, the climate-linked hazards that immediately, or over a number of days. Examples

an area might face;

include hurricanes and typhoons, flash flooding

sensitivity, how sensitive a system is to and land slides. Slow and rapid onset events lead

any of the hazards it is exposed to;

to different patterns of movement,3 ranging from

adaptive capacity, the ability of the system cyclical migration to permanent movement that

to adjust in order to accommodate the impacts.

can occur both internally and internationally.

1 Parry, m. l.; canziani, o. F.; Palutikof, J. P.; Van der linden, P. J.; Hanson, c. e. (eds) (2007): contribution of working group ii to the Fourth assessment report of the intergovernmental Panel on climate change (iPcc),

cambridge, United Kingdom and new York: cambridge University Press.

2 intergovernmental Panel on climate change (iPcc) (1998): the regional impacts of climate change.

an assessment of vulnerability, cambridge: cambridge University Press.

3 Food and agriculture organization of the United nations (2012): Fao's emergency activities: technical Handbook Series: the emergency Sequence: what Fao does – How Fao does it. overview of the Handbooks.

PART I: DEFInIng THE CHALLEngE – MyTHs AnD FACTs ABOUT CLIMATE CHAngE AnD MIgRATIOn 9

People who move in the context of climate change

Creating opportunities for migration into

will have differing responses, choices or limitations

Europe could provide some people with a way

when determining their movement. It is important

of avoiding extreme climate change impacts as

to acknowledge the difference between slow and

European countries are generally less exposed

rapid onset events to understand and develop the

to the risks of climate change or are more able to

various policy responses and gaps in legal protec-

adapt to the risks. While people usually migrate

tion that arise in regard to human movements.

within their own country, some people might

have the means to move and seek work in the EU

Faced with sudden onset disasters, people are

as a way of protecting themselves and their fami-

more likely to be forced to flee for survival. In con-

lies against worsening environmental conditions.

trast when faced with slow onset disasters, which

By creating new, legal and safe migration options

unfold over a number of months or years, people

the EU can assist people in protecting themselves

may still be forced or obliged to move, but may

from certain climate change impacts.

have more opportunity to decide how and when.

Further, some people may be fortunate enough to

When people move due to sudden disasters

have the resources and opportunity to plan their

like floods and hurricanes, they tend to move short

migration. With such wide variations in deter-

distances. However, such disasters sometimes

mining the timing and destination of movement

lead to protracted displacement situations where

it is helpful to consider movement on a spectrum,

people remain in temporary shelters for months

with forced movement at one end and voluntary

or even years. In spite of the best efforts of govern-

movement at the other.

ments and international agencies, such situations

are often hugely detrimental to the welfare of the

1.3 The significance of climate change displaced population, especially of vulnerable

and migration for Europe

groups such as the elderly, women, children, peo-

ple with disabilities and people with severe health

It is unlikely that large numbers of people

problems. In some instances, European countries

will move en masse into Europe solely because

that are mostly geographically distant from the site

of climate change. But this does not mean that

of disaster provide temporary protection. In the

there will be no inward movement to European

face of increasingly severe climate-linked disas-

countries at all and that there are no implications

ters, European decision-makers must set up rules

for the European Union (EU).4 European deci-

of how and when they agree to provide refuge and

sion-makers should consider migration linked to

protection during such disasters.

climate change for a number of reasons.

The European Union has the power to shape

By taking into account the phenomenon of

global adaptation and development policy, and

climate change and migration, and specifically

should do so in a way that sees some forms of

the legal status of people who move for reasons

migration as a way of reducing vulnerability to

related to climate change, the EU can create a

climate change. The EU and its Member States

humane and functioning immigration and asy-

should consider funding development and

lum system that is fit for purpose.

adaptation projects that create opportunities for

people to move. By focusing these projects on

areas that are especially vulnerable to climate

impacts, people could begin to reduce their vul-

nerability by choosing to migrate. At the moment,

4 geddes, a.; Sommerville, w. (2013): migration and environmental change: assessing the developing european

approach, migration Policy institute, Policy Brief Series, issue no. 2.

10 TIME TO ACT – How tHe eU can lead on climate cHange and migration few development or adaptation programmes con-2.1 The Horn of Africa

sider migration as a key to reducing vulnerability,

however through their funding of such projects,

‘Because of severe drought, my family and

the EU decision-makers have the opportunity to

I moved permanently to the river some dis-

put this on the agenda.

tance away. But this was difficult because of

fighting going on in that area, and eventually

we moved because of it.’

2. How the interplay

between other factors

Lau woman from Sudan,

Fugnido Camp, Ethiopia7

and climate change

shapes patterns of

movement

When asked, people rarely state that the

sole cause of their movement is climate change.

Evidence indicates that, in most cases, other

important forces shape patterns of movement.

This even holds true for movement in the con-

text of sudden climate-linked disasters.5 So while

there are important connections between climate

change and migration, the impacts of climate

change often combine with several other factors

G.A. Hussein

to cause the movement of people. Clearly, how-

ever, climate change may negatively affect other

drivers of migration such as economic conditions,

In the Horn of Africa, people interviewed in

which is understood to strongly influence deci-

refugee camps frequently stated various environ-

sions to migrate.6

mental changes among a number of causes of

their displacement. Other factors included politi-

By examining a series of examples and case

cal instability, conflict and degraded livelihoods.

studies, this report builds up a picture of how climate

The impacts of climate change were very rarely

change influences the movement of people, and

identified as the sole cause of displacement.

looks at how climate change interacts with a number

Rather, the interviewees tended to see environ-

of other forces to shape patterns of movement.

mental change, especially changes in rainfall,

as one factor that weakened their ability to cope

with other forces causing their displacement.8

5 randall, a; Salsbury, J; white, Z. (2014): moving Stories. the voices of people who move in the context of

environmental change, oxford: climate outreach and information network.

6 Foresight: migration and global environmental change (2011): Final Project report: executive Summary, london: the government office for Science, 11-14.

7 randall a.; Salsbury, J; white, Z. (2014): moving Stories. the voices of people who move in the context of

environmental change, oxford: climate outreach and information network.

8 tamer, a.; radha g.; Sakdapolrak, P.; warner, K. (2012): climate change, vulnerability and human mobility:

Perspectives of refugees from the east and Horn of africa, Bonn: University of the United nations institute for environment and Human Security.

PART I: DEFInIng THE CHALLEngE – MyTHs AnD FACTs ABOUT CLIMATE CHAngE AnD MIgRATIOn 11

The multi-causal nature of the displace-

2.2 The sahel

ment described by the interviewees is confirmed

through a brief examination of the forces creat-

‘I crossed the border with my animals, my

ing the ongoing displacement crisis in the region.

donkeys, my children and my wife. I travelled

For example, in Djibouti and Somalia, high inter-

to Timbuktu, crossed the river and came down

national food prices have severely affected both

to Burkina. I walked every day until sunset

countries because they are highly import depend-

and after I would go to bed. The journey took

ent.9 The region has also experienced two decades

three months.’

of political violence including interstate wars, civil

conflicts and violence involving the massacre of

Malian man, in Burkina Faso13

civilians.10 Climatic factors are clearly important:

in 2010 the region experienced its worst drought

in 60 years. There is strong evidence that the

drought was a consequence of climate change.11

Testimony by refugees and other kinds of evidence

suggest a complex interaction between environ-

mental, political and economic forces. The tragic

result of this interaction has been a refugee crisis

of unprecedented scale. During the peak of the cri-

sis, 1,400 people a day were arriving at the Dadaab

complex of refugee camps. The camp complex is

now the biggest in the world.12

World Bank Photo Collection

9 world Food Programme (2013): Horn of africa crisis.

10 University of Upsala (2012): conflictencyclopedia, north africa.

11 lott, F. c.; christidis, n.; Stott, P. a. (2013): can the 2011 east african drought be attributed to human-induced climate change?, geophysical research letters, 40 (6), 1177-1181.

12 care international (2012): dadaab refugee camps update on the crisis in the Horn of africa.

13 randall, a.; Salsbury, J.; white, Z. (2014): moving Stories. the voices of people who move in the context of environmental change, oxford: climate outreach and information network.

12 TIME TO ACT – How tHe eU can lead on climate cHange and migration The picture of migration and displacement in

2.3 Pakistan

the Sahel region shows similar interwoven forces

that make up the drivers of movement. It should

‘The water came at night and we didn’t have

be noted that, in this region, migration has been a

time to save our belongings; we had to choose

traditional way of life for many years, for example

whether to save our children and ourselves or

to tend livestock. As in the Horn of Africa, much of

our property and assets, so we chose to save

the population of the Sahel is highly dependent on

our kids. We left everything and ran to save

agriculture as the primary livelihood.14 Agriculture

our lives.’

is predominantly rain fed, which falls almost

entirely during a three- to four-month season.

Unnamed survivor of 2010 floods.18

Therefore, changes to rainfall patterns can have

a deleterious effect on agricultural production and

livelihoods, which has contributed to widespread

displacement. More recently, this finding has been

confirmed by a United Nations University study,

which found that changes in rainfall had an impact

on migratory decisions.15 Between the 1960s and

1980s, drought caused large-scale displacement

in the region. The movement was primarily inter-

nal and involved people moving from north to

south. Where migration took place across inter-

national borders, people tended to move from the

land-locked countries of the Sahel to the coast.16

Tariq Masood Malik/ Oxfam International

However, although loss of livelihoods and drought

may cause movement, it is also important to note

that moving requires resources. As people’s liveli-

Pakistan has experienced widespread dis-

hoods are degraded they can find it more difficult

placement due to disasters.19 In recent years,

to move. This can mean that people find them-

flooding has caused large-scale damage, loss of

selves trapped in areas that can no longer provide

life and internal displacement of communities,

them with a livelihood, and yet are unable to leave.

which have then been supported with humani-

This is precisely what happened during the 1983-

tarian aid in camps and temporary settlements.20

85 drought in the Sahel. Across the region, levels

In spite of these disasters, Pakistan has also been

of mobility increased, however in Mali, levels of

a major destination for people seeking protection

mobility decreased as people simply didn't have

and is currently the most common destination

the resources to move.17

country for refugees from Somalia. Pakistan also

14 Kandji, S. t.; Verchot, l.; mackensen, J. (2006): climate change and Variability in the Sahel region: impacts and adaptation Strategies in the agricultural Sector, nairobi, Kenya: word agroforestry centre (icraF), United nations environment Programme (UneP).

15 warner, K.; afifi, t. (2014): where the rain falls: evidence from 8 countries on how vulnerable households use migration to manage the risk of rainfall variability and food insecurity, in: climate and development, 6 (1).

16 Permanent interstate committee for drought control in the Sahel (cilSS) (2011): livelihood Security: climate change, migration and conflict in the Sahel, geneva: UneP, international organization for migration (iom),

office for the coordination of Humanitarian affairs (ocHa), Un University.

17 Foresight: migration and global environmental change (2011): Final Project report: executive Summary,

london: the government office for Science, 13.

18 randall, a; Salsbury, J; white, Z. (2014): moving Stories. the voices of people who move in the context of environmental change, oxford: climate outreach and information network.

19 office for the coordination of Humanitarian affairs (2011): Pakistan media Factsheet.

20 international organization for migration (iom) (2012): iom Pakistan response – six months on, islamabad.

PART I: DEFInIng THE CHALLEngE – MyTHs AnD FACTs ABOUT CLIMATE CHAngE AnD MIgRATIOn 13

hosts 1.6 million refugees from Afghanistan.21

regions of Alaska and Canada show a similar mix-

Clearly, environmental factors have created

ture of reasons for moving or staying as in other

widespread internal displacement, but other

parts of the world. People interviewed in the Many

forces such as conflict and political instability are

Strong Voices project spoke about the impacts of

also driving people into Pakistan.

environmental change on their living conditions,

citing new hazards such as erosion and difficulty

2.4 The Arctic

moving along traditional hunting routes due to

thinner ice.23 However, it is also clear that mobility

patterns in the Arctic are changing for a number

‘About five years ago the sea ice used to take

of reasons. For the last half-century, governments

longer to melt. It lasted about 10 months but

now it’s only 8 months. This harms our way of

have tried to settle the nomadic Arctic peoples,

life, our way of hunting, our way of fishing, and

often forcibly.24 At the same time there has also

our way of travelling from one place to another.’

been significant out-migration by young people

in search of education and work opportunities.

Charlie Nakqashuk, Pangnirtung, Nunavut 22

2.5 Bangladesh

‘Climate change has wrecked everything; our

people are living in other towns and cities, like

refugees. All I wanted was to grow old with my

children and their children. But now they are

gone and I don’t think they will ever return.’

Shamisur Gazi, 83, Chakbara, Bangladesh 25

kaet44

In the Arctic regions of Alaska and Canada,

environmental change has interacted with a vari-

Moneer ul Islam/Oxfam International

ety of economic and political factors to shape

patterns of movement. Interviews conduct-

ed with indigenous people living in the Arctic

21 United nations High commissioner for refugees (2013): UnHcr country operations profile – Pakistan.

22 randall, a; Salsbury, J; white, Z. (2014): moving Stories. the voices of people who move in the context of environmental change, oxford: climate outreach and information network.

23 grid-arenal: many Strong Voices. the many Strong Voices. Portraits of resilience.

24 government of canada (2010): Backgrounder - apology for inuit High arctic relocation. aboriginal affairs and northern development canada.

25 randall, a; Salsbury, J; white, Z. (2014): moving Stories. the voices of people who move in the context of environmental change, oxford: climate outreach and information network.

14 TIME TO ACT – How tHe eU can lead on climate cHange and migration Bangladesh is vulnerable to a number of cli-2.6 Pacific Island states

mate-related hazards and has severely limited

capacities to respond to these climate risks due to

‘Carterets’ people are facing, and will con-

a series of factors. There are currently 50 million

tinue to face, many challenges as we relocate

Bangladeshis living in areas prone to flooding.

from our ancestral grounds. However, our plan

These people are vulnerable to a number of slow

is one in which we remain as independent and

and rapid onset disasters. Flash floods and cyclones

self-sufficient as possible. We wish to maintain

have created sudden displacements. Erosion and

our cultural identity and live sustainably wher-

water stress have degraded livelihoods slowly, and

ever we are.’

limited people’s ability to cope with disasters.26

Other factors such as extreme poverty also mag-

Ursula Rakova, Carteret Islands

nify vulnerability and limit the ability to adapt to

climate change. While climate-linked disasters are

a key driver of internal displacement, and are likely

to become more so, poverty makes the country less

able to respond to these disasters. Bangladesh also

Richard Markham/ACIAR Australia

experiences widespread out-migration. The flow

of remittances created by millions of Bangladeshis

working abroad has become a major part of

Like Bangladesh, many of the low-lying island

the country’s economy.27 The force driving this

states in the Pacific are vulnerable to the impacts

cross-border migration is primarily the search for

of slow and rapid onset events. Cyclones and

employment in rapidly-growing economies to sup-

storm surges create sudden displacements while

port their families back home. The extent to which

droughts, salination of soils, erosion and sea level

climate change will increase or limit remittance

rise also create more slowly unfolding problems.

income is clearly an important issue to consider in

Sea level rise obviously represents one of the big-

Bangladesh and other countries that rely heavily on

gest problems to these low lying islands. With the

this form of income.

majority of the population living near the coast

and much of the infrastructure at, or just above

sea level, this clearly presents a huge challenge.

The vulnerability of the Pacific Island States to

climate change is exacerbated by high levels of

poverty together with small populations and geo-

graphical remoteness.28 This vulnerability, along

with a series of other important forces, creates the

patterns of mobility that can be observed in and

around the Pacific Island States.

26 asian development Bank (2012): addressing climate change and migration in asia and the Pacific, manila: adB.

27 world Bank (2013): Press release. developing countries to receive over $410 billion in remittances in 2013, says world Bank.

28 Ferris, e.; cernea, m.; Petz, d. (2011): on the front line of climate change: learning from and with Pacific island countries, new York: the Brookings institution – london School of economics, Project on internal displacement.

PART I: DEFInIng THE CHALLEngE – MyTHs AnD FACTs ABOUT CLIMATE CHAngE AnD MIgRATIOn 15

Many of the Island States experience different

kinds of mobility linked to climate change:

3. some facts about

movement with

displacement due to sudden onset disas-

ters, where people move temporarily and return

a climate change

after the disaster;

dimension

internal and international migration as

people seek work elsewhere, partly in response to

livelihood degradation linked to climate change

From the case studies here and from the

impacts;

research undertaken by experts and academ-

many communities are considering ics, the consensus is that most movement with

planned relocation as a way of moving while a climate change dimension is likely to be inter-also maintaining social connections and cultural

nal rather than cross-border.31 When people

heritage;

move due to sudden onset disasters,32 they are

finally some people are also experiencing more likely to remain in-country, often close to

immobility, a desire to move but a lack of legal or the scene of the disaster. Sometime the displace-

safe migratory opportunities – as demonstrated

ment is temporary, however disasters often create

by this testimony:

protracted displacement, where people end up in

camps for months or even years. Sudden disasters

such as flash floods and typhoons usually mean

‘The majority of I-Kiribati have no wish to

people move rapidly to ensure their survival. They

live in another country, but mounting evidence

suggests that we may soon have little choice.

may be carrying their possessions or helping chil-

Therefore migration may become the key part

dren and other vulnerable community members,

of the way we are forced to ‘adapt’ … But,

hence they are more likely to remain within their

there’s a problem. Unlike our neighbours in

own country.33 Further, that displacement is more

Tuvalu (with a population of about 10,000) we

likely to be short in distance to enable people to

have no significant or sympathetic migration

return home as soon as possible. In cases where

relationship or policy with any country.’

people are crossing borders, such as in the Horn

of Africa, it seems that people are experiencing

Linda Uan, Kiribati29

‘progressive displacement’, where a chain of fac-

tors creates their cross-border movement. So

Several countries have visa arrangements

although their initial displacement may be the

with Australia and New Zealand and this has cre-

result of drought, they may then be displaced

ated the opportunity for people to move if they

again several times before crossing a border to

wish.30 It is likely that climate change impacts will

escape conflict or political violence.34

magnify these existing migratory trends, rather

than create entirely new ones.

29 government of Kiribati (2013): i-Kiribati want to migrate with dignity.

30 immigration new Zealand (2014): Pacific access category.

31 Foresight: migration and global environmental change (2011): Final Project report, london: the government office for Science.

32 Ferris, e.: (2011): climate change and internal displacement: a contribution to the discussion Prepared for UnHcr Bellagio roundtable, 22-26 February 2011, 9.

33 warner, K. (2010): global environmental change and migration: governance challenges, in: global environmental change, 20(3).

34 afifi, t.; govil, r.; Sakdapolark, P.; warner, K. (2012): climate change, vulnerability and human mobility: Perspectives of refugees from the east and Horn of africa, UnHcr/UnU.

16 TIME TO ACT – How tHe eU can lead on climate cHange and migration It is highly unlikely that entire communities

Clearly millions of people are migrating and

will move en masse permanently.35 Little evi-

crossing borders every year; however, the avail-

dence points to patterns of movement in which

able evidence indicates that currently climate

one community – or even an entire village, town

change is not the only factor driving long dis-

or region – decide to move at the same time, to

tance, cross border movement.37

the same location. Slow onset events such as

droughts are more likely to create longer dis-

In the case of both slow and rapid onset

tance movements, although these are still mainly

events, people are unlikely to cross continents. If

internal. Rather than crossing international bor-

people do cross borders in response to climate

ders, people are seeking non-farm work in cities,

change, they tend to move to neighbouring coun-

reinforcing the existing powerful trend of rural to

tries. When people move, they are not necessarily

urban movement. Even in these cases, people are

moving permanently. In the case of displacement

generally moving to cities within their own coun-

linked to sudden onset events, people tend to

try, and often to the nearest big city.

move immediately in response to the disaster

and then return home as soon as possible. In cas-

Climate change may also lead to less move-

es of migration in response to slow onset events,

ment, trapping the most vulnerable people in some

climate change is likely to increase seasonal

of the most dangerous locations. This is due to the

migration, where people move temporarily to

fact that moving requires resources and as climate

find other work as farming becomes harder.38 For

change adversely affects vulnerable livelihoods,

example, rather than moving permanently away

people may find themselves without the resources

from rural areas, many people move temporarily

to move.36 As noted earlier, this was clearly the case

from rural to urban areas during times of acute

in Mali during the drought of 1983 and it seems

environmental stress and then return.

likely that this may also be the case elsewhere.

It is also clear that migration linked to climate

Another issue that affects the movement of

change does not affect everyone in the same way,

people is the limitation on international immigra-

even within the same community or family. There

tion. Many states severely restrict the numbers and

are important variations in the way that some

type of immigrants allowed to cross their borders

people are able to respond to climate change

and implement a strict immigration entry regime.

and the extent to which they are able to move.

Those displaced by climate change do not have any

Vulnerability to climate change is affected by gen-

specific international legal protection available to

der, age, disability and membership of an ethnic

them and do not have any right to enter the ter-

group or minority.

ritory of another country. This backdrop also has

an impact on migratory decisions and the choices,

or lack of choices, available to people who have to

move for reasons of climate change.

35 Haas, H. (2013): oxford martin School webcast, international migration institute, will climate change cause mass migration?

36 Black, r. (2013): migration, immobility and displacement outcomes following extreme events, in: environmental Science & Policy, 27 (1), 32-43.

37 Foresight: migration and global environmental change (2011): Final Project report, london: the government office for Science.

38 Kniveton, d.; Smith, c. d.; Black, r. (2012): emerging migration flows in a changing climate, in: dryland africa, nature climate change 2, 444-447.

PART I: DEFInIng THE CHALLEngE – MyTHs AnD FACTs ABOUT CLIMATE CHAngE AnD MIgRATIOn 17

Boubacar Soumaré/ Oxfam International

Migration, climate change and gender

Due to the division of labour, unequal access to

resources and decision-making processes, women

Populations that are poor, discriminated against

are especially vulnerable to the effects of climate

and otherwise marginalised are often more

change.40 There are many reasons why women are

exposed to the negative effects of climate change.

particularly vulnerable: they form a dispropor-

Commonly, such populations will inhabit areas

tionately greater share of those in poverty; women

more prone to disasters such as coastal zones,

in rural areas in developing countries are highly

flood plains and arid regions. They are more reli-

dependent on natural resources for their liveli-

ant on natural resources and, by virtue of poverty,

hood due to their responsibility to secure water,

have limited adaptive capacity. The ability to

food and energy for cooking and heating; they are

adapt to climate change also varies within popu-

more likely to be excluded from decision-making

lations and it is understood that climate change

processes; they have been denied educational

magnifies existing inequalities. Men and women

opportunities that are open to men; they are less

have socially conditioned vulnerabilities and

likely to have access to early warning systems and

capacities that must be considered when develop-

their role as carers means they may respond less

ing responses to climate change so that specific

quickly to disasters due to restricted mobility.41

needs and priorities are adequately addressed.39

39 Jones, l. (2010): overcoming social barriers to adaptation, overseas development institute.

40 Jungehülsing, J. (2010): women who go, women who stay: reactions to climate change, Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung méxico, centroamérica y el caribe.

41 european Parliament, (2012): committee on women’s rights and gender equality, report on women and climate

change, a7-0049/2012, 13.

18 TIME TO ACT – How tHe eU can lead on climate cHange and migration the differentiated impact of climate change be-and thus less able to adapt to the effects of climate

tween men and women has not been sufficiently change. it is also clear that women are more vul-

understood in relation to strategies of migration as nerable when migrating and are more likely to

an adaptation to climate change.42 women have experience violence, verbal abuse or to be traf-

different capacities and capabilities for adapta-

ficked.43 However, a true picture of the difference

tion than men due to their socio-economic status. in gender in terms of priorities and possibilities of

Knowledge, care responsibilities and resources are migration as an adaptation strategy is not known.

factors that are likely to vary between men and these gaps in research and understanding must be

women and which will lead to differing opportu-

plugged in order to develop adaptation strategies

nities to adapt. Further, women are often poorer with a greater understanding of the role of gender.

the sole reason for their movement, but see it as

4. Framing and

one among many factors.47 The evidence from a

number of regions across the world also indicates

communicating

that environmental factors usually interact with

climate change and

other forces to create human movement, rather

migration

than being the sole cause of movement. Therefore,

labelling someone an ‘environmental displacee’

(for example) suggests that environmental factors

4.1 Problems with terminology

are the sole cause of their movement. To this extent,

these labels are not a useful aid to understanding

There is an ongoing debate about what to call

the complexity of climate-linked movement.

people who move in the context of environmental

change. Various organisations and reports have

Similarly, some terms also suggest something

suggested different terms, ranging from ‘climate

about the experience of the person who has moved.

refugee’,44 ‘climate migrant’,45 ‘environmentally dis-

For example ‘environmentally displaced person’

placed person’46 and even describing people at risk

suggests that someone has been displaced, or

of displacement as ‘climate change refugees to-be’.

forced to move; whereas in many cases when peo-

ple move in the context of slow onset events, they

There are several difficulties with these terms.

may have some choice in how, when and where

They suggest that it is possible to pick out who is

they move to. The term ‘climate migrant’ implies

and who is not an ‘environmental migrant’ or

a significant amount of choice about moving, when,

‘climate refugee’. In reality, people who have an

in fact, if someone is displaced in the context of

environmental or climate change dimension to

a sudden onset disaster, it is very likely they will have

their movement will also have several other forces

had no choice about moving. Some of the labels

influencing their movement. Research shows that

also imply information about where someone has

people tend not to see environmental change as

moved to. For example ‘climate refugee’ suggests

42 european Parliament, (2012): committee on women’s rights and gender equality, report on women and climate

change, a7-0049/2012, 7.

43 international organization for migration (iom) (2013): iom’s gender equality and women’s empowerment activities.

44 ‘climate refugees’ documentary film production (2012): climate refugees.

45 United nations University (2013): climate migration ‘a complex problem’.

46 Boano, c.; Zetter, r.; morris, t. (2008):environmentally displaced people: Understanding linkages between

environmental change, livelihoods and forced migration, Forced migration Policy Brief no.1, oxford:

refugee Studies centre.

47 afifi, t.; govil, r.; Sakdapolrak, P.; warner, K. (2012): climate change, vulnerability and human mobility: Perspectives of refugees from the east and Horn of africa. Bonn: United nations University institute for environment and Human Security.

PART I: DEFInIng THE CHALLEngE – MyTHs AnD FACTs ABOUT CLIMATE CHAngE AnD MIgRATIOn 19

a cross-border movement, as to fall within the legal productive members of their new communities,

definition of a ‘refugee’ someone must be outside rather than as ‘refugees’.50 Similarly, Ursula Rakova,

their country of origin. However, as we have seen, a campaigner from the Carteret Islands, has been

most climate-linked movement will be internal very critical of the way in which Carteret people

rather than cross-border.

have been termed ‘climate refugees’ by the media.

She argues that while their movement might be

The choice of words also has important legal inevitable, their hope is that it will be very differ-

and policy implications. The term ‘climate refu-

ent from the kind of forced movement experienced

gee’ suggests that people might be entitled to by most people who are described as refugees. She

some kind of legal protection, for example under stated: ‘Our plan is one in which we remain as inde-

the 1951 Refugee Convention. The term also pendent and self-sufficient as possible. We wish to

implies that such people must be protected under maintain our cultural identity and live sustainably

existing refugee law. However, people whose wherever we are.’51 Clearly, her desired situation is

migration is linked to climate change are very far from the circumstances in which most refugees

unlikely to qualify for refugee status as defined find themselves. It is vital to consider the wishes of by the Convention.48 There are some suggestions affected people in how they want to be described.

that the Refugee Convention should be amended At the moment the voices of affected communi-

to incorporate people whose migration is linked ties are largely absent from the debate about how

to climate change. There is wide consensus, how-

climate-linked migration should be addressed.

ever, that any attempt to renegotiate the terms of Unless people are happy with the phrases being

the Refugee Convention would not produce the used to describe their communities they will con-

desired legal protection, and might in fact risk tinue to feel alienated from the debate.

weakening the protection currently provided for

other people displaced across borders.49

For these reasons, a number of other terms have

been adopted. ‘People who move in the context of

Finally, many of the existing terms referred to environmental change’52 is perhaps cumbersome,

above are not how people with an environmental but is at least accurate. ‘People who have an environ-

dimension to their movement refer to them-

mental dimension to their movement’ is similarly

selves. For example, the President of the island descriptively useful. The Nansen Initiative53 has set-state Kiribati, Anote Tong, has been critical of the tled on the phrase ‘people displaced across borders

phrase ‘climate refugees’. He argued that when the due to natural disasters and the adverse effects of people of Kiribati do have to leave, they want to do climate change.’54

so with dignity, as skilled migrants and welcome,

48 the 1951 refugee convention defines a refugee is someone who ‘owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.’

49 international centre for migration Policy development (icmPd) (2011): ‘climate refugees’: legal and policy responses to environmentally induced migration, Study requested by the european Parliament’s committee on civil liberties, Justice and Home affairs, Brussels: european Parliament.

50 Farbotko, c.; lazrus, H. (2012): the first climate refugees? contesting global narratives of climate change in tuvalu.

in: global environmental change, 22 (2), 382-390.

51 United nations University (2009): How-to guide for environmental refugees.

52 Kälin, w.; Schrepfer, n. (2012): Protecting People crossing Borders in the context of climate change normative.

gaps and Possible approaches, UnHcr.

53 in 2011 the norwegian government held a conference on climate change and displacement. the outcome of this conference was a set of broad recommendations known as the nansen Principles. in 2012 the governments of norway and Switzerland launched the nansen initiative, a state-owned consultation process that sought to build consensus on how best to address cross-border displacement in the context of sudden and slow onset climate change and geophysical disasters.

54 the nansen initiative (2013): objectives.

20 TIME TO ACT – How tHe eU can lead on climate cHange and migration 4.2 Climate-linked migration as a new

Framing climate-linked migration as a secu-

security threat?

rity threat is clearly not supported by evidence

and could be very unhelpful in building tolerant

Migration linked to climate change is often

societies.

presented as a new security problem that must

be addressed. It is true that there are a number of

4.3 Migration as an adaptive response

regions where disaster displacement could inter-

to climate change

act with existing conflicts to worsen the situation.55

However, news stories declaring that migrants

There are more positive ways of framing

might arrive in ‘waves’ or ‘floods’ and are a secu-

migration linked to climate change that can both

rity threat to their destination country are clearly

accurately characterise the phenomenon and

inaccurate.56 Apart from being an inaccurate rep-

view migrants as active agents in making deci-

resentation of how migration linked to climate

sions. Migration may be one of the most powerful

change might happen, it is also an extremely

ways of managing the impacts of climate change.

unhelpful way of framing the issue. There is strong

There may be circumstances in which moving is

psychological evidence that presenting issues

the most effective way for a community to adapt

in terms of security encourages a strongly self-

to the worst effects of climate change.61

enhancing and inward-looking perspective, which

is quite at odds with building a society that is open

Climate adaptation is a contested term, so

and tolerant of migrants.57 There is also evidence

while migration may fall outside some traditional

that arguments framed in terms of security can

definitions of adaptation, it clearly can fall with-

make people more prejudiced and more likely to

in some more nuanced ways of thinking about

favour military intervention.58 Communicators

adaptation. For example, the World Resources

need to be extremely careful when discussing

Institute has produced a framework for climate

migration alongside negative climate impacts such

change adaptation that defines a ‘spectrum’ of cli-

as rising sea levels or extreme weather events, as it

mate change adaptation projects.62 This spectrum

is all too easy to create the impression that migra-

ranges from infrastructure adaptation projects,

tion is a threat and should be feared.

such as sea and flood defences to development

and livelihoods projects that help build resilience

It is also frequently suggested that climate

to climate change impacts, such as working with

change will cause people to move into already

pastoralists on rangeland management to make

densely populated areas and that this increased

the land more resilient to drought.

population density will cause violent conflict

over scarce resources, new civil conflict, or even

There are clearly cases in which communities

interstate warfare.59 However, there is currently

use migration as a way of increasing their resil-

only very mixed and inconclusive evidence for

ience to climate change that would fall within this

a direct causal relationship between climate-

definition of adaptation.

linked movement of people and violent conflict.60

55 werz, m.; conley, l. (2012): climate change, migration, and conflict addressing complex crisis scenarios in the 21st century, washington: center for american Progress, Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung washington dc.

56 mitchel, l. (2013): climate change, not jobs, will force migrants to Britain, warns mP, in: daily express, 12 august.

57 crompton, t. (2011): common cause: the case for working with cultural values, london: wwF.

58 cohrs, J.c.; moschner, B.; maes, J.; Kielmann, S. (2005): Personal values and attitudes toward war, in: Journal of Peace Psychology 11 (3).

59 Hartmann, B. (2010): rethinking climate refugees and climate conflict. rhetoric reality and politics of policy discourse, in: Journal of international development 22 (2).

60 gleditsch, n. (2012): Special issue on climate change and conflict, Journal of Peace research 49 (1).

61 Black, r. (2011): climate change: migration as adaptation, in: nature 478, 447-449.

62 world resources institute (2012): ready or not? assessing national institutional capacity for climate change adaption.

PART I: DEFInIng THE CHALLEngE – MyTHs AnD FACTs ABOUT CLIMATE CHAngE AnD MIgRATIOn 21

An increasing number of people migrate could require developed countries to reconsider

temporarily and seasonally. In rural agricultural their policies on immigration, which are usually

areas, people often remain at home during the restrictive. It would also mean reconsidering inter-

busy periods of the agricultural calendar and national development and funding priorities which

move to find work elsewhere during the quieter tend to assist recipients to in situ rather than assist-times. This seems to be a trend that is increasing ing them to move. There are policies and projects

regardless of climate change impacts. However, that could facilitate migration as a way of adapting to it is likely that as climate change impacts make climate change. For example, it is well-documented

farming in some places harder, people will that training people in non-farm skills often results

increasingly use this pattern of migration as a way in out-migration from rural areas.64 This raises the of adapting. For example, if changes in weather possibility that offering educational opportunities patterns shorten the growing season in some and retraining in areas highly exposed to natural

regions, seasonal migration could increasingly hazards could enable people to seek work in areas of

become a way to help communities respond.

lower risk if they choose.

There is also evidence that people use

Migration may also be helping to build some

migration as a way of adapting to water stress, communities’ resilience to sudden onset disasters.

particularly in agricultural areas.63 During peri-

This happens in two ways. If some people have

ods of temporary water stress, some household migrated away from an area that is highly exposed

members will move to nearby cities and attempt to some kinds of natural hazards, then there are

to find temporary work. If and when the period simply fewer people in the areas, and therefore of water stress ends and farming becomes more fewer people at risk of injury, death or displace-productive, they will then return and resume ment in the event of a disaster. Further, the role of

farm-based work.

remittances is also important here. In areas prone

to disasters, remittances can be extremely helpful

These strategies are increasing resilience in during or after a disaster. In the event of a disaster,

several ways. As income from farming falls (for livelihoods and businesses providing income are

example due to water stress) some household usually severely disrupted and it can take a long

members move to find work elsewhere. This helps time before normal income-generating activi-

maintain continuity in the household’s income. At ties can be resumed. In such cases, remittances

the same time, the size of the household decreas-

from a different area, or even a different country,

es, which reduces expenditure, and there is likely can provide a vital stopgap. For example, in 2009

to be an inflow of remittances from the household nearly 10% of the Philippines’ citizens lived outside

members who are working elsewhere.

the country. This overseas workforce has created

a powerful flow of remittances into the Philippines,

The idea of migration as a form of climate which now accounts for over 11% of GDP. With

adaptation is not universally accepted and raises increasing exposure to disasters at home, this flow

important ethical and legal questions. Recognising of remittances from abroad has provided some

migration as a positive response to climate change financial stability for families affected by disasters.

63 warner, K.; afifi, t. (2014): where the rain falls: evidence from 8 countries on how vulnerable households use migration to manage the risk of rainfall variability and food insecurity, in: climate and development, 6 (1).

64 mahajan, V.; Kumar gupta, r. (2011): non Farm opportunities for Smallholder agriculture, Paper presented at the iFad conference on new directions for Smallholder agriculture, 24-25 January 2011, 5.

22 TIME TO ACT – How tHe eU can lead on climate cHange and migration 5. summary of key

to begin making policy decisions that will help

characteristics

and protect people who move in the context

of climate change. Certain key characteristics

of climate-linked

of climate-related migration can be identified.

migration

Movement is more likely to be inter-

nal than across international borders.

Where people cross international

borders, they are more likely to move to

neighbouring countries rather than crossing

continents.

In sudden onset climate disasters,

people tend to move a short distance and for

a temporary period.

Climate change is likely to increase

seasonal migration as well as rural to urban

migration.

Individual characteristics such as

Globovisión

gender or age may impact on movement and

choices.

The available evidence creates a complex

Climate change may deplete the live-

picture from which making predictions about

lihood of communities to the extent they are

the future is challenging. Notwithstanding, it is

trapped and unable to move.

clear that there is enough available information

PART I: DEFInIng THE CHALLEngE – MyTHs AnD FACTs ABOUT CLIMATE CHAngE AnD MIgRATIOn 23

PART 2:

Tackling the challenge – Policy recommendations

to the EU

By Margit Ammer & Monika Mayrhofer

tional

nterna

xfam I

ANdy Hall/O

24 TIME TO ACT – How tHe eU can lead on climate cHange and migration

At present, there is no coherent EU policy

1. Policy responses by

on environment-related forms of migration and

displacement, which means there is no well-

the EU so far

structured normative framework that addresses

different forms of climate- and environment-relat-

ed migration. However, environment-related

1.1 Initiatives by the

forms of migration have been a topic of discussion

European Parliament

at EU level for a while and a multitude of insti-

tutions and actors are involved in shaping the

EU institutions started to engage with environ-

process. So far, EU deliberations have focussed on

ment-related migration and displacement in the

the subsequent questions:

late 1990s by gathering information, commission-

ing research projects and organising events in order

How and to what extent will environ-

to discuss the topic with different stakeholders. The

ment-related migration and displacement affect

European Parliament was the first EU institution

European countries and the EU?

to do some groundwork in this regard. It included

Should the EU respond to this issue and if

the issue of ‘climate refugees’ in its 1999 resolution

yes, in what way?

on The Environment, Security and Foreign Policy,

To what extent are existing legal and policy

which stressed the extent of the challenge and

frameworks adequate to effectively accommodate

warned against the direct and indirect pressures on

and cover different forms of environment-related

EU immigration and justice policies, development

migration?

assistance and spending on humanitarian aid as

Does the EU need new instruments and

well as ‘increased security problems for the EU in

policies to deal with the phenomenon of climate

the form of regional instability in other parts of the

change and migration?

world’.65 In addition, the Parliament organised sem-

inars, workshops, hearings and other discussion

The initial findings of this on-going discussion

events.66 A study on ‘Climate Refugees’ (2011), com-

and reflection process on this topic have been

missioned by the European Parliament ( Committee

summarised in the European Commission’s Staff

on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs), both

Working Document (CSWD) on ‘Climate change,

explored protection gaps and possible policy

environmental degradation, and migration’

responses at an international level and also ana-

(accompanying the EU strategy on adaptation

lysed the current EU legal and policy framework.67

to climate change), published in April 2013. This

document should serve as a starting point for

The most recent initiative was launched by

a discussion on the topic of environment-related

the Greens/European Free Alliance group in the

migration/displacement with Member States,

European Parliament. The group adopted the

which may eventually lead to the development of

position paper ‘Climate Change, Refugees and

a policy in this field.

Migration’.68 The paper discusses crucial issues

65 european Parliament (1999): resolution on the environment, security and foreign policy. 28.1.1999, a4-0005/99, art. i.

66 For a list of such events see european commission (2013): Staff working document ‘climate change, environmental degradation, and migration’, accompanying the document ‘communication from the commission to the european

Parliament, the council, the european economic and Social committee and the committee of the regions,

Swd(2013)138 final, 16.4.2013, in the following: cSwd, 6.

67 wicmPd (2011): ‘climate refugees’: legal and policy responses to environmentally induced migration, Study

requested by the european Parliament’s committee on civil liberties, Justice and Home affairs, Brussels:

european Parliament.

68 the greens/eFa in the european Parliament (2013): Position paper climate change, refugees and migration,

adopted in may 2013, drafted by Hélène Flautre, Jean lambert, Ska Keller and Barbara lochbihler.

PART II: TACkLIng THE CHALLEngE – POLICy RECOMMEnDATIOns TO THE EU 25

concerning terminology, adaptation and devel-

1.3 stockholm Programme and

opment, legal options and EU options with regard

Commission staff Working Document

to climate change and migration and makes rec-

ommendations for further policy developments

In 2009, the European Council included a

in this field.

paragraph on climate change and migration in

the Stockholm Programme.70 This was an impor-

1.2 First steps undertaken by the EU tant step on the way towards an EU approach on

High Representative and the European climate change and migration. The paragraph

Commission

highlights the need to explore the connection

between climate change, migration and develop-

In 2008, the High Representative for the

ment and asks the European Commission to carry

Common Foreign and Security Policy and the

out ‘an analysis of the effects of climate change on

European Commission published a document

international migration, including its potential

on Climate change and international security.

effects on immigration to the Union’.71 This served

The paper describes environmentally-induced

as a starting point to develop the Commission Staff

migration as a ‘threat’ that might enhance the

Working Document (CSWD), published in April

potential for conflict in transit and destination

2013. During the preparation of the CSWD, the

countries. The document points out that Europe

European Commission organised expert consul-

‘must expect substantially increased migratory

tations and roundtables such as the consultation

pressure’ and recommended an enhancement of

of experts on ‘Climate Change and Migration’ in

EU capacities by building up knowledge and sys-

May 2011. The CSWD represents the culmination

tems of monitoring and early warning. It further

of the efforts of the Commission to launch a dis-

emphasised the role of the multilateral leadership

cussion on the inter-linkages between migration,

of the EU to promote global climate security by

environmental degradation and climate change,

considering ‘environmentally-triggered addition-

and to provide an overview of the research and

al migratory stress in the further development of

data currently available in this area. The CSWD

a comprehensive European migration policy, in

aims to present a compilation ‘of the many initia-

liaison with all relevant international bodies.’69

tives of relevance for the topic which are already

being taken by the EU in various policy fields, and

analyses on-going debates on policy responses at

EU and international level.’72

69 High representative and the european commission to the european council (2008): climate change and

international security, S113/08, 5-7. it was argued that europe would bear the consequences of global warming

inter alia in the form of mass migration since some parts of the population of some eU-neighbouring regions

(e.g. northern africa, middle east), which are already affected by difficult health conditions, unemployment, social exclusion, would become more prone to the impacts of climate change. in that way, internal and international

migration could be triggered.

70 ‘the Stockholm Programme – an open and Secure europe Serving and Protecting citizens’ defines the eU policy priorities in the area of justice and home affairs for 2010-2014.

71 european council (2009): the Stockholm Programme – an open and secure europe serving and protecting citizens.

14449/09, Jai 679, Brussels, 16.10.2009, 42.

72 european commission (2013): cSwd, 3.

26 TIME TO ACT – How tHe eU can lead on climate cHange and migration

On 19 July 2013, the Council of the European

2.1 keeping a low profile or taking

Union released the Conclusions on the 2013 UN

a leadership role?

High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Develop-

ment and on broadening the development-migration

As mentioned above, the general ‘policy style’

nexus stating that ‘climate and environmental degra-

with regard to environment-related migration is

dation are already exerting an increasing influence

cautious. So far, the European Commission has

on migration and mobility and therefore considers

been quite reluctant to take a leadership role

that the linkages between climate change, envi-

at international level and towards EU Member

ronmental degradation and migration should be

States. The policies suggested or adopted so far

further explored and addressed as appropriate, in

rather aim at promoting existing initiatives or

particular in the context of development coopera-

re-framing existing measures (e.g. development

tion, foreign policy and humanitarian assistance’.73

policies) as also being relevant for address-

The document calls on the EU and its Member

ing environment-related migration. Compared

States ‘to urgently take steps to deepen knowl-

to other issues, climate change and migration

edge and further develop policy’ in this field.

is a rather low-priority item on the EU policy

agenda. This is not only true for the European

Commission, where several Directorate-Generals

2. shortcomings of

were involved in the drafting process of the

CSWD – however, with changing responsibilities.

current policy

Environment-related migration also ranks low on

responses

the agenda of the European Parliament. Although

the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and

Home Affairs commissioned the above-men-

The approach of the European Commission

tioned study on ‘Climate Refugees’, and the Greens

to environment-related migration can be charac-

in particular were repeatedly trying to promote

terised as being cautious and reserved, especially

the topic, initiatives to put the topic on the agenda

when it comes to migration and asylum policies

of other European Parliament Committees and to

and frameworks. The following chapter will brief-

include it in Committee reports or to discuss it in

ly summarise the most important general insights

Committee hearings have failed so far.

drawn from the policies suggested so far at EU

level, focussing mainly on the CSWD. Thus, the

The initiatives – especially those by the

following arguments will focus primarily on

European Commission – and the process so far

the work of the Commission.

suggest that only incremental and less contro-

versial policy changes, such as in the field of

development cooperation and humanitarian aid,

will emerge rather than developing new policies

or revising or opening up legal instruments in the

field of migration and asylum policy.

73 council of the european Union (2013): conclusions of the council and of the representatives of governments of the member States meeting within the council on the 2013 Un High-level dialogue on migration and development

and on broadening the development-migration nexus. 12415/13, Brussels, 19 July 2013, 6.

PART II: TACkLIng THE CHALLEngE – POLICy RECOMMEnDATIOns TO THE EU 27

Pablo Tosco/Oxfam International

2.2 Adopting a comprehensive

migration, smuggling and trafficking – outside of

approach and re-framing the issue of

the EU.75 Both dimensions are mentioned in the

environment-related migration

CSWD. However, the policy focus is on the exter-

nal dimension. This is justified by the reference

EU policy on environment-related migra-

that environment-related migration will prima-

tion and displacement has an internal and an

rily occur ‘in the developing world, with migrants

external dimension. Both dimensions are heav-

moving either internally or to countries in the

ily influenced by the objective to limit or manage

same region.’76 However, the Commission fails

immigration and refugee flows into EU territory.74

to acknowledge in the CSWD, on the one hand,

The internal dimension relates to migration into

that there is no data available on whether and

the EU. The external dimension refers to the

how many people are moving towards Europe

inclusion of migration and asylum policies into

for inter alia environmental reasons. On the oth-

external relations with third countries. The latter

er hand, it ignores that people who would like

aims at preventing immigration by addressing the

to move to the EU in this context would in most

root causes of migration in third countries and by

cases not be able to do so legally – especially with

transferring migration control instruments – such

regard to unskilled and poor persons. Instead, the

as border control or measures to combat illegal

Commission assumes in the CSWD that no one

74 Boswell, c. (2003): the ‘external dimension’ of eU immigration and asylum policy. international affairs, 79 (3), 619.

75 ibid., see also castles, S. (2004): why migration policies fail, ethnic and racial Studies, 27 (2), 218.

76 european commission (2013): cSwd, 34.

28 TIME TO ACT – How tHe eU can lead on climate cHange and migration

will migrate to Europe in this context. Given that

2.3 Adopting a human rights

four fifths of the worldwide refugee population

approach and taking vulnerable

stay within their regions of origin, the combina-

groups into account

tion of population growth, the increase in the

quantity and intensity of environmental haz-

The European Union is legally obliged to

ards and insufficient adaptive capacity will put

respect human rights in all its policies. Article 2

more and more pressure on the regions of origin.

of the Treaty on the European Union states that

Current policy responses therefore clearly lack

the ‘Union is founded on the values of respect

a comprehensive approach to the phenomenon

for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equal-

of climate change and migration.

ity, the rule of law and respect for human rights,

including the rights of persons belonging to

The EU’s approach to environment-related

minorities.’ According to Article 6(1), the EU rec-

migration was initially driven to a large extent

ognises the rights, freedoms and principles in the

by security considerations; however, lately it has

Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European

been complemented by a development approach.

Union. Thus, the rights listed in the Charter

The former refers to the perception of immigration

are to be applied by EU institutions and Member

primarily as a threat to national security. The latter

States when implementing EU law. In addition,

rather highlights migration as a positive contribu-

the EU’s external relations should be guided by

tion to the development of a region. Although the

principles such as ‘democracy, the rule of law, the

development approach emphasises the positive

universality and indivisibility of human rights and

aspects of migration, it is criticised for seeking

fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity,

to pursue the same objectives as the security

the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect

approach, i.e. to strengthen immigration control

for the principles of the United Nations Charter

and to decrease migration towards European

and international law’ (Article 21, Treaty on the

countries.77 Both dimensions are problematic

European Union). Although the CSWD contains

by either producing stereotypes of a mass-influx

a short reference to international human rights

of – mostly unskilled and poor – migrants or,

law, stating that ‘[h]uman rights law applies to

paradoxically, by denying responsibility for any

environmentally induced migrations, as to all

activity in the field of EU immigration and asylum

other persons’,78 the consistent implemen-

policy because it is regarded primarily as a ‘devel-

tation in regard to all policies and measures

opment’ problem and most migration is said to

that concerns environment-related migration

occur within the Global South.

and displacement is flawed. For example, the

CSWD proposes that ‘the EU funded Temporary

and Circular Labour Migration (TCLM) agree-

ment between Spain and Colombia can serve as

a model’79 when it comes to promoting and facili-

tating migration as an adaptation strategy. Some

recent research has shown that TCLMs have

serious shortcomings when it comes to the pro-

tection of rights of persons migrating and working

77 Vlassopoulos, c. (2012): climate change and migration: towards a new nexus for policy making in the european Union?, in Human rights and climate change. eU Policy options, european Parliament, directorate-general for

external Policies of the Union, Brussels, 61; and lavenex, S. and Kunz r. (2012): the migration-development nexus in eU external relations, in: Journal of european integration, 30 (3), 452-453.

78 european commission (2013): cSwd, 16.

79 european commission (2013): cSwd, 28.

PART II: TACkLIng THE CHALLEngE – POLICy RECOMMEnDATIOns TO THE EU 29

Geoff Pugh/Oxfam International

under these schemes. There is often a ‘trade-off’

As pointed out in the first section of this

between the rights of circular migrants and eco-

paper, specific groups such as women, minori-

nomic gains of these programmes. In destination

ties, the poor or children are specifically affected

countries, ‘temporary migrant workers remain

by negative consequences of climate change and

outside ordinary legal parameters, as they are only

are particularly vulnerable as migrant groups.

afforded selected and partial rights, in contrast to

Vulnerable groups so far only play a marginal role

native and permanent immigrants.’80 This does not

within EU considerations on environment-related

only apply to those programmes carried out in so-

migration and displacement.

called ‘underdeveloped’ and/or nondemocratic

countries but also to the alleged ‘successful and

well-managed programmes’ such as the TCLM

agreement between Spain and Colombia.81

80 Zapata-Barrero, r.; Faúndez garcía, r.; Sánchez-montijano, e. (2012): circular temporary labour migration: reassessing established public policies, in: international Journal of Population research Volume 2012, 6-7.

81 ibid., 6.

30 TIME TO ACT – How tHe eU can lead on climate cHange and migration

situation could amount to inhuman or degrading

3. Looking more closely treatment’.87 Despite that, the CSWD mentions

at EU asylum and

only that the Qualification Directive would ‘not

include environmental degradation nor climate

migration policy

change amongst the types of serious harm which

can lead to granting such protection’.88 However,

3.1 The internal dimension:

the relevant question to be asked is whether

asylum policy

the return of a person to his or her country

of origin, which is affected by environmen-

The EU Qualification Directive82 regulates who

tal degradation or environmental disasters,

qualifies for ‘international protection’, i.e. as a refu-

poses the risk of ‘inhuman or degrading treat-

gee according to the Geneva Refugee Convention

ment’.89 Neither the European Court of Human

– the primary refugee protection instrument at

Rights in Strasbourg nor the Court of Justice of

global level – or as a person benefitting from sub-

the European Union in Luxembourg has explicitly

sidiary protection status. Subsidiary protection is

taken position on this question yet.

an EU version of the so-called ‘complementary pro-

tection’ based on general human rights obligations,

It is not only that the CSWD oversimplifies

in particular on the principle of non-refoulement83

the interpretation of ‘serious harm’ – the reason-

(specifically Art. 3 of the European Convention

ing in the CSWD regarding the appropriateness

on Human Rights). Environmentally displaced

of subsidiary protection must also be brought

persons could only under exceptional circum-

into question: the CSWD argues that subsidi-

stances qualify as refugees under the Geneva

ary protection would be inappropriate in cases

Convention84, which is also the position taken

of slow-onset environmental degradation since

in the Commission’s Staff Working Document

people would ‘tend to seek support for finding

(CSWD).85 However, this is less clear-cut with

an alternative livelihood and earning a living

regard to subsidiary protection.

rather than seeking refugee-type protection’ so

that ‘[n]either the aim nor the content of refugee-

Movements in the context of environmen-

type protection would appear to be “appropriate”

tal-related impacts have the ‘potential […] to be

[…]’. With regard to this aspect, the CSWD does

covered under ‘inhuman or degrading treatment’

not acknowledge that slow-onset environmen-

(based on Article 3 of the European Convention

tal degradation may, after some time, lead to

on Human Rights)’.86 Even though Member States

forced forms of migration. Moreover, the CSWD

did not want to cover this form of movement in the

argues that because of its long-term character,

Qualification Directive, this ‘does not foreclose

subsidiary protection would also not be ‘appro-

the possibility that treatment resulting from such

priate’ in the case of rapid-onset events leading to

82 european Parliament & council of the european Union (2011): directive 2011/95/eU of the european Parliament and of the council of 13 december 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (recast), official Journal of the european Union, l 337/9.

83 the principle of non-refoulement is defined as the prohibition to expel a person to a country where she/he would face a real risk of a threat to her/his right to life or a real risk of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; it includes the prohibition to refuse entry if the person would otherwise face one of the risks mentioned.

84 mcadam, J. (2012): climate change, Forced migration, and international law, oxford: University Press, 47; and UnHcr (2009): climate change, natural disasters and human displacement: a UnHcr perspective, geneva.

85 european commission (2013): cSwd, 17.

86 mcadam, J. (2012): climate change, Forced migration, and international law, 103.

87 mcadam, J. (2012): climate change, Forced migration, and international law, 104.

88 european commission (2013): cSwd, 18.

89 art. 15 lit b Qualification directive (see 82).

PART II: TACkLIng THE CHALLEngE – POLICy RECOMMEnDATIOns TO THE EU 31

temporary displacement. However, subsidiary pro-

Finally, another important point must be

tection does not necessarily have to be regarded as

raised: many displaced persons (would) most

a long-term protection since cessation is envisaged

likely face the same challenges as refugees in

if the conditions for granting it no longer exist.

accessing EU territories (e.g. the need for a visa,

the existence of carrier sanctions or strengthened

To conclude, subsidiary protection might be

border control). This means that they would in

a form of protection accessible for some persons

many cases need to use irregular means to enter

affected if the Qualification Directive was inter-

or stay on the territory of the Member States since

preted in a certain way. However, the following

EU asylum law is linked to EU visa policy, EU rules

obstacles still exist:

on external border controls, EU law on irregular

migration, EU external relations policy and devel-

Firstly, regarding the question wheth-

opment policy.93

er a person qualifies for subsidiary protection,

a future-oriented risk forecast must be under-

Temporary protection according to the

taken. Therefore, persons who left their country of

Temporary Protection Directive (2001/55/EC)

origin after an environmental event or process can-

should serve to tackle urgent protection needs in

not claim subsidiary protection if the situation in

the case of a ‘mass influx of displaced persons’ or

the country of origin has eased in the meantime.90

when a mass influx is ‘imminent’ until individual

This means that it is primarily the hypothetical situ-

asylum applications can be handled; it is defined

ation upon the return of a person that is relevant

as ‘a procedure of exceptional character’.94 The

when assessing whether somebody is eligible for

personal scope of application of the Temporary

subsidiary protection – and the existence of a diffi-

Protection Directive seems to be broader than

cult situation in the past is not as important.

the one with regard to subsidiary protection95 and

Secondly, Art. 3 of the European Con-

could be of relevance for environmentally dis-

vention on Human Rights does ‘not allow for

placed persons – if a larger group was affected.

pre-emptive movement where conditions are

anticipated to become dire, and thus would not

So far, however, the Temporary Protection

assist people trying to move before the situation

Directive has never been applied: in order to trig-

became intolerable.’91

ger the application of the Directive, a decision by

Thirdly, the situation leading to ‘inhuman the Council (qualified majority), upon proposal

or degrading treatment’ must cover the whole

by the Commission on the existence of a mass

country of origin or it has to be unreasonable for influx of displaced persons, must exist. This has so the person concerned to move to a safe area and

far not been the case, not even in the context of

settle down there.92

the ‘Arab spring’ or the Syrian civil war.

90 wouters, K. (2009): international legal Standards for the protection from refoulement. antwerp: intersentia, 25.

91 mcadam, J. (2012): climate change, Forced migration, and international law, 76.

92 art. 8 Qualification directive (see 82).

93 Peers, S. (2011): eU Justice and Home affairs law, oxford: University Press, 295-297.

94 council of the european Union (2001): council directive 2001/55/ec of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof (temporary

Protection directive), official Journal of the european Union, l 212/12, art.2 lit a.

95 displaced persons are defined as third country nationals or stateless persons who had to leave their country or region of origin (or were evacuated after a call of international organisations) and cannot return safely and permanently. this applies in particular to persons who have fled from areas that were seriously threatened by systematic or widespread human rights violations or who are victims of human rights violations (art.2 lit c temporary Protection directive).

32 TIME TO ACT – How tHe eU can lead on climate cHange and migration

The CSWD regards temporary protection as

States from providing protection to those who

‘appropriate after severe rapid-onset disasters

actually manage to arrive on EU territories.

(such as floods), when masses flee from the area

affected but when the possibility of them return-

While not entirely excluding the possibility

ing in the short or medium term remains open.’96

of labour migration towards the EU, the CSWD

However, the document does not contain further

does not specifically refer to it. In this vein, the

information regarding which circumstances it

Commission mentions in the Staff Working

would deem the Directive applicable for environ-

Document that future initiatives on labour migra-

mentally displaced persons.

tion and mobility would be better aimed at regions

at risk of environmental degradation and should

3.2 The internal dimension:

build on experience gained with labour migration

migration as adaptation through

schemes implemented by the EU and its Member

EU labour migration policies?

States as well as non-EU countries. An example

mentioned by the CSWD is the Temporary and

The European Commission clearly acknowl-

Circular Labour Migration agreement between

edges migration as an adaptation strategy in its

Spain and Colombia and the New Zealand labour

Staff Working Document. It states that the facili-

migration policy for Pacific islands. With regard

tation of well-managed mobility and labour

to the promotion of well-managed international

migration from environmentally degraded areas

mobility and better organisation of legal migra-

could represent an effective strategy to reduce

tion, the CSWD also refers to the Global Approach

environment-related displacement.97 It seems,

to Migration and Mobility (GAMM),99 e.g. pro-

however, that the Commission rather has mobil-

moting circular migration schemes.

ity and labour migration within the ‘developing

world’ in mind, i.e. migration within countries and

Immigration to the EU (as adaptation) is not

regions of origin, rather than migration towards

explicitly discussed, which certainly has to do with

the EU. The document refers explicitly to the pro-

the difficult process of harmonising rules on labour

motion of ‘mobility within states (e.g. rural-urban

migration and the fact that Member States have –

migration)’, and to ‘international migration, in

according to the primary law bases in the Treaty

particular between developing countries in the

on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)

same region’.98 Moreover, in the conclusion of the

– the right to control the number of workers to be

CSWD, the Commission stresses that ‘addressing

admitted to their labour markets. Consequently, it

environmentally induced migration is principally a

would be up to national governments to determine

matter for the EU development and humanitarian

how many third country nationals are allowed to

aid policies’. Thus, it is not regarded as a pressing

enter in order to seek work and, hence, whether

issue for EU immigration policy. The prediction

persons affected by environmental degradation

that most people moving in the context of environ-

can make use of migration as an adaptation mech-

ment-related impacts will stay within their region

anism by immigrating to EU Member States in

does not mean that nobody will ever or has ever

search for work. Despite that, the TFEU clearly

come to Europe. Similarly, the fact that four fifths

speaks of a ‘common immigration policy’ – and in

of the worldwide refugee population stay in their

this context the Commission would have been in

regions of origin does not release EU Member

the position to put this issue forward.

96 european commission (2013): cSwd, 19.

97 european commission (2013): cSwd, 26, with reference to Foresight (2011).

98 european commission (2013): cSwd, 28. it mentions that a 26 million eUr initiative to promote implementation of the ecowaS 1980 Free movement Protocol was recently launched.

99 european commission (2011): communication from the commission to the european Parliament, the council, the european economic and Social committee and the committee of the regions, the global approach to migration and

mobility, com(2011) 743 final, Brussels, 18.11.2011.

PART II: TACkLIng THE CHALLEngE – POLICy RECOMMEnDATIOns TO THE EU 33

At EU level, so far only modest steps have been

important due to climate change impacts (see part I

taken to harmonise the entry and residence of

of this report). However, there are shortcomings

certain categories of workers: The so-called ‘Blue

when it comes to the question of human rights

Card Directive’, adopted in 2009, regulates entry,

for migrants.102 In this context, the UN Special

residence and a common special procedure with

Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants

regard to highly qualified employment,100 which

critically stated that ‘the number of visas issued

might be of relevance only to a small fraction of

under this programme will remain at the discre-

persons affected by degraded environment. The

tion of Member States’ and ‘that it does not provide

Council and the European Parliament approved

any long-term solutions and may in fact lead to

the ‘Seasonal Migrant Workers Directive’101 in

migrants ending up with irregular status if they

February 2014, which regulates the conditions for

overstay their visas.’103 The Rapporteur recom-

entry and residence of seasonal workers including

mended the opening up of legal entry channels to

a joint permit. This could be relevant to persons

the EU which ‘may prove to be more efficient and

who wish to make use of labour migration as an

less costly than punitive measures, and may also

adaptation strategy – taking into account that

contribute to a reduction in irregular migration’.104

seasonal migration might become even more

Nonie Reyes/World Bank Photo Collection

100 council of the european Union (2009): council directive 2009/50/ec of 25 may 2009 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment, official Journal of the european Union, l 155/17.

101 directive not yet published in the official Journal of the european Union. european commission (2010): Proposal for a directive of the european Parliament and of the council on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of seasonal employment, com(2010) 379 final, 2010/0210 (cod), Brussels, 13.7.2010.

102 the permit would allow the holder to reside for five to nine months within a 12-months-period, after which return is obligatory; re-entry is to be facilitated by member States in a subsequent season. there exists no possibility of status change. the directive does – in contrast to the ‘Blue card directive’ – not provide for the entry of family members.

103 Special rapporteur on the Human rights of migrants (2013): report of the Special rapporteur on the Human

rights of migrants; regional study: management of the external borders of the european Union and its impact on the human rights of migrants, a/Hrc/23/46, 24.4.2013.

104 ibid.

34 TIME TO ACT – How tHe eU can lead on climate cHange and migration

In sum, the EU’s action with regard to migration

According to the CSWD, some of the EU ini-

policy has been described as ‘imbalanced’ since the

tiatives in supporting sustainable solutions for

entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty (1999).

displaced people could ‘if adequately adapted […]

EU legislation on border management, visa and

serve as a useful model to apply to environmentally

irregular migration is regarded as ‘substantial’ and

induced displacement’.107 Some initiatives men-

EU action relating to the operational level would be

tioned in this context are the Regional Protection

‘quite integrated’ whereas ‘legal migration issues,

Programmes (RPPs).

in particular admission for work purposes, are not

addressed in a detailed and coherent manner’.105

Regional Protection

Programmes (RPPs)

Other suggestions made in the CSWD as to

the potential role of the EU with regard to migra-

RPPs are a rather new concept introduced by

tion as adaptation include, amongst others:

a Communication in 2005 and subsequently inte-

grated into the Global Approach to Migration and

supporting partners in introducing a migra-

Mobility. They aim at strengthening the protection

tion dimension to their national adaptation planning;

capacity of third countries and at supporting the

highlighting the potential of migration as provision of durable solutions for refugees. RPPs

a coping strategy in political dialogues with ‘devel-

comprise particular projects for the improvement

oping countries’;

of the general protection situation, of asylum pro-

playing a role in global migration and devel-

cedures and of reception conditions. They also

opment fora.

include projects for the hosting community and

a (voluntary) resettlement component.108

3.3 The external dimension

It seems sensible to enhance the protection

As acknowledged by the CSWD, many, if not

capacity of host countries of environmentally-dis-

most, persons affected are likely to stay in their

placed persons. However, the following challenges

countries or regions of origin. Thus, they will add

must be borne in mind when applying RPPs to

to the large number of refugees and internally dis-

environment-related displacement:

placed persons living in the ‘developing world’.106

Already today, the EU supports – in the context of

Firstly, RPPs do not provide for a norma-

the external dimension of asylum policy – regions

tive framework upon which protection is granted.

and countries of origin and transit in their efforts

Since existing asylum frameworks do not cover all

to assist and protect displaced persons, in par-

environmentally-displaced persons, it is question-

ticular refugees. The CSWD mentions that apart

able whether currently this group would benefit

from providing humanitarian assistance, the EU

from RPPs without amending those frameworks.

could support the provision of durable solutions

Secondly, RPPs have had only a very lim-

for persons who are displaced permanently or for

ited impact so far due to restricted flexibility,

a longer term.

lack of funding, insufficient coordination with

105 Pascouau, Y. (2013): eU immigration policy: act now before it is too late, commentary european Policy centre (ePc) 20.6.2013.

106 UnHcr (2013): global trends 2012, geneva: By the end of 2012 there were approx. 45.2 million persons forcibly displaced persons including 28.8 million internally displaced persons (idPs). Four fifths of the worldwide refugee population are hosted by ‘developing countries’.

107 european commission (2013): cSwd, 30.

108 european commission (2005): communication of the commission to the council and the european Parliament

on regional Protection Programmes, com(2005) 388, Brussels, 1.9.2005.

PART II: TACkLIng THE CHALLEngE – POLICy RECOMMEnDATIOns TO THE EU 35

other areas, such as humanitarian assistance and

development.109 RPPs are criticised for constitut-

ing only a list of projects with very limited funding

(from the development budget) available, in par-

ticular when compared to funds provided in the

context of EU humanitarian assistance. It was

also described as a ‘repackaging’ of already exist-

ing projects. It is therefore doubtful whether such

a concept should be expanded to other types of

needs, given that there is already ‘very little mon-

YIM Hafiz

ey for very large needs’.

Thirdly, relying too heavily on the external

dimension can be risky: it has been argued in the

degradation but lacking the resources to either

context of refugee protection – which might be to

adapt or migrate’, e.g. for countries at risk of being

a certain extent also true for environment-related

‘inundated by sea water or becoming environmen-

displacement – that refugees should not be con-

tally unsustainable due to desertification’. Finally,

fined to areas where effective protection cannot

relocation is seen as an option after displacement

be guaranteed. Durable solutions will not always

to host communities lacking the capacity to pro-

be available in regions of origin or transit for all

vide a durable solution to ‘lighten the burden on

individuals in need of protection. However, work-

host communities’.111

ing with countries of origin would be also based

on ‘a desire to control refugee flows’.

In this context, the European Commission sug-

gests that the ‘EU should […] consider supporting

Thus, it must be questioned whether RPPs

countries severely exposed to environmental stres-

– given their shortcomings – lead to a transforma-

sors to assess the path of degradation and design

tion of the hosting areas into ‘safe havens’.110 In

specific preventive internal, or where necessary,

this context another component of RPPs, reset-

international relocation measures when adapta-

tlement, becomes particularly important. So far,

tion strategies can no longer be implemented’. The

resettlement hardly played a role given the absent

CSWD refers to the experience of the EU and its

or low commitments of EU Member States.

Member States with regard to their own resettlement

programmes, which could be useful ‘in support-

Relocation

ing non-EU countries’ efforts to use relocation in

managing environmentally induced migration’.

The CSWD mentions that the EU could play

Thus, a potential role of the EU is seen in develop-

a role with regard to supporting ‘planned reloca-

ing preventive internal, or if necessary, international

tions’ (as a last resort). It argues that the facilitation

relocation measures. However, the specific wording

of relocation could be important in preventing

(‘non-EU countries’ efforts to use relocation’) sug-

‘potential unorganised displacement’, in particular

gests that the CSWD is rather referring to relocation

for so-called ‘trapped populations’ or ‘persons in

undertaken by non-EU Member States.

communities severely affected by environmental

109 european commission (2010): report from the commission to the european Parliament and the council,

First annual report on immigration and asylum (2009) com (2010) 214, Brussels, 6.5.2010, 8.

110 crisp, J. (2003): refugee protection in regions of origin: Potential and challenges, migration Policy institute.

111 european commission (2013): cSwd, 31.

36 TIME TO ACT – How tHe eU can lead on climate cHange and migration

POLICy RECOMMEnDATIOns

and frameworks, and in particular the European

TO THE EUROPEAn UnIOn

Commission Staff Working Document, ( Part II)

policy makers should take into account the sub-

From the analysis of key characteristics of move-

sequent recommendations in order to proceed

ment in the context of climate change ( Part I) and

towards a coherent EU approach with regard to

of legal and policy gaps of current EU initiatives

migration in the context of climate change:

The European Commission should people could begin to reduce their vulnerability

assume an active leadership role with regard

by choosing to migrate.

to environment-related migration, not only

By taking into account the phenomenon

by supporting or contributing to debates on a

of climate change and migration, and specifi-

global level, but also by seeking and advocat-

cally the legal status of people who move for

ing solutions towards other EU institutions and

reasons related to climate change, the EU can

towards EU Member States.

create a humane and functioning immigration

All EU policies on environment-related and asylum system that is fit for purpose.

migration and displacement must respect and

While movements in the context of envi-

protect the rights of individuals concerned

ronmental change are more likely to be internal

and comply with human rights obligations.

than across international borders, some people

Vulnerable groups such as women, the poor,

might have the means to move and seek work

minorities or children have to be taken into

in the EU as a way of protecting themselves and

consideration when developing measures and

their families against worsening environmental

policies with regard to environment-related

conditions. Although the external dimension of

migration and displacement.

migration is important, the EU must therefore

European decision-makers should recon-

also give due weight to the internal dimension

sider the frames that are currently shaping EU

of migration and provide legal means for labour

discussions on environment-related migration

immigration to the EU for migrants in the con-

and displacement. It is important that the EU – as

text of climate change or providing protection for

one of the major contributors to the production

displaced people.

of greenhouse gases – is aware of its responsi-

The EU should make use of the potential

bilities not only by taking appropriate action in

of the Qualification Directive (subsidiary pro-

terms of legal and policy frameworks in the field

tection) in the context of environment-related

of migration and asylum policy but also by being

forms of migration and displacement. However,

aware of its responsibility on how to influence

since there are disadvantages with regard to

the discourse and dismantle negative stereotypes

this form of protection, the EU should con-

about migrants that generally accompany secu-

sider using its competence to adopt new legal

rity debates.

instruments under Art. 78 of the Treaty on the

The European Union should shape global Functioning of the European Union.

adaptation and development policy in a way that

In the face of increasingly severe climate-

sees some forms of migration as a way of reduc-

linked disasters, the EU should set up rules of

ing vulnerability to climate change.

how and when to provide refuge and protection

The EU and its Member States should during such disasters. The EU should make use

consider funding development and adaptation

of the Temporary Protection Directive in the case

projects that create opportunities for people to

of a mass influx of persons displaced by inter alia

move. By focusing these projects on areas that

environment-related events.

are especially vulnerable to climate impacts,

PART II: TACkLIng THE CHALLEngE – POLICy RECOMMEnDATIOns TO THE EU 37

The EU should create legal channels to

The idea of preventing displacement

EU territory in order to avoid the distress and

by preventive planned relocation is sensible.

deaths of persons en route to Europe. In particu-

However, the EU should not focus solely on this

lar, legal channels for labour migration should

aspect and also consider options that aim at the

be opened in order to enable persons and com-

reduction of the ‘burden’ of regions of origin,

munities to reduce their vulnerabilities. As also

e.g. modification of the concept of resettlement

stressed by the UN Special Rapporteur on the

as a means for ensuring safe access to Europe

Human Rights of Migrants, ‘the opening of legal

and taking the responsibility/‘burden’ from

entry channels to the EU may prove to be more

regions of origin.

efficient and less costly than punitive measures.’

The southern Mediterranean region may

While Regional Protection Programmes specifically be affected by the impacts of envi-

(RPPs) could be relevant in particular for environ-

ronmental degradation. The EU is therefore well

mentally-displaced persons who are ‘trapped’ in

advised to prepare a meaningful contribution

their regions of origin, the current practice sug-

towards sharing the ‘burden’ of regions of origin.

gests that they would not bring an added value

when applied to climate-related displacement.

The concept should be reflected and adequate

resources would be needed to make RPPs worka-

ble for environmentally-displaced persons. Apart

from that, RPPs should not be used as an excuse

for barring access to Europe.

38 TIME TO ACT – How tHe eU can lead on climate cHange and migration

COnCLUsIOns

The inter-linkages between climate change

However, the complexity of the challenge should

and migration are complex and at times hard to

not be used as an excuse for not addressing this

grasp. This is reflected not only in the conceptual

issue. In particular, there is already ample evi-

discussions on definitions most suitable for actu-

dence that environment-related migration and

ally describing and capturing this multifaceted

displacement is occurring and that it will increase

phenomenon, but also in the consequences for

in the future.

policy-making. Addressing migration in the con-

text of climate change presents new challenges for

The European Union is in a position where it

policy makers at both international and national

must begin to develop a holistic policy approach

levels as it is difficult to translate the complexity

that addresses migration in the context of climate

of the issue into a coherent and well-designed

change. On the one hand, EU development and

policy and legal framework. To date, there is no

adaptation policies should adequately address the

legally binding definition of ‘environment-related

challenge of climate-linked migration. On the other

migration and displacement’.

hand, understanding the gaps in legal protection,

identifying particularly vulnerable populations and

The topic is further complicated by the fact that

supporting the practice of migration as an adaptive

industrialised countries and regions, such as the EU,

response are just some of the actions possible by

produce per capita the largest share of human-made

the European Union. If not closed, these legal and

greenhouse emissions, which are mainly respon-

policy gaps will cause major difficulties and wide-

sible for global warming. Yet, the adverse effects

ranging humanitarian crises. The EU should act as a

of climate change are mainly felt by ‘developing’

leading political force to address the phenomenon

or least developed countries: their vulnerability is

of climate change and migration.

comparatively high whereas their adaptive capac-

ity is quite low. Thus, the impact of human-induced

climate change on population mobility raises

important political and legal questions such as

accountability, financial responsibility, global effort

sharing and not least the necessity of political and

legal frameworks responding to this multi-dimen-

sional phenomenon.

39

List of abbreviations

Art.

Article

COIN

Climate and Outreach Information Network

CSWD European Commission’s Staff Working Document on ‘Climate change,

environmental degradation, and migration’ (accompanying the EU strategy

on adaptation to climate change)

EU

European Union

GAMM Global Approach to Migration and Mobility

IPCC

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

RPP

Regional Protection Programme

TCLM

Temporary and Circular Labour Migration

TFEU

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

UN

United Nations

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Shutterstock

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http://www.flickr.com/photos/guuleed/144748969/

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BY-NC-ND 2.0. http://www.flickr.com/photos/worldbank/1195773825/

p. 12 ‘Communities attempt to flee the flooding, Sindh, Pakistan’ by Tariq Masood Malik/Oxfam

International licensed under CC BY-NC-ND 2.0. http://www.flickr.com/photos/8470194@

N02/6149853156/in/photolist-anrB5Y-anoMop-8xxGsQ-8qQ48z-8qQ4kP-8zheuw-8wXSXR-gjK93U-

8uJyPd-8uFvvi-9uiNEE-9ufJKa-9uiM5q-9ufMbg-8qSpSx-8qSpSM-a4UR8C-8zheuC-8zgM4o-982NUF-

8xhikC-8xk5QX-8uFv8K-8zysGf-8zytoS-986dPS-aRpnvP-8xehdB-8zheuh-8zgM4h-8xeh5M-8zheuf-

9kMoMw-aRpmZF-8pVCEa-8tPRJF-8NUdFX-8zytG9-8qQ36V-9uiLi5-8B58rq-8zyrJs-8qW1hd-8zvhTT-

8qSpRk-8zyqB7-8qR7N3-dzn4J3-8NUdJi-8qW1hW-8pQ82G

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Oxfam International licensed under CC BY-NC-ND 2.0.

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aZNJoF-aZNMKi-aZNKBi-aZNPkX-aZNF46-aZNDkZ-aZNPEH-aZNP3a-acfm3z-acic27-acfmQ6-

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46 TIME TO ACT – How tHe eU can lead on climate cHange and migration

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47

Short biographies

Margit Ammer is a researcher at the ludwig Boltzmann institute of Human rights. She has a legal

background and her research at the institute focuses on asylum and migration issues as well as on their inter-linkages with the environment. For the past six years, she has been (inter alia) conducting

research projects on the legal and normative frameworks that apply to different forms of migration and

displacement associated with the environment. margit is a member of the management committee and

the core group of coSt action iS1101 ‘climate change and migration: Knowledge, law and Policy,

and theory’.

Monika Mayrhofer is a researcher in the team working on anti-discrimination, asylum and diversity

issues at the ludwig Boltzmann institute of Human rights. She graduated from the University of Vienna

with a master’s degree and a Phd in political science and is specialised in the fields of anti-discrim-

ination and diversity, gender, migration and european integration. She has been involved in a range

of international research projects, including studies on environment-related migration, the european

human rights system and the evaluation of the integration of refugee and asylum-seeking children in the

austrian educational system.

Alex Randall works as Project manager on the defending rights Programme of the climate outreach

and information network (coin). He is mainly focused on communications work for the UK climate

change and migration coalition – an alliance that exists to challenge the lack of long-term strategies

to support and protect people at risk of displacement linked to environmental change. Before joining

coin he worked at the centre for alternative technology. He has also worked for the Public interest

research centre on their Values and Frames project. He co-founded cheat neutral, a spoof offsetting

company, and Un Fair Play, an organisation that works with small island states at international climate

change negotiations.

Jo salsbury works on the defending rights Programme of the climate outreach and information network (coin). She has a masters in international Human rights law from essex University and

spent a number of years representing asylum seekers and refugees. She has also worked for the Human

rights institute of the international Bar association where she focused on rule of law and fair trial

issues. Prior to starting with coin she worked for oxfam focusing on partnership development.

TC AO TE TIME TO ACT

IMT

HOw THE EU CAn lEAd On ClIMATE

CHAngE And MIgrATIOn

The inter-linkages between climate change and migration are

The time has come to translate research evidence and recom-

complex and at times hard to grasp. Addressing migration in

mendations into policy practice. The European Union (EU)

the context of climate change presents new challenges for policy

could act as a leading political force and should begin to de-

makers at both international and national levels.

velop a holistic policy approach that addresses climate change

and migration.

However, the complexity of the challenge should not be used as

an excuse for not addressing the issue. There is already ample

This report debunks some common myths and provides an un-

evidence that environment-related migration and displacement

derstanding of key characteristics of migration in the context of

is occurring and that it will increase in the future. Research

climate change. With a focus on EU policies and legal frame-

projects have provided a better understanding of the phenom-

works in the area of migration and asylum, the report presents

enon and of corresponding legal and policy gaps.

a series of recommendations in order to proceed towards a coher-

ent EU approach on climate change and migration.

Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, European Union, Brussels – 15 Rue d’Arlon – B-1050 Brussels – Belgium

T +32 2 743 41 00 F +32 2 743 41 09 E info@eu.boell.org w www.eu.boell.org

Table of Contents

PART I:

PART 2: