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grzegorz wiśniewski, managing director of Institute or Renewable Energy (IEO) in Warsaw, Poland. Mr Wisniewski graduated from Warsaw University of Technology (mechanics and process engineering) in

1987 and Warsaw University (organization and management) in 1989 and was awarded several inter-

national scholarships, at EU and USA universities and research centers. He specializes in research, development, and implementation of solar, wind, and bioenergy (biogas) technologies and socio-economic studies. He is co-author of Polish National renewable energy strategy (2001), some parts of renewable energy regulations and a few strategic reports and consultations for the Polish government (e.g. Ministry of Environment and Ministry of Economy – 2007-2009) and NGOs (e.g. Greenpeace,

renewable energy industrial associations) devoted to renewable energy potentials and forecasts. Since 2003 he has been also representative of Poland and member of the ManagEnergy Reflection Group

(MERG Chairman 2007/2008) – advisory group of the Directorate General of Transport and Energy

at the European Commission (DG TREN) in area of local, regional, and sustainable energy. He was

a chairman of the renewables energy advisory group for the Polish Minister of Environment and he is a chairman of renewable energy advisory group of Association of Polish Counties and he was as well

as a member of Management Board of the Polish Chamber of Renewable Energy (2008-2010).

Zbigniew M. Karaczun, associate professor at Warsaw University of Life Sciences (WULS), Department of Environment Protection. His background is agriculture science, sustainable development, and eco log i cal policy. Since 1999 he has been a chairman of “Sustainable development and eco-management” specialization at WULS. Besides his engagement as national expert, consultant, and adviser, he has participated in many international organizations and projects, including numerous Phare projects and other EU-funded projects. He has worked as an expert to FAO and USAID. In years 1998-2000 he

was an European integration adviser to Polish Minister of Environment. In 2003 he received an award from the Polish Minister of Environment. He is a member of Polish Ecological Club (president of the Mazovian Branch of PEC), and in years 1995-2000 he was Director of Climate Action Network Central

and Eastern Europe. Since 2005 he has been a Senior Expert of the Polish Climate Coalition. He is an author of more than 200 papers, articles, reports, and books.

Reaching Energy Security in Europe through Renewables

Publication in the publication series Europe

Authors: Grzegorz Wiśniewski and Zbigniew M. Karaczun

Translation from Polish: Małgorzata Romanowicz

English proof-reading: William Glass

Commissioned and published by the Heinrich Böll Foundation

Warsaw, June 2011

© Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung

All rights reserved

Layout: Studio27

Cover picture: Bartosz Łobejko

ISBN: 978-83-61340-84-3

This publication can be ordered from Heinrich Böll Foundation, Warsaw Office, Żurawia 45, 00-680

Warsaw, Poland

T +48 22 594 23 33 F +48 22 594 23 37 E pl-info@pl.boell.org W www.boell.pl

publication SeRieS on euRope

Reaching energy Security

in europe through Renewables

grzegorz wiśniewski

Zbigniew M. Karaczun

Commissioned and published by the Heinrich Böll Foundation

table of contentS

Introduction

7

1. energy Security: individual, local and regional factors in european

energy security based on the use of renewable energy sources

9

by Grzegorz Wiśniewski

1.1. The need for a sustainable approach to energy security in energy-climate policy

10

1.2. American experiments with energy security

11

1.3. The concept of energy security in Poland so far

13

1.4. Difficulties with the centric approach to overcoming problems connected

with improving energy security in Poland

15

1.5. The forgotten idea of local and regional energy security

19

1.6. Individual energy security

22

1.7. Tasks for the EU

24

2. the european union on the road to energy independence

26

by Zbigniew M. Karaczun

2.1. Introduction

26

2.2. Community energy security

27

2.3. Towards renewable energy sources

29

2.4. What does the EU need?

31

2.5. Conclusion

34

2.6. Acknowledgements

36

5

Introduction

introduction

Meeting 100% of Europe’s electricity needs through renewable energy by

2050 is possible – if we succeed in pooling the potential of Europe’s renewable

energy sources. This will require cooperation between EU member states, as

well as coherent policies and regulation at the European level. Both currently

exist only in fragmented form as energy policy in Europe is still shaped mainly

at the national level. The Heinrich Böll Foundation therefore asked a number of

experts to take stock of European policy in the sectors most important for the

transition to renewable energy, to identify the areas in which European coopera-

tion has been inadequate to date, and to propose possible solutions.

In this publication two Polish experts, Grzegorz Wiśniewski and Dr. Zbig-

niew Karaczun, consider how the collective use of renewable energies by Eu-

ropean countries in electric power generation can improve energy security in

Europe. Especially in the period leading up to the Polish presidency of the EU

Council in the second half of 2011, in which questions related to energy security

will supposedly play an important role, bringing attention to the importance

of renewable energy sources in this context seems very significant and worth

emphasizing.

Dr. Zbigniew Karaczun points to energy issues as the historical basis for the

existence of the European community, which, in the face of new global chal-

lenges including those related to climate change, should increasingly move out

of the sphere of purely national interests. Why do energy security and associat-

ed challenges demand an intensification of cooperation between EU members?

What action should be taken on the EU level to promote the development of re-

newables? Could the construction by the Community of an economy independ-

ent of fossil fuels become the new European project?

Grzegorz Wiśniewski emphasizes the importance of local and regional ini-

tiatives, as well as the role of the individual consumer (and producer) of en-

ergy in strengthening European energy security. He considers the form which

the concept of local and regional energy security based on renewable energy

sources (combined with other forms of energy generation) could take, and at

the same time how the European Union could promote energy security on local

and regional levels. Wiśniewski presents different conceptions of and political

strategies for energy security; he contrasts the EU vision of climate and energy

policy contained in the EU energy-climate package with the American concep-

tion from the time of the George W. Bush presidency, elements of which seem

to dominate Polish thinking on such issues so far. Why is the role of the actions

undertaken on the regional, local, and individual levels crucial in the process of

improving the energy security?

Introduction

7

The two analyses included in this publication can therefore be said to present

two sides of the same question – the role that renewable energy sources can and

should play in the process of reinforcing Europe’s energy security: the issue

of developing the European governance structure necessary to achieving this

end, as well as presenting the tasks for the European Union in supporting and

promoting local and regional initiatives fundamental for this process. Which

mechanisms are essential on a European level, and which solutions must inevi-

tably be introduced on the regional, local, and individual levels, so that these

actions complement each other are the key questions for creating a coherent

and effective framework for the advancement of energy efficiency based on the

use of renewable energy sources.

Ralf Fücks

President of the Heinrich Böll Fundation

Wolfgang Templin

Director of the Warsaw Office

of the Heinrich Böll Foundation

ces

opean energy security based on the use of renewable energy sour

enewables

urope through Re

nergy Security in e

Reaching

1 Energy Security: Individual, local and regional factors in Eur

8

1. energy Security: individual, local and regional

factors in european energy security based on

the use of renewable energy sources

by grzegorz wiśniewski

The current discussion on European energy security is dominated by the ques-

tions of diversifying the supply of conventional carbon-based fuels to European

Union (EU) member states and of the role to be played by traditional energy

corporations. Meanwhile, both fossil fuels and traditional energy corporations

belong to an age which is slowly coming to an end, and they cannot be expected

to provide solutions to problems of energy security in the coming era of rapid

technological change, stimulated in the EU by an active climate-energy policy

and supporting research policies. Renewable energy sources will play a key role

ces

in this process. Thanks to their dispersed nature and that of the resources they

use, their development must lead to intelligent energy management and to the

decentralization of energy systems. Therefore to continue discussing energy se-

curity from an essentially national perspective, without considering local and

regional factors and the individual energy consumer, who is no longer just a pas-

sive element in the energy supply system, becomes an outdated and unproduc-

tive approach. To improve energy security we must consider many aspects of

the economy and many points of view, and engage with a much greater number

of local and regional partners as well as energy consumers. This is confirmed by

the findings of recent (more or less successful) experiments aimed at improving

energy security, both in Europe and in the US, where this issue has a particular

character, as well as in Poland, where the conception of energy security in use

must be viewed in its specific historic and geopolitical circumstances.

This essay considers the wider global and European context, but it is written

opean energy security based on the use of renewable energy sour

from a Polish perspective. As a member of the EU, Poland views energy security

as one of its priority issues and is currently proposing it as a key theme for the

Polish Presidency of the European Council in the second half of 2011.

enewables

In my opinion, the current Polish interpretation of energy security is not

adequately integrated within the framework of EU policy and its trends, in par-

ticular when it comes to climate protection, innovation, and the common mar-

ket. It also makes insufficient use of energy security improvement measures

urope through Re

common in the EU such as the promotion of renewables and energy efficiency.

The priority given to national energy security in Poland does not lead to seem-

ingly natural processes such as integration with the EU and emphasis on the

exploitation of the country’s own renewable resources. In the domain of energy

nergy Security in e

security action has been taken, however, to protect the role of national coal, to

diversify the external supply of carbon-based fuels, and to construct nuclear

power infrastructure in Poland. Diversification thus interpreted is not accom-

Reaching

1 Energy Security: Individual, local and regional factors in Eur

9

panied by the decentralization and de-monopolization of the energy production

sector. Such an approach is more reminiscent of the somewhat outdated Bush

era US energy policy than of the EU climate-energy policy model. The costs of

implementing the established concept of energy security are analyzed superfi-

cially and without accompanying public debate. This essay aims to analyze the

aforementioned problems and to outline the logic of a more active engagement

in the EU energy-climate policy, in particular the need to decentralize energy

production systems while relying on national, renewable energy sources. The

causal relationships and evaluations set out in this work have been arrived at

independently and represent solely the author’s own current views.

1.1. the need for a sustainable approach to energy security in energy-climate policy

The balancing of traditionally conflicting interests in EU energy and climate

policy can be graphically represented by a triangle. This “energy triangle” has

three major components: improving energy security, ensuring environmentally

sustainable development, and increasing competitiveness. The conflict inher-

ent in this combination can be resolved using consistent, coordinated measures,

which should result in the creation of a new model based on renewable energy

ces

sources and improved energy efficiency. In other words, the current model should

be changed and a new equilibrium reached (also thanks to new technologies).

The 3 x 20% EU climate package is a good example of pursuing this equilib-

rium (within the new context of climate policy) in the time frame of the coming

decade. The most significant element of this package is the goal of reaching a 20

percent share for renewable sources in EU energy use by 2020. Achieving this

goal will determine the successful execution of the whole package, including

emission reductions and a reduction in fossil fuel sourcing. And successfully im-

plementing all of the three “twenties” will guarantee the security of our energy

and fuel supplies.

Up until now the governments of individual EU member states have set the

tone for the discussion on energy security and would sometimes readily sacri-

fice environmental sustainability and climate security on the “altar of energy

security.” Some countries - those viewing the menace of energy insecurity with

opean energy security based on the use of renewable energy sour

particular terror - were even ready to sacrifice the competitiveness of their econ-

omies, especially in the long-term.

The increasing engagement of governments on energy security issues,

enewables

which strengthens as fossil fuels are being used up, is a global phenomenon. It

is generally believed to be a valid concern for governments, justifying interven-

tion, especially at a time of economic slow-down and with energy and climate

crises looming. It is difficult not to agree with this view, particularly if the poli-

urope through Re

cies being implemented focus on introducing innovative solutions. Things get

considerably worse, however, when, in the name of improving energy security,

governments get involved in areas usually reserved for the private sector, thus

limiting possibilities for individual enterprise, or when the government’s aim is

nergy Security in e

to support inefficient companies in traditional areas of the energy sector, such as

mining, for example by artificially maintaining employment in such companies

for prolonged periods of time.

Reaching

1 Energy Security: Individual, local and regional factors in Eur

10

Governments’ anxiety about energy security can express itself in various

ways. Mario Monti, the EU Commissioner for Competition between 1999 and

2004, argued that the EU needed a policy which “helps sectors awaiting a transi-

tion to a “green” economy and ... allows member states to focus on particularly

promising areas, such as energy or green vehicles.”1 With such an approach

the interests of science, environmental, and energy security policies can easily

be reconciled, while at the same time lowering the costs of implementing each

policy separately. Around the same time this problem was seen quite differently

in the US. In 2004 Paul Roberts remarked in his well known book, The End of

Oil, that, at a time of growing pressure and an increasing risk of conflict over

resources, governments find it difficult to concentrate on long-term challenges,

such as climate or renewables - i.e. those that are themselves key to energy

security.2 Describing US policy at the time, Roberts wrote in the foreword that,

faced with the threat to energy supply manifesting itself in rising fuel prices,

the Bush administration maintained the existing energy supply model and only

took action to increase national fossil fuel extraction and imports. This attitude

is reminiscent of the current approach to improving economic competitiveness

and energy security in Poland. It must be noted, however, that while the US with

its economic and military might could realistically try to win the coming battle

ces

over conventional energy resources, this would entail greater and greater costs.

It would also be difficult to call such an approach sustainable, nor the solution

to the problem - lasting. Analyzing this line of reasoning more closely can be

worthwhile, especially that - as it would seem - it has impacted the way the prob-

lem is seen in countries such as Poland.

1.2. american experiments with energy security

President George W. Bush probably best described his energy security doc-

trine to international partners during the International Renewable Energy

Conference (WIREC) in Washington in 2008.3 He proposed that energy secu-

rity issues should determine practically all of US energy policy. The United

States does not easily tolerate even a minimal level of insecurity (unlike Eu-

rope, with its differing experiences). Another of Bush’s paradigms was the

opean energy security based on the use of renewable energy sour

necessity of fast economic growth. One cannot but agree with this choice of

priorities, but how are low fuel prices to be maintained if the aim is “abso-

enewables

lute” security, and when, as Bush himself stated, “more and more countries

don’t like us”? There is a price to pay, and of course not everyone can afford

to pay it. Environmental issues should be dealt with later, according to Bush;

he was open to discussion, but - he added - this has to be “specific” discus-

urope through Re

sion. It would seem that President Bush was reasoning logically, but that he

lacked the imagination needed to foresee inevitable changes in the energy

1

Andrzej Lubowski, “Ile państwa w gospodarce,” [“How Much State in the Economy”] Gazeta

nergy Security in

Wyborcza, 15 August 2010.

e

2

Paul Roberts, The End of Oil: On the Edge of a Perilous World (New York: Mariners Books, 2005).

3

“Bush: America Must ‘Get Off Oil’,” Environment News Service, http://www.ens-newswire.com/

Reaching

1 Energy Security: Individual, local and regional factors in Eur

ens/mar2008/2008-03-05-01.html.

11

sector. He tried to extrapolate based on past experience - a deluded approach

in the midst of the current technological revolution and changes brought on

by globalization and the decentralization of systems. Neither was he capable

of seeking solutions by turning towards specific regions or states, nor did he

have the ability to open up to wider international cooperation. Bush did not

concern himself with issues as decentralized as heating or cooling, which

are both important components of local energy security, but which, from a

strategic viewpoint, did not constitute a priority for him. When discussing

electric energy, he spoke almost solely of nuclear power (“nuclear power is

limitless”). Describing legislative action already undertaken in the US, he

stressed that it has two main objectives: facilitating siting procedures for

new investments and enormous bank guarantees for nuclear power (10 bil-

lion USD), supported by means reserved for research in this area. Bush did

not launch measures of this type for wind or solar power (here, effective sup-

port was provided by a series of US states, and even cities).

George W. Bush’s controversial approach to the problem of energy security

and its effectiveness also met with criticism in some economic circles of the

time. The Age of Turbulence, a book published in 2007 by former US Federal

Reserve chief Alan Greenspan, contains criticism of the Bush administration’s

ces

approach to energy security, which is deemed “too unilateral.”4 Greenspan

writes that the only reasonable definition of energy independence (an element

of energy security - author’s note) is the possibility of dictating global prices

by accessing still unexploited fuel reserves, while the period of fuel independ-

ence enjoyed by the US before the first energy crisis (up until 1971) finished

long ago. Greenspan also adds that, if history is a sign of things to come, fossil

fuels (oil, gas, nuclear power) can be expected to be pushed out by cheaper

alternatives (ethanol, hydrogen, renewables) before traditional reserves run

out. In other words, Greenspan argues that the observed growth in fossil fuel

prices is a natural economic process, which will “lead to the mass production

of intelligent, clean and effective energy technologies of its own accord” and it

would be best if governments did not get in the way of this process with their

outdated interventionism.

However, the US approach cannot be reduced to this past conservative en-

opean energy security based on the use of renewable energy sour

ergy security doctrine on a federal level as advanced by George Bush. The US is

also characterized by the extensive autonomy enjoyed by individual states, and

especially the wide margin of liberty left to individual consumers, themselves

enewables

more and more often also energy producers. Despite unfavorable federal policy,

a majority of states expressed the wish to source a minimum 10% of their elec-

tric energy from renewables. The possibility of independently producing elec-

tric power in the US no longer surprises anyone and is seen as normal. Connect-

urope through Re

ing an American household to the grid is a two-sided process, with a two-way

counter, which allows an insight into the consumption and production of energy

from micro-sources such as small wind farms or photovoltaic installations. In

a household micro-grid, the electric car is starting to play an important role,

nergy Security in e

providing energy storage. So if local energy production exceeds the level of use,

4

Alan Greenspan, The Age of Turbulence: Adventures in a New World (New York: Penguin Press, 2007).

Reaching

1 Energy Security: Individual, local and regional factors in Eur

12

then at the end of the month the consumer receives a payment instead of a bill.

The problem is that micro-grids, which include renewable energy sources, dis-

turb the market order created by power corporations. Without decisive backing

from the federal government their development has been relatively slow - until

the Barack Obama presidency brought the 2009 stabilization plan (largely con-

sistent with Commissioner Mario Monti’s views and coinciding with EU policy).

It must be noted, however, that when it comes to the development of the “pro-

sumer” (consumer and producer of energy) concept and the ability to let the

individual green energy producer pay directly for his net consumption, the US

is far ahead of the EU.

As mentioned above, the American concept of energy security has changed

with the Barack Obama presidency and with his plan of investing 140 billion USD

of federal funding into green and generally innovative technologies. Thanks to

this, the long-term energy dependency of the US is also expected to decrease.

It is still too early for a fuller appraisal of the effects of President Obama’s plan

in terms of the durability of the improvement in energy security, but, despite

various limitations in US home affairs and the need to compromise, it is a more

modern, sustainable and forward-looking policy and one better suited to con-

temporary conditions. It is also decidedly more akin to the energy policy which

ces

has been promoted in the EU for the last twenty years.

1.3. the concept of energy security in poland so far

In Poland the concept of energy security meets with greater obstacles from

the practical implementation side than from the policy or legal aspects, al-

though even the latter may sometimes cause doubts to arise. In the 3rd article

of the 16th chapter of the Energy Law Act, the concept of energy security was

defined as “a state of the economy enabling current and expected future de-

mand for fuel and energy to be met, in a technically and economically justi-

fied way, while fulfilling the needs of environmental protection.” This defini-

tion, largely transferred into Polish law from EU documents, is wide-ranging

and not very specific, but it is apparent that what is meant here is the security

of supplies interpreted as the physical availability of energy sources, taking

opean energy security based on the use of renewable energy sour

into account raw material and energy prices within the “economy.” This al-

lows for a wider view of the problem, but in current policy this definition is

enewables

unfortunately applied in a very narrow and traditional manner. In practice, it

is difficult to find a role for renewables, energy efficiency or decentralization

in this context.

Some EU countries, especially new member countries - and in particular

urope through Re

Poland, which, in the second half of this decade, has become one of the most

ardent allies of US policy in the EU - are mired in a fear of dependency on

carbon-based fuel imports from Russia. The fact that Poland bases itself on the

“Bush conception of energy security” is reflected in the importance accorded to

the diversification of traditional fossil energy sources (both imported and na-

nergy Security in e

tional), even when this means disregarding the costs (as in the case of construct-

ing LNG terminals). It can also be seen in the persistent promotion of national

Reaching

1 Energy Security: Individual, local and regional factors in Eur

coal, together with the unconvincing argument that coal will remain a strategic

13

energy resource, in combination with renewables, even in the long-term.5 The

promotion of nuclear power, to be introduced “from scratch,” is also growing

more intense (since 2008), although in Poland, as opposed to the US, this power

sector must depend wholly on imported technology and imported fuel. At the

same time, the role of renewables, energy efficiency, decentralization and inno-

vation in energy security, and climate security has so far been underestimated.

Apart from the questionable logic of choosing a doctrine similar to one pro-

moted in the US in the Bush era, the question remains of whether implementing

measures resembling those used in the US a decade ago in a medium-sized EU

country does not call for more serious, structured thought.

This does not seem to constitute a strategic vision of Poland’s development

from the point of view of the energy sector or of energy-climate security, and it

is obvious that this approach, largely divorced from the potential of renewable

energy sources and climatic conditions, will not live up to the “challenges” of

the contemporary world.

Even now, doubts are beginning to appear in circles where the view of energy

security described above is largely held. Professor Jadwiga Staniszkis, the well-

known Polish political scientist and sociologist, argues that energy should be seen

from a much wider perspective than just in terms of pipelines, such as the Nabuc-

ces

co gas pipeline. She invokes US intelligence service reports in which Europe and

Japan are presented as two areas likely to be affected by an energy crisis between

now and 2025. Professor Staniszkis remarks that nothing is currently being done

to prepare for the introduction of new technologies which will be key to providing

enough energy, and writes with some regret: “If only Poland, which has stressed

the problem of energy security in the EU for some time, went further - not only

in terms of geopolitics, but also technology.”6 Staniszkis connects the need to

diversify energy supplies with innovation: “Poland could add the problem of new

technologies to this. During the crisis, with lowered public expectations, the US is

using the government’s new, stronger position in the financial system to pump big

money into technological development.” She postulates that “it is in the interest

of Poland to convince Europe to say to itself: ‘We are locking ourselves in within

our small club, because only we are capable of this technological leap.’ This leap

forward can be achieved using the intellectual capital of new member countries.”

opean energy security based on the use of renewable energy sour

Her voice is worth noting, also in the context of the vision for the Polish EU Presi-

dency in 2011, in which energy security is to be given special importance. So far,

discussion on this issue could cause alarm in some circles, due to Poland’s persist-

enewables

ent pursuit of outdated technologies which, even in a mid-term perspective, turn

out extremely expensive (uncompetitive compared to renewables). Traditional

thinking about energy security displays an increasing lack of understanding of

urope through Re

5

“Determining a time horizon for the share of renewables in the power generation structure - at a

level of 20%, and later poss. 30% (by 2030), taking into account the assumption that, in the case

of Poland, coal is a valuable resource, it should be saved, although after the incubation period

of ‘clean coal technologies’ (by 2020–2025) it may be worthwhile using less of it (by 2040–2050)

nergy Security in

making coal a strategic reserve for the second half of the XXI century.” Source: Assembly of

e

Strategic Advisors to the Prime Minister, “Poland 2030 Report”, Warsaw 2009.

6

Jadwiga Staniszkis, „Jesienią rzucę się do walki,” [“In autumn I will fling myself into fight,”]

Rzeczpospolita, 6 August 2009.

Reaching

1 Energy Security: Individual, local and regional factors in Eur

14

the wider and strategic consequences of the current economic slow-down and of

the EU climate package, supported in the US, in the EU and in leading EU coun-

tries by a range of stimulation packages promoting renewables.

1.4. Difficulties with the centric approach to overcoming problems connected

with improving energy security in poland

Aided by innovation and decentralization, the technological and industrial

revolution in the energy sector causes traditional concepts of energy security

to run into insurmountable problems when put into practice within dynamic

environments and political processes aimed at overcoming climate change.

Alan Greenspan notes that, despite efforts and encouragements to this end

from successive governments, since 1976 not one oil refinery has been built in

the US. He writes: “Although several remain in the planning phase, the main

problem stems from insecurity as to future environmental standards - because

a typical new refinery means a financial engagement with a 30 year horizon.

This insecurity renders investments into the construction of these installations

particularly risky.”

Equivalent problems affect investment in improving the security of electric

ces

power supply in Poland, currently based on coal and coal-fuelled power stations

in as much as 94%. As Prof. Krzysztof Żmijewski argues, the basic problem of

the Polish energy sector is the depreciation affecting the system, directly re-

sulting from the ageing of the infrastructure. Over the last five years two new

coal power stations were put into operation (Pątnów II and Łagisza II), and two

others are nearing completion (Bełchatów II and Częstochowa). Two further

generators for the Opole power station are being planned, but all this is insignif-

icant relative to the level of unmet demand. Power transmission lines in Poland

have not been more intensively developed for many years now. According to

Żmijewski, to stop the process of technical depreciation, investments of at least

625 MWe a year are needed. The level of depreciation of sources has reached

79%. In the case of transmission networks, depreciation reaches 71%, and in

the case of the heating sector - 63%. Stopping the process of depreciation of

technical infrastructure requires investments at a rate of 16 billion EUR a year

opean energy security based on the use of renewable energy sour

(of which 5 billion EUR a year for the electric power sector). This level of invest-

ment cannot be reached on credits, because the borrowing power of the Polish

enewables

electric power sector is insufficient (9–12 billion EUR), while 25 billion EUR is

the sum needed by 2015. The interest to be paid would cause enormous price

increases. Other solutions must therefore be sought.

Gathering investment capital on such a scale is a problem, especially

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while other EU countries are also competing for it - countries which do not

benefit from derogations for CO2 emission allowances for their power sta-

tions and heating plants within the new ETS directive, and the recent di-

rective on industrial emissions. EU countries without long-term derogations

in this area create more favorable conditions for investment in new energy

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sources than Poland and Central European countries, which have managed

to obtain derogation rights during negotiations for the EU climate package in

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1 Energy Security: Individual, local and regional factors in Eur

2008. Of the total financial means assigned to Poland for the years 2007-2012

15

(over 65 billion EUR - a significant sum on the EU scale), only a small part

has been allocated to renewables by the central government (only around

0.6% of the total, together with the cohesion fund and the fund for regional

development - although local governments adopted a different approach, as

I will explain below). The greater part of the cohesion fund, being directly

available to the government, was allocated to the development of needed but

traditional infrastructure, including energy infrastructure. Significant levels

of public funding are still being assigned to the protection of national mining

industries (and coal power), and they are far from being spent on the devel-

opment of clean coal technologies, but rather on the temporary protection of

employment in mining and the energy sector. Such investment policies will

not help build long-term energy security. As a result of its choice of priorities,

in the name of protecting the current interests of its power sector, Poland

is not fully benefiting from EU mechanisms accessible to it. These include,

among others, the stabilization package focused on green technologies or the

idea of common European grids, which could serve as a basis for a broader

European conception of energy security, in particular when it comes to elec-

tric power.

One of the untapped solutions is the construction of international grid con-

ces

nections with Poland’s neighbors. Connecting the systems would enable the

balancing of peak demand, as well as making better use of renewables as the

share of green energy from unstable sources in the electric power system inev-

itably increases. The lack of international connections forms a further barrier

to the development of renewables. New grid connections would also minimize

demand for national reserve power, and this would entail significant cost de-

creases in Poland, on a “climatic” time scale (2050) but also even on the time

scale of the climate package (3 x 20% by 2020). According to analyses con-

ducted by the European Climate Foundation, investment costs in the renew-

able sector will remain higher for a certain time, but will fall dramatically once

the infrastructure is in place.7 Western Europe assumes that a common energy

market will be in operation by 2015. By 2013 an energy market for so called

“old” EU members should be in place, and other member states will enter this

market gradually.

opean energy security based on the use of renewable energy sour

Another factor in the building of energy security championed in the EU, and

insufficiently taken advantage of in Poland, is the development of renewables.

As a result of liberalization and in the age of climate policy, renewables will

enewables

play a key role in Europe’s supply of clean energy sources as early as 2020-

2030. Different European countries dispose of varying, but on a continental

scale, complementary, renewable energy resources: in the north hydro-power,

bio-energy, and wind dominate, while Southern Europe has greater solar and

urope through Re

geothermal resources. Estimates suggest that the total economic potential of

these sources exceeds their current exploitation twenty-fold. Research-backed

initiatives such as ERENE, the European Community for Renewable Energy (a

new community, akin to Euratom, for the optimal use of Europe’s renewable

nergy Security in e

7

European Climate Foundation, “Road Map 2050: A Practical Guide to a Prosperous, Low Carbon

Europe,” Brussels 2009.

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1 Energy Security: Individual, local and regional factors in Eur

16

energy potential), focused on cooperation and the exploitation of renewable

energy resources within a pan-European network, including marine networks,

could allow us to meet all of our demand for energy from renewable sources

by 2050, especially when it comes to electric power. The EU is in urgent need

of a few flagship projects in this context, such as the installation of solar power

plants in North Africa and the creation of wind farms in the North Sea. Assess-

ing the situation realistically, Europe is not capable of achieving full energy

independence by 2030, but it will continue getting closer to this goal, and the

fact that the EU has initiated these processes sufficiently early must be seen as

a very positive step.

The failure to take advantage of the possibilities offered by the EU in the

area of energy and climate security does not entail low energy prices and bet-

ter economic competitiveness, contrary to opinions current in Poland. It can

also be argued that, with the current barrier to investment, the process of re-

forming the energy sector has slowed down. This is due to derogations and the

difficulties of building a free electric power market in Poland because of the

monopolization and partial nationalization of the power generation and distri-

bution sector by means of four vertically integrated national power corpora-

tions (PGE, Tauron, Enion, Energa), dominated by government shares. The

ces

creation of vertically consolidated state enterprises was conducted with the

explicit aim of increasing the value of the national power sector and improving

national energy security, here understood to mean the direct influence exerted

by the state on the policy conducted by key national corporations. Everything

would indicate that, with a monopoly in place and without active efforts to

advance energy efficiency and sustainable energy sources or to open up the

market, renewables will find it more difficult to break through than in other

EU countries. Insufficient consideration has been given to the view, dominant

in the EU, that full liberalization of the electric energy market benefits national

consumers most (unbundling, i.e. separating production and supply, and the

removal of bottlenecks in this field by finally connecting “energy islands” to

the European network). The four energy corporations acting as regional mo-

nopolies created as a result of consolidation were allowed to conduct actions

such as increasing energy prices, without the possibility of the regulator suc-

opean energy security based on the use of renewable energy sour

cessfully intervening in the commercial exchange processes of these groups,

and in practice without an option for end consumers to take advantage of such

enewables

means as changing their energy provider.

Structural conditions and the electric energy market model adopted by Po-

land inevitably - and completely independently of the EU climate package - lead

to systematic increases in energy prices, increasingly hitting the budgets of

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small business, and especially those of individual households. The figure below

represents trends in prices for electric energy and gas (a sector monopolized in

Poland by one state company, PGNiG).

nergy Security in e

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1 Energy Security: Individual, local and regional factors in Eur

17

fig. 1: electricity and gas prices for final consumers

ces

Over one decade (1999-2009), electric energy prices for consumers in Po-

land rose by 107%, and gas by 163% - despite a lack of investments to increase

power - while the (relatively high) average income increase over this period was

below 64%. This phenomenon cannot be explained otherwise but by the high

level of monopolization in the sectors of energy and fuel production and distri-

bution, and by the low efficiency which persists in the energy sector. Neither can

the phenomenon be explained by the high costs of the EU climate package, as

the energy sector has argued during its past lobbying efforts against the adop-

tion of the package and in its current lobbying for increased public aid.

The result is that an average Polish family spends over 12% of its monthly

income on fuel and energy (of which 5% on electric energy).8 It can therefore be

said that a large portion of households are affected by energy poverty. It is also

difficult not to postulate that in Poland these negative phenomena could grow

opean energy security based on the use of renewable energy sour

in strength and that they have a certain causal connection with the established

conception of energy security, based on the strengthening of state coal-energy

monopolies, in particular with regard to electric power. Policy in this field, de-

enewables

termined by the government’s relations with energy corporations, is becoming

increasingly inefficient in promoting the interests of the energy consumer and

in the development of renewables. There is therefore a constant need to build

organizational alternatives on a regional and local level, and to provide end

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consumers with technological alternatives to the extremely centralized Polish

model of energy supply. This is why it is worthwhile looking more closely at the

regional factor of energy security, largely ignored in Poland, and the (initially

limited) freedom citizens have to improve their individual energy security.

nergy Security in e

8

In the United Kingdom energy poverty has been defined as a situation in which a household finds

itself spending more than 10% of its income on an adequate level of heating.

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1 Energy Security: Individual, local and regional factors in Eur

18

1.5. the forgotten idea of local and regional energy security

It is assumed that ensuring energy security is one of the responsibilities of gov-

ernments. This was certainly the case in the 19th, and partly also in the 20th

century. Efforts to ensure security often led to very insecure situations, however

- several recent wars were fought over oil. In the contemporary world, energy

security is no longer determined by new multi-gigawatt turbo generators run-

ning on fossil fuels (nuclear fuel, coal, gas), increasingly expensive to acquire

and operate, and a bigger number of pipelines (from places where fuel reserves

are decreasing to places where demand for them is rising), but rather by actions

to increase energy efficiency and use local renewable energy sources. Since this

has been the case, governments, used to the established situation and proce-

dures in the energy sector, seem incapable of finding a solution independently.

Traditional “advice” given to governments by just as traditional energy enter-

prises will normally lead to over-investment in outdated technologies and to

very high government guarantees and costs, tolerated (or rather camouflaged)

as necessary for “state security.” It is perhaps for the best that in this respect

governments will at least partly give up their monopoly on knowledge and pow-

er and will take advantage of cooperation within the EU in solving this problem.

ces

It would perhaps be even better if they paid more attention to the capabilities of

regional assemblies in this field.

Coming back to my previous point, it would seem logical to argue that Po-

land’s approach to energy security lacks a regional, bottom-up, individual in-

gredient, and that energy security - as opposed to military security, for example

– should be more of a combination of regional, local, and individual security

than a division of national security into administrative units. Although currently

things are somewhat different in practice, this type of thoroughly modern think-

ing appeared in Poland almost ten years ago. In a statement “on the state of

national energy security and action taken by the government in this field,” pre-

pared for the Council of Ministers in 2001 (at a time when Poland was in the

midst of a battle over the adoption of the renewable energy development strat-

egy), the following remarks appeared: “In the future the increasing importance

of local energy security must be taken into account, as a result of the methodical

opean energy security based on the use of renewable energy sour

execution of the country’s administrative reforms, with a series of powers being

devolved from the central administration to a provincial, county or commune

enewables

level.... Energy security can be expected to evolve on three levels:

local (in one or several communes9), the most important element of which

is the reliability and continuity of thermal energy supplies,

regional (e.g. over the area of a province), the most significant element of

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which is the capability and readiness to provide power transmission services for

communes (groups of communes) and exchanges of energy between regions,

national.

If such a plan is implemented, responsibility for the level of energy security will

be attributed as follows:

nergy Security in e

9

Commune – gmina – is the principal unit (lowest uniform level) of territorial division in Poland

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1 Energy Security: Individual, local and regional factors in Eur

(editor’s note).

19

government administration - creating conditions for the unhindered devel-

opment of international, inter-regional and intra-regional infrastructural con-

nections, allowing for reliable and unlimited transit, transmission and regional

energy distribution services,

local government administration - developing local potential for electric

and thermal power generation, including renewable energy, local distribution

services, and ensuring the supply of electric power and heat to consumers.”10

It is therefore a shame that currently the issue of energy security is dis-

cussed solely from a geopolitical and corporative perspective, focusing on cen-

tralized investments, Russian gas and national coal, with too little said about

ways of improving energy security from the local and regional levels, which we

can influence directly. The fact is that local government and politicians, who are

elected locally, do usually notice this problem and the existing potential, but un-

fortunately the theory and practice aimed at combining these two ways of view-

ing the problem into one system are not sufficiently developed. The political, ex-

pert, and business base for the promotion of such an approach is also too weak.

Local governments could play a particular role in the development of renew-

able energy. According to former EU Commissioner for Regional Policy, Danuta

Huebner, a growing number of projects in the EU are implemented on local

ces

and regional levels. Currently decisions regarding as many as 67% of all pub-

lic investments are taken on a local or regional level. At the same time, local

governments attach much importance to improving the environment in their

area, decreasing pollution, improving the energy security of the region and the

energy balance of individual communes. Facilitating cooperation between local

government structures in creating a strategy for the development of renewable

energy therefore seems logical. Such conclusions and measures for the promo-

tion of renewable energy can be arrived at by different paths. Some local gov-

ernment structures experience the problem of environmental threats directly,

and these can be felt even during attempts to build renewable energy infrastruc-

ture (which receive extensive publicity). A certain number of local governing

bodies, motivated by a broadly understood responsibility for their citizens, for

others and for future generations, engage in actions such as the EU Covenant

of Mayors initiated by the European Commission, working in cooperation with

opean energy security based on the use of renewable energy sour

the Committee of the Regions. The Covenant is to focus on implementing the 3

x 20% climate package, especially in urban areas, with the aim of reducing CO2

emissions. However, the 3 x 20% package is nothing more than broadly under-

enewables

stood energy security at every level and in the whole of the EU. Local governing

bodies - as opposed to central government and traditional energy enterprises -

see these activities as a source of benefits, rather than costs.

Probably the best known reaction of local government members to this type

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of problem could be observed in the spring of 2008, at the time of the “Szczecin

black-out,” the most widely reported of such events in Poland over the last three

years. The position held by the Covenant of Marshals of the Republic of Poland at

the time in respect to improving the energy security of the country by developing

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10 Government statement on the state of national energy security, adopted by the Chamber of Dep-

uties on 25 January 2002.

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1 Energy Security: Individual, local and regional factors in Eur

20

renewable energy and electric power transmission networks gave rise to the crea-

tion of so-called provincial energy security councils in Poland.11 Poland is not a

federal country, neither is it sufficiently decentralized, and under our jurisdiction-

al system provinces find it difficult to achieve rapid results in this respect. As for

the current management structure in the field of energy security, the creation of

specialized institutions to provide support for local government seems essential.

This could be a joint task for regional and local energy agencies. A dozen or so

of them already exist in Poland, several of them strongly connected with the pro-

vincial government and highly active. The action plans of agencies with financial

backing from the European Commission (the IEE program - Intelligent Energy for

Europe) include goals connected with the improvement of local energy security,

such as compiling regional energy strategies, regional strategies for renewables,

and commune-based energy plans, as well as action in the interests of end con-

sumers of energy and the promotion of local exploitation of renewable resources.

In the capital of the region which experienced the black-out mentioned

above - Szczecin - and in the surrounding area, the real (rather than political)

losses were counted. This was a serious event, as losses to just one fertilizer

plant in Police amounted to 10 million PLN, and the Szczecin shipyards lost 2

million PLN. Many suggestions were made as to how to solve the problem from

ces

a “technical” perspective, but the voices of experts and local government activ-

ists encouraged a broader view of the issue, and stressed that the “Szczecin

events” would hurt the city’s image. This would be particularly worrying for

(local) industry (even though bigger factories usually have back-up power), and

especially if such events happened regularly.

In this situation we should be aware of the growing importance of the qual-

ity of spatial development plans (at regional and local levels), planning in the

energy sector (on the regional level this will very quickly develop into the crea-

tion of not only provincial renewable energy development programs but also

regional energy policy), with the possible use of such measures as e.g. air pro-

tection plans. It cannot be denied that, on its own, even the most diligent im-

plementation of current law will not be enough, and that to face the challenges

described above legal changes will be necessary. The responsibility for energy

security (as well as means) will also have to be transferred to a regional level to

opean energy security based on the use of renewable energy sour

a large degree, and even to a local level on subsidiary terms. Plans for the devel-

opment of the network of distribution companies should always be correlated

enewables

with plans for the development of renewable energy in regions and communes

and agreed in detail with local government. Local governing bodies should in

turn know where they plan to promote investments into renewables. With lo-

cal governing bodies better prepared, the government will be able to achieve

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more through cooperation and coordinated action, and to look for solutions to

the problem of energy security, among others, inside the country, and not only

outside, where Poland does not dispose of sufficient leverage.

nergy Security in e

11 “Stanowisko Konwentu Marszałków Województw RP, Miedzyzdroje,” [“Position of the Convent

of the Marshals of Voivodships, Międzyzdroje”] Internetowy serwis informacyjny Związku Woje-

wództw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 13 March 2010, http://www.zwrp.pl/index2.php?option=com_

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1 Energy Security: Individual, local and regional factors in Eur

content&do_pdf=1&id=671.

21

1.6. individual energy security

Central and local government should create conditions for the improvement of

the energy security of each individual company and citizen. However, they should

also create conditions for the individual consumer to be able to independently

contribute to a better, more reliable, and more environmentally friendly way of

meeting his own energy needs. The goal is to release citizens’ own creativity and

initiative by removing legal barriers created in the current, centralized, and still

highly monopolized energy supply system, but also by ensuring the availability

of small-scale technologies on the marketplace, enabling the development of dis-

tributed generation (in small and medium enterprises, or SMEs) and micro-gen-

eration (in households). Use can be made here of the US experiences mentioned

above, so far underestimated in the EU, as well as of the great potential of indi-

vidual entrepreneurial spirit, also (and perhaps especially) in Poland.

Stanisław Lem, Poland’s best known science fiction writer, was strongly at-

tached to a personal feeling of safety following his experiences during the war

and over the cold war period. This also concerned the electricity supply in his

house in Kliny, where he lived and wrote in the seventies, also called the “years

of shortages” in communist Poland. As his son Tomasz Lem writes in the book

ces

Awantury na tle powszechnego ciążenia ( Riot in a Gravitational Field - not avail-

able in English), the regular (almost daily) blackouts motivated Stanisław Lem

to acquire an enormous and noisy electric generator from a fishing boat to back

up his own feeling of energy security, and to ensure he had the light needed

for writing books at night for example.12 This anecdote, colored with humor

particular to Lem’s extraordinary personality, demonstrates a particular type of

entrepreneurial spirit and the individual potential of citizens who, in communist

times, had to deal with many discomforts unheard of in Europe at the time, in-

cluding the weaknesses of a centralized energy system.

Currently citizens have access to a much wider (although still too narrow)

range of energy technologies, which they can easily make direct use of. These

include, when it comes to heating (and cooling), solar thermal panels, biomass

pellet boilers, and heat pumps, and when it comes to electricity - small-scale

wind farms, photovoltaic systems, micro-biogas plants, fuel cells using biofuels,

opean energy security based on the use of renewable energy sour

and even renewably produced hydrogen. It must be noted, however, that energy

consumers find it difficult to access the grid, and that the development of tech-

nologies serving distributed generation is too slow. It seems that traditional en-

enewables

ergy corporations not only have too strong an influence on regulations relative

to the access of independent energy producers to the grid, but also that in their

choice of priorities for funding and the rules of co-funding scientific research

into new technologies their main goal is maintaining the status quo (only slight

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changes to traditional multi-scale technologies are accepted). Not enough stress

is put on small-scale technologies for independent, individual energy producers.

This is the case with regard to scientific research funding on a national level (in

Poland the majority of funding is still allocated to the development of traditional

nergy Security in e

12 Tomasz Lem, Awantury na Tle Powszechnego Ciążenia [ Riot in a Gravitational Field] (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 2009).

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1 Energy Security: Individual, local and regional factors in Eur

22

energy technologies, mainly coal power), as well as on an EU level (dispropor-

tionately high means for the development of nuclear power under Euratom and

excessive importance accorded to the needs of traditional energy enterprises,

attempting to defend themselves against the arrival of cutting edge technologies

on the market). With the current, extremely stale range of technologies in use

(dating back to the 19th century), cutting edge technologies should not be as-

sociated with enormous scales - previously something to be proud of in energy

expert circles - but should rather be aimed at the great potential of replicating

small-scale technologies. It is using such new technologies, serving to decen-

tralize absurdly giant systems which we have constructed and which every day

take us further away from consolidation and order and closer to uncertainty and

chaos, that we can improve our energy security in a sustainable manner. The

slow, but inevitable decline of energy supply systems which no longer have any

significant development potential (apart from the unlimited potential of rising

costs) can be seen as a positive phenomenon, as long as we are careful to make

use of some of their achievements and if we are determined in the construction

of sustainable technological alternatives.

This is a chance, but also an obvious challenge for Poland and in a sense for

the whole European Union, which, with its 40% market share, remains a world

ces

leader in the export of technologies using renewable energy sources, even if

the attribution of resources and funding for research and development in this

area is clearly growing faster in China and the US. The EU must make sure

that it can strengthen its leadership position by adequately increasing the distri-

bution of resources and financial means, but at the same time it should distance

itself from unjustified backing for certain technologies and outdated general

conceptions of the energy sector.

We are entering an era where an energy consumer can go to one of the hy-

permarket chains selling building materials to choose a solar panel or wind tur-

bine which he can himself install, and enjoy electric energy produced within his

own household, which will meet all his energy needs. Networks of installers and

producers of household appliances of this type will greatly gain in importance

in this process. In the well-known publication Small Is Profitable (2002), the

authors counted as many as 207 benefits which the development of distributed

opean energy security based on the use of renewable energy sour

generation is expected to bring for the consumer and the citizen.13 A significant

part of these is directly or indirectly connected with an improvement in local

enewables

and individual energy security.

These processes are growing in strength, and they will shake the founda-

tions of the current order governing the energy market created by the corporate

energy sector, which will inevitably meet with resistance. The lack of faith in the

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executive power of states and international institutions stems from the fact that

governments, while trying to change things, would have to influence changes in

thinking within corporations, where the outdated paradigm of basing unchang-

ing levels of productivity on increasingly limited resources dominates. The well

known Polish sociologist and philosopher and key representative of the “post-

nergy Security in e

13 Amory B. Lovins et al., Small Is Profitable: The Hidden Economic Benefits of Making Electrical Reaching

1 Energy Security: Individual, local and regional factors in Eur

Resources at Right Size (Snowmass, CO: Rocky Mountain Institute, 2002).

23

modernist school,” professor Zygmunt Bauman, stresses the important role of

local initiatives with truly global ambitions, such as e.g. environmental or con-

sumer movements, in civil society. He warns, however, that “this is difficult, as

the objectives are global, and the actors local and difficult to organize.”14 It will

be made possible, however, by technological progress and legal limits on the role

of monopolies in restricting access to the grid. No one can command our wishes

and preferences. People incessantly seek variety, independence and security of

their energy supply, and will find them in new, small-scale energy technologies.

1.7. tasks for the eu

A significant and sustainable improvement in energy security cannot be achieved

under a system dominated by relations between the government and traditional

energy corporations. If cooperation only involves these two sides only the level

of costs becomes obvious, and the effects are bound to be short-term. A Euro-

pean perspective and cooperation are essential here and will have a positive im-

pact both on lowering energy supply costs as on general energy security and the

quality of services. The EU should also act to de-monopolize and decentralize

the industry and to unleash the potential of local initiatives and the development

ces

of small-scale technologies, without which small-scale energy consumers will

find themselves with least protection on the liberal market.

Initiating EU support for the decentralization of energy systems and the devel-

opment of small-scale technologies, particular to local communities, SMEs and in-

dividual energy consumers (transforming them into “pro-sumers”), is an essential

element of the transformation process and of ensuring a smooth evolution of ener-

gy systems towards environmental sustainability and energy security at every level.

The Lisbon Treaty, in which the functioning of the EU on local and regional

government levels was first included, should be effectively made use of in the

improvement of energy security. This entails, among other things, that regions

and local government structures participate in consultations when new EU rules

are being drafted, and that their interests must be considered when assessing

the effects of implementing the new regulations. The contents of the Treaty

should also be reflected in the formulation of policy and law in the energy sec-

opean energy security based on the use of renewable energy sour

tor, and in the implementation of EU directives in EU member countries. Impor-

tant tasks for the EU include the engagement of regional and local government

structures (e.g. through the Covenant of Mayors mentioned above, or, earlier,

enewables

the MERG Reflection Group representing regional energy agencies), pilot finan-

cial mechanisms such as ELENA (European Local Energy Assistance - a Euro-

pean Investment Bank program to encourage environmentally sustainable en-

ergy for local government) or CONCERTO (demonstration projects within the

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7th EU Framework Research and Development Program), and these should be

expanded and popularized. If activity is not stimulated on a local level, it will be

difficult to promote energy efficiency and the development of renewable energy

sources - this mainly requires local-level action, much closer to the individual

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14 Interview by Iwona Kokoszka, Forbes, 26.07.2010. http://www.forbes.pl/artykuly/sekcje/opinie

/20-pytan-do----zygmunta-baumana,5586,1.

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1 Energy Security: Individual, local and regional factors in Eur

24

than central government. The role of governments should be to create the right

conditions for such initiatives and - together with the EU - to coordinate actions

to promote modern energy infrastructure and technological development.

Work on the EU budget for 2014-2020, including the compilation of a list of

priorities for the next EU research and development program, constitutes an excel-

lent chance to undertake such action. EU recommendations to allocate a significant

part of the total EU budget to renewables and energy efficiency have not so far

been fully followed.15 Recommendations to allocate around 2% of the total budget

from funding for cohesion policies / the Cohesion Fund and the European Regional

Development Fund (ERDF) were also only partially respected. In line with the EU’s

new energy-climate challenges relative to the 3 x 20% package, over the 2014-2020

time period an increase in the share of means allocated to renewables should be

sought, while ensuring that they can also be used to support strategic investments

(such as e.g. marine wind farms), infrastructural investments (the development of

distribution networks to benefit renewable sources), as well as investments into

small-scale renewables, forming a part of distributed generation, and the creation

of local intelligent micro-grids. The improvement of local and individual energy

security would certainly benefit from increased efforts to implement the 2009/28/

WE directive fully and on time. The directive, which deals with promoting the use

ces

of renewable energy sources, includes a series of annotations (e.g. in relation to

the priority of connecting renewables to the grid or the role of installation compa-

nies). In particular, the EU should actively promote the full opening up of the grid

to energy micro-sources (the possibility for an energy “pro-sumer” to pay his local

distribution network for his net energy consumption) as in this respect it is lagging

behind the US and failing to tap into the full potential of its citizens.

The 20-percent renewable energy share in the balance of gross final energy use

by 2020 required by the directive, and the expected 30-35% share of green energy

in meeting the demand for electric power (in places reaching 50%), constitute the

best means not only of reducing emissions, but also of improving energy security.

In order to provide technological support for implementing the directive a

critical assessment of the 7th EU Framework Research and Technological Devel-

opment Program (binding until the year 2013) is also necessary, before the next

program for up until 2020 is drawn up. Although of the whole 7th Framework

opean energy security based on the use of renewable energy sour

Program budget (53.2 billion EUR) a significant amount has been allocated to

energy (2.35 billion EUR), the Euratom budget (2.75 billion EUR) seems dis-

enewables

proportionately high. Tenders organized under the “Energy” heading of the 7th

Framework Program should also be revised, as they focus practically solely on

large-scale projects involving big energy corporations, which are rarely sources

of innovation or real inroads into the renewable energy sector.

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Over the next decade, access to new, increasingly efficient and reliable tech-

nologies utilizing local renewable energy resources will be as important as ac-

cess to fossil fuel resources was in this decade, and consequently technological

rather than resource security will increasingly determine energy security.

nergy Security in e

15 Article 7of Regulation (EC) No 397/2009 of the Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009

amending Regulation (EC) No 1080/2006 on the European Regional Development Fund as re-

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1 Energy Security: Individual, local and regional factors in Eur

gards the eligibility of energy efficiency and renewable energy investments in housing.

25

2. the european union on the road to energy

independence

by Zbigniew M. Karaczun

How can European energy security be improved? Can the European Union be-

come independent of external energy supplies and energy? How to support the

growth of renewable energy sources in Europe so that they become the main

source of energy produced by the EU? In this text the author tries to find an-

swers to these questions.

2.1. introduction

Two of the three European Communities brought to life by the Treaties of Rome

of 25 March 1957 were directly or indirectly concerned with energy. One of

the aims of Euratom (the European Atomic Energy Community) was, and re-

mains, to promote nuclear power development in Community countries and to

strengthen their cooperation in this area.1 The April 1951 Treaty of Paris estab-

lished the European Coal and Steel Community, creating a common European

market whose goals included boosting the production of coal, seen as a funda-

mental energy resource at the time, and facilitating trade in coal between Com-

munity countries.2 This allowed for the quick development of the energy sector

in countries belonging to Economic Communities and provided them with a

high level of energy security. As a result, no further action was taken in the

1950s and1960s to coordinate energy policy across the whole Community, con-

sidering this one of the economic issues that member countries can and should

resolve independently.

The situation changed in the seventies with the first oil crisis, caused by

OPEC countries introducing an embargo on the sale of crude oil extracted

in those countries. This made politicians realize that Europe was strongly

reliant on the import of energy resources and that access to these resourc-

es and meeting ever-growing demand were becoming important problems

enewables

from the point of view of economic development. European politicians also

understood that access to energy resources was becoming a strategic issue,

as these could be used by exporting countries as a political and economic

weapon.

urope through Re

It also became apparent at the time that Europe needed stronger coordina-

tion of energy policy and that the creation of an institutional framework for

actions aimed at avoiding future energy supply problems was imperative. The

first of such actions was the involvement of the European Union (EU) in the

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1

The decision to create Euratom was made in June 1955 during the Messina conference negotiations.

2

Initially 6 countries: Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, Germany, France, and Italy.

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2 The European Union on the road to energy independence

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26

International Energy Agency (IEA), created in 1974, which became the most

important European tool for analyzing and monitoring the international energy

market. The IEA started to analyze possibilities for raising energy independence

and energy security in the European Communities. Another result of the first oil

crisis was a closer cooperation between European countries and the Soviet Un-

ion (and later Russia), seen as an alternative supply source to Arab states. The

search for new deposits in Europe also intensified, and the extraction of existing

resources increased.

Almost two decades later, in 1991, the European Union announced the En-

ergy Charter Declaration, which became the basis for the 1994 Energy Charter

Treaty.3 These documents were created with the aim of strengthening coopera-

tion between individual parties in the sphere of energy security and promoting

the diversification of the supply of resources and energy to individual states and

regions. Energy policy still remained the domain of individual member coun-

tries, however, and in most cases did not foresee a significant move away from

fossil fuels.

This was soon to change. The 1990s was a period during which the European

energy sector had to face another challenge: the need to reduce greenhouse gas

emissions. Since the beginning of negotiations under the UN Framework Con-

vention on Climate Change, the European Union has been one of the most ac-

tive negotiators and a leader in international efforts in this area. A radical cut in

emissions of the principal greenhouse gas, carbon dioxide, required a thorough

overhaul of the means by which energy was generated and the replacement of

carbon-based fuel burning processes with renewable sources as ways of obtain-

ing energy. But while an aggressive climate policy and ambitious goals set for

the European Union have not met with major protests from member countries,

efforts to significantly change the approach to energy policy has. Several at-

tempts to redefine it (in 1995, 2001, and 2003) did not bring the expected results.

This was mainly due to the interests of individual member states dominating

over the interests of the European Union. This became one of the reasons why

the European Commission started to seek other ways of improving the energy

security of the EU.

2.2. community energy security

enewables

The European Union is dependent on fossil fuels. The EU consumes around

17% of the energy produced globally, and almost 80% of this comes from burn-

ing carbon-based fuels: coal, oil, and natural gas. Half of the energy resources

consumed in the EU are imported. In the case of oil, the percentage imported

urope through Re

reaches 80%, while for natural gas 57%.4 Some member countries are complete-

ly dependent on natural gas supplies; for others the reliability of imports is a key

factor of energy security (table 1).

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3

T. W. Walde , ed. The Energy Charter Treaty (London: Kluwer Law International, 1996).

4

The European Union imports around 70% of its oil and natural gas from Russia and the Middle

East, countries with sketchy democratic standards and political instabilities. Russia is the sup-

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2 The European Union on the road to energy independence

plier of 45% of all gas and 29% of all oil consumed in the EU.

27

table 1: level of dependence on natural gas imports for selected eu countries

(data from 2005)

country

1. Share of imports in natural gas supply (%)

Share of imports from Russia in gas supply (%)

Estonia

100

100

Finland

100

100

Czech

98

70

Republic

France

98

26

Austria

88

74

Italy

85

30

Germany

81

39

Poland

70

50

Source: IEA 2009

Dependence on imports, concerns about disruption to supplies, and the

lack of a common European energy policy result in some countries forcing

through projects which improve their own energy security, even when this

happens at the cost of decreasing the security of other EU members. One

example is the project of constructing a pipeline under the Baltic Sea con-

necting Russia with Germany, against the protests of the Baltic countries and

Poland, fearing for the security of their own supplies.5 This is understanda-

ble, however. Such actions are caused by a lack of coordination in EU energy

and energy security policies. Politicians, fearing their voters’ reactions, take

decisions that are beneficial to the interest groups they represent and to their

own national electorates, not paying attention to whether such decisions may

be harmful to other countries. Especially as they rightly expect other coun-

tries to behave similarly. And so the vicious circle continues.

It became clear that these fears are justified and that such a high level of

dependency on imported fossil fuels constitutes a major risk when Gazprom,

the Russian natural gas monopoly, suddenly cut off gas supplies to Ukraine

in 2005. Because the resource was transported to EU countries via a pipeline

which transits Ukraine, the consequences of this decision were immediately

felt by some European Union countries, among them Austria, Germany, Po-

land, and Italy, which began receiving up to 30% less gas. Although the cri-

sis only lasted a few days, it caused significant losses for many companies

which depended on gas for production purposes. It was also an unambiguous

enewables

signal showing that the level of energy security of member states was insuf-

ficient. This belief intensified in January 2007 when Transneft, another Rus-

sian company, halted crude oil supplies delivered via the Friendship pipeline.

Although this action was aimed at Belarus, its consequences – in the form of

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a 20% cut in oil supplies – were felt very strongly by countries like Germany

and Poland.

5

The construction of a pipeline bypassing the Baltic countries and Poland and using it to sup-

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ply gas to “old” EU countries will not result in gas shortages for the bypassed countries. It will, e

however, increase Russia’s degree of freedom in its “game” with supplies. Russia will be able to

close supplies to Central European countries without fearing that its interests in the West of the

continent will be affected.

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The Russia-Ukraine gas crisis, the Russia-Belarus oil crisis, and the cuts

in deliveries to EU member countries should make the European community

realize that EU policy as it stands does not ensure energy security in terms

of the most basic criterion: reliability of supplies. Europe’s heavy reliance on

the import of resources and energy from countries that are unstable political-

ly and not fully democratic means that the EU economy and community are

at risk of being blackmailed by “rogue states” or countries not fully imple-

menting democratic principles. The answer to this threat should be tighter

cooperation on energy issues between member states, increased diversifica-

tion of supply sources, and wider use of energy sourced in EU countries. For

the latter, only renewable resources provide sufficient amounts of energy.

Although, it would seem, the need has been perceived, the EU is still una-

ble to find a practical solution and reduce its dependence. As a consequence,

forecasts point to a further rise in the EU’s reliance on supplies of energy

resources. By 2030 as much as 65% of energy sources utilized by the EU will

come from imports. The majority of imports will be comprised of non-renew-

ables – despite plans for the wide development of renewable energy sources.

2.3. towards renewable energy sources

One of the reactions of highly developed countries to the energy crisis of the

seventies was the development of the first plans for energy systems based

on renewable resources. This process did not last long, however, and did not

bring lasting changes. The rapid return of low prices for oil and other energy

resources, followed by three decades of policies aimed at lowering resource

and energy prices, conspired to limit interest in the development of renew-

able energy sources. The lack of confidence in renewables was encouraged

by big energy corporations, which conducted more or less official lobbying

activities, with no interest in changing the prevailing policy directions. Ef-

forts made at the time did not, therefore, have durable effects and failed to

bring about a fundamental change in energy policy in developed countries.

A much stronger signal for the development of renewable sources ap-

peared twenty years later with the beginning of climate negotiations. Deci-

sions to cut emissions taken by some countries at the time meant, in practice,

that those countries chose to increase the role of renewables. This also con-

enewables

cerned the European Union.

In 1996 the European Commission published the Green and then the

White Paper dealing with the development of renewable energy sources.6 It

specified an objective for the EU – reaching a 12% renewable energy share

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in the total EU energy mix by 2010. The European Commission stated the

main reasons for introducing this priority as the necessity of increasing EU

energy security and the need to improve the effectiveness of environmental

protection measures. The authors of the White Paper pointed to the numer-

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6

European Commission, “Communication from the Commission: Energy for the future: renew-

able sources of energy. White Paper for Community Strategy and Action Plan”, COM (97) 599

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2 The European Union on the road to energy independence

final 26.11.1997.

29

ous benefits that the realization of the stated objective for the development of

renewables would bring for the whole EU. These were, most of all:

the creation of 500 - 900 thousand additional new jobs

cutting the costs of buying carbon-based resources for use by the Euro-

pean energy sector by an annual 3 billion euro (after 2010)

cutting energy resource imports by 17.4%

cutting CO2 emissions by 402 million tons/year after 2010

At the same time, according to the European Commission’s calculations,

the cost of implementing this objective across the entire EU was to come to

95 billion euro between 1997 and 2010.7

The imperatives contained in the White Paper served as the basis for the

2001/77/EC directive, adopted in 2001, regarding the promotion of electric

power from renewable sources on the internal electric energy market, which

reiterated the objective outlined in the White Paper (a 12% renewables share

in energy generation). Unfortunately, the European Commission did not

manage to force through a legally binding status for this objective. The main

argument put forward was many member countries’ fear that they would not

be able to reach this level of development of renewables – not only because

of the high investment costs, but also due to organizational and technical

problems that could not be resolved in such a short time. These fears were,

it would seem, justified. By 2005, half of the “old” member countries failed

to reach a share of renewables that would ensure achieving a 12% share by

2010.8

This did not discourage the Commission’s efforts, however. In January

2007 the Renewable Energy Roadmap was presented, and no more than three

months later the European Council adopted a legally binding target to ensure

a 20% share for renewable energy in the final energy mix of the whole EU.9

On this basis, on 23 January 2008, the Commission presented a new draft

directive dealing with the development of renewable energy sources.10 It re-

ceived political endorsement on 9 December and was adopted by the Euro-

pean Council on 12 December 2008. The most important change in relation

to the earlier legal act was the establishment of a legally binding target – a

20% share of energy from renewable sources in final energy use by 2020.

To reach this goal, it was agreed to set differentiated commitments for indi-

vidual countries. Each country, based on its own evaluation of its capabili-

ties and its political drive, set the share of renewables it is to reach in 2020

enewables

(figure 1). This solution, at least in theory, improves the chances of attaining

the objective.

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7

http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/other/l27023_en.htm. Accessed 15.10.2010.

8

It must be noted, however, that the objective introduced by directive 2001/77/EC was not obliga-

tory, but rather political, which meant that not all member countries used their resources fully to reach it. Had the objective been of an obligatory nature, the level of development of renewables

would probably be more advanced at present.

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9

Commission Of The European Communities, “Communication From The Commission to the

e

Council and the European Parliament: Renewable Energy Road Map. Renewable energies in the

21st century: building a more sustainable future”, COM (2006) 848 final. Brussels, 10.1.2007.

10 Directive 2009/28/EC on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources.

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2 The European Union on the road to energy independence

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fig. 1: Development targets for renewables in individual member countries for 2020

Source: Directive 2009/28/EC

To further increase these chances, the European Commission made it com-

pulsory for member states to compile national action plans for the development

of renewables by 30 June 2010. By 15 October 2010 such plans had been pre-

pared by 23 member states. Only Belgium, Estonia, Poland, and Hungary had

failed to present them.

It can therefore be said that the European Union and its institutions have

done a lot to ensure meeting the stated objective. But was it enough? Does shift-

ing responsibility for the development of renewables onto national governments

absolve EU institutions from all other efforts? And one more question, of fore-

most importance: is the objective introduced by directive 2009/28/EC sufficient

to provide the EU with energy security, taken to mean both the reliability of

energy supplies and the environmental safety of energy generation?

2.4. what does the eu need?

The foundation of building a Europe based on the use of renewable energy

sources is the reconstruction of European solidarity. The principle of solidarity

enewables

has been one of the European Union’s funding paradigms for many years – the

readiness of rich societies to share with the poorer. Thanks to this, countries

such as Greece, Spain, and Ireland have experienced a great developmental

leap forward. The practical implementation of this principle also benefited new

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member countries joining the EU after 2004. Thanks to cohesion funds, invest-

ments that stimulate their economic and societal growth are carried out.11

The solidarity principle also had a deeper dimension. It meant the readiness

of European society to renounce certain goods and benefits in order to ensure

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11 Cohesion policy also has a positive impact on the economies of donating countries. Almost half of the means spent in “new” member states is estimated to return – in the form of purchased

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2 The European Union on the road to energy independence

goods and services – to “old” EU countries.

31

access to them for future generations. This is why the European Union adopted

progressive environmental policies for many years, setting and implementing

targets that were unprecedented on a global scale. This also contributed to the

European economy maintaining its place at the forefront of global innovation,

effectively competing in the international market with the other economic gi-

ants like the United States and Japan. It would seem that the belief that the soli-

darity principle still holds was fundamental to decisions aiming to increase the

role of energy generation based on renewable sources in the EU. This is because

the development of renewables, even at the cost of sacrifices made by the cur-

rent generation, means that we retain valuable resources for future generations

and that we do not develop at the cost of degrading the natural environment.

Unfortunately, changes in the distribution of power in the international economic

market, the entry of China and other economic “tigers” into the market, and the economic

crisis of recent years have changed the attitude of European societies. The rise in populist

and nationalist tendencies is a threat to the openness and unity of Europe. As many of the

CEE citizens believe, European solidarity weakens as France and Italy expel Romanian

Roma people, Finland fights beggars, Ireland has seen killings of workers from Central

and Eastern Europe accused of stealing jobs from the Irish, and the president of France

reprimands politicians from new member countries for not keeping quiet while great EU

countries make decisions and for demanding that their interests be respected.

All this is happening with minimal and selective protests from politicians from

other countries, because in reality no one has a clear conscience. Although most

politicians loudly expressed their outrage at Greece’s attempt to mislead the Euro-

pean Commission, no radical action was actually taken against the country. In fact

most governments use various accounting tricks to boost their balance sheets. The

defense of national interests dominates efforts to bolster European cooperation and

increase EU policy coordination. The solidarity principle is dying.

This is a very gloomy perspective for the common energy policy of the European Un-

ion and for making renewable energy sources a basis on which to build its energy security.

It is impossible to create a new system without greater solidarity on the part of member

states. The acceptance of greater risk is necessary for the whole system to function in an ef-

ficient and effective manner: instead of taking actions at the national level (that is relatively

“easy”) the member states must risk, believing that actions taken at the European level will

be effective and that the problems of particular states will be treated equally.

Each EU country must assent to the heightened individual risk resulting from

the transfer of the management of their own energy sector onto a higher, com-

enewables

munity level. The principle that energy security will be constructed on the level of

the whole community rather than individual countries is an imperative that must

be accepted, and any investments made should improve common security above

all else. This is because the tightening of cooperation and integration among EU

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countries is a key, principal step in building a new European energy order. With-

out this, without greater trust that the Community can effectively solve Europe’s

energy problems, an active development of renewables will not be possible.

Creating a new EU institution to support the renewable energy sector is the

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second essential step toward building a renewable-energy Europe. Community

practice to date clearly demonstrates that, of all the objectives set by the EU, it

is those managed on a Community level and coordinated by a specially appoint-

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32

ed pan-European institution that are carried out most efficiently. The creation

of Euratom contributed to the fast development of the nuclear sector in Europe.

The Coal and Steel Community allowed for low coal prices to be maintained for

many years and guaranteed steady supplies to power stations in all EU countries.

A new institution responsible for the development of renewables and reducing

our dependence on fossil fuels should not only monitor efforts undertaken by the

governments of individual countries and the private sector in this area, but also

broadly coordinate these efforts and promote those courses of action that will be

considered essential from the point of view of an emerging new energy sector

encompassing the whole bloc. Such an institution should cooperate closely with

DG Research so as to ensure the rapid implementation of innovative solutions.

Widening research efforts, encouraging scientific cooperation, and implementing

innovative solution form the next, third element in the construction of Europe’s en-

ergy security. The development of renewable energy in Europe needs its own “Apollo

Program” - combining a science program, which utilizes the knowledge of the best

specialists, with an implementation program, which allows for their ideas, new solu-

tions, and technologies to be put into practice. Wide-ranging scientific research on

a pan-European level is essential, as is the implementation of innovative solutions

when it comes to developing new, more effective renewable technologies, intelligent

transmission networks, energy storage, creating energy reserves, and helping end

consumers adapt to functioning in tandem with renewable energy sources, or rather

changing the role of a passive energy consumer into its active “prosumer.”12 Crucially,

a new concept of energy security from the point of view of the end consumer must be

formulated; in most cases problems with power in the grid can be solved by cutting

demand from the end consumer. This will require the creation of a new type of rela-

tionship: in the case of power shortages, instead of buying in power from producers

(who will not always be able to react on time), distributors will pay those users who

agree to cut their consumption for a given period of time. It will become necessary

to differentiate energy prices for different producers depending on their readiness

to react to grid problems. Those maintaining reserves capable of instantly supplying

the grid with energy (in the case of an outage) must be paid more. This will make it

possible to stabilize the functioning of the system and decrease the risk of outages.

The fourth essential element will be money. A program of remodeling the energy

sector will require substantial, stable sources of financing, just as was the case with

man’s journey to the moon, the cost will be high. According to calculations carried

enewables

out by the European Renewable Energy Council (EREC), fully switching to renewable

energies by 2050 will cost 2,800 billion euro.13 This is a colossal sum. And although,

as estimated by EREC, the savings resulting from not having to purchase coal, natural

gas, and oil will more than compensate for the investments (estimated at 3,800 billion

urope through Re

euro by 2050), it remains clear that access to funds could become a barrier to change.

On the other hand it is worth remembering that delivering the European econ-

omy from the effects of the last financial crisis and helping Greece has cost the

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12 More on this can be found in J. Popczyk, Distributed Energy in the Interest of the Consumer –

Market – Energy Climate Pact (Warsaw: Institute for Sustainable Development, 2010).

13 http://www.ecoportal.com.pl/eko-energia/100-energii-ze-zrodel-odnawialnych-do-roku-2050.

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2 The European Union on the road to energy independence

Accessed on 16.10.2010.

33

European Union a similar sum in recent years.14 So as not to allow for a repeat

of the EU currency crisis such as that which hit Greece, the European summit of

9-10 May 2010 voted through the creation of a special mechanism to stabilize the

common currency, with a 750 billion Euro fund at its disposition. Of this sum, the

input of member countries to the European Stabilization Mechanism will total

440 billion Euro, 60 billion is to come from the EU budget, while the International

Monetary Fund has offered 250 billion Euro. This clearly indicates that, if the po-

litical will is there, even very large financial means can be mobilized.

The money should stimulate investments, especially those that allow growing

independence from carbon-based fuels and whose implementation raises the level

of energy security on the scale of the whole Community. Without common projects

and investments it will be difficult for Europe to cut its reliance on non-renewable

resources. A further element should be provided by better coordination of EU poli-

cy being implemented in different domains. At present this is not so obvious. While

adopting progressive climate policies and putting pressure on member countries to

radically cut their greenhouse gas emissions, the European Commission simultane-

ously approves development programs, proposed by individual countries and to be

paid for with EU funds, which will result in a rise in emissions!15 While calling for

cuts in transport emissions, the EU supports the construction of motorways and

infrastructure that promotes motorization. It encourages moving away from fossil

fuels, but at the same time agrees to subsidies for the coal industry. If the European

Union is to be efficient, this must change. It cannot simultaneously finance the de-

velopment of renewables and conventional energies. Ensuring a rise in the share

of renewable sources remains impossible as long as carbon-based fuels continue to

receive subsidies – e.g. by not including external costs in the price of energy gener-

ated by burning non-renewable resources.16

2.5. conclusion

The target of a 20% share for renewable energy sources adopted by the EU should

be interpreted as the Community’s first step to building an economy independent

of fossil fuels. Achieving this target will not guarantee a leap forward in terms of

improving Europe’s energy security. Fifty to 60% of total energy will continue to be

generated from imported non-renewable sources. Nevertheless, meeting this objec-

tive could usher in a breakthrough in the way we think about the European energy

enewables

14 The value of public money (government guarantees) allocated for bailing out national economies amounted to almost 2 trillion euro by the end of the first quarter of 2009 for only 3 EU countries! The United Kingdom allocated 656 billion Euro to this end, Germany – 643 billion Euro,

urope through R

and Ireland – 624 billion Euro. Source: J. Osiński, Introduction, The European Union and the

e

Economic Crisis: Understanding the Crisis, no. 3 (Warsaw: SGH, 2009), p. 7–12. Of course giving out guarantees does not mean that these funds were actually spent (as it will be the case with

investments into renewables), but this demonstrates the readiness of governments to allot such

sums to chosen purposes.

15 Z. M. Karaczun, A. Kassenberg, M. Sobolewski, European Union Funds for the years 2007-2013

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and Environmental Protection (Warsaw: InE, 2008), p. 96.

e

16 For example, according to the European Environment Agency, the external costs of producing

electric energy in Poland are the highest in the EU and amount to 5-18 eurocents/kWh, compared

to an EU average of 1.8-5.9 euro cents/kWh.

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34

sector, and it should help remove market and technological barriers hindering the

development of renewables. The mass use of renewable energy source technologies

will contribute to lowering their cost. The ongoing modernization of power trans-

mission infrastructure and its adaptation to the need of using renewables will make

the connection of new power generating capacity based on renewable sources not

only cheaper, but also less problematic. It can therefore be assumed that, although

the 20% share for renewables is not a revolution in itself, it is the beginning of one,

which will allow for a significant acceleration and facilitation of the development of

renewables in the years to come. This is why achieving this target is so important.

Europe needs a new challenge, so as not to sink into complacency and not to

lose its advance on quickly developing new economies. Achieving independence

from energy resources could become such a challenge. As Ralf Fücks wrote in

the preface to ERENE: European Community for Renewable Energy: A Feasibil-

ity Study, to retain the political dynamic and public support the European Union

needs great goals.17 ERENE – which points to the possibility of meeting Europe’s

energy needs solely using renewable sources – sets such a goal, similarly to the DE-

SERTEC project (using the surface of the desert to produce solar energy and using

wind power). That this project is not just the fantasy of a handful of enthusiasts is

demonstrated by the fact that, alongside new technology companies (Schott Solar,

MAN Solar Millenium), it has attracted the engagement of numerous European

companies, also conservative firms from the financial sector, such as Munich Re,

Deutsche Bank or HSH Nordbank as well as energy and industrial corporations

such as ABB, E.ON, RWE or Siemens. A number of recent studies have also dem-

onstrated that the European Union can generate all the electricity it needs from

renewable energy sources – if Europe cooperates in using its renewable energy

sources and takes a European approach instead of each member state developing

its own policy and primarily using just the resources on its own territory.18

Responsibility for promoting the development of renewable energy therefore

cannot be limited to member countries, but requires active efforts from Community

institutions. Selecting and supporting investments that are important from the point

of view of the whole European bloc is essential – such as, at present, system intercon-

nectors, which reinforce the security of national systems by connecting them to the

systems of other EU countries.19 The Commission also needs to take a principled ap-

proach towards attempts at illegally providing public assistance for conventional en-

ergy sources, as this creates a market barrier to the development of renewables. Over

enewables

17 Ralf Fücks, “Preface” in: Schreyer M. Metz L., “ERENE: European Community for Renewable

Energy. A feasibility study ” published by the H. Böll Foundation, Warsaw 2009.

18 See, for example, European Climate Foundation, Roadmap 2050 (The Hague 2010); EREC & Greenpeace: RE-thinking 2050 – A 100% Renewable Energy Vision for the European Union (Brus-urope through Re

sels 2010) or: PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (PwC), the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research PIK, 100% renewable electricity A roadmap to 2050 for Europe and North Africa Available at: http://download.pwc.com/ie/pubs/renewable_vision_europe_nov2010.pdf.

19 When during the winter of 2002-2003 the Norwegian electrical grid experienced a significant

power deficit, the crisis was resolved also thanks to the import of energy from Poland (using a

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direct current cable running along the Baltic sea floor). A second factor was the rise in energy

e

prices on the spot market (up to around 100 euro/MWh), which led many enterprising consum-

ers to cut their use of grid energy and switch on their own generators (from: M. Duda, “Liberal-

izacja rynku a bezpieczeństwo dostaw energii elektrycznej,” [“Market liberalization and electric

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2 The European Union on the road to energy independence

power supply security”] in Biuletyn URE 2004/1: 24 - 27).

35

the next two years the foundations for spending new European funds for the years

2014-2020 are to emerge. They should be based on the allocation of all available funds

for renewable sources and related infrastructure. This will provide an unambiguous

signal that the European Union is determined to build a low-carbon economy.

The European Commission seems to understand this increasingly well.20 At

the beginning of May 2010 it submitted for consultation a new document setting

out the directions of energy policy development for the years 2011-2020. It listed

the following priorities:21

the creation of a modern integrated grid

making progress towards a low-carbon economy

support for innovative technologies and moving away from traditional solutions

support for a coordinated energy policy in relation to suppliers from outside

the European Union

protecting EU citizens and guaranteeing them energy security

With adequate methods of implementing these targets and the use of ap-

propriate instruments this could become a significant component of building a

Community energy security based on the use of renewables.

As it promotes the development of renewables, the European Union must not

forget that renewable energy is not always secure. Every technology – renewables

included – comes with a risk factor which must be addressed, best of all at the deci-

sion stage. Building a new energy system for the European Union, based on the use

of renewable sources, must be carried out with the results of a wide-ranging analysis

of their impact on the natural, social, and economic environment in mind. Only then,

when this impact turns out less significant than that of conventional sources, should

the transformation be implemented on a European scale. Meanwhile, individual deci-

sions – where and what type of installation to build – must always be considered one

by one, so as to prevent negative effects on the environment and/or minimize them.

The above review does not discuss all the actions which should be taken in the

European Union to increase the use of renewables. It does, however, point to the

most important such actions. Although the change in current thinking about the EU

energy sector seems difficult to bring about, it is worth noting that, if the European

Union wants to build its position as a leader in the most competitive market in the

world, it is essential. In a world of shrinking energy reserves and rising needs, with

those reserves controlled mostly by countries with low democratic standards, in a

world threatened by the degradation of natural resources, there is no other way.

enewables

2.6. acknowledgements

The author would like to sincerely thank Andrzej Kassenberg and Mirosław

Sobolewski for inspiration and comments while preparing this text. Neverthe-

urope through Re

less, he wishes to note that all opinions and any mistakes are his only.

20 Andrzej Kassenberg, Energy and Climate Policy of the EU and Poland: Educational Materials of the Institute for Sustainable Development. Published by ISD, Warsaw 2010.

nergy Security in

21 “Towards a new Energy Strategy for Europe 2011-2020”, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/strategies/

e

consultations/2010_07_02_energy_strategy_en.htm.

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Document Outline

- Reaching Energy Security - okladka - internet

- Reaching Energy Security - wnetrze - internet

- Reaching Energy Security - okladka - internet2

Table of Contents

Reaching Energy Security - okladka - internet

Reaching Energy Security - wnetrze - internet

Reaching Energy Security - okladka - internet2