World Nuclear Industry

Status Report 2013

by Mycle Schneider

Antony Froggatt

with Komei Hosokawa

Steve Thomas

Yukio Yamaguchi

Julie Hazemann

foreword Peter Bradford

A Mycle Schneider Consulting Project

Paris, London, Kyoto, July 2013

With the support of

Artwork Anna Jeretic

Fred & Alice Stanback

The World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013

By

Mycle Schneider

Independent Consultant, Paris, France

Project Coordinator and Lead Author

Antony Froggatt

Independent Consultant, London, U.K.

Lead Author

With

Komei Hosokawa

Professor for Environmental and Social Research, Kyoto Seika University, Japan

Contributing Author

Steve Thomas

Professor for Energy Policy, Greenwich University, U.K.

Contributing Author

Yukio Yamaguchi

Co-director of the Citizen's Nuclear Information Center (CNIC), Tokyo, Japan

Contributing Author

Julie Hazemann

Director of EnerWebWatch, Paris, France

Documentary Research, Modeling and Graphic Design

Foreword by Peter A. Bradford

Paris, London, July 2013

A

Mycle Schneider Consulting

Project

Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al.

World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013-V3

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Acknowledgments

The project coordinator wishes to thank in particular his colleague, fellow lead author and friend

Antony Froggatt for his constant support and extraordinary reliability in this project, and his co-

authors Steve Thomas, Komei Hosokawa and Yukio Yamaguchi for their creative special

contributions to this report. A big thank you to Peter A. Bradford for his thoughtful foreword.

The authors wish to thank Fred & Alice Stanback, Amory B. Lovins, Rocky Mountain Institute,

Rebecca Harms, the Greens-EFA Group in the European Parliament, Arne Jungjohann, Rebecca

Bertram, Heinrich Böll Foundation U.S., Sabine von Stockar, the Swiss Renewable Energy

Foundation for their generous support for this project.

A big thank you to John Corbett for his extensive research assistance on finances and to Philippe

Rivière for his creative work on the website and his generous assistance at any time of the day.

The report has greatly benefitted from partial or full proof-reading, editing suggestions and

comments by Aileen Smith, Amory B. Lovins, Miles Goldstick, MV Ramana and Shaun Burnie.

Thank you all.

Special thanks to Anna Jeretic for making available the beautiful artwork and to Adélaïde Dubois-

Taine for designing the cover page.

Note

This report contains a very large amount of factual and numerical data. While we do our utmost to

verify and double-check, nobody is perfect. The authors are always grateful for corrections and

suggestions of improvement.

Lead Authors’ Contacts

Mycle Schneider

Antony Froggatt

45, allée des deux cèdres

53a Nevill Road

91210 Draveil (Paris)

London N16 8SW

France

United Kingdom

Phone: +33-1-69 83 23 79

Ph: +44-79 68 80 52 99

Email: mycle@orange.fr

E: a.froggatt@btinternet.com

The World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013

© Mycle Schneider Consulting

Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al.

World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013

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Table of Contents

Foreword .............................................................................................................................................. 4

Executive Summary and Conclusions ............................................................................................... 6

Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 10

General Overview Worldwide .......................................................................................................... 11

Potential Newcomer Countries ......................................................................................................... 25

Construction Times ........................................................................................................................... 33

Construction Times of Past and Currently Operating Reactors ...................................................................... 33

Construction Times and Costs of Reactors Currently Under Construction .................................................... 34

The Economics of Nuclear Power – An Update .............................................................................. 34

Introduction ...................................................................................................................................................... 34

The Characteristics of Nuclear Economics ...................................................................................................... 35

The U.S. Nuclear Power Program ................................................................................................................... 37

The U.K. Nuclear Program .............................................................................................................................. 41

European Union Policy .................................................................................................................................... 45

The Chinese Program ....................................................................................................................................... 46

Olkiluoto and Flamanville ............................................................................................................................... 48

Conclusions on Nuclear Economics ................................................................................................................ 51

Financial Markets and Nuclear Power ............................................................................................ 52

Fukushima – A Status Report .......................................................................................................... 61

Characteristics of the Fukushima Disaster ....................................................................................................... 61

Off-site Challenges: Evacuation, Decontamination ......................................................................................... 62

Current Status of Fukushima Daiichi 1–4 ........................................................................................................ 64

Wave or Shake? ............................................................................................................................................... 66

On-site Challenges: Water, Waste, Radiation ................................................................................................. 68

Summary and Prospects ................................................................................................................................... 71

Nuclear Power vs. Renewable Energy ............................................................................................. 73

Investment ........................................................................................................................................................ 73

Installed Capacity ............................................................................................................................................ 75

Electricity Generation ...................................................................................................................................... 76

Annexes ............................................................................................................................................... 84

Annex 1. Overview by Region and Country ................................................................................... 85

Africa ............................................................................................................................................................... 85

The Americas ................................................................................................................................................... 87

Asia .................................................................................................................................................................. 94

European Union (EU27) and Switzerland ..................................................................................................... 106

Former Soviet Union ..................................................................................................................................... 122

Annex 2: Reactor Construction Times 2003-2013 ........................................................................ 127

Annex 3: Definition of Credit Rating by the Main Agencies ....................................................... 128

Annex 4: About the Authors ........................................................................................................... 129

Annex 5: Abbreviations .................................................................................................................. 131

Annex 6. Status of Nuclear Power in the World (1 July 2013) .................................................... 135

Annex 7. Nuclear Reactors in the World Listed as “Under Construction” (1 July 2013) ......... 136

Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013

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Foreword

By Peter A. Bradford*

Nuclear power requires obedience, not transparency. The gap between nuclear rhetoric and nuclear

reality has been a fundamental impediment to wise energy policy decisions for half a century now.

For various reasons in many nations, the nuclear industry cannot tell the truth about its progress, its

promise or its perils. Its backers in government and in academia do no better.

Rhetorical excess from opponents of nuclear power contributes to the fog, but proponents have by

far the heavier artillery. During the rise and fall of the bubble formerly known as “the nuclear

renaissance” in the U.S. many of their tools have been on full display.

Academic and governmental studies a decade ago understated the likely cost of new reactors and

overstated their potential contribution to fighting climate change. By 2006 a few U.S. state

legislatures had been enticed to expose utility customers to all the risks of building new reactors.

Industry-sponsored conferences persuaded businesses and newspapers of an imminent jobs bonanza,

ignoring job losses resulting from high electric rates and passing up cheaper, more labor intensive

alternatives. These local groups added to the pressure on Congress for more subsidies.

France and Japan were held out as examples of countries that had avoided the timidity and

overregulation that had stalled nuclear construction in the U.S. Indeed, it was argued, these nations

had even solved the waste problem through their commitment to reprocessing spent fuel.

At times inconsistent tales were told simultaneously. Thus the U.S. Congress was told that the new

licensing process and the new generic designs were so untried and environmental opposition so

formidable that loan guarantees were needed to lay the risks off on taxpayers. At the same time Wall

Street and state legislatures were assured that these new features had chloroformed public opposition

and otherwise laid to rest the terrifying industry ghosts embodied by the nine figure dollar losses at

Shoreham, Seabrook, WPPSS, and Midland, sites that resonate in U.S. nuclear folklore like Civil

War battlefield names.

The renaissance story line was hard to resist. By early 2009, applications for 31 new reactors were

pending at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The promises came garnished with tales of

remorseful changes of heart from oft-obscure nuclear converts. With few exceptions, the news media

- especially television with its thirst for the short and the simple - fell for the renaissance story line.

It is all in ruins now. The 31 proposed reactors are down to four actually being built and a few others

lingering on in search of a license, which is good for 20 years. Those four are hopelessly uneconomic

but proceed because their state legislatures have committed to finish them as long as a dollar remains

to be taken from any electric customer’s pocket. Operating reactors are being closed as uneconomic

for the first time in fifteen years.

Still the band plays on. President Obama recently touted new reactors as part of his “all of the above”

policy on climate change. But is “all of the above” really a policy? Do we build palaces to avert

housing shortages? Don’t we instead prioritize, based on the best information available? U.S.

secretaries of energy enthuse that the four new reactors will be completed “on time and on budget”,

never mind that they are already behind and over and that “on budget” will mean “well above the

cost of creating equivalent low carbon energy more sensibly”.

As always in the face of failure, the industry puts forth new designs as a basis for new promises, now

touting small modular reactors with the same fervor that it touted large partially modular reactors a

decade ago. Congress finds a few hundred million to preserve these dreams even as its cutbacks

shatter so many others.

––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

*Adjunct Professor, Vermont Law School, teaching "Nuclear Power and Public Policy", former

commissioner U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), former chair of the New York and

Maine Utility Regulatory Commissions.

Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013

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A new movie, Pandora’s Promise (no filmmaker familiar with nuclear history would include

“promise” in a title intended to be pronuclear1), recently screened at Sundance.

Featuring the same old converts and straw men, it opened in theaters a few weeks ago to tiny

audiences and generally unenthusiastic reviews, especially from reviewers knowledgeable about

nuclear power2.

In the astonishing persistence of the global appetite for false nuclear promises lies the critical

importance of the World Nuclear Industry Status Report.

The Report sets forth in painstaking detail the actual experience and achievements of nuclear energy

around the world. It is based for the most part on generally accepted data distinctively graphed for

clearer understanding. Where the authors introduce judgment, they explain what they have done and

why. The Report has a track record stretching back years. It is much better than the embarrassing

exuberances of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the World Nuclear Association or the

pronouncements of most national governments. If more journalists would use it for reference, their

readers would be spared much of the foolishness that they must now consume.

Most of the myths on which the purported nuclear renaissance rested founder on the rocks of the

information presented here.

Is new nuclear power cheaper than alternative ways of meeting energy needs? Of course not. What

about low carbon “baseload” alternatives? See page 73ff. Can a country grow its economy by

building nuclear reactors? What don’t you understand about the employment consequences of

imposing rate shock on industrial and commercial customers? Are the consequences of the

Fukushima meltowns really being overstated by antinuclear activists? Maybe, but see the chapter on

the status of Fukushima.

In short, the nuclear renaissance –whatever it may be called throughout the world - has always

consisted entirely of the number of reactors whose excess costs governments were prepared to make

mandatory for either customers or taxpayers. Investor capital cannot be conscripted. Investors of the

sort that nuclear power must attract study risks carefully. They know the information in this report,

and so should everyone else with responsibility for energy decisions that allocate nuclear risk.

1 A more accurate use of the word is in M.V. Ramana’s aptly titled and excellent history of India’s nuclear

follies,

The Power of Promise (Penguin Viking, 2012).

2 For an insightful example, see Victor Gilinsky and Henry Sokolski, “Pandora’s Promise: Is the Issue Really

Environmental”, Nuclear Intelligence Weekly, June 21, 2013,

http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1219&rtid=1.

Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013

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Executive Summary and Conclusions

Two years after the Fukushima disaster started unfolding on 11 March 2011, its impact on the global

nuclear industry has become increasingly visible. Global electricity generation from nuclear plants

dropped by a historic 7 percent in 2012, adding to the record drop of 4 percent in 2011. This World

Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013 (WNISR) provides a global overview of the history, the current

status and the trends of nuclear power programs worldwide. It looks at nuclear reactor units in

operation and under construction. Annex 1 provides 40 pages of detailed country-by-country

information. A specific chapter assesses the situation in potential newcomer countries. For the

second time, the report looks at the credit-rating performance of some of the major nuclear

companies and utilities. A more detailed chapter on the development patterns of renewable energies

versus nuclear power is also included. Annex 6 provides an overview table with key data on the

world nuclear industry by country.

The 2013 edition of the World Nuclear Industry Status Report also includes an update on nuclear

economics as well as an overview of the status, on-site and off-site, of the challenges triggered by the

Fukushima disaster. However, this report’s emphasis on recent post-Fukushima developments should

not obscure an important fact: as previous editions (see www.WorldNuclearReport.org) detail, the

world nuclear industry already faced daunting challenges long before Fukushima, just as the U.S.

nuclear power industry had largely collapsed before the 1979 Three Mile Island accident3. The

nuclear promoters’ invention that a global nuclear renaissance was flourishing until 3/114 is equally

false: Fukushima only added to already grave problems, starting with poor economics.

The performance of the nuclear industry over the year from July 2012 to July 2013 can be summed

up as follows:

Operation and Construction Data (1 July 2013)5

Operation. There are 31 countries operating nuclear power plants in the world.6 A total of

427 reactors have a combined installed capacity of 364 GWe7. These figures assume the final

shutdown of the ten reactors at Fukushima-Daiichi and -Daini. It should be noted that as of

1 July 2013 only two (Ohi-3 and -4) of the 44 remaining Japanese reactors are operating and

their future is highly uncertain. In fact, even if four utilities are expected to submit restart

requests in July 2013, many observers believe that a large share of the suspended Japanese

units will likely never restart.

The nuclear industry is in decline: The 427 operating reactors are 17 lower than the peak in

in 2002, while, the total installed capacity peaked in 2010 at 375 GWe before declining to

the current level, which was last seen a decade ago. Annual nuclear electricity generation

reached a maximum in 2006 at 2,660 TWh, then dropped to 2,346 TWh in 2012 (down

7 percent compared to 2011, down 12 percent from 2006). About three-quarters of this

decline is due to the situation in Japan8, but 16 other countries, including the top five nuclear

generators, decreased their nuclear generation too.

3 See Nathan Hultman, Jonathan Koomey, “Three Mile Island: The driver of US nuclear power’s decline”,

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May-June 2013, see http://bos.sagepub.com/content/69/3/63, accessed

7 July 2013.

4 3/11 refers to the triple disaster earthquake-tsunami-nuclear accident on 11 March 2011.

5 See Annex 7 for a country-by-country overview of reactors in operation and under construction as well as the

nuclear share in electricity generation and primary energy.

6 Unless otherwise noted, the figures indicated are as of 1 July 2013.

7 All figures are given for nominal net electricity generating capacity. GW stands for gigawatt or thousand

megawatt.

8 The continuing debacle of the Japanese reactors led to the provisional categorization as “in long-term

shutdown”, see main text for details.

Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013

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The nuclear share in the world’s power generation declined steadily from a historic peak of

17 percent in 1993 to about 10 percent in 2012. Nuclear power’s share of global commercial

primary energy production plunged to 4.5 percent, a level last seen in 1984.9 Only one

country, the Czech Republic, reached its record nuclear contribution to the electricity mix in

2012.

Age. In the absence of major new-build programs, the unit-weighted average age of the world

nuclear reactor fleet continues to increase and in mid-2013 stands at 28 years. Over 190 units

(45 percent of total) have operated for 30 years of which 44 have run for 40 years or more.

Construction. Fourteen countries are currently building nuclear power plants, one more than a

year ago as the United Arab Emirates (UAE) started construction at Barrakah. The UAE is

the first new country in 27 years to have started building a commercial nuclear power plant.

As of July 2013, 66 reactors are under construction (7 more than in July 2012) with a total

capacity of 63 GW. The average construction time of the units under construction, as of the

end of 2012, is 8 years. However:

• Nine reactors have been listed as “under construction” for more than 20 years and four

additional reactors have been listed for 10 years or more.

• Forty-five projects do not have an official planned start-up date on the International Atomic

Energy Agency’s (IAEA) database.

• At least 23 have encountered construction delays, most of them multi-year. For the

remaining 43 reactor units, either construction began within the past five years or they have

not yet reached projected start-up dates, making it difficult or impossible to assess whether

they are on schedule or not.

• Two-thirds (44) of the units under construction are located in three countries: China, India

and Russia.

The average construction time of the 34 units that started up in the world between 2003 and

July 2013 was 9.4 years.

Reactor Status and Nuclear Programs

• Startups and Shutdowns. Only three reactors started up in 2012, while six were shut down10

and in 2013 up to 1 July, only one started up, while four shutdown decisions—all in the

U.S.—were taken in the first half of 2013.11 Three of those four units faced costly repairs,

but one, Kewaunee, Wisconsin, was running well and had received a license renewal just

two years ago to operate up to a total of 60 years; it simply became uneconomic to run. As of

1 July 2013, there were only two reactors operating in Japan and how many others will

receive permission to restart and over what timeframe remains highly uncertain.

• Newcomer Program Delays. Engagement in nuclear programs has been delayed by most of

the potential newcomer countries, including Bangladesh, Belarus, Jordan, Lithuania, Poland,

Saudi Arabia and Vietnam.

9 According to BP, “Statistical Review of World Energy”, June 2013.

10 Shutdown is defined as definitively taken off the grid. The shutdown date is the last day when the reactor

generated electricity.

11 The operator decided in June 2013 to shut down the two San Onofre units in California. However, they have

not generated electricity for over a year. So in the WNISR database the units have been withdrawn for the year

2012 rather than 2013.

Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013

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Construction & New Build Issues

• Construction Cancellation. In Russia, one reactor, which had just started construction in 2012

(Baltic-1), was abandoned in May 2013.

• Construction Starts. In 2012, construction began on six reactors and on three so far in 2013,

including on two units in the U.S. for the first time in three and a half decades. Those two

units have been offered over $8 billion in federal loan guarantees and other subsidies whose

total rivals their construction cost, and special laws have transferred financial risks to the

taxpayers and customers.

• Certification Delays. The certification of new reactor designs has continued to be delayed, in

the U.S. certification of the Franco-German-designed EPR12 was pushed back again, this

time to 2015. Only the Westinghouse AP1000 has received full generic design approval in

the U.S.

• Construction Start Delays. In various countries firmly planned construction starts were

delayed, most notably in China, where for almost two years, between December 2010 and

November 2012, not a single new reactor building site was opened. Furthermore, in the first

half of 2013 it did not start any further constructions.

Economics & Finances

• Capital Cost Increases. Construction costs are a key determinant of the final nuclear

electricity generating costs and many projects are significantly over budget. Cost estimates

have increased in the past decade from $1,000 to $7,000 per kW installed. The U.S. Vogtle

project, now officially under construction, is built by the same firm whose two previous

reactors at that site were originally budgeted at $660 million and were later estimated to have

cost $9 billion.

• State Aid. The U.K. model of Contract for Difference (CFD), a kind of feed-in tariff agreement

for nuclear electricity that is aimed at providing a subsidy scheme for new-build, in the view

of many observers, is likely to violate current EU competition rules.

• Operating Cost Increases. In some countries, especially the U.S. illustrated by the Kewaunee

case, historically low inflation-adjusted operating costs—especially for major repairs—have

escalated so rapidly that the average reactor’s operating costs is barely below the normal

band of wholesale power prices.

• Post-Fukushima Costs. Additional costs arising from upgrading and backfitting measures

following the lessons of the Fukushima crisis are only beginning to surface. They are likely

to have substantial impact on investment as well as operational costs.

• Income and Debt. Nine out of 14 major utilities assessed saw their earnings decline over the

past five years while 13 constantly increased their debt level.

• Credit Rating. Over the past five years, of 15 assessed nuclear utilities, 10 were downgraded

by credit rating agency Standard and Poor’s, four companies remained stable, while only one

was upgraded over the same period. Rating agencies consider nuclear investment risky and

the abandoning of nuclear projects explicitly “credit positive”.

• Share Value. The share value of the world’s largest nuclear operator, French state utility EDF,

went down by 85 percent over the past five years, while the share price of the world’s largest

nuclear builder, French state company AREVA, dropped by up to 88 percent.

12 European Pressurized Water Reactor (in Europe) or Evolutionary Pressurized Water Reactor (in the U.S. and

elsewhere).

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Fukushima Status Report

This assessment includes analyses of on-site and off-site challenges that have arisen from the 3/11

disaster. To what extent the disaster was triggered by the earthquake or the tsunami or by both in

combination cannot yet be conclusively elucidated.

• On-site Challenges. Radiation readings inside the reactor buildings of units 1–3 vary between

5 mSv/h and 73 Sv/h13, which makes human intervention almost impossible. Massive amounts of

water, about 360 tons per day, are still pumped into the destroyed reactors via makeshift vinyl tubes

that frequently leak. This water, together with a similar additional amount of groundwater, seeps into

the basements of the reactor buildings, some of it decontaminated to some degree and re-injected.

The amount of radioactive water that cannot be re-used is constantly increasing and has reached

380,000 tons in precarious storage of which 90,000 tons in the basements. It is estimated that

27 times the amount of cesium-137 released into the air in the first three weeks or more than

2.5 times the total amount released at the Chernobyl accident is contained in this water.

• Off-site Challenges. More than 150,000 people remain in forced evacuation. About 130,000

compensation claims have been filed. A total of 101 municipalities in 8 prefectures were designated

as a “Scheduled Contamination Survey Zone”, where annual doses between 1 and 20 mSv are

predicted and local authorities are responsible for decontamination work. In addition, the central

government is in charge of decontamination efforts in 11 municipalities in Fukushima Prefecture

covering 235 km2, where annual doses exceed 20 mSv. Less than 5 percent of the surface has seen

any decontamination efforts.

The worst-case scenario, as depicted by the Chairman of the Japan Atomic Energy Commission in

the middle of the crisis in March 2011, remains the collapse of the spent fuel pool of unit 414 and a

subsequent fuel fire, potentially requiring evacuation of up to 10 million people in a 250 km radius

of Fukushima, including a significant part of Tokyo.

Nuclear Power vs. Renewable Energy Deployment

In spite of a slight decrease in global investment in 2012, partly reflecting rapidly falling equipment

prices, renewable energy development continues its rapid expansion in both, capacity and generation.

China, Germany and Japan, three of the world’s four largest economies, as well as India, now

generate more power from renewables than from nuclear power.

• Investment. Global investment in renewable energy totaled $268 billion15 in 2012, down from

$300 billion the previous year16 but still five times the 2004 amount. China increased spending

by 20 percent to $65 billion and was by far the largest investor. While some big investors (U.S.,

Germany, Italy) reduced their spending considerably, some smaller players boosted their

investments and reached the top ten, including South Africa, which skyrocketed spending by a

factor of 200 to reach $5.5 billion, and Japan, which added 75 percent to reach $16 billion.

• Installed Capacity. Globally, since 2000, the annual growth rates for onshore wind power have

averaged 27 percent and for solar photovoltaics 42 percent. This has resulted in 2012 in 45 GW

of wind and 32 GW of solar being installed, compared to a net addition of 1.2 GW of nuclear.

China has a total of 75 GW of operating wind power capacity, roughly doubled in each of the

past five years.

• Electricity Generation. In 2012 wind produced almost 500 TWh and solar power about 100 TWh

more than in 2000, while nuclear power generated 100 TWh less. For the first time in 2012

13 Without massive radiation protection a lethal dose would be reached within minutes.

14 Pools are above the reactor vessels between the 4th and the 5th floor. The pool of unit 4 contains as much fuel

as the 3 others combined.

15 Does not include any investments in large hydropower projects, but a very small percentage on Carbon

Capture and Storage (CCS).

16 The figure had been corrected upwards from $260 billion after publication of WNISR 2012.

Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013

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China and India generated more power from wind than from nuclear plants, while in China solar

electricity generation grew by 400 percent in one year.

Introduction

On 29 June 2013, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) declared

at the Ministerial Conference in St. Petersburg, Russia that “nuclear power will make a significant

and growing contribution to sustainable development in the coming decades”. 17 The future will show

whether or not nuclear power will play an increasing role. In the meantime, the World Nuclear

Industry Status Report 2013 (WNISR) provides a reality check of the current situation and trends of

an industry that in the past has rarely been able to fulfill its own promises. The 2012 edition of the

WNISR demonstrated that the IAEA consistently overestimated the development of nuclear power in

the world18, a side-effect of “the leading role of the IAEA in promoting peaceful uses of nuclear

energy”.19

Contrary to the IAEA’s hopes for the future, this edition of the WNISR shows that nuclear power

generation experienced a drop of 7 percent in 2012, larger even than the previous year’s record

4 percent decline. As in previous editions, this report provides many diverse health indicators of the

nuclear industry, including numbers of reactors operating, under construction, installed capacities,

and extensive country-by-country assessments of nuclear programs around the world. As in the past

two editions, a chapter is included that compares certain trends in the nuclear industry with

developments in the renewable energy industry.

A greatly extended economic chapter provides data on key strategic markets, especially the U.S. and

the U.K., and financial indicators (e.g. share value and credit-rating developments). Professor Steve

Thomas once again shares his insights in this area.

In addition, now more than two years after the Fukushima disaster started unfolding, also included is

a concise overview of the key issues that continue to raise serious concerns among international

experts and the Japanese population. Two independent Japanese experts, Professor Komei Hosokawa

from Kyoto and Professor Yukio Yamaguchi from Tokyo have contributed their analysis.

The World Nuclear Industry Status Report has turned into a major international reference on nuclear

issues. Over the past year, numerous mainstream publications20 use the WNISR as their information

source for analysis and/or as statistical reference for graphic work, rather than solely relying on

IAEA or World Nuclear Association (WNA) data.

The international team that has collaborated to make this project work sincerely hopes that the

WNISR 2013 will meet the increasingly high expectations.

17 International Ministerial Conference, “Nuclear Power in the 21st Century”, St. Petersburg, 27-29 June 2013,

Concluding Statement by the President of the Conference, see

http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/stpclosing.pdf, accessed 30 June 2013.

18 “Unrealistic Projections”, in Mycle Schneider et al., “World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2012”, see

http://www.worldnuclearreport.org/The-World-Nuclear-Industry-Status.html#unpro.

19 International Ministerial Conference, op.cit.

20 For a selection of media citations, see http://www.worldnuclearreport.org/-In-the-media-.html.

Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013

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General Overview Worldwide

I would like to begin by congratulating the Kingdom of Swaziland

on becoming the 159th Member State of the IAEA.

Yukiya Amano

IAEA, Director General

Introductory Statement to Board of Governors

4 March 2013

As of the middle of 2013, a total of 31 countries were operating nuclear fission reactors for energy

purposes. Nuclear power plants generated 2,346 terawatt-hours (TWh or billion kilowatt-hours) of

electricity in 201221, less than in 1999 and a 172 TWh or 6.8 percent decrease compared to 2011 as

well as 11.8 percent below the historic maximum nuclear generation in 2006. The maximum

contribution of nuclear power to commercial electricity generation worldwide was reached in 1993

with 17 percent (see figure 1). It has dropped to 10.4 percent in 2012, a level last seen in the 1980s.

According to BP, the nuclear share in commercial primary energy consumption dropped to

4.5 percent, “the lowest since 1984”.22

Figure 1: Nuclear Electricity Generation in the World

Source : IAEA-PRIS, BP, MSC, 2013

About three-quarters of the decrease is due to the continuing and substantial generation drop in Japan

(–139 TWh or –50 percent over the previous year), which in three years fell back from the 3rd to the

18th position of nuclear generators. Production also decreased for differing reasons in all top five

nuclear generating countries: United States (–20 TWh or –2.5 percent), France (–16 TWh/–4 percent),

Germany (–8 TWh/–10 percent), South Korea (–7 TWh/5 percent) and Russia with an insignificant

drop (–0.8 TWh/–0.5 percent).

21 If not otherwise noted, all nuclear capacity and electricity generation figures based on International Atomic

Energy Agency (IAEA), Power Reactor Information System (PRIS) online database,

www.iaea.org/programmes/a2/index.html.

22 BP, “Statistical Review of World Energy”, June 2013.

Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013

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Nuclear generation declined in a total of 17 countries, while in 14 countries it increased or remained

stable23. Seven countries24 generated their historic maximum in 2012.

Figure 2. Nuclear Power Generation by Country, 2012/2011 and Historic Maximum

Sources: IAEA-PRIS, MSC, 2013

The “big five” nuclear generating countries—by rank: the United States, France, Russia, South Korea

and Germany—generated 67 percent of all nuclear electricity in the world. The three countries that

have phased out nuclear power (Italy, Kazakhstan, Lithuania), and Armenia, generated their historic

maximum of nuclear electricity in the 1980s. Several other countries’ nuclear power generation

peaked in the 1990s, among them Belgium, Canada, Japan, and the U.K. A further six countries

peaked their nuclear generation between 2001 and 2005: Bulgaria, France, Germany, South Africa,

Spain, and Sweden. Among the countries with a steady increase in nuclear generation are China, the

Czech Republic and Russia. However, even where countries are increasing their nuclear electricity

production this is in most cases not keeping pace with overall increases in electricity demand leading

to a reduced and declining role for nuclear power.

Only one country in the world, the Czech Republic, peaked its nuclear share in 2012 with 35 percent.

In fact, all other countries—except Iran, which started up its first nuclear plant in 2011—reached their

maximum share of nuclear power prior to 2010. While three countries peaked in 2008 (China) or 2009

(Romania, Russia), the other 26 countries saw their largest nuclear share by 2005. In total, nuclear

power played its largest role in ten countries during the 1980s25, in 12 countries each in the 1990s and

in the 2000s.

Increases in nuclear generation are mostly a result of higher productivity and uprating26 at existing

plants rather than due to new reactors. According to the latest assessment by Nuclear Engineering

International27, the global annual load factor28 of nuclear power plants decreased from 77 percent in

23 Less than 1 TWh variation from the previous year

24 Brazil, China, Czech Republic, Hungary, India, Iran, Pakistan

25 Armenia, Hungary, India, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Taiwan.

26 Increasing the capacity of nuclear reactors by equipment upgrades e.g. more powerful steam generators or

turbines.

27 Nuclear Engineering International, “Load Factors to end December 2012”, May 2013.

Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013

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201129 to 70 percent in 2012. Not surprisingly the biggest change was seen in Japan, where the load

factor plunged from 69.5 percent in 2010 to 39.5 percent in 2011 to 3.7 percent in 2012. This is also

due to the fact that officially 50 of the 54 pre-3/11 units in Japan are still counted as operational—even

though some reactors have not generated electricity for years (see box hereunder).

Figure 3. Nuclear Share in Electricity Mix by Country, 2012/2011 and Historic Maximum

Sources: IAEA-PRIS, MSC, 2013

Although both countries decreased performance, as in 2011, Romania and Taiwan had the highest load

factors in 2012 with 92.8 and 90.8 percent respectively. The most dramatic reductions in load factor

outside Japan were in Belgium (–11.8 percentage points), Mexico (–20 percentage points) and South

Korea (–9.5 percentage points). Belgium had two of its seven reactors off-line for much of the year

because of thousands of cracks discovered in their pressure vessels. They only restarted in June 2013.

Mexico is carrying out major uprating work on both of its units. South Korea had a series of scandals

involving quality control issues that kept a number of units down. Other major nuclear countries saw

their load factors deteriorate to some degree: the U.S. by 3.1 percentage points to reach 83.2 percent,

France by 2.3 percentage points, now down to 73.6 percent and remaining at the lower end of global

performance.

28 Nuclear Engineering International load factor definition: “Annual load factors are calculated by dividing the

gross generation of a reactor in a one-year period by the gross capacity of the reactor (sometimes called output),

as originally designed, multiplied by the number of hours in the calendar year. The figures are expressed as

percentages. Where a plant is uprated, the revised capacity is used from the date of the uprating.”

29 NEI revised the 2011 figure from 76 to 77 percent.

Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013

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Japanese Reactors “in Operation” or “in Long-Term Shutdown”?

In an unprecedented move, on 16 January 2013, the IAEA shifted 47 Japanese nuclear reactors from the category

“In Operation” to the category “Long-term Shutdown” (LTS) in its web-based Power Reactor Information

System (PRIS)30. The number of nuclear reactors listed as “In Operation” in the world thus dropped to 390, a

level last seen in 1986, the year of the Chernobyl accident. The move was a dramatic step by the IAEA in its

official statistics by acknowledging the the current industrial reality in Japan. Coming from the IAEA this was

without doubt a unique revision of world operational nuclear data.

Screen Capture 1 : The IAEA’s Online Database on Nuclear Power Reactors on 16 January 2013

Note: Yellow highlighting added. Source: IAEA, 2013, see http://www.iaea.org/pris/

Screen Capture 2 : The IAEA’s Online Database on Nuclear Power Reactors on 19 January 2013

Note: Yellow highlighting added. Source: IAEA, 2013, see http://www.iaea.org/pris/

This historic revision however, did not last. Only two days later, the Japanese government requested

the reversal of the reactor status of the 47 Japanese reactors from the IAEA’s LTS category to “In

operation”. The modification was thus reversed on 18 January and commented on by the IAEA in a

press release on 19 January 2013.31

30 See http://www.iaea.org/pris/.

31 IAEA, “Japan corrects error in IAEA nuclear power database”, press release, 19 January 2013,

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An IAEA representative explained by email: “In communication with the Government of Japan, it was identified

that this status is not applicable for [the] time being and our Japanese counterpart changed the decision and the

status was put back.”32 Another IAEA representative identified the “IAEA counterpart” in a phone interview as

the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES). This was confirmed in the IAEA press release.

According to the IAEA, JNES, an incorporated Administrative Agency, modified the raw country data in the

online Power Reactor Information System (PRIS) of the IAEA. The modification was then automatically

integrated into the World Overview pages of the Agency’s website.

Any correspondent or counterpart to the IAEA’s online database has to be authorized by its respective

government. In addition, it is understood that modifications of the reactor status are controlled by the respective

government. However, it is unclear what happened in this case, as it is hard to believe that such a significant

modification of the reactor status of the Japanese reactor fleet happened at the initiative of an individual at JNES.

If this was indeed the case, the question remains why this was done. The IAEA stated that the Japanese

counterparts advised the Agency that the “changes resulted from a clerical error”.

The explanation given of a “clerical error” is surprising and unconvincing. The reactor-by-reactor changes were

precise and made perfect sense. In fact, all of the 47 reactors could well fall within the IAEA definition for LTS

status33:

Reactor is considered in long-term shutdown status from the Long-term Shutdown date to the Restart

Date, if it has been shut down for an extended period (usually more than one year) and any of the

following conditions has occurred in early period of shutdown:

1. restart is not being aggressively pursued (there is no vigorous onsite activity to restart the unit) or

2. no firm restart date or recovery schedule has been established, but there is the intention to re-start the

unit eventually.

This status may be for example due to technical, economical, strategic or political reasons. This status

does not apply to long-term maintenance outages, including unit refurbishment, if the outage schedule is

consistently followed, or to long-term outages due to regulatory restrictions (licence suspension), if restart

(licence recovery) term and conditions have been established. Such units are still considered ‘operational’

(in a long-term outage).

If an intention not to restart the shutdown unit has been officially announced by the owner, the unit is

considered ‘permanently shut-down’.

Furthermore, if this incident was due to a simple “clerical error”, why would it take JNES two days to notify the

Agency?

The incident raises the question of the operational rules of the PRIS database. It seems astounding that

representatives of individual governments, utilities, research or safety organizations can actually directly modify

the IAEA’s public website. The IAEA explained that it “runs the PRIS database with input from its Member

States, which own the information provided”. However, as a consequence of the Japan incident, the Agency

decided to change the procedures34:

The Nuclear Energy Department of the IAEA, which runs the PRIS database, is implementing a software

upgrade that in future would prevent status changes being entered into the system without the agreement

of the system administrators, and would require clear justification from the national counterparts.

Any outside observer would have expected this to be the rule before the incident. The overall information

management by the IAEA and the Japanese authorities—with very significant changes in reactor statistics, one

way or the other, without any public explanation for three days—puts serious doubts on the reliability of the

information provided.

see http://www.iaea.org/press/?p=3250, accessed 30 June 2013.

32 Email to Mycle Schneider, dated 18 January 2013 as a reply to our request from 16 January, prior to the

release of the first story on the issue on www.WorldNuclearReport.org, “Historic Move: IAEA Shifts 47

Japanese Reactors Into ‘Long-Term Shutdown’ Category”, 16 January 2013, see

http://www.worldnuclearreport.org/Historic-Move-IAEA-Shifts-47.html.

33 See IAEA Glossary http://www.iaea.org/pris/Glossary.aspx.

34 IAEA, “Japan corrects error in IAEA nuclear power database”, press release, 19 January 2013, see

http://www.iaea.org/press/?p=3250, accessed 30 June 2013.

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Overview of Operation, Power Generation, Age Distribution

Since the start of the commercial nuclear power age in the mid-1950s there have been two major

waves of grid connections (see Figure 4). A first wave peaked in 1974, with 26 reactor startups in that

year. The second wave reached a historic maximum in 1984 and 1985, just before the Chernobyl

accident, reaching 33 grid connections in each year. By the end of the 1980s, the uninterrupted net

increase of operating units had ceased, and in 1990 for the first time the number of reactor shutdowns

outweighed the number of startups. The 1992-2001 decade showed twice as many startups than

shutdowns (51/23), while in the past decade 2003-2012 the trend reversed (31/51). Six reactors

(including two units at San Onofre, California, that did not generate any power anymore in 2013) were

shut down in 2012, while only three started up. In the first half of 2013, another two units were closed

(also in the U.S.), while only one unit started up (in China).

Figure 4. Nuclear Power Reactor Grid Connections and Shutdowns, 1956–2013

Source: IAEA-PRIS, MSC, 2013

As of 1 July 2013, under the Baseline Scenario (see hereunder), a total of 427 nuclear reactors were

considered operating in 31 countries, down 17 from the maximum of 444 in 2002. The current world

reactor fleet has a total nominal electric net capacity of about 364 gigawatts (GW or thousand

megawatts). However, there are large uncertainties in these figures, mainly stemming from the

undefined future of the 50 Japanese nuclear reactors that are officially still operating but, except for

two units, are all shut down as of 1 July 2013. We have therefore considered three scenarios:

• The Baseline Scenario. Only the 10 Fukushima reactors are permanently closed. Many industry

analysts now consider this as unrealistically optimistic. However, it remains unclear, which units will

remain closed. Utilities were awaiting the Nuclear Regulatory Authority’s new safety rules that were

released on 8 July 2013. Four utilities have announced “early applications for restart” for 10 reactors35,

whatever that means in practice.

• The East Coast Scenario. In addition to the Fukushima units, the seven reactors affected directly or

indirectly by 3/11 events remain closed. These include three Onagawa reactors that were closest to the

3/11 epicenter, the three remaining Hamaoka units shut down at the request of former Prime Minister

35 JAIF, “Nuclear Power Plants in Japan (in operation and under construction)”, 19 June 2013.

Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013

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Naoto Kan because of high earthquake risk estimates and the Tokai reactor, the nuclear plant closest to

the Tokyo Metropolitan area (ca. 100 km). Under this scenario, the total number of operating units in

the world would drop to 420 and the installed capacity to 354 GWe.

• The German Scenario. In addition to the units considered closed under the Baseline and East Coast

Scenarios the 13 reactors in Japan with an operational age in excess of 30 years will remain shut

down. The German government decided in the wake of 3/11 to permanently shut down the eight

reactors down that had operated for over three decades. That would leave Japan with 24 operating

reactors, the worldwide figure would drop to 407, last seen in 1987, and the installed capacity to 349

GWe, not experienced since the mid-1990s.

Figure 5. World Nuclear Reactor Fleet, 1954–2013

Sources: IAEA-PRIS, MSC, 2013

Considering the opposition to nuclear power in Japan, especially by local authorities under the

influence of an increasingly vocal public opinion, against the restart of any nuclear reactor, it is

possible—even under a strongly pro-nuclear central government—that there will be the short-term

closure of the majority of the nuclear program in the country. This would not be a “phase-out”

scenario but rather the simple “abandoning” of nuclear power. Every authorization of restart will be

subject to intense battles between promoters and opponents of the nuclear option. The continuous

instability of the Fukushima site could also lead to further incidents and additional releases of large

amounts of radioactivity, especially following strong aftershocks, of which a substantial risk persists.

Under these circumstances, the scenarios above are likely to prove quite conservative.

The total world installed nuclear capacity has decreased six times since the beginning of the

commercial application of nuclear fission, all in the past 15 years—in 1997, 2003, 2007, 2008, 2009

and 2011. Despite 15 fewer units operating in early 2012 compared to 2002, the generating capacity is

still about identical and as of late June 2013, with two fewer units operating, the installed capacity is

identical to its value a year ago. This is a result of the combined effects of larger units replacing

smaller ones and, mainly, technical alterations at existing plants, a process known as uprating. In the

United States, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has approved 148 uprates since 1977.

These included, in 2012, six uprates between 1.6 percent (Harris 1) and 13.1 percent (Grand Gulf 1).

Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013

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The cumulative approved uprates in the United States total 6.9 GW.36 Most of these have already been

implemented. A similar trend of uprates and lifetime extensions of existing reactors can be seen in

Europe. The main incentive for lifetime extensions is their considerable economic advantage over

new-build, but upgrading and extending the operating lives of older reactors have lower safety

margins than replacement with more modern designs.

It appears however that the incentives for power uprates are waning as in 2012 the number of units

with pending applications dropped from 20 in the previous year to 14 and the total capacity increase

that would occur from 1.5 GW to 1 GW. 37 The increasing challenge for existing U.S. reactors to

compete with wholesale market prices set by the operating costs of gas-fired and wind generators led

nuclear giant Exelon to abandon planned uprates for four older units.38

Adding together uprates, new-build capacity, and substracting closures, the capacity of the global

nuclear fleet increased by about 30 GWe between 1992 and 2002 to reach 362 GWe; it peaked in 2010

at 375 GWe before falling back to the level achieved a decade ago.

The use of nuclear energy has been limited to a small number of countries, with only 31 countries, or

16 percent of the 193 members of the United Nations, operating nuclear power plants in early 2013

(see Figure 2). Half of the world’s nuclear countries are located in the European Union (EU), and in

2012 they accounted for 36 percent of the world’s nuclear production. France alone generated about

half (48 percent) of the EU’s nuclear production.

Overview of Current New Build

Currently, 14 countries are building nuclear power plants. With the United Arab Emirates (UAE)

concreting the base-slab for two units at Barakah in July 2012 and May 2013, one country was added

to the list compared to the last edition of the WNISR. Japan halted work at two units following the

3/11 events, Ohma and Shimane-3, which had been under construction since 2007 and 2010

respectively. Officially construction resumed at Ohma on 1 October 2012 and Shimane-3 has

remained “under construction”, according to Japan Atomic Industrial Forum (JAIF)39 and IAEA

statistics. However, in view of the current situation in Japan, we consider it very unlikely that these

plants will be completed; it will be hard enough for the industry to get its stranded plant restarted.

In the previous WNISR edition, the Russian Kursk-5 unit was removed from the list, following reports

that the builder, Rosatom, confirmed that the project was abandoned. The unit finally disappeared

from the IAEA’s data base early July 2013. So, as of early July 2013, 66 reactors are defined here as

under construction, seven more than a year ago. However, 28 of these are in China, leaving the total in

the rest of the world being 38. The current number compares with a peak of 234 units in building

progress—totaling more than 200 GW—in 1979. However, many of those projects (48) were never

finished (see Figure 6.) The year 2004, with 26 units under construction, marked a record low for

construction since the beginning of the nuclear age in the 1950s.

After a near two year freeze on nuclear plant construction following the events of March 2011, when

no new building site was opened, China resumed construction on on 17 November 2012. 40 The World

36 Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), “Approved Applications for Power Uprates”, updated 29 March

2012, at www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/power-uprates/status-power-apps/approved-

applications.html, accessed on 22 June 2013.

37 Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), “Pending Applications for Power Uprates”, updated 30 April 2012,

at www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/power-uprates/status-power-apps/pending-applications.html,

accessed on 22 June 2013.

38 Platts, “Exelon cancels power uprates for LaSalle, Limerick nuclear plants”, 12 June 2013, see

http://www.platts.com/latest-news/electric-power/Washington/Exelon-cancels-power-uprates-for-LaSalle-

Limerick-21152061, accessed 7 July 2013.

39 JAIF, “Nuclear Power Plants in Japan”, 22 May 2013.

40 The previous construction start dated from 31 December 2010.

Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013

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Nuclear Association assumes that at least five authorized construction starts did not happen, with at

least another ten in the pipeline for 2011 alone.41

Figure 6. Number of Nuclear Reactors under Construction

Source: IAEA-PRIS, MSC 2013

The total capacity of units now under construction in the world is about 63 GWe, up by about 7 GWe

compared to a year ago, with an average unit size of 960 MW (see Table 1 and Annex 7 for details). A

closer look at currently listed projects illustrates the level of uncertainty associated with reactor

building, especially given that most constructors assume a five-year construction period:

• Nine reactors have been listed as “under construction” for more than 20 years. The U.S. Watts Bar-2

project in Tennessee holds the record, as construction started in December 1972, but was

subsequently frozen. It failed to meet the latest startup date in 2012 and is now scheduled to be

connected to the grid in 2015. Other long-term construction projects include three Russian units,

two Mochovce units in Slovakia, and two Khmelnitski units in Ukraine. The construction of the

Argentinian Atucha-2 reactor started 32 years ago.

• Four reactors have been listed as “under-construction” for over 10 years. These are two Taiwanese

units at Lungmen for about 14 years and two Indian units at Kudankulam for around 10 years.

• Forty-five projects do not have an IAEA planned start-up date.

• At least 23 of the units listed by the IAEA as “under construction” have encountered construction

delays, most of them significant. All of the 43 remaining units were started within the last five

years or have not reached projected start-up dates yet. This makes it difficult to assess whether or

not they are on schedule.

• Two thirds (44) of the units under construction are located in just three countries: China, India and

Russia. Historically, none of these countries have historically been very transparent or reliable

about information on the status of their construction sites. It is nevertheless known that half of the

Russian units listed are experiencing multi-year delays (see Annex 7 for details).

41 www.world-nuclear.com/info/inf63.html, accessed 3 May 2012.

Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013

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Table 1: Nuclear Reactors “Under Construction” (as of 1 July 2013)42

Country

Units MWe (net) Construction Start Grid Connection

China

28

27,790

2008-2013

2013-2017

Russia

9

7,273

1983-2019

2014-2019

India

7

4,824

2002-2011

2013-2016

South Korea

5

6,320

2008-2013

2013-2017

USA

3

3,399

1972-2013

2015-2017

Pakistan

2

630

2011

2016-2017

Slovakia

2

880

1985

2014-2015

Taiwan

2

2,600

1999

2014-2015

UAE

2

2,690

2012-2013

2017-2018

Ukraine

2

1,900

1986-1987

2015-2016

Argentina

1

692

1981

2013

Brazil

1

1,245

2010

2016

Finland

1

1,600

2005

2016

France

1

1,600

2007

2016

Total

66

63,443

1972-2013

2013-2019

Source : IAEA-PRIS, MSC, 2013

The lead time for nuclear plants includes not only construction times but also lengthy licensing

procedures in most countries, complex financing negotiations, and site preparation.

Past experience shows that simply having an order for a reactor, or even having a nuclear plant at an

advanced stage of construction, is no guarantee for grid connection and power production. The French

Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) statistics on “cancelled orders” through 2002 indicate

253 cancelled orders in 31 countries, many of them at an advanced construction stage (see also

Figure 6). The United States alone accounted for 138 of these cancellations.43 Many U.S. utilities

incurred significant financial harm because of cancelled reactor-building projects.

Operating Age

In the absence of any significant new-build and grid connection over many years, the average age

(since grid connection) of operating nuclear power plants has been increasing steadily and now stands

at about 28 years.44 Some nuclear utilities envisage average reactor lifetimes of beyond 40 years and

even up to 60 years. In the United States, reactors are initially licensed to operate for 40 years. Nuclear

operators can request a license renewal for an additional 20 years from the NRC. As of June 2013,

72 of the 100 operating U.S. units have received an extension, and another 18 applications are under

NRC review.45 However, these applications are currently on hold pending completion of a review of

the management of commercial nuclear reactor spent fuel, with no license extension decision to be

granted until completion of this process.46

Even license renewal does not guarantee longer operating life. None of the 32 units that have been

shut down in the U.S. had reached 40 years on the grid. In other words, at least a quarter of the

reactors built in the U.S. never reached their design lifetime. On the other hand, of the 100 currently

operating plants 24 units have operated for 40 years or more.

42 For further details see Annex 8.

43 CEA, “Elecnuc – Nuclear Power Plants in the World”, 2002.

44 Here, reactor age is calculated from grid connection to final disconnection from the grid. In this report,

“startup” is synonymous with grid connection and “shutdown” with withdrawal from the grid.

45 U.S.NRC, “Status of License Renewal Applications and Industry Activities”, updated 17 June 2013, see

http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewal/applications.html, accessed 23 June 2013.

46 U.S.NRC, “Waste Confidence”, see http://www.nrc.gov/waste/spent-fuel-storage/wcd.html, accessed 10 July

2013.

Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013

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Many other countries, however, have no time limitations on operating licenses. In France, where the

country’s first operating PWR started up in 1977, reactors must undergo in-depth inspection and

testing every decade. The French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) evaluates on a reactor-by-reactor

basis whether a unit can operate for more than 30 years. At this point, ASN considers the issue of

lifetimes beyond 40 years to be irrelevant, although the French utility EDF has clearly stated that, for

economic reasons, it plans to prioritize lifetime extension over large-scale new-build. However, only a

few plants have so far received a permit to extend their operational life from 30 to 40 years, but only

under the condition of significant upgrading. President François Hollande vowed to close down the

country’s oldest reactors at Fessenheim by the end of 2016 and to engage on a path leading to the

reduction of the nuclear share in power generation from 75 to 50 percent by 2025. These decisions

were confirmed in September 2012 by the Conseil de Politique Nucléaire, the highest nuclear

decision-making body chaired by the President himself.47 However, even if ASN gave the go-ahead

for all of the oldest units to operate for 40 years, 22 of the 58 French operating reactors will reach that

age by 2020.

Figure 7. Age Distribution of Operating Nuclear Reactors, 2013

Sources: IAEA-PRIS, MSC, 2013

In assessing the likelihood of reactors being able to operate for up to 60 years, it is useful to compare

the age distribution of reactors that are currently operating with those that have already shut down (see

Figures 7 and 8). As of mid-2013, 31 of the world’s operating reactors have exceeded the 40-year

mark.48 As the age pyramid illustrates, that number will rapidly increase over the next few years. A

total of 190 units have already reached age 30 or more.

The age structure of the 153 units already shut down confirms the picture. In total, 47 of these units

operated for 30 years or more and of those, 20 reactors operated for 40 years or more (see Figure 8).

The majority of these were Magnox reactors located in the U.K. As they were designed to produce

weapons-grade plutonium, these were all small reactors (50–490 MW) that had operated with very low

47 Conseil de Politique Nucléaire, 28 September 2012, press release issued on 15 October 2012, see

http://www.elysee.fr/communiques-de-presse/article/conseil-de-politique-nucleaire/, accessed 23 June 2013.

48 We count the age starting with grid connection, and figures are rounded by half-years.

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burn-up fuel and very low power density (watts of heat per liter of core volume). Therefore there are

significant differences from the large 900 MW or 1,300 MW commercial reactors whose high burn-up

fuel and high power density generate significantly more stress on materials and equipment. Many units

of the first generation have operated for only a few years. Considering that the average age of the

153 units that have already shut down is about 24 years—with 8 more units shut down over the past

year the figure did not change—plans to extend the operational lifetime of large numbers of units to 40

years and beyond seem rather optimistic.

As a result of the Fukushima nuclear disaster questions have been raised about the wisdom of

operating older reactors. The Fukushima-I units (1 to 4) were connected to the grid between 1971 and

1974. The license for unit 1 was extended for another 10 years in February 2011. Four days after the

accidents in Japan, the German government ordered the shutdown of seven reactors that had started up

before 1981. These reactors, together with another unit that was closed at the time, never restarted.

The sole selection criterion was operational age. Other countries did not adopt the same approach, but

it is clear that the 3/11 events had an impact on previously assumed extended lifetimes in other

countries as well, including in Belgium, Switzerland and Taiwan.

Figure 8. Age Distribution of Shutdown Nuclear Reactors, 2013

Sources: IAEA-PRIS, MSC, 2013

For the purposes of capacity projections, in a first scenario (40-Year Lifetime Projection, see

Figure 9), we have assumed a general lifetime of 40 years for worldwide operating reactors, with a

few adjustments, while we take into account already-authorized lifetime extensions in a second

scenario (PLEX Projection). There are several individual cases where continued operation or lifetime

extensions are in question and an official decision to shutdown earlier has been made49 (see

Figure 10).

The lifetime projections make possible an evaluation of the number of plants that would have to come

on line over the next decades to offset closures and simply maintain the same number of operating

plants. Even with 66 units under construction—as of 1 July 2013, all of which are considered online

49 The Japanese reactors constitute the largest contingency of uncertainty. In this scenario all but the

10 Fukushima reactors would return to operation. A highly conservative assumption.

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by 2020—installed nuclear capacity would drop by 25 GW. Therefore in total 55 additional reactors

would have to be finished and started up prior to 2020 in order to maintain the status quo. This

corresponds to between eight and nine new grid connections per year, with an additional 205 units

(191 GW) over the following 10-year period—one every 18 days. This compares to 33 grid

connections over the past 10-year period.

Figure 9. The 40-Year Lifetime Projection

Sources: IAEA-PRIS, WNA, MSC 2013

The achievement of the 2020 target appears increasingly unlikely given the existing difficult financial

situation of the world’s main reactor builders and utilities, the general economic crisis and generally

hostile public opinion—aside from any other specific post-Fukushima effects. A notable difference to

previous assessments consists in the assumption that constraints on the manufacturing of key reactor

components is playing a minor role as reactor orders have not been following capacity extensions, in

particular of key component manufacturer Japan Steel Works (JSW).

As a result, the number of reactors in operation will decline over the coming years unless lifetime

extensions beyond 40 years becomes widespread. The scenario of such generalized lifetime extensions

is however even less likely after Fukushima, as many questions regarding safety upgrades,

maintenance costs, and other issues would need to be much more carefully addressed.

Developments in Asia, and particularly in China, do not fundamentally change the global picture.

Reported figures for China’s 2020 target for installed nuclear capacity have fluctuated between 40 GW

and 120 GW in the past. The freeze of construction initiation for almost two years has reduced

Chinese ambitions. While there has been considerable acceleration of construction starts in the past—

with 19 new building sites initiated in 2009 and 2010—not a single new construction site was initiated

between December 2010 and November 2012, and none was reported in the first half of 2013. In

addition, the average construction time for the 18 operating units in China was 5.8 years. At present,

28 units with about 28 GW are under construction and scheduled to be connected before 2018, which

will bring the total to 42 GW. The prospects for significantly exceeding the original 2008 target of

40 GW for 2020 is unlikely. There are also indications that new reactors will be allowed only in

coastal, not inland, sites, restricting the number of suitable sites available.

We have also modeled a scenario in which all currently licensed lifetime extensions and license

renewals (mainly in the United States) are maintained and all construction sites are completed. For all

Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013

23

other units we have maintained a 40-year lifetime projection, unless a firm earlier or later shutdown

date has been announced. The net number of operating reactors would still decrease by 11 units even if

installed capacity would grow by 11.5 GW in 2020. The overall pattern of the decline would hardly be

altered, it would merely be delayed by some years. (See Figures 10 and 11).

Figure 10. The PLEX Projection

Sources: IAEA-PRIS, US-NRC, WNA, MSC 2013

Figure 11. Forty-Year Lifetime Projection versus PLEX Projection (in numbers of reactors)

Sources: IAEA-PRIS, US-NRC, MSC 2013

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Potential Newcomer Countries

In its International Status and Prospects for Nuclear Power 201250 the IAEA estimates that there are a

total of 29 countries that are described as developing nuclear power programs for the first time. This

includes three countries that have ordered nuclear power plants, 14 countries that are considering

starting a nuclear power program and in which there is a “strong indication of intentions to proceed”,

six countries show “active preparation for a possible nuclear power program” and a further six that are

actively preparing for a possible nuclear power program with no final decision. The total number of

countries listed as developing nuclear power programs has fallen since the IAEA last published its

assessment in 2010, when there were 33.

According to the IAEA, the three countries that have ordered nuclear power plants are the United Arab

Emirates (UAE), Turkey and Belarus. The Agency also states that there are nine countries that have

suggested a start-up date for first power before 2030. The IAEA does not list those countries, but it is

likely to include the three in which orders have been placed, plus Bangladesh, Jordan, Lithuania,

Poland, Saudi Arabia and Vietnam. This 2012 analysis from the IAEA is a retreat from its suggestions

earlier in the same year when it stated it expected Vietnam, Bangladesh, United Arab Emirates,

Turkey and Belarus to start building their first nuclear power plants in 2012 and that Jordan and Saudi

Arabia could follow in 2013.51 This prediction seems to be divergent with actual events, with only the

UAE starting construction, one unit each in 2012 and 2013. IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano

reported to his Board of Governors in March 2013: “The UAE is the first new country in 27 years to

have started building a nuclear power plant.”52

Figure 12 illustrates the history of national nuclear programs with the startup of the first and shutdown

of the last reactor per country.

Figure 12. Start-ups and Closures of National Nuclear Power Programs, 1950–2013

Sources: IAEA-PRIS 2013, MSC, 2013

50 IAEA “International Status and Prospects for Nuclear Power 2012”, International Atomic Energy Agency,

Report by the Director General, 15 August 2012.

51 Enformable.com, “IAEA – Vietnam and 4 other countries to incorporate nuclear energy after Fukushima”,

Lucas W Hixson, 24 February 2012, http://enformable.com/2012/02/iaea-vietnam-and-4-other-countries-to-

incorporate-nuclear-energy-after-fukushima/; accessed 5 May 2012.

52 Yukiya Amano, “Introductory Statement to Board of Governors”, 4 March 2013, see

http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/2013/amsp2013n03.html, accessed 10 June 2013.

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Below is an assessment by country of the status of the projects that the IAEA has referred to, which

indicates that most are much further from the launch of their program than the IAEA frequently

suggests.

Bangladesh currently has an installed electricity capacity of 6 GW, with plans to introduce an

additional 20 GW by 2020, reportedly to service the 60 percent of the population lacking access to

electricity.53 Bangladesh has been considering embarking on nuclear power for 50 years54 and the

latest attempt is expected to come from 2 GW of nuclear provided by Russian reactors. In 2011

Science Minister Yeafesh Osman was quoted as saying “we have signed the deal… to ease the power

crisis”. He said that construction of the plants would start by 2013 and would take five years to

complete.55 In January 2013 Deputy Finance Minister of Russia Sergey Storchak and Economic

Relations Division (ERD) Secretary of Bangladesh Md Abul Kalam Azad signed an agreement on the

Extension of State Export Credit for financing the preparatory stage work at Rooppur.56 However, the

deal is only for $500 million57 and will only cover the site preparatory work.58 According to Rosatom

this will begin in January 201459 and is being complemented with $150 million of domestic financing.

Completion of this phase is expected by June 2017.60 Nuclear Intelligence Weekly suggests that

groundwork will only start in January 2015 and startup by 2018.61

As with many other countries, access to water has been identified as a potential stumbling block of the

Rooppur (or Ruppur) plant, with plans to site it on the banks of the river Padmar. During the first half

of the year, much of the river’s water resource is already withdrawn by India through the Farakka

Barrage, leaving insufficient cooling water for the plant and other activities in Bangladesh.62

In mid-2006, the government of Belarus, which, 20 years before, was heavily contaminated by the

Chernobyl accident, approved a plan for construction of a nuclear power plant in the Mogilev region

in the east of the country. An agreement with Russia on cooperation for the construction of a nuclear

power plant in Belarus was signed on 15 March 2011. Expressions of interest were sought from

international companies, and, not surprisingly given the existing economic and political ties, a bid

from Russia’s Atomstroyexport was taken forward. Under a financing agreement, Russia would

provide a $9 billion loan. Prior to 3/11, the two countries reportedly aimed at the signature of an

agreement on plant construction in spring 2011, with construction starting in September of the same

year.63 In November 2011 it was agreed that Russia would lend up to $10 billion for 25 years to

finance 90 percent of the contract between Atomstroyexport and the Belarus Directorate for Nuclear

Power Plant Construction. In February 2012 Russian state-owned Vnesheconombank (VEB) and

Belarusian commercial bank Belvnesheconombank signed an agreement to implement the Russian

export credit facility.64 In July 2012 a contract was signed for the construction of two VVER 1200

reactors (analogous to the Western PWR), with an estimated cost of $10 billion, including a $3 billion

53 Economist, “The most bucks for the biggest bang”, 6 February 2013.

54 WNN, “Russian loan for Rooppur construction”, 16 January 2013.

55 BBC, “Bangladesh agrees nuclear power deal with Russia”, 2 November 2011,

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-15552687, accessed 5 May 2012.

56 Energy Bangla “Bangladesh, Russia sign nuclear power pact”, 17 January 2013.

57 All dollar (equivalent) amounts are expressed in U.S. dollars unless indicated otherwise. However, the year’s

dollars are not always clear in the original references.

58 The Star, “Russia to lend $1.5B to Bangladesh to build nuclear power station, buy arms”, 15 January 2013.

59 Rosatom , “Photo exhibition ‘The Russian Nuclear Power’ started in Bangladesh”, 2 April 2013.

60 The Financial Express, “Building Rooppur nuke plant likely to start this year”, 2 April 2013.

61 Nuclear Intelligence Weekly, 15 March 2013.

62 A. Rahman, “Is Bangladesh Sleepwalking to Nuclear Power”, New Age Online, 7 February 2013

63 Voice of Russia, “Belarus Nuclear Deal to be Signed on March 15,” 16 February 2011.

64 WNA, “Nuclear Power in Belarus”, April 2013.

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in infrastructure costs to accommodate the undeveloped remoteness of Ostrovets in northern Belarus.65

In December 2012, Russian Vnesheconombank authorized allocating a $500 million credit line for the

Belarusian Finance Ministry to make advance payments for preparation work66. This phase was

scheduled to be completed by mid-2013 with concreting work to start in September 2013. The first

unit is scheduled to be operational in 2017.67

In August 2011, the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection of Belarus stated

that the first unit would be commissioned in 2016 and the second one in 2018. Both would be of the

VVER “NPP-2006” type with a capacity of 1170 MW each.68 However, it is now expected that the

reactors will not be completed until 2018 and 2020.69 Opposition to the project is increasing. On the

26th anniversary of the Chernobyl catastrophe in 2012, about one-thousand people demonstrated in the

Belarussian capital Minsk against the nuclear project,70 with a similar sized protest held in April

201371.

The Lithuanian Government has repeatedly criticised the safety of the project and has particular

concerns as the proposed site at Astravyets as it is only 50 km from its capital Vilnius. The Espoo

Convention Implementation Committee has instructed Belarus to continue environmental impact

assessment procedures based on the Espoo Convention in order to provide answers to all the questions

asked by Lithuania and take into consideration all comments. However, Vitalijus Auglys, director of

the Pollution Prevention Department in Lithuania’s Natural Resources Ministry, stated: “We haven’t

received the latest information from them. We can’t even start consultations with them, because we

must hold public discussions.”72

Lithuania had two large RMBK (Chernobyl-type) reactors at Ignalina which were shut down in 2004

and 2009 as part of the agreement to join the European Union. Before the 2009 shutdown, Lithuania’s

remaining unit generated 76.2 percent of the country’s electricity, the largest percentage share

worldwide. As a result of the closure, Lithuania has significantly increased electricity imports from

Belarus, Latvia and Russia. The decision to boost electricity imports is purely based on economic

considerations. By the end of 2011, the country had an installed capacity of about 2.8 GW compared

to a peak load of 1.9 GW.73

In February 2007, the governments of the three Baltic States and Poland agreed to build a new nuclear

power plant at Ignalina—the Visaginas project. Lithuania passed a parliamentary bill in July 2007

calling for construction and completion by 2015. The Lithuanian government announced that it would

conduct direct negotiations with potential investors and that it hoped to begin operation of the new

plant in 2020.74 This led to exclusive negotiations with Korean utility KEPCO, which turned down

65 Nuclear Intelligence Weekly, “Belarus, Aided by Russia and Broke, Europe’s Last Dictatorship Proceeds With

NPP, 28 September 2012

66 Belarusian Telegraph Agency, “Excavation of Belarusian nuclear station second power unit foundation pit

begins”, 1 February 2013

67 Itar-Tass, “Belarus NPP cost should not exceed funds for Kaliningrad NPP construction – Semashko”,

17 February 2012, see http://www.itar-tass.com/en/c154/346054.html, accessed 1 June 2012.

68 V.V. Kulik, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection of the Republic of

Belarus, Letter to the European Commission, dated 9 August 2011.

69 Belarusian Telegraph Agency, “Excavation of Belarusian nuclear station second power unit foundation pit

begins”, 1 February 2013

70 Nuclear Intelligence Weekly, 17 April 2012.

71 Belarus Digest, “The Chernobyl Way 2013”, 29 April 2013

72 Lithuania Tribune, “Belarus wants dialogue on nuclear power plant, but no consultations planned”,

22 April 2013

73 Vladas Paskevicius, “Electricity Sector Development in Lithuania”, Lithuanian Electricity Association,

December 2011.

74 WNA, “Nuclear Power in Lithuania,” October 2012, www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf109.html, accessed

10 June 2013.

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cooperation in early December 2010, two weeks after submitting a bid. In December 2011 Poland

withdrew from the project75.

The Lithuanian government, along with its partners in Estonia and Latvia, picked Hitachi together

with its Hitachi-GE Nuclear Energy Ltd. unit as a strategic investor and technology supplier to

construct a nuclear plant by the end of 2020.76 In May 2012, the percentage breakdown of the initially

$6.5 billion project were announced with a 20 percent ownership for Hitachi, and 38 percent for

Lithuania, while Estonia would take 22 percent and Latvia 20 percent.77

However, in October 2012 a consultative national referendum on the future of nuclear power was held

in Lithuania and 63 percent voted against new nuclear construction, with sufficient turnout to validate

the result.78 Prior to his appointment as Prime Minister, Algirdas Butkevicius, stated that legislation

prohibiting the project would be submitted once the new parliament convenes and that “the people

expressed their wish in the referendum, and I will follow the people’s will”.79

Renewable energy suppliers are making use of the current situation to promote their expansion. The

Lithuanian wind energy association has stated: “The newly elected government will have to make a

new energy strategy, where onshore and offshore wind power possibly could take the place of nuclear

power”, both with a doubling of domestic production, to 500 MW and imports linked to wind

development in Sweden and Poland.80

Remarkably a Lithuanian government commissioned report concluded that under both low and high

gas price scenarios it would be cheaper to buy electricity from the regional market than to proceed

with the construction of a nuclear reactor in the country. Consultants at the Lithuanian Energy Institute

concluded that current costs of electricity, including imports, would be 4–10 Lithuanian cents (1.5–3.8

US cents) per kilowatt-hour less than power from a new reactor. Under these conditions it would save

Lithuania $152.8 million per year not to build the reactor.81

Poland planned the development of a series of nuclear power stations in the 1980s and started

construction of two VVER 1000/320 reactors in Żarnowiec on the Baltic coast, but both construction

and further plans were halted following the Chernobyl accident. In 2008, however, Poland announced

that it was going to re-enter the nuclear arena. In November 2010, the government adopted the

Ministry of Economy’s Nuclear Energy Program, which was submitted to a Strategic Environmental

Assessment. Poland aims to build 6 GW of nuclear capacity with the first reactor starting up by 2020.

In response over 60,000 submissions were received from neighboring Germany; the results are due in

the summer of 2013.

Officials have revised the planning in the meantime targeting 2022–23 for the startup of the first

reactor. The State utility PGE set up two daughter companies to implement the project, which is

supposed to result in two nuclear power stations with 3 GW capacity each. PGE announced the choice

of three potential sites in December 2011: Gąski (Mielno), Lubiatowo (Choczewo) and Żarnowiec.

Financing of the ambitious project remains unclear and public opinion is highly uncertain. While

Poland was the only country showing a majority in favor of nuclear new-build in a 24-country opinion

survey in June 201182, a local referendum in February 2012 in Mielno showed a surprising 94 percent

opposed to the plan. The Polish government reacted by starting a $6 million public information

75 Nuclear Power Daily, “Poland Freezes Role in Lithuania Atomic Project,”, 9 December 2011

76 Bloomberg, “Lithuania Seeking Lower Electricity Prices at New Nuclear Plant”, 15 February 2012,

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-15/lithuania-seeking-lower-electricity-prices-at-new-nuclear-

plant.html, accessed 10 June 2013.

77 Nuclear Intelligence Weekly, “Lithuania”, 11 May 2012.

78 Reuters, “Lithuanians send nuclear plant back to drawing board”, 15 October 2012.

79 Nuclear Intelligence Weekly, “Lithuania, Prospective PM Wants to Scrape Visaginas”, 9 November 2012.

80 Bloomberg, “Lithuania May Partly Replace Nuclear Power With Wind, Lobby Says”, 20 November 2012.

81 Nucleonics Week, “Visaginas generation cost would be above market prices: consultants”, 2 May 2013.

82 IPSOS, “Global Citizen Reaction to the Fukushima Nuclear Plant Disaster”, June 2011.

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campaign, labeled “Meet the Atom”. “We want to make sure that the first Polish nuclear power plant

is established with the approval of Polish society”, Hanna Trojanowska, vice minister and government

commissioner for nuclear energy, stated in late March 2012.83 The director of external relations for the

state utility PGE, which promotes the project, stated that “obviously we will not proceed against the

will of local people”.84 A September 2012 update of the 24-country opinion survey identifies Poland

as one in only three countries where public support for nuclear power decreased, from 61 to

53 percent.85

The project does not seem to be going forward very quickly, and in January 2013 the Polish utility

PGE selected Australia’s Worley Parsons to conduct a five-year, $81.5 million study on the siting and

development of a nuclear power plant, with a capacity of up to 3 GW.86 The Polish government is

reviewing the project and aims to streamline project management in order to reduce costs. It was

foreseen that the first units will come into operation around 2023, with the last ones before 2030. A

tender for construction and financing was to be opened in the end of 2013. But this schedule is likely

to slip as the Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, stated in June 2013 that new nuclear may not be needed if

shale gas is developed: "I'm not ruling out nuclear in our energy mix, but later than planned (...) This

is primarily due to the expected growth of natural gas as an energy source, including domestic shale

gas."87

In August 2009 the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia announced that it was considering launching a nuclear

power program, and in April 2010 a royal decree stated: "The development of atomic energy is

essential to meet the Kingdom's growing requirements for energy to generate electricity, produce

desalinated water and reduce reliance on depleting hydrocarbon resources.”88 The King Abdullah City

for Atomic and Renewable Energy (KA-CARE) has been set up in Riyadh to advance this agenda and

to be the competent agency for treaties on nuclear energy signed by the Kingdom. It is also

responsible for supervising works related to nuclear energy and radioactive waste projects. In June

2010 it appointed the Finland- and Switzerland-based consultancy firm Pöyry to help define a "high-

level strategy in the area of nuclear and renewable energy applications" with desalination. In June

2011 the coordinator of scientific collaboration at KA-CARE said that it plans to construct 16 nuclear

power reactors over the next 20 years at a cost of more than 300 billion riyals ($80 billion). The first

two reactors would be planned to be online in ten years and then two more per year until 2030.89

However, according to a World Energy Council survey, “Saudi Arabia reported that using nuclear is

still under consideration and that the WNA figures given above [16 reactors, 20 GW] are

speculative.”90 The assessment confirms reports that the KA-CARE nuclear proposal has still not been

approved by the country’s top economic board, headed by King Abdullah.91 In March 2013, it was

reported that a KA-CARE official has said that a tender is now unlikely for another 7–8 years.92

Saudi Arabia has very large electricity expansion projects. It plans to double installed capacity to

100 GW by 2021, mainly through fossil fuels, but with a 10 percent renewable target by 2020. There

83 Nucleonics Week, “As Polish nuclear plans progress, government seeks public support”, 5 April 2012.

84 Idem.

85 IPSOS 2012, “Global support for energy sources September 2012 – Change since Fukushima”,

12 October 2012.

86 Nuclear Intelligence Weekly, Briefs-Poland, 8 February 2013.

87 Business New Europe, “Poland backpedals on nuclear strategy”, 19 June 2013.

88 World Politics Review, “Saudi Arabia’s Nuclear Ambitions Part of Broader Strategy”, 16 June 2011,

http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/9186/saudi-arabias-nuclear-ambitions-part-of-broader-strategy,

accessed 6 May 2012.

89 WNA, “Emerging Nuclear Energy Countries”, February 2012, see http://www.world-

nuclear.org/info/inf102.html, accessed 7 May 2012.

90 WEC, “World Energy Perspective: Nuclear Energy One Year After Fukushima”, 9 March 2012.

91 Nuclear Intelligence Weekly, “Saudi Arabia – Nuclear Plans Remain Stalled”, 13 February 2012.

92 Nuclear Intelligence Weekly, “US-Saudi NCA Talks Have Yet to Tackle ENR”, 1 March 2013

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is a $100 billion state spending commitment over the next ten years on renewables and nuclear

combined.93 Recent announcements tend to emphasize renewables; for example, 24 GW of renewable

capacity (producing one-third of projected electricity use) is reportedly targeted by 2020 and 54 GW

by 2032. A renewable-and-nuclear policy statement is expected later in 2013.94

However, these choices are not only about energy and economics. Senior Saudi Arabian diplomats

have reportedly stated that “if Iran develops a nuclear weapon, that will be unacceptable to us and we

will have to follow suit”, and officials in Riyadh have said that the country would reluctantly push

ahead with their own civilian nuclear program.95 Independent experts have suggested that the drive for

civil nuclear power in the region is seen by some as a “security hedge”, and that “if Iran was not on

the path to a nuclear weapon capability you would probably not see this [civil nuclear] rush”.96

Concerns over nuclear non-proliferation have led the Canadian Government, in a briefing note, to

conclude that the Kingdom “does not meet Canada’s requirements for nuclear co-operation”.97

U.S. firms are also currently excluded from any projects due to the lack of a nuclear co-operation

agreement. The likelihood of an agreement being signed has been reduced recently with a speech by

Hashim Yamani, head of the KA-CARE that the Kingdom was reluctant to willingly forgo enrichment

and reprocessing98.

Turkey has a decades long history of attempting to build a nuclear power program, starting in the

early 1970s. In 2006, the government presented a revised nuclear initiative and announced plans for up

to 4.5 GW of capacity at Akkuyu and at the Black Sea site of Sinop. The plans met with large-scale

local protests. The following year, Turkey approved a bill introducing new laws on the construction

and operation of nuclear power plants, which led in March 2008 to a revised tender process for the

Akkuyu plant. Only one bid was received jointly from Atomstroyexport and Inter RAO (both from

Russia) and Park Teknik (Turkey) for an AES-2006 power plant (another name for the VVER-1200)

with four 1200 MW reactors. In May 2010, the Russian and Turkish heads of state signed an

intergovernmental agreement for Rosatom to build, own, and operate the Akkuyu plant with four 1200

MW AES-2006 units—a project reported to be worth $20 billion.99 The main opposition party, the

Republican People’s Party, resorted to the courts to have the agreement overturned as it says that the

tender was not open as required.100 In December 2011, the project company filed applications for

construction permits and a power generation license, as well as for an environmental impact

assessment, with a view to starting construction in 2013.101 However, the power generation licence and

environmental approval are only expected by the end of 2013 and the construction licence by mid

2014, enabling full construction to start in 2015.102 The most recent cost estimate is $25 billion, with

the project being built on a ‘build, own and operate’ (BOO) basis by the Russian consortium, with the

electricity being sold at a fixed price. Russia has indicated it would provide 100 percent of financing

and reportedly has already spent $700 million on the project. Accordingly, the negotiations about the

electricity price are difficult and have been ongoing for years. One source indicates that the 2010

93 Ernst&Young, “Renewable energy country attractiveness indices”, February 2012.

94 Saudi Gazette, “Saudi Arabia seeks to become ‘green’ energy efficient by 2032”, 5 July 2013, see

http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/index.cfm?method=home.regcon&contentid=20130705172382, accessed

7 July 2013.

95 Guardian, “Riyadh will build nuclear weapons if Iran gets them, Saudi prince warns”, Jason Burke,

29 June 2011.

96 The Times, “Six Arab States join rush to go nuclear”, Richard Beeston, 4 November 2006.

97 Ottawa Citizen, “Canada concerned about Saudi Arabia’s nuclear intentions”, 28 January 2013

98 Nuclear Intelligence Weekly, “US-Saudi NCA Talks Have Yet to Tackle ENR”, 1 March 2013

99 WNN , “Russia’s Plans for Akkuyu”, 13 May 2010.

100 Todays Zaman, “Turkey's main opposition to appeal nuclear power plant bill”, 22 July 2010

101 WNN, “Site Work to Start for Turkish Plants,” 25 February 2011.

102 WNA, “Nuclear Power in Turkey”, 9 April 2013.

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intergovernmental agreement committed to paying Turkey $123.5/MWh for the first 15 years.103 The

licensing process is by its very nature complex, especially as this is the first time a commerical nuclear

reactor would be licenced in the country and that there are no VVER 1200 designs in operation.

Therefore the licensing process will be heavily reliant on the reactor vendor.104

In March 2010, Turkey also signed an agreement with Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) to

prepare a bid for the Sinop plant. However, the parties failed to reach an agreement because of

“differences in issues including electricity sales price.”105 Negotiations switched to Toshiba, with the

support of the Japanese government, and in December 2010 the parties signed an agreement to prepare

a bid for development. A French consortium of AREVA and GDF Suez has also indicated an intention

to bid for the project, as has French state utility EDF and the Chinese Guangdong Nuclear Power

Company (CGN). In November 2011 the prime minister requested the South Korean president to

renew the KEPCO bid106. Yet another candidate entered the process when, on 24 April 2012, Turkish

state utility EUAS signed a memorandum of understanding with the Canadian firm CANDU-AECL

(now owned by SNC-Lavalin) that covers a feasibility study for a 4-unit nuclear plant at Sinop.

However, as the trade journal Nuclear Intelligence Weekly points out, “the deciding factor in Ankara

will almost certainly not be the technology as much as the financing that comes with it”.107

In May 2013, a $22 billion intergovernmental agreement was signed between Japan and Turkey for

the construction of the Sinop plant. Within the Japanese lead consortium will be Mitsubishi, the Itochu

Corportation, and GDF-Suez. The consortium chose a, as yet never built PWR Generation III+

design—the ATMEA—form the French nuclear group AREVA. The bulk of the project will be

financed by Nippon Export and Investment Insurance (NEXI), Japan's export credit agency, and

French credit insurer Coface.108

In October 2010, Vietnam signed an intergovernmental agreement with Russia’s Atomstroyexport to

build the Ninh Thuan 1 nuclear power plant, using 1200 MW reactors. Construction was slated to

begin in 2014, and the turnkey project will be owned and operated by the state utility Electricity of

Vietnam (EVN), with operations beginning in 2020.109 However, in April 2013, the Song Da

Corporation stated that it expected to start construction in the next 2–3 years.110 Rosatom has

confirmed that Russia’s Ministry of Finance is prepared to finance at least 85 percent of this first

plant, and that Russia will supply the new fuel and take back used fuel for the life of the plant. An

agreement for up to $9 billion finance was signed in November 2011 with the Russian government's

state export credit bureau, and a second $0.5 billion agreement covered the establishment of a nuclear

science and technology center.111

Vietnam has also signed an intergovernmental agreement with Japan for the construction of a second

nuclear power plant in Ninh Thuan province, with its two reactors to come on line in 2024–25. The

agreement calls for assistance in conducting feasibility studies for the project, low-interest and

preferential loans, technology transfer and training of human resources, and cooperation in the waste

treatment and stable supply of materials for the whole life of the project. In July 2011, the government

103 NIW, “Turkey – Financing Continues to Hold Back Nuclear Plans”, 7 September 2012.

104 Bookings Institute, “Human Resource Development in New Nuclear Energy States: Case Studies from the

Middle East, John Banks, Kevin Massy, Charles Ebinger (Ed.), November 2012.

105 Bloomberg, Tsuyoshi Inajima, “Turkey Holds Nuclear Talks With Japan After South Korean Discussions

Fail,” Bloomberg.com, 23 December 2010.

106 WNA, “Nuclear Power in Turkey”, May 2013.

107 Nuclear Intelligence Weekly, “Candu Down in Jordan, Up in Turkey”, 4 May 2012.

108 Reuters, “UPDATE 1-Turkey, Japan sign $22 bln nuclear power plant deal”, 3 May 2013.

109 Global Energy Magazine, “Japan and Russia to Build Ninhthuan Nuclear Power Plants for Vietnam,”

3 November 2010.

110 Investvine, “Vietnam prepares for nuclear power”, posted by Arno Maierbrugger on 13 April 2013

111 WNA, “Nuclear Power in Vietnam”, May 2013, http://world-nuclear.org/info/vietnam_inf131.html, accessed

10 June 2013.

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issued a master plan specifying Ninh Thuan 1 & 2 nuclear power plants with a total of eight 1000

MWe-class reactors, one coming on line each year 2020–27, then two more larger ones to 2029 at a

central location. However, the State owned Electricity of Vietnam Corporation, which is to be the sole

investor in the four reactors, is still preparing the feasibilty studies.112 In May 2013, the Government

set up a National Council for Atomic Energy, which is designed to identify the strategies and priorities

for the development of nuclear power.113 Both of these development suggest that a 2020 startup date

for the first reactor is unrealistic.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has the most advanced new nuclear development plans in the

Middle East. In April 2008, the UAE published a nuclear energy policy that stated that nuclear power

was a proven, environmentally promising and commercially competitive option that “could make a

significant base-load contribution to the UAE’s economy and future energy security.”114 The policy

proposed installing up to 20 GW of nuclear energy capacity, including 5 GW by 2020, which would

then represent about 22 percent of total planned installed power generating capacity. This would

require the operation of four reactors, two between Abu Dhabi city and Ruwais, one at Al Fujayrah,

and possibly one at As Sila.

A joint-venture approach, similar to that developed for the water and conventional power utilities, was

proposed in which the government would retain a 60 percent share and a private company a 40 percent

share. A call for bids in 2009 resulted in nine expressions of interest and the shortlisting of three

companies: AREVA (France) with GDF-SUEZ, EDF, and Total, proposing EPRs; GE-Hitachi (U.S.-

Japan), proposing ABWRs; and a South Korean consortium, proposing APR1400 PWRs. In December

2009, the Korean consortium was awarded the $20 billion contract for the construction and first fuel

loads of four reactors, reportedly because the consortium could demonstrate the highest capacity

factors, lowest construction costs, and shortest construction times. The trade press considers that “it

remains to be seen whether South Korea’s bid was realistic, or whether it was seriously under-priced”.

The outcome might be fatal: “If things go wrong, Korea’s entry to the nuclear export market could be

short-lived.“115 Indeed, updated cost estimates are reportedly already skyrocketing between $36 billion

and “closer to $40 billion”.116

The regulatory review undertaken in the UAE has relied on the original 2008 assessement by the

Korean Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS), as “since the basic reactor design had already been

reviewed by another nuclear regulator, FANR (Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation) said that it

used the KINS Safety Evaluation Report to gloss over some parts of the Preliminary Safety Analysis

report, provided that the documentation was complete”.117

In July 2010, a site-preparation license and a limited construction license were granted for four

reactors at a single site at Barakah, 53 kilometers along the coast from Ruwais.118 The application is

based substantially on the safety analysis prepared for South Korea’s Shin–Kori units 3 and 4, the

“reference plant” for the UAE’s new-build program. A tentative schedule published in late

December 2010, and not revised since, projects that Barakah-1 will start commercial operation in 2017

with unit 2 operating from 2018. Construction of Barakah-1 officially started on 19 July 2012 and of

Barakah-2 on 28 May 2013. In March 2013, the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC)

submitted its application for the construction of units 3 and 4, to the national regulator.119

112 Nucleonics Week, “Vietnam might require investors to set up fund for closure costs”, 11 January 2013.

113 WNN, “New nuclear development council for Vietnam”, 9 May 2013.

114 ArabianOilandGas.com “Abdullah Al Mutawa Explains How the UAE is Preparing to Meet Future Power

Demands,”, 10 June 2008.

115 Energy Economist, “Prospects for Nuclear Power in 2012”, Platts, February 2012.

116 Nuclear Intelligence Weekly, “United Arab Emirates: No Plans for Second NPP”, 20 April 2012.

117 Nuclear Engineering International, “Building Barakah”, 28 September 2012

118 ArabianBusinesss.com, “ENEC Welcomes Regulator’s License Approval,” 11 July 2010.

119 WNN, “Application in for the next two Barakah units”, 4 March 2013

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Construction Times

Construction Times of Past and Currently Operating Reactors

There has been a clear global trend towards increasing construction times since the beginning of the

nuclear age. National building programs were faster in the early years of nuclear power. As Figure 13

illustrates, in the 1970s and 1980s construction times were quite homogenous, while in the past two

decades they have been varied. The only unit that started up in the first half of 2013, a Chinese reactor,

took 5.5 years to build and two South Korean units and a Chinese reactor that were connected to the

grid in 2012 averaged a 4.5-year construction time. Worldwide, however, it took an average of 13.8

years to build the seven units started up in 2011 and 9.5 years for the five reactors that began operating

in 2010.

The reasons for gradually increasing construction times are not well understood. It is clear that

continuously increasing safety requirements and, in some countries, lengthy legal cases due to public

opposition have played a role. While growing system complexity as a consequence of the previous

conditions is also likely to have affected construction times and costs.

Most, but not all of the nuclear countries have experienced this symptom. The latest generation of

operating units provides an illustration of this. Over a 10-year period between 2003 and July 2013 a

total of 34 reactors started up. Average construction time was 9.4 years with a large range from

3.8 to 26.8 years. (See Annex 2 for details). There are significant differences between the nine

countries that started up reactors during that period.

Figure 13: Average Annual Construction Times in the World 1954–2013

Sources: MSC based on IAEA-PRIS 2013

Note: The bubble size is equivalent to the number of units started up in the given year.

________________________________________________________________________________

All 34 reactors that started up over the past decade are located in Asia (China, India, Japan, Pakistan,

South Korea), Eastern Europe (Romania, Russia, Ukraine) or the Middle East (Iran). Not a single unit

Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013

33

was started up in the Western world during that period.120 With 11 units China, started up the largest

fleet, followed by India (6), and South Korea (5).

Construction times over the past decade were most impressive in Japan and South Korea with

4.4 years on average for the nine units built in both countries together, compared to performance in

other countries. China reached an average of just under six years, ranging from 4.4 to 11.2 years.

Iran holds the negative record. Its only commercial nuclear power reactor took over 36 years to finally

operate, while Romania built for over 24 years to finish its second unit and Russia an average of just

under 24 years to complete three reactors.

The increase in construction times is considered the primary driver of rising costs.

Construction Times and Costs of Reactors Currently Under Construction

As indicated in the General Overview section, at least 23 of the units listed by the IAEA as “under

construction” have encountered costly multi-year construction delays. All of the 42 remaining units

were started within the last five years or have yet to reach their projected start-up date, making it

difficult to assess whether they are on schedule. Average construction time of the 62 listed projects

started up before 2013 currently stands at eight years, ranging from Tianwan-3, launched on

27 December 2012, to the Watts Bar-2 site in the U.S. with 40 years.

The Economics of Nuclear Power – An Update

Introduction

At the center of the claims for the new generation of nuclear power plants, so-called Generation III,

that was expected to drive a “Nuclear Renaissance” were ambitious forecasts for their economics. Ten

years ago, construction cost estimates of around $1,000/kW allowed the nuclear industry to claim that

power from these new designs would be competitive with the cheapest source of power, natural gas,

then being sold at low prices compared to current prices. The two key markets these claims seemed to

have opened up were the U.S. and the U.K., both potentially substantial markets but also highly

influential because of their historically pioneering role in nuclear power development and the strong

credibility of their safety regulatory bodies. The present chapter looks at whether the U.K. proposals

for nuclear new-build would be legal under current European Union legislation, and whether, if it

were, other Member States could adopt the ‘British Model’ to launch their own nuclear programs.

The chapter also assesses developments in China, by far the largest market for nuclear power plants in

the past decade and a potential proving ground for Generation III+ designs121; as well as progress at

the two sites in Western Europe, Olkiluoto (Finland) and Flamanville (France), where there has been

instructive construction experience with one of the two key Gen III+ designs, the French AREVA

European Pressurized water Reactor (EPR).122

A decade on, it is clear that claims for these new reactors were hopelessly inaccurate and by 2012/13,

the typical cost estimate for Gen III+ designs is of the order $7,000/kW (levelized 2012/13 USD).

Analyzing which kinds of organizations published which costs at what dates reveals that the low early

estimates were by vendors or their surrogates.123 Moreover, as analyst Jim Harding first noted, these

120 The last units to start up in the Western world were Brazil’s Angra-2 after 24 years of construction and

Civaux-2 in France in 1999 after 8.5 years of construction.

121 The criteria for the different design generations are not precise but generation III+ designs are generally

expected to rely more on ‘passive’ rather than ‘engineered’ safety features and were therefore expected to be

simpler and cheaper than its predecessors

122 For the US market, the EPR is known as the Evolutionary Power Reactor.

123 Amory, B. Lovins, Rocky Mountain Institute, “Reinventing Fire: Bold Business Solutions for the New

Energy Era”, White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green, see www.reinventingfire.com.

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were ‘variable’ prices, meaning that the buyer took all the risk of cost overruns. But in the late 2000s,

as commercial discussions developed for many proposed U.S. reactors, financial institutions and

independent analysts found that the actual bids suddenly became many times higher if, as they nearly

always were, the prices were ‘fixed’ (the vendor takes all the price risk) or ‘firm’ (the vendor takes all

the price risk beyond predefined metrics of inflation in the cost of the main factor inputs like steel,

concrete, and labor). That is, when the vendors actually had to take much or all of the price risk

themselves, so they had an incentive to bid honest prices rather than seductive but ephemeral dreams,

the quoted nuclear construction cost soared by several- to manifold, to levels that are far, often several

or many times, higher than the observed market prices of available carbon-free alternatives (notably

efficient use, combined-heat-and-power, onshore wind power, and, in some cases, even modern

photovoltaics).

Thus at the order of cost revealed in the marketplace in recent years, new nuclear power plants are

amongst the most expensive generation options available and, despite a substantial rise in gas prices in

most regions, far more expensive than gas and renewable options such as onshore wind. Whilst the

cost curve for renewables is generally downwards, nuclear costs, as throughout the 60 year history of

nuclear power are still on an upward trend, especially as lessons from Fukushima are identified and

incorporated into reactor designs.

Deriving a full estimate of the cost of a kWh of electricity from a nuclear power plant is an immensely

complex process requiring a large number of assumptions. Many of these are based on little or no

practical experience of the processes involved, such as disposal of intermediate and high-level wastes

and the decommissioning of retired nuclear power plants. However, from a corporate point of view

and using conventional project appraisal techniques, there are just three variables that will largely

determine the cost of nuclear power: the cost of construction, the cost of capital and the reliability.

These three variables determine the fixed cost element of a kWh of nuclear electricity, which is

normally more than 70 percent of the total cost of a kWh of nuclear electricity.

It is important to note that the process of ‘discounting’ future costs and benefits, explained below,

under which the further into the future costs and benefits occur, the less weight they carry in project

appraisals means that any costs and benefits incurred decades in the future have much less impact on

the overall economics. This is particularly important for waste disposal and decommissioning but it

also means that the economics of nuclear power is, all things being equal, relatively insensitive to

assumed plant lifetime but is particularly sensitive to reliability in the early years of operation.

The Characteristics of Nuclear Economics

“What is clear is that it is completely impossible to produce definitive

estimates for new nuclear costs at this time.”

Steve Kidd

Director of Strategy & Research

World Nuclear Association

22 August 2008124

Fixed Costs

Reliability

Reliability is measured by the plant’s load factor (capacity factor in U.S. parlance). This is calculated

as the kWh produced by the plant in a given period as a percentage of the kWh that would have been

produced had the plant operated uninterrupted at its maximum power rating. Typically, the nuclear

industry has forecast the nuclear power plants would achieve load factors of 85 percent or more. In

practice relatively few plants have achieved this level of reliability over a significant period of time

and in 1980, the worldwide average load factor was 60 percent with some plants achieving good levels

124 Steve Kidd, “Escalating costs of new build: what does it mean”, 22 August 2008, see

http://www.neimagazine.com/opinion/opinionescalating-costs-of-new-build-what-does-it-mean/, accessed

7 July 2013.

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of reliability but others performing very poorly. Reliability is less uncertain than it was and the

worldwide average is now about 70 percent with some plants tending to do considerably better than

the average. A high level of reliability of nuclear plants is not guaranteed, especially for new untested

designs, but the risk of poor performance might be less than in the past.

Construction Costs

As noted above, construction costs are highly uncertain with little prospect in the next few years that

estimating accurate construction costs will become any easier. For the purposes of analysis and

comparison, costs should exclude the financing cost during the construction process but include the

cost of the first fuel charge. In other words, overnight costs should be clearly distinguished from total

costs. Comparisons also require conversion into a common currency (usually the US$) and common

base date. This can cause problems because currency exchange rates are unstable and can fluctuate by

10 percent or more, even in a short period, so care must be taken to ensure exchange rates are

representative of long-term exchange rates and that costs are adjusted to a common time basis. These

adjustments are inevitably not exact, and mean that modest differences in costs (perhaps ±10 percent)

may result simply from the inaccuracies inherent in translating to a common currency and time-basis.

Cost of Capital

In the past, the cost of capital was not subject to much debate in forecasts of nuclear power costs. This

was because electricity was then a monopoly business under which the owner of the power plants

could pass on to consumers whatever costs were incurred. This meant that while nuclear power was

clearly a very risky investment because of its poor record of plant being built to time and cost and

operating reliably, this risk was generally entirely borne by customers. For financiers, nuclear power

was a low risk loan because electricity is a vital purchase and consumers nearly always paid their bills.

This meant the cost of finance—rightly or wrongly—was also assumed to be low in developed

countries. In developing countries with unstable economies and currencies, finance often has been

problematic.

As soon as the assumption of cost pass-through no longer held, either because regulators no longer

allowed whatever costs were incurred to be passed through (as in the U.S. in the late 1970s) or

because monopoly had been replaced by a competitive electricity market, finance became problematic.

In a competitive market, if a company’s power is too expensive, it will be forced out of business. It

seems highly likely that if there is no assurance that regulators will allow cost pass through or the

nuclear plant will have to survive in a genuinely competitive market, finance will not be available (or

prohibitively expensive). All the nuclear plants on which construction has started in the past decade

are in monopoly systems, usually state-owned, or in markets where the plant owner has such a

dominant position that competition is too weak to have any impact on the owner’s ability to set prices

or the plant is largely protected by a long-term power purchase agreement (PPA).

In general, large investments are typically financed by a mix of debt (borrowing from financiers) and

equity (typically from the company’s own resources or effectively foregone profits). The relative

proportions of debt and equity vary but typically equity is significantly more expensive than debt. If a

project is financed by 60 percent debt at a real interest rate of 5 percent and 40 percent equity at a real

interest rate of 10 percent, the Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) is 7 percent.125

Whilst it can be helpful to compare construction costs using the “overnight cost” convention (what the

plant would cost to build if that could be done overnight), over the years of actual construction the

project must also finance its capital. Longer construction thus incurs more interest (and/or dividend)

costs, which compound. Moreover, if real (inflation-adjusted) construction costs escalate over time, as

they have tended to do virtually worldwide, longer construction means more cost escalation, also

compounding. The combined effect of these two phenomena in U.S. nuclear projects proposed since

the mid-2000s has been that expected total construction cost, including financing and real escalation

during construction, approaches double the overnight cost.

125 5*0.6 + 10*0.4 = 7

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Cost of Decommissioning and Waste Disposal

Other costs such as waste disposal and decommissioning are expected to be huge, on the order of

billions of dollars per reactor, and are highly uncertain because of the relative lack of experience of

these processes, (especially if many reactors must be decommissioned at once, straining limited

technical resources). But under conventional project appraisal techniques, these costs are ‘discounted’

to give a ‘net present value’ (NPV) far below their undiscounted cost. For example, it is often

assumed, as in the U.K., that the expensive, problematic and unproven part of the decommissioning

process, cutting up and disposing of the reactor vessel, takes place perhaps 150 years after the start of

operation. Under conventional accounting procedures, the owner of the plant effectively puts aside a

sum of money now and it is assumed this money will earn interest until it is required to pay for

decommissioning. If we assume a real (net of inflation) interest rate of 3 percent, over 150 years126, a

sum of money will grow by a factor of more than 80. So if we assume that the construction of a new

reactor would be $10 billion and the undiscounted decommissioning cost would be half that figure, the

discounted cost of decommissioning (NPV) would be just $59m. Even if we assume a delay of

75 years (perhaps 15 years after plant closure) and take the more cautious assumption, of a real interest

rate of 2 percent earned over 75 years127, the discounted decommissioning cost (NPV) would be about

$1 billion. In practice, the funds are accumulated through what is effectively a surcharge on the price

of electricity, although in some countries they may be not set aside at all but spent for other purposes.

For this method of provisioning to give a high level of confidence that sufficient funds are available to

carry out decommissioning when a future generation (whose decision it will be on timing, not the

current generation) decides to carry out the task, the following conditions will have to be fulfilled:

• The funds are actually set aside and are not lost, for example due to investment in funds that fail;

• The processes required are technically feasible, including disposal of the waste;

• The cost estimates for each step are accurate;

• The forecast rate of interest is actually achieved;

• The forecast timing of decommissioning is correct; and

• The plant operates for as long as expected.

Current best-practice, certainly not implemented in most countries, is that decommissioning funds and

funds to pay for waste disposal, are invested in funds that are ‘segregated’ from the company that

owns the plant so if the company fails, the provisions are not lost and the company cannot use the

provisions as a cheap source of capital to fund its own, perhaps risky investments. Funds are also

placed in very low risk investments—inevitably, this means the interest rate will be correspondingly

low—to minimize the risk of failure of the investments made. This best practice partly addresses the

first risk but addressing the other risks, where possible at all, would require additional safeguards, for

example, expensive financial instruments that would be guaranteed to make up any shortfall in funds.

It is not clear whether such instruments would be available and credible, nor what their cost would be.

The U.S. Nuclear Power Program

The U.S. government was the first to respond to the promises made of a ‘Nuclear Renaissance’

through President George W. Bush’s Nuclear 2010 Program launched in 2002. At that time, the most

recent order for a nuclear power plant not subsequently cancelled was placed in 1973. The Bush

government believed that new nuclear power plants were competitive with any other form of

generation (including gas) and all that was needed to re-start ordering was to provide subsidies to

allow the construction of a handful of demonstration plants (perhaps three projects) that would show

that the issues that had led to the collapse of ordering in the U.S. had been solved by Generation III+

designs. The expectation at the time of the launch of the program was that the first plants would come

on line by 2010.

126 Based on an operating life of 60 years and a delay to complete decommissioning of 90 years.

127 Based on an operating life of 40 years and a delay to complete decommissioning of 35 years.

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Loan Guarantees and Other Subsidies128

The U.S. Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT 2005) provided a legal basis for the program and

envisaged three types of support.129 First, a limited number of new nuclear power plants could receive

$18/MWh production tax creditfor eight years for up to $125m per 1000MW (or about 80 percent of

what the plant could earn if it ran 100 percent of the time).130 The second benefit was a provision for

federal loan guarantees covering up to 80 percent of project costs. The third benefit provided up to

$500m in risk insurance for the first two units and $250m (€187.5m) for units 3–6. This insurance was

to be paid if delays not the fault of the licensee slow the licensing of the plant.131

The key subsidy was the Federal loan guarantees which allowed the developers to borrow at interest

rates comparable to the Treasury rates. In 2009, four of the projects were shortlisted for loan

guarantees. Two of these, the Summer (South Carolina) and Vogtle (Georgia) projects, were for twin

AP1000s and were in states where electricity remains a regulated monopoly, while the other two,

Calvert Cliffs (a single EPR) and South Texas (a pair of ABWRs) are in states with competitive

wholesale electricity markets. Not by coincidence, the two projects in competitive markets are highly

unlikely to go ahead even with loan guarantees. Federal loan guarantees require the payment of a fee

that reflects the riskiness of the project.

The fee for the Calvert Cliffs plant was reported to be 11.6 percent of the amount of loan guarantees

offered, $7.6 billion and the size of this fee was reported to be a key element in the decision not to

pursue this project.132 There was also an issue over the ownership of the plant. U.S. law prohibits

foreign control of nuclear power plants, but after the main U.S. partner, Constellation, withdrew from

the project, this left EDF as the sole owner. As a result, the NRC refused permission for the project to

go ahead.133 In April 2011, NRG, the main developer for the South Texas project stopped funding and

work effectively ceased on the project.134 This left Toshiba American Nuclear Energy Corporation

(TANE) as the effective controller of the project. Whilst TANE’s nominal stake is only 10 percent in

Nuclear Innovation North America (NINA), the NRC ruled that “its overwhelming financial

contributions give it significantly more power than is reflected by this ownership stake.”135

128 Doug Koplow dedicated an entire report to the specific issue of nuclear subsidies. He concluded that in the

U.S. proposed subsidies to many of the new-build projects exceed actual power generation prices. See Doug

Koplow, “Nuclear Power: Still Not Viable without Subsidies”, Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), February

2011, available at http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_power/nuclear_power_and_global_warming/nuclear-power-

subsidies-report.html.

129 This subsidy, in pretax levelized value, is worth $25/MWh at a 15 percent annual hurdle rate, 40 percent

marginal tax rate, and 40-year operating life (or $11/MWh using a 3 percent real discount rate). That’s less than

the value—$28 and $18/MWh respectively—of new wind power’s tax credit, which (unlike the permanent

nuclear one) currently expires for projects not begun by the end of 2013. However, legacy operating subsidies of

$3–8/MWh more than make up the difference, giving the next 6 GW of U.S. nuclear new-build a higher-than-

wind-power operating subsidy in addition to ~100% construction subsidies; Amory B. Lovins, personal

communication, 7 July 2013.

130 This production tax credit, which approximates the credit available for wind power, is available to the first

6GW of new units over the next eight years and is to be divided among the eligible plants. So if 12GW worth of

new plants meets the criteria each one would get the credit only for 500 MW. It is equivalent to paying about

$140/ton for avoided carbon assuming that the plant displaces half coal and half gas, though of course the plant

would go on avoiding carbon for many years after the credit expired.

131 All three measures require implementing regulations, and the loan guarantees require an appropriation. So the

actual scope and benefit of the subsidy is unclear.

132 Nucleonics Week, “Constellation move casts doubt about nuclear merchant plants' future”, 14 October 2010.

133 Washington Post, “New nuclear reactor rejected; Rule against foreign ownership trips up UniStar's bid”,

12 March 2013.

134 Nucleonics Week, “Merchant economics hurt new projects, operating units: analysts”, 13 September 2012.

135 http://www.worldnuclearreport.org/US-Ownership-Rules-Hurdle-for.html, accessed 9 May 2013.

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Generic Design Reviews136

Four designs137 started a process of generic design review intended to resolve all significant design

issues other than site-specific ones. A fifth design, the ABWR138, had already received generic design

approval in 1997 but this approval expired in 2012 and is being renewed. A large number of potential

projects quickly emerged with about 23 substantial proposals with a total of 36 reactors projected. The

optimism quickly waned as estimated costs escalated at an alarming rate, the required Federal budget

for loan guarantees skyrocketed, generic design reviews took much longer to complete than expected

and natural-gas prices fell. Many of the projects made little significant progress.

Of the five designs, the ESBWR and the APWR have no realistic prospects for orders. Only the

AP1000 has received full generic design approval.139 In April 2013, no completion date for the ABWR

reviews was specified, the EPR review was not expected to be complete before 2015,140 and the

APWR review was scheduled for completion in 2015.141The ESBWR review was said to be near

completion but a new issue arose and there is now no scheduled date for completion.142

Vogtle and Summer

The Vogtle site is where two reactors were completed in the 1980s which suffered some of the largest

cost escalations of any project. Those two reactors were originally budgeted to cost $660m but ended

up costing $9 billion.143 The current Vogtle project, to add two modern reactors, was given a

conditional offer of $8.3 billion in loan guarantees in 2010. The size of the fee was not published but

was reported to be between 0.5 and 1.5 percent based on the strong backing of the parent company of

the developer, Southern Company, and on the expectation that the Georgia Public Service

Commission (PSC) would allow full cost recovery.144 The Georgia PSC allowed Southern Company to

begin to recover the costs of the plant from consumers in 2011.

By early July 2013, there was still no agreement on the final terms of the loan guarantees and the

offer’s deadline was extended for the third time, to the end of September 2013. On 21 June 2013,

ratings agency Zacks downgraded Southern Company’s credit rating.145 Construction (pouring of first

structural concrete) at the first unit at Vogtle started on 12 March 2013146, by which time the cost and

schedule were already beginning to overrun.147 When the project was approved, its estimated cost had

risen to $14 billion. However, in the year up to the start of construction, problems with site preparation

and initial construction work had led to the owners of the plant to sue two major contractors for

$900 million.148 The plant is reported to be already about a year behind its schedule of completing the

first unit in 2017. Georgia Power, the largest partner in the project (but still a minority owner, having

laid off most of the cost and risk on relatively small partners), requested a $381 million increase in the

certified capital cost of its share of the project to approximately $4.8 billion from $4.4 billion,

according to Moody's. It also indicated that financing costs would rise to about $2.1 billion from

136 http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/design-cert.html, accessed 1 May 2013.

137 These were the Westinghouse AP1000, the GE-Hitachi ESBWR, the AREVA EPR, the Mitsubishi AP1400.

138 The ABWR is offered both by Toshiba and GE-Hitachi in competition.

139 http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/design-cert/ap1000.html, accessed 13 May 2013.

140 http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/design-cert/epr/review-schedule.html, accessed 13 May 2013.

141 http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/RS-APWR_design_certification_rescheduled-1306124.html, accessed

13 May 2013.

142 http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/design-cert/esbwr/review-schedule.html, accessed 13 May 2013.

143 Associated Press, “'Significant' issues building new Ga. nuke plant”, 10 June 2011.

144 Nucleonics Week, “Varying financing terms seen for utility, merchant projects”, 11 March 2010.

145 PR Newswire, “Another Vogtle Reactor Deadline Passes: Taxpayer Advocates Warn Government Keeps

Pushing Bad Deal That Wall Street Won't Touch”, 2 July 2013.

146 http://www.worldnuclearreport.org/Construction-Start-at-Vogtle.html, accessed 13 May 2013.

147 The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, “Vogtle rises, but nuke revival lags”, 17 February 2013.

148 Nucleonics Week, “US modular nuclear construction going slower than expected: monitor”, 3 January 2013.

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$1.7 billion because of a delay in the scheduled completion date.149 Credit rating agencies are critically

examining the credit rating of one of the smaller of the four partners in the project.150 The largest

partner in the project with 46 percent is Georgia Power, part of the huge Southern Company and seen

as being large enough not to be put at risk by cost overruns. However, the second largest partner with

30 percent is the much smaller Oglethorpe Power Corp. The cost overruns led Fitch to put its credit

rating on “negative outlook”, i.e. at risk of being downgraded.

The Summer project has even stronger backing from the state regulatory body in South Carolina, and

although the owners sought loan guarantees of about $8 billion, which they may decline if they

consider the fee too high. In March 2013, an appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court was

launched by, amongst others, the Sierra Club, against the decision by the South Carolina Public

Service Commission to allow recovery of $300m from consumers for expenses related to construction

of Summer.151 Construction of the first unit started in March 2013 with a targeted completion date of

2017 and 2018 for the second unit.152

The Vogtle and Summer projects both depend on unusual state laws that require customers to pay for

the plant as it’s built, whatever it costs, and whether it ever runs or not. The owners apparently think

this manages their own risk. However, similar arrangements turned out in the 1970s–80s nuclear boom

to increase the owners’ risk for two reasons: price elasticity has longer to work during construction—

increasing the likelihood of lower-than-expected demand and hence revenue once the plant is

finished—and continual price increases and cost-overrun headlines annoy customers and hence

regulators, who have many ways to penalize the utility no matter what the law says about the project.

Further prospects

The low spot price of natural gas in the U.S. and the booming renewable energy industry (see Chapter

Nuclear Power vs. Renewables) have limited prospects for new nuclear (and coal-fired) plants and

even threaten the viability of existing plants. Beyond Summer and Vogtle, there seems little prospect

in the next few years of any other projects going ahead. The former CEO of Constellation, Michael

Wallace, told Nucleonics Week 153:

It is now not possible for merchant generating companies to move forward with new nuclear projects.

Only those projects in highly-supportive states like Georgia and South Carolina, where nuclear plant

expansions at Southern Nuclear's Vogtle and South Carolina Electric & Gas' Summer are located, appear

likely to go ahead. The economic pressures are threatening even operating units. It is quite likely—more

than that, highly probable—that there will be existing plants prematurely shut down for economic

reasons.

The closure of the Kewaunee154 (PWR, 584 MW started up in 1973) and Crystal River155 (PWR,

838 MW, started up in 1977) plants was announced in 2012/13 despite both plants’ having received

NRC license extensions from 40 years to 60 years.

UBS saw these closures as harbingers of further closures for ‘merchant plants’ (those exposed to

competitive electricity markets) as the non-fuel operating costs of nuclear plants more than

counterbalanced low fuel costs. UBS stated156:

Following Dominion’s recent announcement to retire its Kewaunee nuclear plant in Wisconsin in

October, we believe the plant may be the figurative canary in the coal mine. Despite substantially lower

fuel costs than coal plants, fixed costs are approximately 4–5x times higher than coal plants of

149 The Bond Buyer, “Moody's: Vogtle Nuclear Plant Cost Hikes, Delays are Negative”, 4 March 2013.

150 Associated Press, “Credit agencies eyeing Plant Vogtle cost overrun”, 10 April 2013.

151 SNL Generation Markets Week “SC court to review SCE&G's recovery of additional Summer nuke project

costs”, 26 March 2013.

152 http://www.worldnuclearreport.org/Summer-South-Carolina-First.html, accessed 13 May 2013.

153 Nucleonics Week, “New nuclear expectations modest, conference told”, 21 June 2012.

154 http://www.worldnuclearreport.org/Kewaunee-Plant-in-Wisconsin-Closed.html accessed 10 May 2013.

155 http://www.worldnuclearreport.org/Crystal-River-Reactor-Shut-Down.html, accessed 10 May 2013.

156 UBS Investment Research, “Re-evaluating merchant nuclear” 2 January 2013.

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comparable size and may be higher for single-unit plants. Additionally, maintenance capex of ~$50/kW-

yr, coupled with rising nuclear fuel capex, further impede their economic viability and mask underlying

FCF generation when comparing EBITDA and ascribing EV/EBITDA multiples. Units at particular risk

include Exelon’s Clinton unit in Central Illinois, and its Ginna plant (CENG) in upstate NY, as well as

ETR’s Fitzpatrick and Yankee plants. We see risk to primarily deregulated assets in New York and

Midwest, which suffer from low capacity payments due to over-capacity and structural regulatory

interference, in conjunction with low power prices.

The U.K. Nuclear Program

The U.K.’s commitment to renew nuclear ordering came in 2006, a year later than that of the U.S. By

then, the promise of $1,000/kW had been proven to be far too optimistic by the fixed-price bid that

had won the tender for the Olkiluoto plant at more than $2,000/kW in 2003. The basis for the U.S.

program was that the new designs would be economically competitive with the cheapest fossil-fueled

options. All that was needed was a handful of subsidized demonstration plants after which ordering

without subsidies would supposedly be self-sustaining. The British case was that new nuclear would

not be as cheap as the cheapest fossil-fueled options but with a carbon price on the European Union

Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) of €36 in 2020 (in 2008 values) new nuclear would be

competitive. On this basis, the government claimed that with a few enabling decisions, such as

allocation of sites and generic approval of the designs, utilities would choose nuclear power over other

options.

To back this claim, the government made a firm commitment that no public subsidies would be given.

This claim was never realistic, and as is discussed below, what is proposed now, despite the U.K.

government’s claim that no subsidies are being offered, represents a massive subsidy to new nuclear

power plants. Nevertheless, like the U.S. program before it, the claim that subsidies would not be

needed was a hugely influential endorsement of the new-generation designs.

The Plans: 2006–10

In November 2005, the Government of Tony Blair instituted a review of energy policy widely

reported as being aimed at restarting a nuclear program only two years after the completion of an

earlier review that found no economic case for new nuclear power stations157. A key element of the

proposed nuclear program was the promise that there would be no subsidies. In 2006, well before the

review was complete, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (the ministry then responsible for

energy) was questioned by a Select Committee on the issue of subsidies:158

Q: ‘Do you think the Government would be prepared to consider guarantees: for example, a cap on the

waste costs of new nuclear, or sharing initial planning costs, or even guaranteeing the price of the energy

produced from nuclear?

A: ‘I would be very surprised if we issued that kind of guarantee. The one thing I am clear about is that

when we look at nuclear, we have to look at cost, safety and waste. Those are the three big issues that

were around in 2003 and they are the big issues now. I expect new plant to be built and run by the private

sector. There is a market here…. First of all, and I know this is not the precise question you are asking,

there is no expectation of taxpayers' money being thrown into this. It is down to the private sector.’

The government was also adamant that there would be competition between vendors and developers.

It therefore instigated a program in 2007 of Generic Design Assessment (GDA) under which the U.K.

safety regulator, then the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate, subsequently renamed the Office of

157 The Energy Policy Review of 2003 found: “While nuclear power is currently an important source of carbon

free electricity, the current economics of nuclear power make it an unattractive option for new generating

capacity and there are also important issues for nuclear waste to be resolved.”, BERR (2003) “Our energy future

- creating a low carbon economy”, BERR, London p 61

http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file10719.pdf, p.61, accessed

1 May 2013

158 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmenvaud/584/5112304.htm, accessed

1 May 2013

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Nuclear Regulation (ONR), would carry out a comprehensive review of a number of designs so that a

potential customer would know the only regulatory issues remaining for that design would be limited

site-specific ones. Four designs entered the GDA: the AREVA EPR, the Toshiba/Westinghouse

AP1000, the Hitachi-GE ESBWR, and the AECL ACR1000. This process was scheduled to be

completed in July 2011.

In 2009, EDF took over the company that owned most of the U.K.’s nuclear power plants, British

Energy, giving it access to the main expected sites for new nuclear power plants. To ensure

competition between developers, the government auctioned land at sites of existing nuclear power

plants to other potential developers. It was expected such sites would be suitable for new nuclear

power plants and would see much less opposition than new sites. Three consortia were set up to

develop new nuclear plants:

• NNB GenCo, a joint venture between EDF (80 percent) and the U.K. energy supplier, Centrica

(20 percent);

• Horizon, a 50/50 joint venture between the two German utilities, E.ON and RWE, which already

had a strong position in the U.K. market; and

• Nugen, a joint venture comprising the owner of Scottish Power, the Spanish Iberdrola

(37.5 percent), the French GDF Suez (37.5 percent), and Scottish & Southern Energy, S&SE

(25 percent).

NNB GenCo planned to build four EPRs, two each at Hinkley Point and Sizewell, the first then

expected on-line by 2017. Horizon also planned to build four reactors, design not specified, two each

at Oldbury and Wylfa; while Nugen acquired a site at Sellafield but did not specify the number and

design of reactor to be built. A White Paper on nuclear power was published in January 2008. It

concluded:159

The Government believes it is in the public interest that new nuclear power stations should have a role to

play in this country’s future energy mix alongside other low-carbon sources; that it would be in the public

interest to allow energy companies the option of investing in new nuclear power stations; and that the

Government should take active steps to open up the way to the construction of new nuclear power

stations. It will be for energy companies to fund, develop and build new nuclear power stations in the

U.K., including meeting the full costs of decommissioning and their full share of waste management

costs.

The cost calculations behind this conclusion showed that nuclear power was not as cheap as gas-fired

plants but with a carbon price of €36/ton, it was competitive.160 The Government’s cost-benefit

analysis used a central assumption on an overnight construction cost of £1,250/kW (less than

$2,000/kW). A lower-cost case of £850/kW (about $1,300/kW) and two higher-cost scenarios of

£1,400/kW (about $2,100/kW) and £1,625/kW (about $2,400/kW) were examined. Even then, the

highest-cost estimate was grossly out of line with estimates emerging from the U.S. program and from

tenders for new nuclear capacity in Canada and South Africa, which were then around $5,000/kW.161

Electricity Market Reforms

Until 2010, the government maintained the façade that new nuclear power stations would compete in

the wholesale electricity market set up 20 years earlier on equal terms with other forms of generation,

with just the Carbon market price derived from the EU ETS as support. In February 2010, the Labour

energy minister, Ed Miliband,162 and the energy economic regulator, Ofgem,163 both stated that the

159 Department for Business, Enterprise & Regulatory Reform (2008), “Meeting the Energy Challenge: A White

Paper on Nuclear Power”, The Stationery Office, Norwich.

http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file43006.pdf, p.10, accessed

1 May 2013.

160 Idem, p.59.

161 Steve Thomas, “The economics of nuclear power: an update”, Heinrich Boell Stiftung, 2010, see

http://www.boell.de/downloads/ecology/Thomas_economics.pdf, p.48 accessed 1 May 2013

162 The Times, “Labour prepares to tear up 12 years of energy policy”, 1 February 2010.

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existing electricity market arrangements had to be reformed if security of supply were to be

maintained and the U.K.’s targets on reductions of greenhouse gas emissions were to be met. In May

2010, Gordon Brown’s Labour government was replaced by a coalition government comprising the

Conservatives and Liberal Democrats (previously opposed to nuclear power) but there was no less

governmental enthusiasm for nuclear power, and the process of Electricity Market Reform (EMR)

foreshadowed in the February statements, noted above, was instigated in July 2010.164

In a statement to Parliament in October 2010165 by Chris Huhne, the Government maintained the

rhetoric of no subsidies for new nuclear: “I should like to take the opportunity to reconfirm the

Government’s policy that there will be no public subsidy for new nuclear power.” However, in the

next sentence the government acknowledged that subsidies could be offered: “To be clear, this means

that there will be no levy, direct payment or market support for electricity supplied or capacity

provided by a private sector new nuclear operator, unless similar support is also made available more

widely to other types of generation.” The current minister in charge of the Department of Energy and

Climate Change (DECC), Ed Davey (also a Liberal Democrat), has affirmed that this statement

remains Government policy.166

A White Paper on EMR in July 2011 was eventually followed by a draft Energy Bill in November

2012. The two proposals of most relevant to nuclear power were:167

1. A Carbon Price Floor to reduce investor uncertainty, putting a fair price on carbon and

providing a stronger incentive to invest in low-carbon generation now;

2. The introduction of new long-term contracts (Feed-in Tariff with Contracts for Difference) to

provide stable financial incentives to invest in all forms of low-carbon electricity generation.

The Carbon Floor Price (CFP) was introduced in 2013 and will rise to €36/ton (in 2010 prices) by

2020, the level at which the 2008 White Paper claimed it would be competitive with gas-fired

generation.

Technologies

Less than a year after GDA was started, the Canadian ACR1000 design was withdrawn from the

process.168 Hitachi-GE’s application for the ESBWR was suspended in September 2008.169 The GDA

process was due to be completed in July 2011, but some time before then, the U.K. regulatory body,

the Office of Nuclear Regulation (ONR) acknowledged that it would not be able to issue a timely

Design Acceptance Certificate (DAC). It proposed that it could issue an Interim DAC (IDAC) with a

list of issues to be resolved subsequently. The Fukushima disaster delayed things for six months and in

December 2011, the ONR issued IDACs for the two remaining designs, EPR and AP1000.170 The

AP1000 vendor, the Westinghouse division of Toshiba, stated that as they had no prospective

customer for the AP1000, they would not be attempting to resolve the remaining issues, and no further

work on the AP1000 has been carried out by ONR since then.171

163 http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Media/PressRel/Documents1/Ofgem%20-

%20Discovery%20phase%20II%20Draft%20v15.pdf, accessed 1 May 2013.

164 http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/consultations/emr/emr.aspx, accessed 1 May 2013.

165 http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/news/en_statement/en_statement.aspx, accessed 1 May 2013.

166 http://www.libdemvoice.org/there-will-be-no-public-subsidy-for-nuclear-28150.html, accessed 1 May 2013.

167 http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/legislation/white_papers/emr_wp_2011/emr_wp_2011.aspx,

accessed 1 May 2013.

168 Nuclear News, “AECL drops out of new build process”, May 2008.

169 European Daily Electricity Markets “Two designs left in UK's nuke screening process, as GE-Hitachi

suspends involvement”, September 2008.

170 http://www.hse.gov.uk/newreactors/regulators-issue-interim-dac-soda-gda-key-milestone.htm, accessed

1 May 2013.

171 http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/westinghouse-welcomes-interim-approval-for-ap1000-reactor-

from-uk-regulators-135586383.html, accessed 1 May 2013.

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In effect, given that the only remaining developer in the near term is EDF, which is highly unlikely to

choose any technology other than one supplied by AREVA—both companies being majority owned

by the French state—this means that the objective to have competing technologies has failed and the

only option is the EPR (discussed below). ONR claimed the remaining 31 issues could be resolved

within a year of issuing the IDAC. In December 2012, ONR issued a DAC for the EPR.172 It is

therefore clear that in the short term there can be no competition between technologies except in the

unlikely event that a new developer emerges hoping to build the AP1000.

Developers

NNB GenCo owns the prime sites, having been granted in November 2012 a site license for Hinkley

Point.173 EDF’s commitment to nuclear power is strong and it has the full backing of the French

Government and NB GenCorp must be seen, for these purposes, as driven by EDF. Centrica withdrew

from the joint venture in January 2013 and despite speculation that a Chinese partner would be

brought in to replace it, EDF remains the sole owner.

In March 2012, E.ON and RWE announced they were seeking to sell their stakes in Horizon. Several

buyers were mooted but in November 2012, Horizon was sold to the reactor vendor Hitachi-GE.174

The sale figure was reported to be £700m175 but it is likely this figure is contingent on a number of

factors. Hitachi-GE’s technology is the Advance Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR). The U.K. safety

authorities have little experience of assessing boiling water reactors and so it seems highly unlikely

getting a DAC would take less than the 5–6 years it took the EPR, so it seems unlikely that an order

for an ABWR could be placed before about 2020.

The Nugen joint venture was always the least committed of the three consortia. S&SE announced its

withdrawal from the consortium in September 2011176, leaving the other two members to increase their

stake to 50 percent. In autumn 2012, it was widely rumored that Iberdrola was also considering

withdrawal from Nugen.177 Keith Anderson, the U.K. head of Iberdrola, said that with the possibility

of blackouts looming as soon as 2015, there was no point rushing to build nuclear reactors because

they take about ten years to go online.178 The assumption must therefore be that Nugen is not likely to

proceed with new-build in the near future.

The Negotiations

With Nugen and Horizon not in a position to proceed, the Government has opened bilateral talks with

EDF on the terms of a long-term Contract for Difference (CFD) for the first station, Hinkley Point.

The CFD and Feed-in Tariff (FIT) framework to be set up under EMR provided a framework under

which negotiations were able to start between the Government and NNB GenCo. The FIT

arrangements provided certainty that all the output of any nuclear plant would be sold at a

predetermined price, while the CFD provided predictability on the income per unit sold. Under a CFD,

the selling price is partly fixed but with “escalators” to cover general inflation and allow price

increases outside the control of the plant owner to be passed on to consumers. The “difference”

element is simply a device for reimbursing any difference between the market price and the sale price.

So if the market price is less than the contract price, the plant owner will receive the market price from

the market, and any difference between the contract price and the market price will be paid to or from

the plant owner, ultimately by customers.

172 http://www.hse.gov.uk/newreactors/reports/step-four/close-out/epr70475n.pdf, accessed 1 May 2013.

173 http://www.hse.gov.uk/nuclear/hinkley-point-c/index.htm, accessed 1 May 2013.

174http://www.horizonnuclearpower.com/files/downloads/Horizon%20Completion%20Release%20%28National

%29.pdf, accessed 1 May 2013.

175 Independent, “Hitachi signs '100-year commitment' to boost UK's nuclear expansion plans”, 30 October 2012.

176 http://www.nugeneration.com/download/GDF_SUEZ_IBERDROLA%20release.pdf., accessed 1 May 2013.

177 Utility Week, “Iberdrola cooling on UK nuclear?”, 5 October 2012.

178 The Times, “The answer to future power supply is blowing in the wind, says Iberdrola” February 15, 2013

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Negotiations will focus on two elements. The more obvious one, the “strike price”, is the basic price

paid per MWh. This has to be high enough to cover the full expected costs of building and operating

the nuclear plant and much of the publicity has included speculation on what the price will be with

reports in 2013 suggesting a price of £100/MWh.179 However, of at least as much concern to NNB

GenCo and its financiers are the escalators. It might be expected that the strike price would be indexed

to general inflation so the real value of the income from the plant was protected, but this does not

cover the economic risk. If construction costs escalate, or reliability is poorer than assumed, or

operations & maintenance costs are higher than forecast, the costs will be higher than expected and if

these costs cannot be recovered from consumers, the viability of NNB GenCo would be in doubt. Note

that it is not clear how far EDF would back NNB GenCo if it did get into financial difficulties. If it

were allowed to fail as happened when British Energy went bankrupt in 2002, British taxpayers could

again be called upon to provide subsidies to allow the plants to continue to operate. Whether the

detailed conditions of the CFDs will be made public is doubtful even though it would be a contract

signed by a public body underwritten by taxpayers and electricity consumers. It is likely that the

Government and NNB GenCo would argue important details were commercially sensitive and should

not be made public. There has also been no decision on the duration of the CFD although media

reports in late May 2013 suggest 35 years.180 Reports also suggest that EDF is holding out for terms

that will ensure it obtains a 10 percent real rate of return.

Negotiations will hinge on whether a contract can be agreed that passes enough of the economic risk

of a nuclear power plant on to consumers to satisfy financiers that their loans were secure enough to

issue, but not so much that the Government, especially the Treasury, will be unwilling to agree to the

terms because they placed too much risk on taxpayers. In June 2013, the U.K. Government announced

it would offer loan guarantees, reported to be worth about £10 billion of the £14 billion that the

Hinkley Point reactors are forecast to cost.181 Despite this, the Secretary of State for Energy

acknowledged on 2 July 2013 that agreement was “a few months away”.182

Further Prospects

At time of writing, it is unclear whether an agreement can be reached. However, as in the U.S., the

costs are so high and the problems of obtaining terms that will allow finance to be obtained at

affordable interest rates that the prospect of a stream of orders following to fulfill the Government’s

objective of getting orders for 16 GW of new capacity placed appear to be minimal. Also note that

even an agreement on a CFD is no guarantee to secure financing for the actual implementation of a

new-build project. And whatever the financing, there is no guarantee that the project can be built to

cost, nor that even if it is, customers will want to buy its output, since the prices reportedly being

discussed are roughly twice the market price of U.K. electricity and far above those of abundant

competitors, such as onshore wind power.

European Union Policy

State Aid

While prospects in the U.K. are limited, even if only one or two reactors are ordered in the U.K., the

implications for the rest of the EU would be significant. If an agreement can be struck between the

U.K. Government and EDF, it seems inevitable that a major investigation by the EU Competition

Commission will have to take place to determine whether the U.K. contracts represent illegal state aid.

This is likely to further delay start of construction by two or three more years. Nevertheless, about

179 See Independent, 29 October 2012; Financial Times, 24 July 2012 and Daily Telegraph, 13 August 2012.

180 Wall Street Journal, “EDF, U.K. Near Agreement on Most of Nuclear Reactor Deal”, 26 May 2013.

181 See https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/speech-by-chief-secretary-to-the-treasury-danny-alexander-

investing-in-britains-future and Guardian, “Nuclear power gets £10bn financial guarantee boost”, 27 June 2013.

182 Bloomberg, “EDF Nuclear Deal in U.K. May Take ‘A Few Months’’, 2 July, 2013

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eleven other Member States are reported to be interested in using the U.K. model of CFDs as a basis

for ordering in their home markets. This includes Poland, Czech Republic and France.

There would seem to be little doubt the CFD regime for nuclear power does represent state aid – it

does clearly benefit nuclear power and it is granted by the State. The crux of the case would be

whether it “favors certain undertakings or the production of certain goods (selectivity)”; and “is liable

to distort competition and affect trade between Member States”. Fouquet & Thomas183 argue it clearly

does violate these conditions and would, or at least should, be judged to be unfair state aid and

therefore illegal under EU law.

Changes to State Aid Guidelines

In parallel with this effort, there is also pressure to change the EU guidelines on state aid for nuclear

power so that it can be subsidized in the way that renewables and energy efficiency are subsidized in

some countries. These efforts are part of a review by the Commission of “block exemption regulation”

under which the Commission can exempt certain categories of aid from the notification requirement

applicable to all State aid measures of Article 108(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European

Union (TFEU). Those categories refer, among others, to environmental protection. Thus the General

Block Exemption Regulation does not, for example, provide for a general exemption in the field of

energy, or an exemption to ensure security of supply.

State aid can be cleared by the Commission in some specific cases under the guidelines for

environmental protection (2008) and under the Internal Electricity Market directive (2009). In the first

case energy efficiency and renewables are exempted whereas in the second case, the state can

subsidize infant technologies or projects remedying problems of security of supply. It is hard to see

how an industry with more than half a century of commercial experience can be categorized as

“infant”. Equally, given the very long lead-time for nuclear projects of a decade or more if things go to

plan and up to two decades or more if they go wrong, as has frequently been the case, it is hard to see

how nuclear power could be portrayed as being appropriate to meet shorter-term concerns on security

of supply.

Draft revised guidelines for state aid for energy were due to be published for consultation in late

July 2013 at time of writing with an expectation that final guidelines would be agreed in early 2014.

Likely Outcomes in the Rest of Europe

It is clear the nuclear industry will lobby hard for favorable treatment under European legislation

because without this, its prospects in Europe are minimal. However, the impact of the Fukushima

disaster has been to change the political balance in the EU and it looks highly unlikely that a majority

of Member States could be engineered for proposals that favored nuclear power. Regardless, as with

the U.S. and the U.K., the economic fundamentals of nuclear power seem so poor that even if the

“British Model” were cleared for application elsewhere, the resulting number of additional orders

would be minimal.

The Chinese Program

Whilst the U.S. and the U.K. were expected to bring credibility to the ‘nuclear renaissance’ because of

their long history and expertise in the sector, China has increasingly been seen as the market with

sufficient volume to provide scale economies and learning; to identify and deal with ‘teething

problems’ with the new design; and to provide an efficient, cheap and high-quality supply chain for

the major components.

183 Steve Thomas & Dörte Fouquet, “The new UK nuclear power programme – a FIT for nuclear and a blueprint

for illegal state aid?”, 2013, Greens/EFA Group – European Parliament, Brussels, Belgium.

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Old Designs

China started to order nuclear power plants in large numbers from 2008 onwards, and today 28 of

66 units under construction worldwide are in China. The Chinese program has been based mainly on a

1000 MW design called M310 licensed from AREVA, which in turn had licensed it from

Westinghouse based on a design ordered before 1970. The reactors were supplied mainly by Chinese

Guangdong Nuclear Power Company (CGNPC) using its CPR1000 design, with a couple of orders

going to its competitor Chinese National Nuclear Company (CNNC) based on the same French design

as CGNPC, designated CNP1000. Even in 2008, it was clear that the M310 derived designs were too

old to be a basis for the future and plans were underway to move to Gen III+ designs. A third Chinese

vendor, State Nuclear Power Technology Corp (SNPTC), was also active but did not win any orders in

this phase. An additional issue was that the designs were still under license to AREVA who are not

willing for China to export such reactors.

Gen III+ Designs

China ordered six Gen III+ reactors in 2007–08, four from Westinghouse using the AP1000 design (in

collaboration with SNPTC) and two from AREVA using the EPR design (in collaboration with

CGNPC/EDF). This was a major plus for the Western vendors because it was expected to provide a

shop-window for the new designs and, because it was China, the reactors would be built to time and

apparently to cost. The expectation was that the AP1000 rather than the EPR would take over as the

main design for reactors built in China supplied under license by local companies. However, as

estimated costs of these designs escalated in China as well as the West, there was an increasing

perception that these designs were too expensive for China. There are also reports of construction

delays of about a year and cost overruns with the AP1000s. And around the time when Kang Rixin,

the head of CNNC, was arrested on corruption charges in 2009 (he was sentenced to life imprisonment

a year later), press reports suggested he may have accepted bribes from a foreign reactor vendor.184

When the Fukushima disaster occurred, there were already signs that the ordering rate of up to ten

reactors per year was putting unsustainable strains on the Chinese nuclear supply chain, and in the

three months up to the Fukushima disaster, no reactor construction starts took place. After the

Fukushima disaster, a halt to new reactor starts was called and not lifted until November 2012. Then

construction started on two more reactors of the old 1000-MW design, and a month later on two

demonstration plants using the pebble bed modular reactor design.185 However, by the end of April

2013, no further construction starts had taken place in China and it seems clear that China has not

returned to the days of ten reactor orders per year.

For the future, the prospects for large numbers of orders of AP1000s and EPRs in China appear to be

receding, and the three Chinese vendors are all reported to be developing their own Gen III+ designs.

CGN is working with AREVA to develop a 1000-MW design, designated ACPR1000; SNPTC is

working with Westinghouse to develop a scaled up AP1000, designated CAP1400; and CNNC is

developing its own design which would be entirely independent of foreign vendors, ACP1000.

How close these designs are to deployment is difficult to tell, and whether they would satisfy an

experienced Western regulator like the U.S. NRC is hard to know. Equally, it is too early to tell

whether these designs would prove significantly cheaper to build than AP1000 and EPR.

Development of the ACP1000 appears to be ahead of the other two designs. In April 2013, it was

reported that the design had passed an “authoritative industry evaluation” and was on par with Gen III

designs elsewhere.186 This is clearly not equivalent to the generic design assessment process carried

184 RFI, “L’ex-patron du nucléaire chinois condamné à la perpetuité”, 19 November 2010, see

http://www.rfi.fr/asie-pacifique/20101119-ex-patron-nucleaire-chinois-condamne-perpetuite, accessed

8 July 2013.

185 http://www.worldnuclearreport.org/Reactor-Building-Starts-Again-in.html Accessed May 13, 2013

186 Xinhua General News Service, “China's self-developed nuclear reactor passes industry evaluation”,

19 April 2013.

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out by the U.S. and U.K. safety authorities, because the detailed design, which would be needed for a

generic review, was only then going to commence. It was also reported that an export sale had been

achieved, but the country involved was not named so this report must be treated with skepticism.187 A

vice president of CNNC claimed: “We have submitted an application to the International Atomic

Energy Association [Agency] for a review of the ACP1000, which will help us get the permits to

export to Europe and North America.” This suggests a naivety about the Western regulatory processes,

as the IAEA has no jurisdiction over national safety issues and a positive verdict by the IAEA would

have little impact on national safety authorities’ verdicts.188

Nevertheless, reports did suggest the design would be ready for start of construction by the end of

2013, and with 85 percent indigenous content, would be 10 percent cheaper than foreign Gen III+

designs.

Relevance of Chinese Experience

With much of the recent experience of nuclear construction taking place in China particularly with

Gen III+ designs, it is important to determine how much can be learnt from this experience. The

majority of plants built recently use an old design closely based on the one used for the 34 900-MW

reactors completed in France during 1977–1987. Most of these were built largely to time, though the

construction period did keep lengthening, and experience in China also appears to be good in that

respect. In terms of costs, the picture in France was more complex.189 However, no useful and reliable

cost data from China have been published.

For the Gen III+ designs, there are two EPRs under construction at Taishan and four AP1000s, two at

Sanmen and two at Haiyang. The EPRs started construction in October 2009 and April 2010. There is

no strong evidence of any delays at Taishan.190 It is clear that the Instrumentation & Control system

installed would not satisfy the U.K. safety regulator, which until November 2012 had not approved the

design submitted to it (see below for a discussion of Instrumentation & Control). It is also not clear

what would have happened if the quality control issues that have bedeviled the Olkiluoto and

Flamanville projects (see below) had first occurred in China.

The Haiyang reactors started construction in September 2009 and June 2010 while the Sanmen

reactors were started in April and December 2009. While Westinghouse claimed in early 2012 that the

original schedule of completion of the first unit at Sanmen before end 2013 can still be met191, there

are industry reports that all of the Haiyang and Sanmen units are to start up “in 2014 or 2015”192.

Overall, whilst the apparently smoother progress with these Gen III+ designs in China certainly serves

their reputation, until Chinese experience is more clearly and independently documented and the

regulatory process is more open, it would be dangerous to read too much into this experience. Basic

cost factors also differ markedly: a common remark in the industry is that Chinese reactor-builders

employ twice as many people at a tenth the salary of their Western counterparts.193

Olkiluoto and Flamanville

These two projects, Olkiluoto-3 in Finland and Flamanville-3 in France, were meant to be the

showcase for Gen III+ projects. France generally had a good reputation for completing plants to time,

while Finnish reactors were also completed largely to time and have a formidable reputation for

reliability. Given the importance of these projects to the credibility of the EPR and the need to show

187 China Daily European Edition, “Nuke reactor gets foreign contract”, 20 April 2013.

188 China Daily European Edition, “Nuke reactor gets foreign contract”, 20 April 2013.

189 Arnulf Grübler, “The costs of the French nuclear scale-up: A case of negative learning by doing“, Energy

Policy 38, 2010, 5174–5188.

190 Nucleonics Week, “Heavy component installation finished at Taishan-1”, 24 January 2013.

191 Nucleonics Week, “AP1000 in China to start up as scheduled: Westinghouse”, 2 February 2012.

192 Nuclear Energy Institute, “Nuclear Energy Overview”, 26 April-2 May 2013.

193 Amory B. Lovins, personal communication, 7 July 2013.

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that the problems of cost and time control that earlier generation reactors had suffered, there was a

strong expectation that enough resources would be devoted to these projects to ensure their

construction went smoothly. In fact, closer examination of the French record would have led to some

concerns. Experience with the EPR’s predecessor design and the design it was developed from, the

N4, was extremely bad. The four reactors of this design built took on average 14 years from

construction start to commercial operation and their costs were also very high.194 The N4 was the first

indigenous French design while the previous models were built under Westinghouse license. And

equally seriously, the French constructor’s latest construction start was in 1991—long enough before

to have lost a whole generation of experienced managers for such complex projects. This as much as

other factors—such as the dozens of main languages spoken by the highly international workforce,

and cultural and procedural mismatches between the French designer/builders and the Finnish safety

regulator—proved to be the project’s undoing despite Finland’s well-earned reputation for engineering

prowess and general competence.

Olkiluoto-3

As has been amply documented, these projects have gone wrong on a scale exceptional even for

nuclear projects. The latest estimates for Olkiluoto suggest that the reactor, which was expected at

construction start to take four years to build and cost €3 billion, will take at least 11 years (completion

in 2016) and cost at least €8.5 billion. With three years of construction still left, there can be little

confidence that there will not be further cost and time overruns (see Table 2).

A large number of issues, in particular quality-control problems, have contributed to the delays (see

previous editions of the World Nuclear Industry Status Report), so there is no simple fix. For future

buyers of the EPR, there can be no confidence that relatively simple changes to project management

can remove the risk that projects will go badly wrong.

Flamanville-3

By the time construction at Flamanville-3 began, a rationale was emerging that the problems at

Olkiluoto were due to Finland’s lack of experience with nuclear construction, and to AREVA’s lack of

project management experience195 and the shortage of relevant skills. In France, with EDF’s vast

experience of nuclear construction and its wealth of relevant skills, the problems would not recur.

However, as with Olkiluoto, problems emerged immediately with errors in the pouring of the first

structural concrete.196 As with Olkiluoto-3, no single, particular issue was behind the delays and

therefore no easy lessons emerge for future customers for the EPR to learn. It seems clear the

Flamanville project is going wrong just as badly as the Olkiluoto project and perhaps worse (see

Table 2).

194 Arnulf Grübler, “The costs of the French nuclear scale-up: A case of negative learning by doing “ Energy

Policy 38, 2010, 5174–5188.

195 OL3 is actually the first time that AREVA has overall project responsibility. In the case of all previous

French nuclear construction projects, inside and outside the country, EDF was the architect.

196 Nucleonics Week “Concrete pouring at Flamanville-3 stopped after new problems found”, May 29, 2008

Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013

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Table 2: Evolution of EPR Cost Estimates 2003-2012

Production Costs

Origin of Estimate

Construction Costs (€/kW)197

(€/MWh)

DGEMP 2003198

1,043 (1,274 €2012)

28.4199 €uro2001

EDF 2005200

?

(33-)41201 €uro2004

EDF 2005202

?

(35-)43203 €uro2004

EDF 2006204

2,063 (2,331 €2012)

46 €uro2005

AREVA 2007205

1,300–1,800 (1,498–2,074 €2012)

29.9206 €uro2004

DGEC 2007207

?

44.9 €uro2007

EDF 2008208

2,500 (2,677 €2012)

54-60209 €uro2008

Cour des Comptes 2012210

3,700 (3,874 €2012)

70-90 €uro2010

EDF 2012211 [U.K. EPR]

5,400 €2012

110-166212 €uro2012

EDF 2012213 [Finland EPR]

5,300€2012

?

EDF 2012214 [France EPR]

5,300€2012

?

Sources: As indicated, assembled by MSC

Instrumentation & Control

A particular issue that has caused regulatory concern has been the level of redundancy in the

Instrumentation & Control (I&C) system. As far back as 2004, there were small delays in AREVA’s

supplying the Finnish regulator with details of the design of the I&C, which was to be entirely

digital.215 There continued to be apparently small issues arising on the I&C and in 2006, it became

197 Figures in brackets are adjusted for inflation.

198 DGEMP, “Coûts de référence de la production d’électricité”, Ministère de l’Industrie, 2003.

199 Equivalent to 29.9€2004/MWh, according to EDF.

200 Serge Massart, Goulven Graillat, “La place d’EPR dans la stratégie d’EDF”, EDF, in Revue Contrôle,

May 2005.

201 41€ pour la tête de série, 33€ pour une série de 10 réacteurs.

202 EDF, “Projet Flamanville 3 – Construction d’une central électronucléaire ‘tête de série EPR’ sur le site de

Flamanville”, Dossier Débat Public, CPDP, July 2005.

203 43€ pour la tête de série, 35€ pour une série de 10 réacteurs.

204 EDF, “Investor Day”, London, 4 December 2008.

205 Anne Lauvergeon, “Le nucléaire, un des atouts maîtres dans la nouvelle donne énergétique mondiale”,

Réalités Industrielles, February 2007.

206 Equivalent to 28.4€2001/MWh.

207 According to Cour des Comptes, “Les coûts de la filière électronucléaire”, January 2012.

208 EDF, “Investor Day”, London, 4 December 2008.

209 Low estimate Flamanville-3 case; high estimate potential additional costs inherent to the site.

210 Cour des Comptes, “Les coûts de la filière électronucléaire”, January 2012.

211 The Times, “Soaring costs threaten to blow nuclear plans apart”, 7 May 2012.

212 Citigroup; “New Nuclear in the UK – It isn’t getting any easier”, 8 May 2012.

213 Kauppalehti.fi, “Olkiluoto kolmonen maksaa 8,5 miljardia”, 13 December 2012, see

http://www.kauppalehti.fi/etusivu/olkiluoto+kolmonen+maksaa+8,5+miljardia/201212321921, accessed

8 July 2013.

214 Le Figaro, “EDF: la facture de l’EPR s’envole de 2 milliards”, 4 December 2012, see

http://www.lefigaro.fr/societes/2012/12/03/20005-20121203ARTFIG00635-la-facture-de-l-epr-s-envole.php,

accessed 8 July 2013.

215 Nucleonics Week, “I&C data lagging slightly for STUK safety analysis of new EPR”, January 29, 2004

Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013

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clear the Finnish and French regulators were imposing different requirements with the Finnish

regulator requiring a hard-wired back-up to the digital system.216

Concerns continued and culminated in a letter in April 2009 from the U.K. regulatory authority to

EDF and AREVA expressing its concern about the adequacy of the redundancy in the I&C system.217

The Finnish regulator voiced similar concerns in July and in November 2009, the French, Finnish and

U.K. regulators wrote jointly to AREVA expressing their worries.218 The French authorities were still

not expecting to require a hard-wired back-up but the U.S. authorities, who had launched their generic

review a couple of years before, were also asking questions. In 2010, AREVA modified its U.S. EPR

design to include a hard-wired back-up in response to issues raised by the U.S. NRC.219

In December 2011, when the U.K. safety regulator, Office of Nuclear Regulation (ONR) issued an

“Interim Design Acceptance Certificate” (IDAC) for the EPR, six of the 31 issues still to be resolved

concerned the I&C system. The ONR forecast that these issues could be resolved in a year. However,

progress with I&C seemed slow. The ONR introduced a “traffic light” system to indicate the status of

these issues in their quarterly progress reports. In the report for the period to end June 2012, four out

of six of the issues were given a “red light” signifying that “closure of the GDA Issue is in serious

doubt with major risks apparent”, while the other two were given an amber light—“closure of the

GDA Issue appears feasible but significant risks exist requiring prompt attention.”220 By the end of the

next quarter, one of the issues had been completely resolved, three were given green lights—“Closure

of the GDA Issue appears highly likely”, one was given an amber light, and one still had a red light.221

However, in December 2012, the ONR announced all issues had been resolved.222 It is not clear how

an issue that had been causing serious concern for more than three years and which in June 2012

appeared nowhere near resolution could be resolved so quickly. This is especially puzzling given that

there appears no agreement in sight on how the Finnish regulators can be satisfied.223

In April 2012, the French regulator announced that it was satisfied with the solution offered by

AREVA and lifted the hold it had placed on the design of the system placed in October 2009.224 While

the French solution was reported to require an element of hard-wired back-up, it was not as extensive

as the U.K. and Finnish regulators are requiring. China is reported to be adopting whatever system is

approved for Flamanville, although it is not clear whether this was finalized in time for installation at

Taishan.225

Conclusions on Nuclear Economics

Making significant improvements to the economics of nuclear power plants was central to the

promises of the ‘Nuclear Renaissance’. Simplification of the designs was meant to reduce both the

cost and the risk of problems in the construction phase. By making construction more predictable, this

was expected to make nuclear projects less economically risky and therefore easier and cheaper to

finance. These promises are in tatters with cost estimates now roughly seven times the level predicted

a decade ago and the two projects underway in the West using Franco-German EPR technology

massively over budget and time. Early experience with the two projects recently stated in the U.S.

using AP1000 technology gives little confidence that these problems are restricted to the EPR.

216 Inside NRC, “DGSNR says license for EPR at Flamanville-3 'months' away”, May 15, 2006

217 http://www.hse.gov.uk/newreactors/ri-ukepr-0002.pdf, accessed April 30, 2013

218 Nucleonics Week, “Regulators from France, UK, Finland share concerns about EPR's I&C”, November 5,

2009

219 Nucleonics Week, “AREVA agrees to modify US-EPR after NRC raises I&C concerns”, July 1, 2010

220 http://www.hse.gov.uk/newreactors/reports/gda-q2-12.pdf accessed April 30, 2013

221 http://www.hse.gov.uk/newreactors/reports/gda-q3-12.pdf accessed April 30, 2013

222 http://news.hse.gov.uk/onr/2012/12/uk-regulators-confirm-acceptance-of-new-nuclear-reactor-design/

accessed April 30, 2013

223 Nucleonics Week, “Olkiluoto-3 EPR likely not to operate before 2016: TVO”, 14 February 2013.

224 Nucleonics Week, “ASN lifts hold on Flamanville-3 I&C architecture”, 19 April 2012

225 Nucleonics Week, “Olkiluoto-3 EPR likely not to operate before 2016: TVO”, 14 February 2013.

Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013

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Largely as a result, what were probably the three key markets to crack—the U.S., the U.K. and

China—now look very restricted whilst other major and previously influential potential markets like

Germany and Italy are closed to nuclear or, like India, remain—perhaps—a potential market for

tomorrow. Both the U.S. and the U.K. now appear likely to build fewer than a handful of new reactors,

while China has slowed down the pace and appears likely to opt for its own rather than Western

designs.

With the credibility of Gen III+ designs in serious doubt and little significant progress made on their

expected successor designs, so-called Generation IV, the nuclear industry is seeking funding for new

design concepts, such as Small Modular Reactors (SMRs). Experience suggests that after significant

amounts of public money have been spent on these, they will probably turn out to have no significant

advantages over existing designs. One analyst, having long asked in vain for SMR advocates to

provide a production-cost and economic analysis demonstrating their claimed advantages, summarizes

their key issue thus: “As a matter of physics, reactors don’t scale down well; that’s why they’re big. If

you try to overcome this handicap by capturing economies of mass production, you quickly run up

against a fatal competitor called Small Modular Renewables (and efficiency techniques). Those do

scale down very well; they currently outcompete new reactors by severalfold; and they’re already

decades ahead of SMRs in exploiting their mass-production economies (they’re attracting a quarter-

trillion dollars of private investment per year), and will be another decade ahead by the time an SMR

could be demonstrated. So SMRs might have been worth considering a half-century ago, but today

they’re far too late. End of story.”226

The U.K. Government is considering guaranteeing a profit range for nuclear investors in the form of a

“Contract for Difference” (CFD). However, making up for the difference between the current baseload

power on the market and the estimated cost range of 110–166 €uro per MWh (the “strike price”)

would be difficult to sell for the Government. A Citigroup analysis 227 wonders:

Transfer Construction Risk?: if construction costs are rising, then the only way to contain the rise in the

strike price is to reduce the risk faced by the developer and thereby lower their cost of capital. In practice

this means transferring the construction risk to the taxpayer / consumer. On the face of it the CFD

arrangement is not designed to tackle construction risk allocation so some other mechanism will be

needed alongside the CFD. If the government shoulders all of the construction risk then a cost of capital

below 10 percent is feasible; but the government would be taking on a huge risk over which it has little

control.

Conclusion: if construction costs are indeed anything like £7 billion per reactor, then an already very

challenging programme may be reaching the point of impossibility in our view.

Citigroup’s analysis resonates interestingly with the May 2012 statement by Energy Secretary Ed

Davey when introducing the draft energy bill that would pave the way for a CfD scheme:

Unless nuclear can be price competitive, as the industry says it can be, unless it can be price competitive,

these nuclear projects won’t proceed.228

The bill, in contrast, apparently seeks to ensure nuclear new-build regardless of its economic merit.

Financial Markets and Nuclear Power

Electricity utilities in many parts of the world are facing significant economic and financial problems.

These problems are, in most OECD countries, as a result of low demand increases, often with

accompanying lower market prices, uncertainties over carbon markets and pricing, greater demand and

supply interventions from government to address concerns over climate change and energy security,

226 Amory B. Lovins, personal communication, 6 July 2013; see also “‘New’ nuclear reactors, same old story,”

2009, www.rmi.org/Knowledge-Center/Library/2009-07_NuclearSameOldStory

227 Citigroup; “New Nuclear in the UK – It isn’t getting any easier”, 8 May 2012.

228 BBC, “Energy bill avoids carbon pledge”, 22 May 2012, see http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-

environment-18146940, accessed 22 May 2012.

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volatile global energy prices and higher costs of capital. These conditions have led many analysts to

predict a gloomy future for utilities.

Nomura says of the current situation in Europe that “there is no let-up in the dire outlook for

utilities”229. The situation in Europe is particular acute for utilities in Europe, due to the significant

increase in the use of renewable energy, at a time of flat demand, which is squeezing out the

traditional utilities and investors. Worse, having almost no running cost, renewables in competitive

power markets drive down the market-clearing wholesale price—which just hit new lows in

Germany—and thus force fossil-fueled and even some nuclear plants to operate fewer hours, sell their

output for a lower price, and thus earn lower, zero, or negative profits. According to Moody’s:

Large increases in renewable energy have had a profound negative impact on power prices and the

competitiveness of thermal generation in Europe. What were once considered stable companies have seen

their business models severely disrupted. Given that further increases in renewables are expected, these

negative pressures will continue to erode the credit quality of thermal based utilities in the near to

medium term.230

While in North America it is primarily the rise in production from shale gas in the last few years that

has had a significant impact on the U.S. utility sector and in particular on the traditional central

thermal power plants, primarily coal and nuclear. Moody’s stated in February 2013 that there was still

no sign of recovery for the unregulated utilities due to low gas prices’ depressing electricity prices.

Furthermore, they state “the low natural gas prices make operating coal and nuclear power less

competitive because their fixed costs are relatively high”.231 However, gas is not the only formidable

competitor: wind power, recently selling 25-year fixed-price power for around $22/MWh in the U.S.

Midwestern ‘Windbelt’ net of its $18–28/MWh Production Tax Credit, combined-heat-and-power,

and efficient use of electricity are all helping to drop power prices.

The impact of these conditions was seen in early 2013 with the retirement of the Kewaunee nuclear

power plant, which was described by UBS as potentially “the figurative canary in the coal mine”. UBS

further stated that232:

We believe what started as a focus on coal plant retirements has been expanding into growing risk of

retirement of all fuel types, particularly nuclear and oil-fired units.

However, in North America it is not just the rise in shale gas and wind power that is making current

capacity less profitable or unprofitable to operate; renewables are fundamentally threatening utilities’

business model with ‘radical bypass’, much as mobile telephones bypassed wire-line telephone

companies and stranded their assets. 233 For example, in more than 20 of the United States,

entrepreneurs offer to install solar power on your roof with no down payment and beat your utility bill;

this is expected to spread to most other states within the next few years. The Edison Electric Institute

published a report on the disruptive challenge of new technologies, particularly small scale renewables

and storage, on the electricity utility sector and concluded that “recent technological and economic

changes are expected to challenge and transform the electric utility industry” and that “while the

various disruptive challenges facing the electric utility industry may have different implications, they

all create adverse impacts on revenues, as well as on investor returns234”. In the United States revenues

from retail sales in 2012 were at the same level as in 2007.

229 Nomura, “Utilities sector Outlook – 2013”, December 2012

230 Moody’s, “European Utilities: Wind and Solar Power Will Continue to Erode Thermal Generators’ Credit

Quality”, 5 November 2012

231 Moody’s, “Moody's: Still no sign of recovery for unregulated utilities; regulated remain stable”,

6 February 2013.

232 UBS, “ Re-evaluating Merchant Nuclear”, UBS 2nd January 2013.

233 Amory B. Lovins, 9-page feature (article, interview, and retrospective), Public Utilities Fortnightly,

March 2013.

234 EEI, “Disruptive Challenges: Financial Implications and Strategic Responses to a Changing Retail Electric

Business”, Edison Electric Institute, January 2013.

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As can be seen in Figure 14, the majority of the major utilities across the various continents have

suffered loss of income in the past few years. Of the 13 companies measured, only four have shown a

growth in earnings, two of them in the U.S., SCE (Southern California Electric) and NextrEra

(formerly Florida Power and Light Company), while there have been slight increases or stagnation in

Europe from Germany’s E.ON and France’s EDF. The earnings of the U.S. utilities have benefited

from relatively low fossil fuel prices. In 2012 coal prices for the power sector fell by 2.1 percent,

while the price of gas did increase, they are still significantly lower than a decade ago. While the retail

price for electricity across all types of consumers (residential, commercial, industrial and transport)

increased on average, between 2012 and 2013, by 12 percent.235

Not surprisingly there have been major falls in income in Japan, in this case Kansai Electric Power

Company and TEPCO, the owner of the Fukushima nuclear power plant, which along with all but two

Kansai reactors has been closed for nearly a year. KEPCO, of South Korea, while showing positive

earnings in 2009 and 2010, has seen losses since 2011.

Figure 14: Annual Growth Rates of Earnings of Major Nuclear Companies 2008-2012

Source: Financial Times 2013

The utility sector is finding it increasingly difficult to attract investment. A global survey by PWC

found that many utilities are facing a reduction in capital raising options, with 78 percent of those

surveyed reporting that the financial crisis and economic downturn have had a medium to very high

impact on shortage of capital for infrastructure projects, and 63 percent saying it has had a high or

very high impact. Somewhat surprisingly, PWC found that shortage of capital for infrastructure

projects is felt even more acutely among companies in Asia, the Middle East and Africa than in North

America and Europe236.

The perception of a higher financial risk associated with nuclear power is important as it can lead to a

higher interest rate at which utilities can borrow, and therefore significantly raises the final cost of

235 US EIA, “Electricity Data”, US Energy Information Administration, accessed June 2013,

http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data.cfm#avgcost, accessed 11 June 2013.

236 PWC, “The shape of power to come, investment, affordability and security in an energy-hungry world”, the

12th Pricewaterhouse Coopers Annual Global Power and Utilities Survey, 2012

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54

construction. This is why investment institutions, such as Citibank, have stated: “Due to the

uncertainties on timing and cost, we believe nuclear projects should have a higher ERP [Equity risk

premium] than the overall market”237 and more recently have stated on the situation in the U.K. that "if

the latest cost figures are true, new nuclear power plants in the U.K. are not commercially viable… the

only way they could be built is if the construction risk was transferred to the taxpayer”.238

As a result nuclear power is perceived as a higher risk investment than other conventional electricity-

generating sources, particularly gas. Even amongst the major utilities, gas ranks the most likely new

projects, with 55 percent making major or very major investments versus 37 percent onshore wind,

24 percent offshore wind, and only 21 percent for new coal and nuclear generation.239

Most utilities do not have the financial capabilities to finance new nuclear build solely with their own

balance sheets: to do so could place the entire company at risk. Therefore the companies need to

borrow. However, with nuclear projects having high capital costs, long construction times and a bad

construction track record, the financial risks and therefore the borrowing costs are high. This is one

reason why nuclear projects often involve financing through export credit agencies and why some

governments, such as the U.S., make available loan guarantees to lower the cost of borrowing.240

Figure 15: Compound Annual Growth Rate of Debt levels of Major Utilities 2008–2012

Source: Financial Times 2013

Since 2008, only one of the companies analyzed in Figure 15, E.ON, has decreased its debt levels,

while all 11 other companies have seen an increase in debt. Over the past year E.ON has made a

concerted effort to reduce its engagement in new investment across Europe. This has included the

sales of its share of Horizon, a company established with RWE to build a nuclear power station in the

U.K., and in October 2012 the announcement it was selling its 34 percent stake in the Fennovoimma

237 CitiBank, “New Nuclear – The Economics Say No”, November 2009

238 Reuters, “UK nuclear build requires taxpayer rescue –Citi”, 8 May 2012

239 PWC, “The shape of power to come - Investment, affordability and security in an energy-hungry world”, the

12th Pricewaterhouse Coopers Annual Global Power and Utilities Survey, 2012

240 UCS, “Nuclear Loan Guarantees – Another Taxpayer Bailout Ahead?” Union of Concerned Scientists, March

2009

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nuclear projects where the plans were to begin construction of a 1,600 to 1,800 MW reactor at

Pyhaejoki in northern Finland in late 2016241.

The higher debt level of the utilities will make it particular difficult for these important firms to invest

in large, risky and long-term projects, which will affect investment in nuclear power.

Figure 16 shows the relative share price performance of twelve utilities across Europe, Asia and North

America, and compares them to the S&P Global 100 index, which measures the performance of

100 global companies that derive a substantial portion of their operating income from multiple

countries.

Figure 16: Share or Bond Prices of Major Utilities in Key Regions 2008–June 2013 compared to

S&P Global 100

Source: Yahoo Finance, Accessed June 2013

Nuclear companies are not the only energy sector whose share prices have fallen. Changes in

government policies have also had a significant impact on the prices of renewable energy companies.

Uncertainties over the relative prices of fossil fuels, particularly relating to reductions in demand

resulting from the economic downturn, have led to reductions in the values of many other major

energy companies. However, as the next chapter illustrates, the renewable energy sector is rather

subject to a shift between companies, and continues overall to retain very substantial growth figures.

Since 2011, the share or bond prices of North American companies have diverged from those in

Europe and Asia despite increasing indebtedness amongst all four companies shown, and a decline in

revenues from both PG&E and TVA242. The share prices of North American companies, Southern

California Edison, NextEra Energy, TVA and PG&E have either tracked or outperformed the S&P

Global 100 Index. However, Exelon, operating 20 per cent of the U.S. nuclear fleet, has seen the

performance of its stock prices track more closely to the European and Asian utilities.

AREVA, Hitachi-GE, Toshiba Power Systems, and Mitsubishi Heavy Industry are the major nuclear

vendors; of these only AREVA is an almost purely nuclear stand-alone nuclear constructor. Hitachi-

GE is a joint venture between the two firms, while Toshiba Power Systems is a subsidiary of Toshiba,

241 Bloomberg, “EON Withdraws From Finnish Nuclear Project on Price Slide”, 24 October 2012

242 Although TVA isn’t a public traded company, its bonds are traded on the New York stock exchange, see

http://www.snl.com/IRWebLinkX/GenPage.aspx?IID=4063363&GKP=205782

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and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries is a subsidiary of Mitsubishi, a group of autonomous companies.

Figure 17 shows the share price of these highly diversified companies or their parent companies and

compares them to the global average. What is important to note is the extent to which all of these

electrical and heavy electrical firms have performed below the global average. However, AREVA, a

purely nuclear company, has had a significantly worse performance over the past five years, with its

share price just 20 percent of that of 2008.

The fall in share value for AREVA is reflected in the company’s credit rating (defined in Annex 3),

which, according to S&P, was cut in December 2011 to BBB-, as they believed that “credit metrics

and free cash flow to remain very weak in 2012, with a substantial recovery only in 2014, two years

later than we previously assumed”.243 With net losses in the second half of 2012, at €179 million244,

the group will have to see a significant upturn in its fortunes to see a upgrading of its credit rating.

Figure 17: Share Price of major nuclear vendors, 2008-13, Compared to the S&P Global 100

Source: Yahoo Finance, Accessed June 2013

Rating agencies, of which there are three major institutions, Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s (S&P) and

Fitch, assess the financial strength of companies and governmental entities and their ability to meet the

interest and principal payments on their bonds and other debts. (See Annex 3 for rating definitions).

The ratings given can affect the interest rates at which a company is able to borrow and therefore is an

important factor for utilities’ ability to fund nuclear and other projects through external investment. A

Moody’s analyst was quoted in the energy trade press in March 2012 as stating:

The risks are writ larger when you think of a nuclear project [than for other forms of generation], because

construction and planning is that much more tortuous, construction risk is higher and from an operational

point of they have a high fixed cost base.245

Another utility analyst stated:

243 Bloomberg, “AREVA Credit Rating Cut to BBB- by S&P on Weak Cash Flow”, 20 December 2011

244 Bloomberg, “AREVA – information page”, http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/AREVA:FP, accessed

June 2013.

245 ICIS Heren, “New nuclear electricity costs hit utility ratings - Moody’s”, 27 March 2012,

http://www.icis.com/heren/articles/2012/03/27/9545356/power/edem/new-nuclear-electricity-costs-hit-utility-

ratings---moodys.html, accessed 11 June 2013.

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If [a utility] is already on the edge of a ratings band, a nuclear project could be the thing that pushes them

over the edge—it's just another negative factor.246

Of the utilities surveyed, only one, Korea Electric Power Co. (KEPCO), has received a ratings upgrade

from S&P. 247 In the rational for this upgrade, S&P state that the “potential extraordinary support”

from the Government of the Republic of Korea in the event of financial stress would be “extremely

high”. This upgrade the highlights the important role that Government support plays in many nuclear

operators ability to secure finance. In essence, KEPCO, like EDF and TVA, is being rated more on its

government’s than on its own stand-along creditworthiness.

As can be seen in Table 3, other than KEPCO, all utilities examined that have nuclear interests across

the world continue to be static or downgraded by S&P. In some cases this relates to specific events,

such as Fukushima or it may be a reflection of the general problems facing the electricity sector. July

2012 saw the downgrading of Germany’s two largest utilities, RWE and E.ON, driven by declines in

wholesale power markets, and the divestment from nuclear energy following the acceleration of the

nuclear phase out in Germany. S&P also note that the increasing share of renewable energy has

pushed many of the company’s traditional thermal plants down the merit order: : they run fewer hours

and take lower prices in Europe’s competitive power markets.248

Table 3: Long Term Credit Ratings of Utilities with Nuclear Investments

Company

Date of

2013

2012

2011

2011

2010

2009

2008

last action

June

June

June

April

European Union

CEZ

Oct 2006

A-

A-

A-

A-

A-

A-

A-

EDF

Jan 2012

A+

A+

AA-

AA-

A+

A+

AA-

E.ON

July 2012

A-

A

A

A

A

A

A

ENEL

Mar 2012 BBB+

BBB+

A-

A-

A-

A-

A-

GDF-Suez

July 2008

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

RWE

July 2012 BBB+

A-

A-

A-

A

A

A

TVO

June 2012

BBB

BBB

Asia, South Africa, USA

Kansai249

May 2012

AA-

AA-

AA-

AA

AA

AA

AA

KEPCO

Sept 2012

A+

A

A

A

A

A

A

TEPCO

May 2012

B+

B+

B+

BBB+

AA

AA

AA

ESKOM

Sept 2012

BBB

BBB+

BBB+

BBB+

A-

A-

A-

SCE

Feb 2005 BBB+

BBB+

BBB+

BBB+ BBB+ BBB+

BBB+

PG&E

Dec 2011

BBB

BBB

BBB

BBB+ BBB+ BBB+

BBB+

FLP

Mar 2010

A-

A-

A-

A-

A

A

A

TVA

Aug 2011

AA+

AA+

AA+

AAA

AAA

AAA

AAA

Sources: S&P, Financial Times, Reuters, Company websites and Annual Reports 2013250

In addition to the general trends, there have been a number of notable recent judgments by the rating

agencies on nuclear power. For example, in the U.K., the announcement that Centrica would not

246 ICIS Heren, “Nuclear electricity investment could risk utility credit ratings – analysts”, 20 March 2012,

http://www.icis.com/heren/articles/2012/03/20/9543406/power/edem/nuclear-electricity-investment-could-risk-

utility-credit-ratings--analysts.html, accessed 11 June 2013.

0247 Standard and Poor’s, “Korea Electric Power Corp”, http://www.standardandpoors.com/prot/ratings/entity-

ratings/en/eu/?entityID=269949&sectorCode=UTIL, accessed 3 July 2013.

248 Reuters, “S&P cuts German Utility E.ON to 'A-/A-2';outlook stable”, 27 July 2012.

249 Moody’s rating cited because Kansai is not rated by S&P.

250 Based on research by John Corbett, London, commissioned by MSC.

Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013

58

exercise its option to take a 20 percent interest in the construction of new nuclear plants in conjunction

with its partner EDF Energy, led Moody’s to state:

This decision is credit positive because it removes the high investment and construction risks that would

have resulted from the project. The costs, according to the company, were uncertain and the construction

timetable had lengthened by a number of years since Centrica's original investment in 2009. 251

Likewise in April 2012, RWE and E.ON announced that they would no longer proceed with their

plans to build nuclear power in the U.K.. The reaction of Moody’s investor service was again credit

positive:

The companies’ decision to pull out of their U.K. nuclear joint venture, known as Horizon Nuclear

Power, is credit positive for both German utilities, which can instead focus on investment in less risky

projects 252.

In its rating rationale for the Czech utility CEZ in May 2013, Moody’s stated that important factors in

its credit downgrade is the fall in electricity prices and the decline of nuclear energy as the marginal

producer. Moody’s noted that electricity prices have fallen in Central and Eastern Europe due to low-

cost renewables and weak demand for electricity in the region, which has pushed higher-cost plants

down the merit order, including “fixed cost” lignite, nuclear and hydro power plants. As a result, many

nuclear power plants are not price-competitive with renewables, placing considerable financial

pressure on their operators. Further, Moody's comments that the strategy to develop new nuclear units

could put further downward pressure on the group’s credit rating, due to the financial burden of the

Capex requirements.253 In relation to CEZ’s credit profile, S&P notes that “...although nuclear

electricity generation is favorable as a low carbon-emission generation source, we believe that it

introduces significant construction, operating, and market-exposure risks, especially in volatile

liberalized energy markets.”

The ongoing construction problems at the Finnish Olkiluoto-3 reactor have significantly affected the

views of the rating agencies on the utility Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO).

Table 4 shows the extent to which in the past few years the cost over-runs have harmed the rating of

the utility, taking its Fitch rating from A- to BBB.

Standard & Poor’s rated TVO BBB in 2012 and argued that risk was linked to operating as well as to

new-build reactors: “TVO's dependence on its current two nuclear plants in Finland exposes the

company to asset concentration risk, primarily disruption of operations” and “we expect that TVO's

financial risk profile will continue to be negatively affected in the near to medium term by the large

investment in the new nuclear plant” (Olkiluoto-3). Standard & Poor’s does not exclude further down-

rating, arguing that ratings could be negatively affected if TVO’s liquidity position weakened, for

example if the company's net cash outflows were higher than expected primarily related to the

construction of Olkiluoto-3. 254

Construction delays and cost over-runs have also affected the credit rating of EdF in France. In

December 2012, following further announcements of the cost increases for the Flamanville-3 project

(to €8.5 billion) and a ruling by the Conseil d’Etat on the tariff for distribution of electricity, Moody’s

investment services changed from stable to negative the outlook on the Aa3 senior unsecured ratings

of EdF255.

251 Moody’s, “Centrica's Withdrawal from New Nuclear Plants Is Credit Positive” 7 February 2013.

252 I-nuclear, “Moody’s says German withdrawal ‘credit positive’; decision gives EDF bargaining power”,

2 April 2012, http://www.i-nuclear.com/2012/04/02/moodys-says-german-withdrawal-credit-positive-decision-

gives-edf-bargaining-power/, accessed 11 June 2013.

253 Moody’s, “Credit Opinion: CEZ”, 14 May 2013.

254 Standard & Poor’s, “Ratings Direct, Teollisuuden Voima Oyj”, 28 June 2012

255 Moody’s, “Moody’s changes outlook on EDF’s Aa3 rating to negative from stable”, 5 December 2012

Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013

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Table 4: Fitch Rating for Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO) during 2009–2013

Date

Rating

Fitch Comments

As at May 2009, the new Olkiluoto-3 (OL3) plant is likely to be commissioned by 2012,

a delay of 38 months. However, given the fixed‐price, turn‐key nature of the contract

June 2009

A-

with the AREVA‐Siemens Consortium, Fitch Ratings expects TVO’s exposure to the

delay to be relatively modest, with only a small impact on annualized production costs.

(OL3) to 2013 (from June 2012) to have a limited effect on TVO’s costs—with only a

small impact on annualized production costs. Fitch anticipates production costs to remain

June 2010

A-

competitive after the commissioning of OL3 and subsequently to fall as capital costs

decrease. Fitch notes that while the OL3 project carries construction and project risks,

these are largely mitigated by the fixed-price, turn-key nature of the contract.

The new Olkiluoto 3 (OL3) plant will be commissioned by end‐2012, a 52‐month delay.

TVO’s exposure to the delay is likely to be modest, with only a small impact on

June 2011

A-

annualized production costs, as the contract with the AREVA‐Siemens consortium is a

fixed‐price, turn‐key contract.

The Long-Term IDR and senior unsecured ratings were downgraded in June 2012 due to

the impact on Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO)’s credit profile of the continued delay in

commissioning the third 1,600 megawatt (MW) nuclear plant Olkiluoto 3 (OL3). The

June 2012

BBB+

delay to August 2014 is of 64 months. Annual production costs will increase as a result,

and while still competitive against forward Nord Pool prices, the gap between the two has

narrowed and indicates some erosion of cost advantage.

The downgrade reflects the continued delay in expected commissioning of the third 1,600

MW nuclear plant Olkiluoto 3 (OL3) and our weakened mid-term outlook for the forward

Nord pool wholesale electricity prices. This will erode the value creation for TVO’s

shareholders, a key consideration for our assessment of TVO’s credit profile. The delay

May 2013

BBB

of OL3 to 2016 is about seven years against the original schedule. The substantially

longer than planned construction phase of OL3 is negative for TVO’s cash flows as the

company continues to service debt related to OL3, while OL3’s full cost coverage by

TVO’s shareholders may be initiated only when the new plant is commissioned.

Source: Fitchrating256

In Korea, Moody’s announced in May 2013 that the scandal relating to the stoppage of operation at

four reactors as a result of the revelation that substandard parts had been used with forged test results

was credit negative for KEPCO. The reactors are not expected to restart for another 4–6 months, until

the parts had been replaced, increasing costly natural-gas imports. This is the latest announcement of

inadequate parts’ being used in the reactor fleet.257

In most regions of the world the financial situation of utilities is precarious due to changing supply

technologies, increasing policy interventions, and new consumption patterns. This is reflected in the

generally lower ratings of major utilities, the rising debt levels, falling income, and in most regions—

although currently not North America—falling stock prices. In this uncertain environment, significant

new investment in the power sector is needed, $16.8 trillion according to the IEA258, in order to

replace retiring capacity or meet future predicted increases in demand.

At one time nuclear would have been seen as an important part of this mix, but increasingly it is being

rejected by the financial community as it is by its very nature an expensive investment, due to high

construction costs and long lead times. Its history of cost over-runs and delays has also given it a

reputation as a highly risky investment. As a result, in the majority of countries, nuclear power can

proceed only if many of these risks are taken away from the utilities and its financial backers and put

onto customers or taxpayers—see U.K. or U.S. sections for more details.

256 TVO Credit Ratings http://www.tvo.fi/Credit percent20ratings, accessed 11 June 2013.

257 Moody’s, “Moody's: Stoppages at nuclear plants; credit negative for KEPCO”, 29 May 2013

258 IEA, “World Energy Outlook 2012”, International Energy Agency

Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013

60

Fukushima – A Status Report

On 11 March 2011, a long and strong earthquake followed by a series of once-in-1,000-years-grade

tsunami waves devastated the east coast of Tohoku, the northeastern region of Honshu, Japan’s main

island. The earthquake and tsunami hit 14 reactors in 4 nuclear power stations on the Pacific coast,

namely from north to south, Onagawa with 3 BWR units operated by Tohoku Electric Power Co.,

Fukushima Daiichi with 6 BWRs and Fukushima Daini with 4 BWRs259, both operated by Tokyo

Electric Power Co. (TEPCO), and Tokai Daini (1 BWR) operated by Japan Atomic Power Co.

(JAPCO). Units 1 to 4 of the six Fukushima Daiichi units were devastated, resulting in massive release

of radioactivity into the environment. The other 10 reactors escaped meltdown and radioactive release

by a series of lucky circumstances, but they were nevertheless damaged considerably. It was also mere

fortune that the Rokkasho reprocessing plant on the Pacific coast of Aomori, 300 km north of

Onagawa, escaped major damage; it did lose all external power supplies, but emergency generators

worked to keep liquid high-level waste from boiling and thus from releasing large additional quantities

of radiation.

Concerns over the health of firemen, site workers, and some general public inside and outside of the

exclusion zone and other scheduled zones are grave, as well as the economic consequences for

200,000 refugees, utilities, government and local authorities, but remain outside the scope of this

chapter.260

Characteristics of the Fukushima Disaster

On-site Challenges: Earthquakes, Station Blackout, Flooding, Explosions

TEPCO’s two nuclear stations in Fukushima had a total of about 9 GW of electricity output (Daiichi

4.7 GW and Daini 4.4 GW). Daiichi and Daini are 12 km apart, both located on the Pacific coast of

Fukushima Prefecture more than 200 km away from the offshore epicenter of the 3.11 quake.261

The devastated four reactor units of Fukushima Daiichi are all GE Mark-I BWRs. Unit-1 is of

460 MW power output and has 400 fuel assemblies, while Unit-2, -3 and -4 are each of 784 MW with

548 fuel assemblies. All the units began operation in the 1970s. Unit-3 has 32 MOX fuel assemblies

loaded in 2010, of a total of 548, as first step of a one-third-core MOX program (but no irradiated

MOX fuel currently in the spent fuel pool), while others had normal uranium fuel. At the time of the

main shock of the mega-quake, three reactors (Units 1–3) were operating, while the other three

(Units 4–6) were shut-down for maintenance, repair and refueling. Unit-4 was in the middle of core

shroud replacement work; all the fuel assemblies had been moved to the spent fuel pool.

Seismometer signals tripped the Unit 1–3 reactors on 11 March 2011 at 14:47 JST. All of the five

powerlines that had been transmitting electricity to and from Fukushima Daiichi were destroyed by the

earthquake, which left the station without external power supply. Emergency diesel generators, two

259 Daiichi means “The First” and Daini “The Second”; thus the stations may also be referred to as Fukushima-I

and Fukushima-II, respectively.

260 The May 2012 WHO report (see http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2012/9789241503662_eng.pdf,

accessed 18 June 2013) gives a rather optimistic forecast of the health risks, whereas the May 2013 report by the

Special Rapporteurs to the UN Human Rights Council

(www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session23/A-HRC-23-41-Add3_en.pdf,

accessed 18 June 2013) recommends more precautions.

261 Another nuclear plant operated by TEPCO, Kashiwazaki-Kariwa, in Niigata Prefecture on the other side of

Honshu Island, has 7 BWRs with the combined output of about 8 GW, the world’s largest concentration of

power reactors. Kashiwazaki-Kariwa had been hit by a level 6.8 earthquake in July 2007. Only 4 of the 7 units of

Kashiwazaki-Kariwa were since restarted, but the March 2011 earthquake led again to the shutdown of all

reactors. As of June 2013, no TEPCO nuclear stations are running.

Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013

61

each for all of the reactor-turbine units, automatically started. Less than an hour later, the units were

overrun by water by a tsunami wave exceeding 13 meters and all the diesel generators were flooded.262

All of the diesel generators, circuit boards, and DC263 batteries stored in the basement of the turbine

building went underwater. The doors of the turbine buildings were at 10 m above sea level, but the

tsunami rose higher. The total loss of electric power, or station blackout (SBO), resulted in successive

reactor core meltdowns and melt-through events. Large amounts of hydrogen gas were generated

inside the pressure vessel as hot steam reacted with the zirconium alloy of the fuel cladding. This

hydrogen exploded later, but how the gas moved out, and exactly where it deflagrated, remains

unexplained.

Table 5 shows the latest plant parameter figures of the four Fukushima Daiichi reactors in question.

Continuous cooling is also imperative at Units 1 to 4 spent fuel pools. The irradiated fuel rods in these

four in-house pools would otherwise overheat. Failure of the cooling and excessive build-up of decay

heat could cause a zirconium fire, and then uncontrolled release of radioactivity into the atmosphere.

The Unit-4 spent fuel pool is generally considered most vulnerable because of damage to the building,

which is no longer structurally sound, and the number of fuel rods stored and their relative high

temperature.

Table 5: Spring 2013 plant parameters of Fukushima Daiichi Units 1–4264

Temperature at

Radiation inside the

Quantity of

Temperature of

Fukushima

bottom of

reactor building

radioactive water

spent fuel pool

Daiichi Units

pressure vessel

(mSv/h)

(tons)

(°C)

(°C)

Unit 1

23 - 11,100

≈26

13,900

≈24

Unit 2

5 - 72,900

≈39

22,800

≈22

Unit 3

10 - 4,780

≈37

20,900

≈20

Unit 4

0.1 - 0.6

n/a

15,900

≈28

Radioactive emissions into the atmosphere from the three units (1, 2 and 3) continues at a rate of

10 MBq/h of cesium (= 240 MBq/day)265. This does not include the radionuclides that flow into the

waste water and the unknown direct flow into the groundwater and Pacific Ocean.

Off-site Challenges: Evacuation, Decontamination

The vast scale of the economic loss, real-estate devaluation, primary-industries damage, environmental

hazards, and the enormous personal and community sufferings caused by the Fukushima accident is

hard to grasp in its totality. As of April 2013, more than 150,000 people are still forced to remain

evacuated from their communities in the restricted zones.266 Tens of thousands of other people,

262 The exact height of the 3/11 wave at the Fukushima Daiichi site is unknown. It scaled out the TEPCO’s

offshore wave gauges, whose limit was ±7.5m. Since the flood reached the Unit-5 turbine building, which was

13 m above the sea level and the highest among the 6 units, the wave height is estimated as more than 13 meters.

In 2008, TEPCO had calculated a maximal possible height of a tsunami wave at Fukushima Daiichi at 15.7 m,

based on the Governmental study group’s prospect (July 2002) of a M-8 class earthquake-and-tsunami on the

eastern Pacific coast of Japan (see NAIIC 2012: p.54, Section 1.2.1.2-e).

263 Direct current.

264 Temperatures (pressure vessel bottom and spent fuel pools) are as of 7 May 2013; other figures are from the

press release of 16 April 2013. See www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/index-e.html.

265 TEPCO press release, 26 April 2013. It is one-sixth of the earlier estimate made by the Government

(60 MBq/h, technical document in Japanese, released by the Cabinet Secretariat, 16 December 2011; see

http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/genpatsujiko/pdf/111216e.pdf). TEPCO’s figure is based on dust sampling on-site and

monitors only Cs-134 and -137. The Government 2011 figure includes inert gas estimates. There has been a

considerable variance, with occasional spikes, of Cs-134 and -137 fallout monitored in Fukushima City (60–

70 km offsite) in the past six months (regular announcement on the Fukushima Prefecture official website).

266 Fukushima Minpo (newspaper), 27 March and 18 April 2013.

Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013

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especially concerned mothers with small children, had to seek voluntary refuge away from their home

towns outside contaminated zones. Many of them still live in exile with poor official support. Roughly

130,000 compensation claims have been made by individuals, corporations, trade unions, and local

governments against TEPCO267, of which 6,000 are handled by the statutory mediator, the Center for

Dispute Resolution for Compensating Nuclear Accident (the so-called Nuclear ADR).268

The Japanese Government designated 101 municipalities (city/town/village) in eight Prefectures as a

Scheduled Contamination Survey Zone, where an additional radiation dose of 1 to 20 millisievert per

year (mSv/y) is predicted. Areas where the additional dose is over 20 mSv/y are designated as a

Special Decontamination Zone. In the Survey Zone, local governments are responsible, with national

government subsidies, to conduct decontamination and/or remediation work to decrease radiation dose

rates. In the Special Decontamination Zone, a 235-km2 area in 11 municipalities of Fukushima

Prefecture, the central government is in charge of radiation remediation projects.

So far only 5 percent of the Survey Zone and 4 percent of the Special Decontamination Zone have

been worked on.269 In the 40 Fukushima municipalities designated as Survey Zone (1–20 mSv/y), only

12 percent of the houses, 17 percent of the roads, 60 percent of public buildings (including schools and

playgrounds)270, 75 percent of rice fields, and 53 percent of other farmlands have gone through

remediation work.271 It is often the case that after premises are decontaminated they become

recontaminated due to the wind and/or water flows from the surrounding environment. There are three

main reasons why the remediation projects are badly behind schedule: technical difficulties, lack of

waste disposal arrangements, and shortage of manpower. The Government will have to review the

whole framework of the remediation projects, particularly in the Special Decontamination Zone. If the

remediation effect is little more than the rate of natural decay, which is actually the case in a number

of work areas272, then it is no use spending a huge budget at the expense of refugees’ support.

Health concerns are increasing. We decided to exclude this issue from this short overview considering

its importance, poor survey quality and complexity. The discussion of health concerns stemming from

the Fukushima disaster vastly exceeds the scope of this report.

267 Japan Federation of Bar Associations, 8 June 2013.

268 ADR stands for Alternative Dispute Resolution. In case this officially supported out-of-court mediation fails,

claimants can go to court, but that can be a further burden for them in time, cost, and energy.

269 Mainichi Shinbun, 4 March 2013; NHK News, 17 May 2013.

270 As to schools and childcare facilities, 98% of the premises have been worked on and the dose rates have been

substantially lowered (see Jiji, 7 June 2013, based on Ministry of Environment press release).

271 Fukushima Prefecture administration press release, as reported in the local newspaper, Fukushima Minpo, 4

June 2013.

272 According to the monitoring results in the model areas of the official decontamination projects, an average of

25% reduction of gamma dose rate is reported after 15 months (December 2011–March 2013) of trials (Ministry

of Environment press release, 7 June 2013). The figure means it is mainly due to the natural decay of Cs-134

plus weathering, rather than due to the human intervention. By comparison, the reduction rate was around 60%

in the period up to December 2011, which was mainly due to human efforts plus weathering. In other words,

although the early, urgent work of decontamination, such as shaving playground surface soils, had some effect,

further reduction turned out to be hard to achieve and rather unrealistic. To cite a typical case from Fukushima

City, the eastern hillside residential area of Watari, where the city-contracted (and sub-contracted) operators

slowly conduct remediation work, people still live in ambient exposure rates of 1 to 4 microsievert per hour

(µSv/h) with a number of micro-hotspots of up to 150 µSv/h here and there, as monitored by Greenpeace Japan,

Friends of the Earth-Japan, local resident groups, and one of the authors and colleagues, during the period from

May 2011 to May 2013.

Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013

63

Current Status of Fukushima Daiichi 1–4

After six different professional investigations (see hereunder), the real story of why and how the

destruction of each reactor unit came about is still in the mist. This section reviews the current

conditions and the specific problems of each reactor units.

Unit-1

Meltdown in the Unit-1 reactor proceeded much sooner than the other units. The fuel mostly melted

through (thus the temperature at the pressure vessel bottom is now lower than other units; see Table 1)

and dropped down onto the secondary container floor. The molten fuel is probably eroding the thick

concrete base at the bottom of the container, although the depth of the erosion is hard to estimate. The

quick meltdown and melt-through seem to have been accelerated by the operators’ failure to keep the

isolation condenser running properly, and by a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) caused by the

earthquake shocks. 273

The radiation environment at Unit-1 is not so severe as at Unit-2, but the dose rate inside the Unit-1

container is more than twice as high as that of Unit-3 (see Table 5).

The Unit-1 building is currently covered with polyester sheets to minimize radioactive releases into

the atmosphere. However, TEPCO plans to remove the cover early next year so that the debris

scattered around on the top floor (Level-5) of the building can be removed and a crane to retrieve

irradiated fuel from the spent fuel pool can be installed above the building.274 The company says a

new, larger sheet will be installed to cover both the building and the crane in 2017. In the meantime,

radioactive releases will inevitably increase.

Unit-2

Unlike the other three units, the building of Unit-2 was not severely damaged by explosions, but most

investigators agree that the radioactive release from this reactor was the worst (the largest in Bq). This

was because the blow-out panel in the wall of the Unit-2 collapsed from the force of the Unit-1

explosion, leaving a large opening in the Unit-2 building. The good news was that explosive hydrogen

escaped from the hole; the bad news was that radioactive gas found an easy way out as well.

The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC), which had activated just after the main shock on

11 March 2011, ceased to function on 14 March and meltdown started in the Unit-2 reactor.

Secondary containment pressure went as high as 750 kPa, but venting failed. On 15 March, the

pressure was rapidly lost after the operators/workers heard an explosive sound somewhere around the

torus (suppression chamber in the bottom part of the container).

The location of the explosion, its cause and nature—hydrogen or nitrogen explosion and where the gas

came from—and the degrees of the damage in the torus and/or pipings are all unknown, and will

remain so for some time given the high radiation environment (maximum of 72.9 Sv/h as monitored in

March 2013) in and near the container vessel impeding even a cursory human inspection. What is

known is that there is a large leak (supposedly a substantial rupture) somewhere and the cooling water

poured into the reactor vessel is constantly escaping.

The reactor temperature (39ºC at the bottom of the pressure vessel) is relatively and constantly higher

than at the other reactor units, indicating that the cooling is less effective in this reactor. It probably

reflects the condition of meltdown. The hot molten fuel may have gone deeper into the concrete floor

of the container vessel, and pouring in water has a limited cooling effect. If that’s the case, it means

that retrieving the fuel would be more difficult and would take longer. TEPCO’s decommissioning

roadmap shows that the company is planning on more time in the case of Unit-2 (2017–2023 for spent

273 Mitsuhiko Tanaka, 2013, Kagaku 83(4): 363.

274 TEPCO press release, 9 May 2013.

Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013

64

fuel pool evacuation and 2020–2024 to begin with fuel debris recovery from the reactor containment)

than in the case of Unit-1 (2017 and 2020–22, respectively, for the same operations).275

Unit-3

Venting was carried out twice in Unit-3, but it could not prevent the explosion, which took place

outside the containment seven hours after the second venting. As to the Unit-3 explosion, independent

nuclear expert Arnie Gundersen claims a possibility of small nuclear detonation due to moderated

prompt criticality in the spent fuel pool, probably due to distortion of fuel assembly racks in the pool

caused by the impact of the hydrogen explosion that occurred close to the spent fuel pool.276 So far,

most other professional engineers remain doubtful or reject this scenario outright. However, findings

of fragments of fuel material outside the Unit-3 building and the recent retrieval of extremely

contaminated debris (540 mSv/h recorded at the surface) in the Level 5 (spent fuel pool floor) of the

Unit-3 building277 reflect the fact that the Unit-3 explosion was much more intense than that of Unit-1.

The detonation theory will be ultimately challenged and resolved when the fuel assembly racks and

the fuel rods are physically inspected years from now.

The temperature at the bottom of the Unit-3 reactor pressure vessel was around 36ºC in December

2012. It went down to 25ºC in late March 2013, but again it is around 37ºC in early June 2013. The

fluctuation is much larger than at Unit-1 (low twenties) and Unit-2 (upper thirties). TEPCO plans to

start retrieving fuel debris from the Unit-3 containment in 2021, one year later than Units-1 and -2,

while the fuel retrieval from the Unit-3 spent fuel pool is planned for 2015, two years sooner than

from pools at Units-1 and -2.278 As the explosion of Unit-3 was rather large, the conditions of debris

inside and outside the Unit-3 building are worse than in other units. This makes decommissioning

work particularly hazardous in Unit-3.

Unit-4

At the time of the earthquake and tsunamiUnit-4 was not operational and was undergoing a periodic

inspection. All fuel had been taken out of the reactor vessel and moved to the spent fuel pool, where

older spent fuel assemblies were also stored. At approximately 6:10 am, 15 March 2011, the Unit-4

building exploded, blowing the upper-floor walls and the ceilings away, leaving the spent fuel pool

filled with 1,535 assemblies (1,331 irradiated ones and 204 fresh ones)279 in the open air without

containment, though debris fell into the pond. The cause and mechanism of this explosion are still

unclear. Unlike the earlier explosions at Unit-1 and -3, no video-recording is available; even the exact

time of the explosion remains uncertain. A likely explanation is that hydrogen came from Unit-3 via

the piping; there is also a probability that Unit-4 spent fuel pool temperature went high enough to

cause radiolysis of the water, producing hydrogen gas.

What if the spent fuel pool gets cracked and loses its cooling water? What if the already severely-

damaged (and, as it seems, slightly leaning) reactor building collapses and the spent fuel pool crashes

down, perhaps triggering a spent fuel fire? This could lead to a worst case scenario that was drawn up

in March 2011 by Prof. Kondo, Chairman of the Japan Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC), would

still apply. Evacuation of over 10 million residents in the wider Tokyo megalopolis within a 250-km

radius of Fukushima Daiichi, depending on wind direction, may be required. 280 Radioactivity of the

275 TEPCO press release, 10 June 2013.

276 Arnie Gundersen’s remark at the Session 1, the International Symposium on the Truth of the Fukushima

Nuclear Accident and the Myth of Nuclear Safety, held at the University of Tokyo, 29 August 2012, as recorded

in the Proceedings [in Japanese] (published by Iwanami, November 2012): 16-17.

277 TEPCO press release, 4 May 2013.

278 TEPCO press release, 10 June 2013.

279 Two of the 204 unirradiated assemblies were retrieved in a test operation of July 2012, so the remaining

number of the fuel assemblies is 1,533.

280 Shunsuke Kondo, 25 March 2011, 15 slides as reported to the government. Archived at

www.asahi-net.or.jp/~pn8r-fjsk/saiakusinario.pdf, accessed 18 June 2013.

Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013

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Unit-4 spent fuel pool is more or less equivalent to three full reactor-loads; i.e. the quantity of the

irradiated fuel rods kept in that single pool roughly equals those in Unit-1, -2 and -3 reactor cores

combined. Thus, full release from the Unit-4 spent fuel pool, without any containment or control,

could cause by far the most serious radiological disaster to date.

TEPCO claims that the Unit-4 building has been reinforced enough to survive further quakes, but

retrieving the heat-generating spent fuel from the pool is nonetheless imperative and as quickly as

possible. TEPCO puts a top priority to the construction of a crane-supporting iron framework over the

Unit-4 building. Retrieval of the assemblies is scheduled to begin in November 2013 and to be

completed by 2014.281

Wave or Shake?

So far, six projects of investigation into the Fukushima accident were carried out and five of them

published (mostly in Japanese). They are in order of publication: (1) Ohmae project282, (2) RJIF283, (3)

TEPCO284, (4) NAIIC commissioned by the Diet (Parliament)285, (5) the Government286 and (6) the

Atomic Energy Society of Japan (AESJ).287 The reports differ not only in their perspectives but also in

many of the details in their analysis of the accident sequences. This may not be surprising given the

reality that most of the crucial devices, and the specific locations in the reactor systems where the

destruction and/or dysfunctions occurred, remain uninspected or even inaccessible due to the lethal

radioactive environment in and around the reactor containments.

The most important difference among the above reports is about whether the main cause of the

Fukushima Daiichi disaster was the earthquake shocks or the tsunami inundation. Only the NAIIC

report claims that ruptures in piping or destruction of generator(s) could have caused decisive failures

prior to the tsunami arriving. Other investigation reports are rather negative about that possibility and

consider the tsunami the cause. The quake/tsunami issue bears a key influence on the matter of the

country’s safety regulations of nuclear facilities in general, and the controversy in particular of

whether to restart other power reactors under the current aseismic codes.

Fukushima Daiichi lost all its external power sources as the transmission towers collapsed in the

earthquake. Subsequently, the station lost all its onsite power generators, including those installed for

the case of emergency. This happened also at the Daini station, but one external powerline held up at

281 TEPCO, press release, 10 June 2013.

282 K. Ohmae, “The Last Conditions of Reboot: Final Report of the Investigation Project of the Fukushima

Daiichi Accident” [in Japanese], Shogakkan Publishers, 2012.

283 Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation (RJIF), usually called Minkan Jikocho (Minkan means private sector and

“jikocho” is short for Accident Investigation Committee) was chaired by Professor K. Kitazawa, former

President of the Japan Science and Technology Agency (JST), “The Independent Investigation Commission on

the Fukushima Nuclear Accident, Investigation Report” [in Japanese], RJIF, 1 March 2012, see

http://rebuildjpn.org/en/fukushima/ for an English summary, accessed 19 June 2013.

284 TEPCO, “Fukushima Nuclear Accidents Investigation Report”, 2012, see www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-

com/release/2012/1205638_1870.html, accessed 7 May 2013.

285 National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (NAIIC), usually

called “Kokkai Jikocho” (kokkai means the Japanese Diet) was chaired by Emeritus Prof. K. Kurokawa of

Tokyo University. NAIIC, “The Official Report of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation

Commission”, The National Diet of Japan, 5 July 2012 (NAIIC 2012). English edition at

http://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/3856371/naiic.go.jp/en/report/, accessed 30 April 2013.

286 Investigation Committee on the Accident at Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power

Company (ICANPS), usually called “Seifu Jikocho” (seifu is the national government) was chaired by Emeritus

Prof. Y. Hatamura of the University of Tokyo. ICANPS, Final Report on the Accident at Fukushima Nuclear

Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company, 23 July 2012. English edition at

http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/final-report.html, accessed 30 April 2013.

287 Final report to appear by the end of 2013.

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Daini, narrowly enabling the operators to bring the reactors to cold shutdown, unlike at Daiichi after

its total station blackout. Apparently the Daiichi site’s onsite generators were lost due to the

inundation. NAIIC investigators, however, see the possibility that at least some of the generators had

been destroyed by the earthquake, and that perhaps the Unit-1 reactor suffered a loss-of-coolant

accident due to pipe ruptures before the station blackout.

The nature of the earthquake oscillation experienced by the Daiichi station was rather abnormal in that

it continued for 180 seconds, twice as long as the basic design earthquake ground motion (Ss) for the

reactor building. The length reflects the magnitude of what happened in the epicenter: the main shock

of 3/11 came from the huge fault surface of 450 km longitudinal x 200 km latitudinal. It is highly

likely that the repeated load caused fatigue fractures in all corners of the buildings and installations of

the power stations—not only at Fukushima Daiichi, but also in other reactors that escaped meltdown.

Therefore full investigation of the degrees and extensions of the ruptures, fractures and other modes of

destructions at those other plants seems imperative, though the Government and the power companies

are not open to this suggestion, perhaps because it could bear on both their suitability for potential

restart and on the adequacy of national nuclear seismic standards.

In the “wave or shake” controversy, the exact time of flooding of the emergency diesel generators is of

crucial importance. TEPCO says the first wave (4m high) arrived at 15:27 on 3/11, and the much

higher second wave (scaling out the wave recorder limit of ±7.5m) arrived at 15:35. Both Seifu

Jikocho (Government) and Minkan Jikocho (private) studies adopted these figures. NAIIC ( Kokkai

Jikocho), however, found that these were actually the times recorded 1.5 km offshore where the wave

meter was buoyed, and the big wave must have taken a further 2 to 2.5 minutes to reach the shoreline

(i.e. at 15:37 to 15:37:30). It would take some more time for the tsunami to inundate the diesel

generators. According to the plant record, the respective time of the diesel generator power failure is

the following:

15:35 or 36 — System A, Unit-1

15:37 — System B, Unit-1

15:38 — Systems A and B, Unit-3

Thus apparently the System A of Unit-1 failed before the tsunami. It is most likely that it had stopped

due to the aftershocks before the inundation. It is also possible that the System B of Unit-1 and the two

systems of Unit-3 failed before the flooding. By this logic and evidence, TEPCO’s claim that station

blackout would not have taken place without the tsunami cannot be maintained.288

NAIIC investigators applied a series of failure-tree analysis (FTA) regarding the impacts of the

repeated oscillations and reached a reasonable assumption that the rapid loss of coolant at the Unit-1

reactor, leading to its meltdown, was explicable as caused by a small-scale rupture (or ruptures)

somewhere in the reactor’s piping system, including the piping to the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling

Condenser (IC). Operators who were at the Level 4 of the Unit-1 reactor building on 3/11 testified in

their interviews with NAIIC that they had experienced water leakage at Level 4. Onsite inspection is

essential to determine whether this water was from ruptured pipe(s) or from the damaged spent fuel

pool at Level 5. NAIIC also interviewed a number of Unit-1 operators and plant workers to confirm

that the safety relief valve, an essential device to depressurize the reactor in trouble, did not open,

because nobody heard a loud noise indicating that the main steam had escaped the valve (thus making

the water injection easier and possibly avoiding meltdown). The malfunction of the safety relief valve

would support the small-scale rupture hypothesis.

The NAIIC investigation presents a strong argument that the loss of coolant accident at Unit 1, leading

to its meltdown quicker than other reactor units, had been caused by the earthquake strikes before the

tsunami crippled the emergency generators. Onsite investigation, particularly in Level-3 to Level-5

floors of the Unit-1 building, is needed to specify how much and what kind of damage is found in

288 NAIIC 2012, ibid:227. (Section 2.2.3.4; English edition, Chapter 2, pp.80-81). See also p.17 of the English

summary of NAIIC 2012, http://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/3856371/naiic.go.jp/en/report/ (accessed 1 June

2013).

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which parts of the building and installations. NAIIC’s repeated request for onsite inspection was

refused by TEPCO for safety reasons. TEPCO has so far disclosed only a very limited amount of

video recordings of the floors in question. On 13 March 2013, Hiroshi Kawauchi289 entered the Unit-1

reactor building and his video recording is now open for public inspection.290 The footage shows the

Level-4 devastation is much more than previously estimated; it is now fairly probable that, apart from

the big explosion at Level-5, there was also a hydrogen explosion at Level-4 destroying the piping

systems connecting the reactor vessel and the isolation condenser.291

Notice also that the shake intensity at Unit-1 of Fukushima Daiichi was within the assumed range in

the reactor design, but it caused fatal damage to the unit. The Fukushima Daini reactor units—shaken

by the quake, flooded by the tsunami, and exposed to a station blackout—narrowly escaped the

catastrophe. It is important to understand these event sequences and learn their lessons.

On-site Challenges: Water, Waste, Radiation

Difficulties with Radioactive Water Management

Cooling of the reactor vessels continues at Units-1, -2 and -3. Since the reactor cores of all three units

are melted down and more or less melted through the vessels, the normal reactor cooling systems are

of no use. Operators know where and how the water is injected, but they do not know exactly where it

then goes and how leakage occurs. The coolant (freshwater plus neutron-absorbing boron) is pumped

and sprayed into the main vessels (i.e. pressure vessel, though the pressure is long lost), then leaks into

the secondary containment through the holes and cracks at the bottom of the reactor vessels. After

hopefully cooling the melted nuclear fuel somewhere in the primary and secondary vessels (the forms

and distributions of the fuel debris being unknown), the water leaks out from unidentified ruptures of

the containments and overflows into the basements of the reactor buildings and the connected turbine

buildings. This drainage continuously washes out radionuclides from the destroyed reactors.

Nonetheless, the water injection must continue to prevent the fuel from overheating.

Operators collect the drained radioactive water from the basements and send it through filter systems

to decrease radioactivity and recirculate it back into the reactors. By May 2013, this water circuit was

4 km long, many sections of which were still composed of makeshift vinyl (chloroethylene) tubes

installed above-ground in 2011, rather than severe-duty steel pipes. Thus site workers are always busy

mending leaks and holes, caused for example by frost.

Mr. Ebisawa, who had served NAIIC as an expert reactor engineer, estimated the amount of

radioactivity that had seeped into the water that fills the basement of the reactor buildings (Unit-1, -2

and -3, as of 20 November 2012) as follows:292

Cesium-137:

276 PBq293 (i.e. 40 percent of the reactor core inventory)

Strontium-90:

23 to 33 PBq (i.e. 4.4 to 6.3 percent of the reactor core inventory).

289 Kawauchi is an ex-Member of Parliament and the former chairman of the House of Representatives Special

Committee on Promotion of Science, Technology and Innovation. This committee tried actively to inquire into

the Fukushima accident before the official parliamentary commission, NAIIC, was organized.

290 See http://youtu.be/y0GCj12RSO4 or http://youtu.be/QXcgajz87b0, both accessed on 30 May 2013.

291 On 31 May 2013, the Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NRA) personnel went inside the Unit-1 building to

inspect the physical condition of the IC at Level-4. The dose rate is 20–30 mSv/h, so the inspectors’ stay had to

be limited to 15 minutes. Their report, with several hundred photographs, is yet to come. ( Mainichi Shimbun

reports, 30 May and 4 June; NHK TV report, 5 June 2013.)

292 Toru Ebisawa, 2013, Bulletin of the Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center, 465: 12. J. Kanda gives an earlier

estimate of 160 PBq, as of May 2011, Ocean Policy Research Foundation, Kaiyo Hakusho 2012 [annual report

in Japanese], p. 45. Seizando-Shoten Publishing, 2012.

293 1 PBq = 1 petabecquerel or 1 million billion becquerels or 1015 nuclear distintegrations per second.

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These are far larger amounts than those released into the atmosphere in gaseous form: for example,

more than 27 times the amount of cesium-137 released into the air in the first three weeks294, or about

2.5 to 3.3 times, depending on the estimate, the total amount released into the environment from the

Chernobyl accident295.

The extreme radioactivity (several million Bq per cm3 prior to decontamination) of the outflow is a

serious problem by itself, and to make the situation much worse, the volume of the contaminated

water is continuously increasing. This is due to the influx of groundwater from the hillside into the

reactor buildings through the broken walls. The groundwater influx (Units 1–3 combined) is estimated

at a rate of about 400 tons per day—more than the water pumped in to cool the three reactors (about

360 tons per day).296 TEPCO has been trying to control the influx by drilling extraction holes to the

west (uphill) of the reactor units, but their effect seems to be limited. TEPCO is asking the local

fishermen’s union to approve discharge of the drained water, only to meet a strong opposition from

both the union and the general public.297

The excess of entering over exiting water results in increasing stocks of excess water, after minimal

decontamination, in the storage tanks that are now covering the Fukushima Daiichi station site. The

overall volume of radioactive water that cannot be used in the cooling circulation reached 380,000

tons in early May 2013 (290,000 tons in the storage tanks and the rest in the basement of the

reactor/turbine buildings). If the current regime continues, TEPCO estimates that the amount will be

over 600,000 tons in mid-2015. The company claims to have plans to install more tanks, up to the total

capacity of 700,000 tons, which however will be filled up in less than three years; as yet there is no

planning beyond that target.

In another makeshift attempt, TEPCO dug seven large (10,000-ton-class) sink ponds adjacent to the

tanks, but a series of radioactive leakages was detected in March and April 2013. It was found out that

TEPCO had adopted conventional lining techniques usually applied to solid (non-liquid) industrial

waste, making leakage likely. Following criticism, TEPCO is now pumping the contaminated water

from the leaking ponds up to the new steel tanks. The utility said the transfer would be finished by the

end of June 2013. However, leakage from those new tanks was already detected in late May 2013.

This is not surprising since those tanks are no more than temporary facilities; they are not properly

welded containers but simply steel plates rounded and fastened tightly with bolts. Most of these

makeshift tanks will survive only a few years or less, prone to constant leaks and corrosion.

All these operations and repairs yield additional radiation exposure to the site workers. Also, the high

radioactivity of the waste water stored in the increasing number of tanks results in a sharp rise of

gamma-ray dose rate (from 0.9 up to 7.8 mSv/y) at the power plant boundary.298 This means that the

company’s radiation management target of 1 mSv/y at the site boundary will be exceeded.

In a desperate breakthrough hope, TEPCO started a 4-month test operation of a new multi-nuclide

removal equipment (called ALPS), which is intended to filter out 62 radionuclides other than tritium.

If this works, then the question is what to do with the ALPS-processed water, which may contain only

trace amounts of cesium, strontium, uranium, plutonium, etc, but does contain the full amount of

tritium coming out of the reactor cores. Apparently TEPCO is considering a controlled release into the

sea, which will be fiercely opposed by fishermen, the general public, and overseas neighbors. The

Fishery Union of Fukushima Prefecture already expressed its strong concern even to the proposed

bypass discharge of the hillside water (i.e. control extraction of groundwater before flowing into the

reactor buildings), which contains only trace amounts of the radionuclides.

294 The release of cesium-137 into the atmosphere during the period from 12 March to 31 March 2011 is

estimated at around 10 PBq, see TEPCO press release, 24 May 2012). The total atmospheric release, mostly

iodine-131 and inert gases, is estimated at 480 PBq (MITI, February 2012) to 900 PBq (TEPCO, ibid).

295 Estimates range between 85 PBq (UNSCEAR, 1996) and 110 PBq (Ian Fairlie, et al, TORCH Report, 2006).

296 Groundwater influx is also the case at Unit-4, -5 and -6 buildings, but radioactive contamination of water is

much less serious in those units.

297 Mainichi Shimbun, 31 May 2013; Reuters Japan, 4 June 2013.

298 TEPCO press release, 7 May 2013.

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Apart from the overflow from the cooling circulation described above, and apart from the initial large-

scale discharge of radioactive water into the sea in March–April 2011, the release of contaminated

water to the sea at the power plant port is continuing, although at a decreased rate, and TEPCO has no

effective way to restrain it. The average release rate of Cs-137 was estimated to be 93 GBq per day in

summer 2011 and 8.1 GBq per day in summer 2012.299 In June 2013, it was revealed that the

groundwater sampled from a monitoring well adjacent to the Unit-2 turbine building is contaminated

with strontium and tritium, so the highly radioactive water that filled the unit basement has already

made its way to the aquifer, whence it can easily flow into the sea.300

One big difference between Chernobyl and Fukushima is the serious sea contamination.301 High

concentrations of Cs-137 and Sr-90 in fish/mollusk/seaweed samples offshore have been reported

repeatedly, giving a crushing blow to the fishery, which was the main source of income not only of

Fukushima but also of Japan’s wider Tohoku (Northeast) region.

The Government has recently come up with a radically new engineering plan to cope with the

groundwater problems. The idea of freezing the groundwater, or “artificial tundra”, was proposed by

the construction giant Kajima Co., and was adopted by a Government committee of experts that

reviewed the water management at Fukushima Daiichi.302 Artificial tundra itself appears as a simple

and reasonable concept: a number of 20–30-meter-long pipes will be put vertically into the ground in

line, and very-low-temperature antifreeze solution will be circulated in the pipes to freeze the

groundwater near the pipes, making an underground ice wall. It is an existing technology used in

subway construction and mining to block the influx of groundwater. Such a system, however, would

consume huge amounts of electricity to maintain below-zero temperatures for a long period of time. It

would have to run for more than 10 years while the reactors need coolant circulation. There is also a

risk of reversing the water flow, making the highly radioactive water seep out from the reactor

buildings to the aquifer. TEPCO is now considering the proposal, but does not seem as enthusiastic

about the idea as the Government does.

Contaminated Debris

The total of the station site debris (except the fuel debris) will reach 176,000 tons by the end of March

2016. The solid waste, such as metals, concrete pieces, plastics, and combined materials will be

separated and piled or sealed according to their radioactivity. TEPCO secured a 20,000-ton storage

capacity for debris of 0.1–1.0 mSv/h grade, but the actual amount is likely to exceed this capacity in

early 2016. At the same time, the 34,000-ton storage capacity for contaminated debris of 1–30 mSv/h

grade will be filled up to 33,000 tons. Total available storage capacity for contaminated debris is less

than 200,000 tons, which is estimated to be 90 percent saturated by March 2016. TEPCO is yet to

work out how much debris will accumulate from the site decommissioning work beyond 2016.303 Poor

waste management planning may prove a serious obstacle on the difficult half-century-long road to

decommissioning.

299 J. Kanda, “Continuing 137Cs release to the sea from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant through

2012”, Biogeosciences Discussions, 10: 3577-3595, 2013. See www.biogeosciences-

discuss.net/10/3577/2013/bgd-10-3577-2013.html.

300 The contamination was confirmed in late May 2013, but it took TEPCO more than two weeks to publicly

release the information, see TBS News, NHK News, Mainichi Shimbun, 19 June 2013. Also see

http://enformable.com/2013/06/tepco-confirms-fukushima-daiichi-groundwater-contaminated-with-strontium-

and-tritium/, accessed 20 June 2013.

301 J. Kanda, “Continuing radioactive cesium release to the sea from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power

Plant” [in Japanese], in Kagaku 83(6):634-638, 2013.

302 Yomiuri Shimbun, 30 and 31 May 2013.

303 Kahoku Shimpo, 18 May 2013.

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Workers Exposure to Radiation

Through March 2013, officially a total of 26,942 workers (3,710 TEPCO employees plus

23,232 contractors and subcontractors) have worked at the Fukushima Daiichi site since the accident

started on 11 March 2011. Among those, at least 167 people received radiation doses over 100 mSv

(internal and external), including 9 persons over 200 mSv, over the two years from March 2011 to

March 2013. The maximum personal dose identified was 678.8 mSv. The average was 12.27 mSv per

person. Eighty percent of the workers received doses below 20 mSv.304

These figures exclude the contingent troops (firemen, policemen and the Self-Defence Force) that

entered or flew over the site in March 2011. The size and accuracy of the radiation dose estimations

for these emergency servicemen seem to vary wildly. Under the emergency conditions of March–April

2011, there were a number of cases in which the workers approached high radiation areas without a

radiation manager, who usually escorts the workers to supervise their radiological protection and

monitor the dose rate of the work area. There were also frequent cases in which the workers did not

carry individual dosimeters because of the shortage of the dosimeters in the emergency.305 Thus the

actual total dose could be considerably higher than the official figures given above.

Radiation-exposed workers’ legal dose limit is 100 mSv for five years, but 50 mSv in any one year.306

As a matter of fact, a number of workers who continuously work at Fukushima Daiichi easily receive

their the 5-year limit in less than a year, or the annual limit in only a few months. There are workers

who intentionally “forget” to put on their dosimeters in the hope of securing longer months of

employment. There were even cases where subcontractors put lead shielding around their dosimeters

to lower their recorded exposures so they could work longer.307 This criminal case might just be the tip

of the iceberg. Unless certain compensation schemes or alternative non-exposure jobs are provided for

those who exceed dose limits earlier than their term of service, numerous subcontractors in need of

work will commit clandestine tricks one way or another, doctoring their radiation exposure records.

Currently at the Fukushima Daiichi site, a daily average of 3,000 workers are engaged in radiation-

exposed operations. TEPCO employees are less than 7 percent of them; the rest are employed by

contractors, subcontractors, sub-subcontractors, … down to 9th-level-subcontractors. Recruitment of

new workers is becoming more and more difficult, while experienced workers, such as tower crane

operators, must leave the site once they have achieved the dose limits.

Summary and Prospects

The reactor units are still in instable conditions and the cooling system depends on the temporary soft

hoses that were laid in April-May 2011. Aftershocks are still continuing and the maxim possible M-8

class quake is yet to come. Government and the utility say it would take 40 years (or probably more)

to retrieve the molten fuel from the three reactors. The question is whether the fragile, tightrope-

walking conditions on site can possibly be sustained for that length of time.

The serious challenges the Fukushima Daiichi site is facing include the following, but these are by no

means exhaustive:

(1) Cooling the molten fuel (corium), whose exact location is uncertain, for 5 to 10 years; and to

keep it from re-criticality under frequent aftershocks, big and small.

304 TEPCO, “Status of radiation exposure dose of TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi”, 30 April 2013.

305 Of the 5,000 dosimeters stockpiled in Fukushima Daiichi, only 320 survived the earthquake damage and the

flood. TEPCO had to temporary suspend the rule that workers must carry individual dosimeter; the obligation

was not resumed before May 2011, see Jiji, 1 April 2011; Tokyo Shimbun, 28 April 2011; Kyodo, 28 April

2011; Yomiuri Shimbun, 30 April 2011.

306 In March 2011, the limit was temporary relaxed up to 250 mSv for emergency operations in Fukushima

Daiichi (not applicable in other sites). The 100 mSv limit was resumed in Fukushima in November 2011. The

extraordinary 250 mSv limit is still applicable to certain operations at Fukushima Daiichi.

307 Asahi Shimbun, 21 and 22 June 2012; Mainichi Shimbun, 21 and 22 June 2012; Yomiuri Shimbun, 23 June

2012.

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(2) Circulating the coolant in makeshift, provisional vinyl pipes with non-“rat-safe” power

boards308 and under the remaining threat of another flooding for years to come.

(3) Managing large quantities of radioactive waste water that is continuously building up in the

basements of the reactors and turbine buildings.

(4) Ensure that the wrecked reactor buildings with their spent fuel pools between fourth and fifth

floor withstand aftershocks, possibly M8-grade shakes.

(5) Conduct surveys to pinpoint where and how the reactor containments (including the torus) are

cracked and/or ruptured so that they can be mended and filled with water in order to start

retrieving, if ever possible, the fuel debris.

(6) Reduce continued leakage of radioactivity into the sea and the atmosphere to an absolute

minimum, before any physical containment is re-established, hopefully in some five years.

(7) Carry through all these high-radiation-exposed operations under extreme shortage of

workforce, as most of the skilled operators are rapidly reaching their lifetime dose limit.

On 10 June 2013, TEPCO revised its engineering road map 2015–2023 to start physically retrieving

the molten fuel debris out of the reactor containments of Unit-1, -2 and -3 from 2020 onwards.309

The State of Nuclear Emergency, declared by then Prime Minister Kan in March 2011, has not yet

been lifted. It was lifted for Fukushima Daini in November 2011, but as for Daiichi, the country is still

in an extraordinary situation beyond the law; therefore, the prior legal dose limit of additional 1 mSv/y

caused by nuclear industry activities remains suspended and large numbers of people, inside and

outside the exclusion zones, are told to accept the 20 mSv/y emergency limit without proper

justification and legalization.

308 “Rat stops spent fuel pool cooling system”, Nuke Info Tokyo 154:15, 2013, see

www.cnic.jp/english/newsletter/pdffiles/nit154.pdf, accessed on 5 June 2013. Hours-long failures of the

spent fuel pool cooling were caused repeatedly by rat invasion into the electricity circuit box. The

point is that the indispensable cooling systems still depend on the equipment that was temporarily

installed in the wake of meltdown and explosions and have not been replaced with permanent

installations due to the desperate shortage of workforce under high radiation. The power system has

still poor backups.

309 See www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/roadmap/images/t130610_04-j.pdf (accessed 11 June 2013).

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Nuclear Power vs. Renewable Energy

Three of the world’s largest four economies (China, Germany and Japan),

together representing a quarter of global GDP, are now running their

economies with a higher share of renewables than of nuclear.

Christof Rühl

Chief Economist, BP

12 June 2013310

To reduce or avoid dangerous climate change, the move towards a low- or zero-carbon and fossil-fuel-

independent energy sector must be both rapid and global. Given the diversity of energy services—

cooking, heating and cooling, lighting, communication, mobility, motor torque, etc.—there is no silver

bullet or single technology that will create a low-carbon energy future. Therefore a number of factors

will determine the relative roles and ranking of different technologies, notably: potential for rapid

global deployment, other non-fuel and CO2 resource constraints, compatibility with existing systems

and other technologies, public and political support, and the relative and projected economics. Many

analysts consider energy efficiency the top scorer on all these metrics, so it should generally be bought

before but together with renewables. However, aggregated statistics on technological (or even total)

energy savings are not available—efficiency technologies and their effects are poorly tracked in most

countries—so we focus here on the better-publicized and also important parallel progress in renewable

supplies, omitting a number of other potent competitors to central power stations including

cogeneration (combined-heat-and-power).

Investment

According to an assessment by Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF), global investment in clean

energy—largely renewable energy, excluding large hydro, but also including a small volume of

investment into Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS)—was $268 billion in 2012, the second highest

ever level, down from $300 million in 2011, but still five times the 2004 total of $52 billion, as can be

seen in Figure 18. The largest percentage of the funding was for asset finance of utility-scale

renewable energy projects, such as wind farms, solar parks, and biofuel plants. This received

$148.6 billion, down from $180 billion in 2011. The next largest investment segment was for small-

scale project investment, primarily rooftop solar PV, $80.2 billion, up from $76.5 billion in 2011311.

Figure 18 compares the annual investment decisions for the construction of new nuclear compared to

renewable energy since 2004. In the absence of comprehensive, publicly available investment

estimates for nuclear power by year, the total investment costs have been included in the year in which

construction was started, rather than spreading out the investment over the construction period.

Furthermore, the nuclear investment figures do not include revised budgets if cost overruns occur.

Over this period the total investment in nuclear is nearly an order of magnitude lower than that for

clean energy, which is descibed by BNEF as renewable energy, not including big hydro, and CCS.

China has been by far the largest investor in renewable energies in 2012 with over $65 billion. Some

big players reduced expenditures significantly over the previous year, including the U.S., Germany,

Italy and India. On the other hand, some countries had very large growth rates. South Africa boosted

spendings by a factor of two hundred to $5.5 billion, while Japan increased investements by three

quarters (see Table 6).

310 Rühl, C., “Energy in 2012 – Adapting to a changing World”, Launch of the BP Statistical Review of World

Energy, 12 June 2013.

311 BNEF, “New Investment in Clean Energy Fell 11% in 2012”, Bloomberg New Energy Finance,

14 January 2013.

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The decline in global investment in renewable energy capacity has continued in 2013, and in the first

quarter of the year the figure is estimated at $40 billion, the lowest in any quarter since the first quarter

of crisis year 2009.312 But this does not mean less renewable capacity is being installed. Why not?

While these investment volumes are important to watch, it is essential to consider how much can be

built per invested dollar. The costs of equipment are changing constantly and are generally declining.

Since 2008 the world market cost of photovoltaic (PV) modules have fallen by 80%—and 20% in

2012 alone—while prices for wind turbines, a more mature technology, have fallen 29% since 2008313.

This is in contrast with nuclear power, where the costs have risen considerably. For example the EPR

under construction in France, Flamanville-3, was estimated to cost €4 billion in 2008, but by 2013 it

had risen to €8.5 billion (see Nuclear Economics Chapter for details). The trend is highly relevant,

both for investor confidence and in relation to what the investment can actually buy in terms of

installed capacity.

Figure 18: Global Investment Decisions in Clean Energy and Nuclear Power 2004-12 ($ billion)

Source: BNEF 2013 and WNISR original research, 2013

Table 6: Renewable Energy Investment in Top 10 Countries 2011-2012 (in billion US$)314

Country

2012 2011

China

65.1

54.1

United States

35.6

56,8

Germany

22.8

31.3

Rest of EU*

16.3

17.7

Japan

16.3

9.3

Italy

14.7

30.1

U.K.

8.3

10.0

India

6.9

10.2

South Africa

5.5

0.03

Brazil

5.3

7.8

Note: *Rest of EU is including all of the EU countries besides Germany, Italy and the U.K.

312 Frankfurt School-UNEP Centre/BNEF, “Global Trends in Renewable Energy Investment 2013”, June 2013.

313 BNEF, “Bloomberg New Energy Finance Summit”, Michael Liebreich, 23 April 2013.

314 Note that earlier 2011 figures have been revised by BNEF, some considerably. China’s expenditures, for

example, were raised from $45.5 billion (as represented in WNISR 2012) to $54.1 billion. Sources, BNEF 2013,

according to PEW, “Who is Winning the Clean Energy Race?”, PEW Charitable Trust, April 2013.

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As documented hereunder, the 2011–12 drop in global renewable investment actually supported a

substantial in crease in the amount of renewable capacity added, continuing years of consistently

strong growth, whereas nuclear net additions, as reported earlier, are continuing to fluctuate in recent

years between negative and mildly positive.

Installed Capacity

The commissioning of new electricity-generating facilities involves two major phases, pre-

development and construction. Both affect the speed of technology deployment. The pre-development

phase can include a wide range of activities such as conducting extensive consultations, obtaining the

necessary construction and operating licenses, including public consent, and creating the financing

package. In some cases, technology deployment may be sped up through the use of generic safety

assessments. Alternatively, pre-development may take longer than expected because of local site

conditions, lack of available skilled workforce, or new issues coming to light.

The IAEA estimates that starting a new nuclear program in a country without experience can take

between 11 and 20 years, and the French safety authorities assume a minimum of 15 years to set up an

appropriate framework. Even where countries have nuclear experience, the IEA has estimated a pre-

development phase of approximately eight years for nuclear power.315

It is important to note the differences in construction of a wind farm, and many other renewable

energy schemes, compared to large fossil-fueled or nuclear power stations. The European Wind

Energy Association (EWEA) likens building a wind farm to the purchase of a fleet of trucks: the

turbines are bought at an agreed fixed cost and on an established delivery schedule, and the electrical

infrastructure can be specified well in advance. Although some variable costs are associated with the

civil works, these are very small compared to the overall project cost.316 The construction time for

onshore wind turbines is relatively quick, with smaller farms being completed in a few months, and

most well within a year. The contrast with nuclear power, and even with conventional fossil fuel

power plants, is significant.

These investments are resulting in grid connections and operation of new capacity, and this slowly

changes the electricity mix. Figure 19 shows the extent of solar, wind and nuclear capacity that has

been added to the global grid since 2000. What is clearly demonstrated is that nuclear power capacity

has remained largely constant over the past decade, whereas the two renewable energy sources, solar

and wind, are increasing steadily and rapidly. Globally the average annual growth rates during 2000–

2012 for onshore wind have been 27 percent and for solar PV 42 percent. This resulted in 2012 alone

in 32 GW317 of solar being added to the grid, 45 GW of wind318 versus a net addition of 1.2 GW of

nuclear319.

315 IEA, “Nuclear Power in the OECD”, Paris, 2001.

316 European Wind Energy Association (EWEA), “Wind Energy, The Facts: Volume 1, Technology”, Brussels,

2003.

317 CleanTechnica.com, ”Solar PV Installations Hit 32 GW In 2012, 35 GW Projected For 2013, According To

HIS”, 5 February 2013, see http://cleantechnica.com/2013/02/05/solar-pv-installations-hit-32-gw-in-2012-35-

gw-projected-for-2013-according-to-ihs/, accessed 8 May 2013.

318 GWEC, “Global Statistics for 2012”, Global Wind Energy Council, http://www.gwec.net/global-

figures/graphs/, accessed 8 May 2013.

319 IAEA. “Power Reactor Information System” (PRIS), International Atomic Energy Agency. The IAEA figure

has been adjusted by removing from the figures of the 6 remaining reactors at two Fukushima power plants in

Japan, which we consider will not be restarted. But includes uprates according to PRIS.

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Figure 19: Nuclear, Wind and Solar Capacity Increases in the World 2000-2012 (MW)

Source: IAEA-PRIS, BP, 2013

Electricity Generation

Skeptics of renewable energy highlight the variable output of some technologies (windpower and

photovoltaics—but not all solar power, since solar-thermal-electric plants typically have built-in heat

storage so they can run into or through the night). A consequence of variability is the lower output per

installed MW over the year than that of traditional fossil-fueled or nuclear power stations. In fact,

obviously no power plant operates continually. Most nuclear plants have experienced extended

unplanned shutdown periods, many exceeding a year. Despite their specific variable characteristics,

wind and photovoltaic power are now becoming significant, both nationally and globally.

The continual deployment of modern renewable energy is reducing dependency on fossil fuels and

reducing importers’ security-of-supply concerns. Furthermore, the development of renewables is

helping to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. According to the IEA, positive progress has been made

on the deployment of renewables, which are broadly on target to make the necessary contribution to

meet the two-Celsius-degree target set by the UNFCCC in the Cancún Agreement320. In particular

onshore wind is now able to compete “without special support in electricity markets endowed with

320 At the United Nations climate change conference in Cancún, Mexico, in December 2010, delegates agreed

that “climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our time and that all Parties share a vision for long-term

cooperative action.” For the first time under the U.N. climate framework, participants acknowledged that “deep

cuts in global greenhouse gas emissions are required according to science, and as documented in the Fourth

Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, with a view to reducing global

greenhouse gas emissions so as to hold the increase in global average temperature below 2°C above pre-

industrial levels.” - United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, “Outcome of the Work of the

Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention,” Draft decision, COP 16

(Cancún, Mexico: 2010), at http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_16/application/pdf/cop16_lca.pdf.

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steady winds and supportive regulatory framework”.321 On the other hand, the IEA notes that nuclear

power is “below levels required to achieve the 2 degree scenario objectives. In addition, increasing

public opposition could make government ambitions for nuclear power’s contribution to their energy

supply harder to achieve”.

Figure 20: Annual Variation in Global Electricity Production from Nuclear and Selected

Renewables (TWh/y)

Source: BP 2013

China, EU, Germany, U.S.

In China, electricity demand has grown remarkably over the last decade, and as a result between 2000

and 2010 coal, which is by far the dominant source, increased its installed power capacity by around

460 GW—twice the total coal capacity currently in the EU.

While China is reknowned for its use of coal, half the world’s total, it has also become the world’s

leading producer and deployer of renewable energy. As can be seen in Figure 22, wind power has had

a phenominal growth rate over the past decade, going from an installed capacity of less than 6 GW in

2007 to over 75 GW in 2012. Furthermore, it is not only in installed capacity that wind has achieved

record increases; its corresponding electricity production is also impressive. In fact, in 2012 wind

overtook nuclear power for the first time for the total amount of electricity produced in China. Overall

in 2012, China increased electricity production by 5.5 percent, of which the use of nuclear energy

increased by 12.6 percent, wind power by 35 percent, and solar PV by 400 percent322. What was also

remarkable in 2012 was the extent to which the expansion of wind power was even larger than that of

coal. As thermal power use, nearly synonymous with coal, grew by only about 0.3 percent in China

during 2012, an addition of roughly 12 terawatt hours (TWh) more electricity, wind power production

321 IEA, “Tracking Clean Energy Progress – Energy Technology Perspectives 2012 excerpt as IEA input to the

Clean Energy Ministerial”, International Energy Agency, April 2013

322 CEC “2012 China’s Power Industry Overview, China Electricity Council”, 22 February 2013,

http://www.cec.org.cn/; and REN21, “Renewables 2013 – Global Status Report”, June 2013, see

http://www.ren21.net/REN21Activities/GlobalStatusReport.aspx.

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expanded by about 26 TWh323. In other words, in 2012 China increased electricity production more

than twice as much (in absolute terms) from wind alone as from coal or nuclear power. In India, too,

modern renewable energy sources (wind, solar, biomass) generated 51.2 TWh during the fiscal year

2011-2012324, about 5.5% of the total electricity generated in the country, as compared to nuclear

power that generated 3.5% of the total.325 Preliminary estimates for 2012-13 are 6.4% of the total from

renewable energy and 3.7% from nuclear energy.

Figure 21: Installed Capacity in China from Nuclear, Solar and Wind

Source: BP 2013, PRIS and GWEC

323 Shua, L. “China’s Wind Power Production Increased More Than Coal Power Did for the First Time Ever in

2012”, blog on Thinkprogress.org, 20 March 2013.

324 1 April 2011 to 31 March 2012.

325 These figures are approximate though they clearly capture the current and emerging picture. Different

agencies in India seem to report different figures and no single agency reports total electricity generation from

renewables, nuclear, and all sources. There are slight discrepancies in the figures reported for each of these

quantities. The figures are from http://www.cea.nic.in/executive_summary.html and

http://www.cea.nic.in/reports/articles/god/renewable_energy.pdf and

http://pib.nic.in/newsite/pmreleases.aspx?mincode=28, accessed 7 July 2013.

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Figure 22: Annual Electricity Production in China from Nuclear, Wind and Solar

Source: BP 2013

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In the European Union, the introduction and implementation of the renewable energy directive is

leading to its greater use, rising from 7.9 percent in 2004 to 13 percent in 2011 for energy as a whole.

In the electricity sector it is estimated that in 2012 renewables will now contribute around 22 percent.

This increase in production is likely to continue, as in 2012, 37 percent of the new power capacity

added was solar PV and 27 percent of it was wind power326. Figure 23 shows the changes in

generating capacity in the EU since 2000. In addition to the growth in renewable energy there has been

an increased installation of gas power plants, in part due to their ability to “load follow” and therefore

complement the more variable production from some renewables and in part to replace the closure of

coal and nuclear plants as they reach the end of the operating lives or due to their early retirement on

environmental or economic grounds.

Figure 23: Net Electricity Generating Installations in the EU 2000–2012 GW

Source: EWEA 2013

326 EWEA, “Wind in Power, 2012 European statistics”, European Wind Energy Association, February 2013.

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In 2012, the combined installed renewable electricity capacity in Germany reached 76 GW327, that is

far more than the available French nuclear capacity (63.1 GW). Of course, French nuclear plants

generated 407 TWh, while German renewables generated “only” 136 TWh (gross) of electricity,

compared to 100 TWh (gross) provided by German nuclear plants or the equivalent to one third of

French nuclear power generation in 2012; but the German renewables growth rate remains very

significant (+15.5 percent) while German nuclear generation dropped by 8 percent below 100 TWh for

the first time in three decades and French nuclear generation dropped by 3 percent.328

Total renewables output represents now 23 percent of the German power generation, up from

3 percent in 1991. The growth rate in recent years has been particularly impressive in the solar power

sector. Installed photovoltaic capacity increased by a factor of five since 2008 and solar power

generation by a factor of over six to reach 28 TWh in 2012.

Figure 24: German Power Generation of Nuclear and Renewables

Sources: AGEB 2013

327 Wind (31.3 GW) and solar plants (32.6 GW) represent 84 percent of the installed capacity; see BMU, “Daten

des BMU sur Entwicklung der erneuerbaren Energien in Deutschland im Jahr 2011 auf der Grundlage der

Angaben der AGEE-Stat”, provisional, 8 March 2012.

328 French nuclear plants already generated more power in 2002 (415 TWh) than in 2012, while the German

renewables tripled production over the same period from 46 to 136 TWh.

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In the United States, much has been said about the importance of shale gas and how it has

fundamentally changed the energy sector. As can be seen in the figure below, the output from gas fired

power stations has increased by 374 TWh during 2002–2011, with the continuation of this trend

expected in 2012. This is largely at the expense of coal, which saw a decline of 170 TWh in output, a

decrease of 10 percent from 2001 and from petroleum fuels, which saw a drop of 90 percent to just

16 TWh. Over this period nuclear power’s output increased slightly (by around 3 percent), due to the

upgrading of a number of units. However, it is interesting to note that the combined increase in output

from hydro power and wind is 60 percent of that of natural gas; the highest growth rate was for wind

power, which increased its production from 6 TWh in 2011 to 120 TWh in 2011.

Furthermore, renewables are closing the gap on gas: in 2012, more wind capacity was added than any

other generating source, including gas, with U.S. wind capacity rising by 13 GW to a total of more

than 60 GW. The annual investment during 2008–2012 is now $18 billion, reaching $25 billion in

2012329. The dominance of renewables has continued in the first quarter of 2013 with renewable

energy sources (biomass, geothermal, solar, water, wind) accounting for 84 percent of all new

domestic electrical generating capacity.330 Indeed, in the first quarter of 2013, nearly half of total new

U.S. utility capacity additions was solar photovoltaics.

Figure 25: Increases in Electricity Production in the U.S. between 2001 and 2011

Source: U.S. EIA 2013

Future Costs

The need to move away from a global energy sector dependent on the use of unabated fossil fuels is as

urgent as ever. In May 2013, it was announced that global concentrations of CO2 in the atmosphere

had reached 400 parts per million.331 While the trajectory of current emissions could, according to the

IEA, result in attmospheric concentrations that might lead to global temperature increases of 6 degrees

329 AWEA, “US Wind Industry Annual Market Report”, American Wind Energy Association, 2013

330 FERC, “Office of Energy Projects, Energy Infrastructure Update” for March 2013, Federal Energy

Regulatory Commission.

331 BBC, “Carbon Dioxide Passes Symbolic Mark”, 10 May 2013

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above pre-industrial levels. Therefore in order to try and avoid the most severe consequences of

climate change, a rapid change in the direction of energy investment is required. As has been

demonstrated in the previous parts of this section, nuclear investment and deployment has been

outstripped by renewable energy.

A survey of the major power and utility sectors undertaken by PricewaterhouseCoopers in 2012

showed the extent to which these sectors now see renewables as a major competition. Of those

surveyed the majority felt that renewables would be able to compete with 80 percent plus thinking

onshore wind, biomass and all forms of solar will not need subsidies to compete by 2030. There is less

confidence in offshore wind but, even so, 69 percent say it will be competitive by 2030. 66 percent

also think marine energy will be competitive by 2030.332

On the basis of current conditions there is no reason to believe that this trend will change, and in fact it

is likely to accelerate as the costs of renewable energy continue to fall, while as has been shown in the

economics section, the costs of nuclear continue to rise. This extent of the changes between the two

sectors is seen in Europe when comparing the situation of solar PV in Germany and nuclear power in

the U.K.

In the U.K., as described in more detail in other parts of this report, the Government has been in

negotiations with French utility EdF for a guaranteed price of electricity for a fixed period of time.

The details of the protracted negotiations are confidential; press reports suggest that EdF is asking for

a price guarantee of just under £100/MWh (€118/MWh) for a 40-year period. This electricity price is

based on an estimated construction cost of £12 billion (€14 billion) for two EPR 1.6 GW reactors at

Hinkley. As noted, EdF’s estimated cost of an EPR nuclear reactor in 2006 was around €3 billion.

This sharply contrasts with the rapid falls in the costs of PV and wind turbines in Germany. PV

installation costs in particular have plunged by over 70 percent in seven years. Total installed costs for

German photovoltaics around mid-2012 had reached half the typical U.S. levels, even though both

countries source essentially the same equipment, and most German installations were small and

midsize rooftop systems, while most U.S. installations were utility-scale groundmounted systems.

This changing unit cost is affecting the price guarantee requirements. The decreases in the German

feed-in tariffs for renewables are such that at present the feed-in tariffs for newly installed arrays in

Germany are dropping by 1.8 percentage points per month. As of 30 June 2013, the highest price

(feed-in-tariff level) is 15.35 €c/kWh for the smallest rooftop arrays with the lowest PV price,

dropping to 10.63 €c/kWh for the largest arrays. On the current rate of decline, by June 2014 the

highest price is expected to be €c11.71/kWh. While the exact details of the proposed strike price for

the Hinkley Point C reactor proposed in the U.K. have not been made public, it is suggested that the

price will be fixed (excluding inflation) for potentially up to 40 years at around £95/MWh; this

corresponds to around €c11.1/kWh.333.

Thus as renewable costs continue their downward trajectory, the UK will be tied into a fixed

guaranteed price for its electricity stretching over the next four decades. Not only will this have an

impact on the domestic consumer but raises questions over the impact on the economic

competitiveness of large-scale industrial users.

A recent study by Bloomberg New Energy Finance projects that by 2030, renewable energy

investments will increase by 2.5 to 4.5 times, with the “most likely” scenario an annual expenditure of

about $630 billion (in nominal terms). The study results suggest that “we are beyond the tipping point

towards a cleaner energy future”.334

332 PwC, (2012) “The shape of power to come, Investment, affordability and security in an energy-hungry

world”, the 12th PricewaterhouseCoopers Annual Global Power and Utilities Survey, 2012.

333 Renewables International (2013), “Do the math!, The cost of German solar vs Nuclear”, 16 May 2013

334 HydroWorld.com, “Bloomberg: 70% of new global energy through 2030 will be renewable”, 1 May 2013,

see http://www.hydroworld.com/articles/2013/05/bloomberg--70--of-new-global-energy-through-2030-will-be-

renewab.html, accessed 16 June 2013.

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Annexes

Page

Annex 1: Overview by Region and Country

85

Annex 2: Reactor Construction Times 2003-‐2013

127

Annex 3: Definition of Credit-‐Rating by the Main Agencies

128

Annex 4: About the Authors

129

Annex 5: Abbreviations

131

Annex 6: Status of Nuclear Power in the World

136

Annex 7: Nuclear Reactors in the World Listed as “Under Construction”

137

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Annex 1. Overview by Region and Country

This annex provides an overview of nuclear energy worldwide by region and country. Unless

otherwise noted, data on the numbers of reactors operating and under construction (as of July 2013)

and nuclear’s share in electricity generation are from the International Atomic Energy Agency’s

Power Reactor Information System (PRIS) online database. Historical maximum figures, provided in

parentheses, indicate the year that the nuclear share in the power generation of a given country was the

highest since 1986, the year of the Chernobyl disaster. Load factor figures are drawn from Nuclear

Engineering International, May 2013, unless otherwise noted.

Africa

South Africa has two French (Framatome/AREVA) built reactors. They are both located at the

Koeberg site east of Cape Town, which supplied 12.4 TWh or 5.1 percent of the country’s electricity

in 2012 (the historical maximum was 7.4 percent in 1989). The reactors are the only operating nuclear

power plants on the African continent.

The state-owned South African utility Eskom launched an effort in 1998 to develop the Pebble Bed

Modular Reactor (PBMR), a helium-cooled graphite-moderated reactor based on earlier German

designs. What happened then has been summed up by the Energy Economist this way: “The project

was running about 25 years behind its original schedule, the estimated cost of a demonstration plant

had increased 30-fold and a design fit to submit to the regulator had still not been completed.”335 In

September 2010, the Government “[dropped the] final curtain on PBMR,” a few months after having

terminated all public support.336 Some $1.3 billion had been invested in the project, with more than 80

percent coming from the South African Government.337

The failure of the PBMR led Eskom to consider buying additional large Pressurized Water Reactors

(PWR). In the longer term, it planned to build 20 gigawatts (GW) of nuclear plants by 2025. However,

in addition to escalating cost projections, Eskom faced a challenge of a falling credit rating, reduced

by Moody’s in August 2008 to Baa2, the second-worst investment grade. In November 2008, Eskom

scrapped an international tender because the scale of investment was too high.

In February 2012 the Department of Energy published a Revised Strategic Plan that still contained a

9.6 GW target, or six units for nuclear power by 2030. Startup would be one unit every 18 months

beginning in 2022.338 The South African Government has repeatedly reiterated the 2030 target and

Deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe stated, most recently at the “Nuclear Africa 2013” conference,

that the country “will continue to develop and promote nuclear energy”.339 However, he also noted:

335 Energy Economist, “Prospects for nuclear power in 2012”, Platts, March 2012.

336 “Government Drops Final Curtain on PBMR,” World Nuclear News (WNN), 20 September 2010. The

company PBMR, which in September 2010 still claimed on its website that “the South-African project is on

schedule to be the first commercial scale HTR in the power generation field,” later fired all but nine staff, went

into “care and maintenance” mode to safeguard intellectual property, and shut down its website for good.

337 For an independent historical account of the PBMR, see David Fig, Nuclear Energy Rethink? The Rise and

Demise of South-Africa’s Pebble Bed Modular Reactor, ISS Paper 210 (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies,

April 2010).

338 DOE, “Revised Strategic Plan – 2011/120-02015/16”, February 2012.

339 Engineering News, “SA looks nearly set to start new nuclear power station build programme”, 5 April 2013,

see http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/sa-looks-nearly-set-to-start-new-nuclear-power-station-building-

programme-2013-04-05, accessed 28 April 2013.

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“Admittedly, the use of nuclear energy to mitigate greenhouse gases remains controversial. We remain

committed to invest in clean energy from multiple sources.”

While government support for nuclear power seems little influenced by the events in Fukushima, the

construction industry warns that current projects are running late and over budget. Mile Sofijanic,

Managing Director at Concor Engineering: “If we follow the trend, could the NPP programme cost,

not R300-billion [USD33bn], but R750-billion [USD82bn]? That is not acceptable!” 340 One of the

issues identified by Sofijanic: “We have a lack of skills. That is factually correct.”

Russia’s Rosatom has high hopes for South Africa and offered a full package including extensive

human capacity-building and progressive increase of local input. “Localisation will at the initial stage

of the project be at 30 percent of production, which will eventually peak at 65 percent”, for units seven

and eight, said Alexander Kirillov, head of Rosatom’s marketing office in South Africa.341 Apparently,

Russia’s President Vladimir Putin told his South African counterpart in March 2013 that they would

“offer(ed) different funding options” for the nuclear new-build programme, should a Russian bid be

chosen.342

In June 2012, the Energy Minister stated that Government would make a decision on its nuclear future

by the end of the year. 343 By March 2013, the prospects were dim to get to the point even a year later,

according to trade journal Nuclear Intelligence Weekly:

South Africa’s latest budget seems to leave little room for optimism for those hoping that the government

will decide this year to go forward with its proposed 9.6 GW of new nuclear power. The government

allocated 709.9 million rand ($78.4 million) for nuclear-related programs and subsidies, less than half the

1.623 billion it allocated for clean energy programs and subsidies.344

This may reflect a long-awaited shift towards faster, simpler, lower-cost options. Anton Eberhard, a

professor at the University of Cape Town’s Graduate School of Business and a member of the

National Planning Commission, concluded from recent modelling:

South Africa can achieve electricity supply security without investing in further nuclear power.

Alternative power sources are cheaper and they can also help us achieve our Copenhagen pledges to

reduce carbon emissions.345

Eberhard also stressed that the Independent Power Producers (IPP) renewable energy procurement

program was “highly successful” and “raised R47bn [USD5bn] in its first round”. Meanwhile, the

Energy Minister’s Statement in “response to the UN Secretary General’s call for sustainable energy

for all (SE4ALL)” does not contain the term “nuclear”.346

340 Mile Sofijanic, Managing Director at Concor Engineering, quoted in Engineering News, “SA looks nearly set

to start new nuclear power station build programme”, 5 April 2013, see

http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/sa-looks-nearly-set-to-start-new-nuclear-power-station-building-

programme-2013-04-05, accessed 28 April 2013.

341 ROSATOM, “ROSATOM to promote its nuclear technology on the South African market within the

5th BRICS Summit”, 25 March 2013, see http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/sa-looks-nearly-set-to-start-

new-nuclear-power-station-building-programme-2013-04-05, accessed 28 April 2013.

342 Engineering News, “Moscow willing to finance SA nuclear plants if Russian bid prevails”, 26 April 2013, see

http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/moscow-willing-to-finance-sa-nuclear-plants-if-russian-bid-prevails-

2013-04-26, accessed 28 April 2013.

343 Business Report, “Nuclear plans ready by year end – Peters”, Business Report, 5 June 2012.

344 NIW, 8 March 2013.

345 Business Day, “Nuclear power is neither necessary nor cost-effective”, 19 March 2013; see

http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/2013/03/19/nuclear-power-is-neither-necessary-nor-cost-effective, accessed 29

April 2013.

346 Dipuo Peters, “Remarks by the Minister of Energy on Response to the UN Secretary General’s call for

sustainable energy for all (SE4ALL)”, New York, 22 April 2013, see

http://www.energy.gov.za/files/media/speeches/2013/RemarksByTheMinisterOfEnergySE4ALL_22042013.pdf,

accessed 28 April 2013.

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The Americas

Argentina operates two nuclear reactors that, as in 2011, provided 5.9 TWh or 4.7 percent of the

country’s electricity in 2012 (down from a maximum of 19.8 percent in 1990).

Historically Argentina was one of the countries that embarked on an ambiguous nuclear program,

officially for civil purposes but backed by a strong military lobby. (An advisor to President Galtieri

once said at a press conference that his country had even built a duplicate, unsafeguarded,

reprocessing plant. Argentina also reopened its uranium enrichment plant in 2010, and was revealed

on 1 July 2013347 to have exported 80–100 tons of uranium oxide to Israel, presumably for its nuclear

weapons program.) Nevertheless, the two nuclear plants were supplied by foreign reactor builders:

Atucha-1, which started operation in 1974, was supplied by Siemens, and the CANDU type reactor at

Embalse, which was supplied by the Canadian AECL. After 28 years of operation, the Embalse plant

is supposed to get a major overhaul, including the replacement of hundreds of pressure tubes, to

operate for potentially 25 more years.348 Reportedly, contracts worth $440 million were signed in

August 2011 with the main work to start by November 2013. Work is expected to take five years at a

total cost of $1.37 billion.349

Atucha-2 is officially listed as “under construction” since 1981. In 2004, the IAEA estimated that the

start-up of Atucha-2 would occur in 2005. Since then, the IAEA has kept adjusting the expected “first

grid connection” date, which, as of 6 July 2013 is still given as 1 July 2013, exactly 32 years after

construction start. In June 2013, the Government announced that the project would be completed

within two months.350 That date came and went. The President “pre-started” the plant in a 2011

“inauguration” ceremony, but it apparently remains under construction two years later.

The presidents of Argentina and Brazil, Fernández de Kirchner and Lula da Silva-whose countries had

long been potential military nuclear rivals-, met in February 2008 and agreed to “develop a program of

peaceful nuclear cooperation that will serve as [an] example in this world.”351 In early May 2009, Julio

de Vido, Argentina’s Minister of Planning and Public Works, stated that planning for a fourth nuclear

reactor would be under way and that construction could start as early as within one year.352 It did not.

Neither a siting decision, nor a call for tender, has been reported to date.

After repeated delays construction of a prototype 27 MWe PWR, the domestically designed and built

CAREM25 (a type of pressurized-water Small Modular Reactor with the steam generators inside the

pressure vessel), was scheduled to begin in the first half of 2013 (but was not reported) near the

Atucha site with fuel loading planned for the second half of 2017.353

The Argentinian public’s opposition to nuclear power was only reinforced by Fukushima. In a

September 2012 update of a 24-country IPSOS study, 71 percent of the Argentinians polled opposed

nuclear new-build, a score just below Italians, Germans and Mexicans.354

347 W. Burr & A. Cohen, “Israel’s Secret Uranium Buy,” Foreign Policy, 1 July 2013,

www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/07/01/israels_secret_uranium_buy

348 “Argentina’s Embalse Nuclear Plant to Get 25-year Extension,” PowerGenWorldwide.com, 5 August 2010.

349 Research and Markets, “Nuclear Power Market in Argentina”, May 2012.

350 iEco, “Prometen que en dos meses inaugurarán Atucha II”, 27 June 2013.

351 “Argentina and Brazil Team Up for Nuclear,” WNN, 25 February 2008. Both countries have a long way to go

to make their programs exemplary. Their industrial as well as their non-proliferation record has been far from

convincing.

352 “Argentina to Reinforce Nuclear Energy by Adding 700 MW and Building Fourth Nuclear Plant,”

Marketwire.com, 7 May 2009.

353 CNEA, “Proyecto ‘CAREM’”, undated, see

http://www.cnea.gov.ar/proyectos/carem/cronograma/cronograma.php, accessed 1 May 2013.

354 IPSOS 2012, op.cit.

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Brazil operates two nuclear reactors that provided the country with 15.2 TWh (the historic maximum)

or 3.1 percent of its electricity in 2012 (down from a maximum of 4.3 percent in 2001). The record

electricity generation, which still contributes only modestly to the power supply in the country, is due

to an excellent load factor of 91 percent (+5 percent compared to 2011, 28 percent better than the

lifetime load factor).

As early as 1970, the first contract for the construction of a nuclear power plant, Angra-1, was

awarded to Westinghouse. The reactor went critical in 1981. In 1975, Brazil signed with Germany

what remains probably the largest single contract in the history of the world nuclear industry for the

construction of eight 1.3 GW reactors over a 15-year period. However, due to an ever-increasing debt

burden and obvious interest in nuclear weapons by the Brazilian military, practically the entire

program was abandoned. Only the first reactor covered by the program, Angra-2, was finally

connected to the grid in July 2000, 24 years after construction started.

The construction of Angra-3 was started in 1984 but abandoned in June 1991. However, in May 2010,

Brazil’s Nuclear Energy Commission issued a construction license and the IAEA indicated that a

“new” construction start occurred on 1 June 2010. In early 2011, the Brazilian national development

bank BNDES approved 6.1 billion Reias ($3.6 billion) for work on the reactor, mainly to be carried

out by AREVA.355 The IAEA now envisages commercial operation for 1 January 2016. Other sources

indicate “commissioning” planned for July 2016.356

In January 2011, Brazil’s Energy Minister Edison Lobao stated that the Government planned to

approve the construction of four additional reactors “this year.”357 Right after 3/11, Lobao assured:

“We have no need to revise anything, except for learning from what happened in Japan, and taking a

look at future proceedings.” 358 In early May 2012, a top-level Brazilian Government official

announced that the country will not proceed with the previously stated plans to launch up to eight new

nuclear power plants. “The last plan, which runs through 2020, does not envisage any (new) nuclear

power station because there is no need for it”, the energy ministry’s executive secretary Marcio

Zimmermann stated. “Demand is met with hydro-electrical power and complementary energy sources

such as wind, thermal and natural gas.” According to press agency AFP, the official also announced

that over the coming decade the level of renewable energy would double from 8 to 16 percent.359

Public opinion is still helping the government to look for other solutions than nuclear. In the IPSOS’s

updated 24-country study support for nuclear energy increased by 10 percent but 63 percent of the

population polled remain opposed to nuclear energy in general.360

Canada operates 19 reactors, all of which are CANDU (CANadian Deuterium Uranium), providing

90 TWh or 15.3 percent of the country’s electricity in 2012 (identical to 2011, down from a maximum

of 19.1 percent in 1994). Two reactors have been restarted in 2012 after 15 and 17 years shutdown

periods. On 28 December 2012, Gentilly-2, Québec’s only remaining nuclear reactor, was closed.

There have been significant delays in restarting six of originally eight reactors in long-term-shutdown

(LTS). In December 2012, the LTS status of the two 40-year old Pickering-2 and -3 was “retroactively

355 However, it is surprising to note that AREVA’s 400-page Reference Document 2012 does not even contain

the word “Angra”.

356 NIW, “Potential and Existing Global Nuclear Newbuild Projects Open to International Vendors”, 15 March

2013.

357 “Brazil to Approve Construction of Four Nuclear Power Plants in 2011,” www.neimagazine.com, 10 January

2011.

358 Buenos Aires Herald, “Brazil to continue nuclear energy investments despite Japan crisis”, 15 March 2012;

see http://www.buenosairesherald.com/article/61644/-brazil-to-continue-nuclear-energy-investments-despite-

japan-crisis, accessed, 25 May 2012.

359 WNISR, “Brazil Abandons New Build Plans”, 11 May 2012, see http://www.worldnuclearreport.org/Brazil-

Abandons-New-Build-Plans.

360 IPSOS 2012, op.cit.

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changed to Permanent Shutdown” in May 2007 and October 2008 respectively. In January 2010,

operator Ontario Power Generation (OPG, Ex-Ontario Hydro) requested a five-year license renewal

for the four Pickering-1 to -4361 reactors, but in July 2010 the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission

(CNSC) decided to limit the license to three years. For all remaining six Pickering units, the licenses

expired on 30 June 2013.362 However, these licenses were extended for two months (to August 2013)

in late June 2013.363 The two other units that had been in long-term shutdown, Bruce-1 and -2, were

reconnected to the grid on 19 September and 16 October 2012 respectively.

In May 2012, the Government accepted the Environmental Impact Assessment report for the

construction by OPG of up to four units at the Darlington site. On 17 August 2012, the CNSC issued a

“Site Preparation Licence” for the Darlington project, “a first in over a quarter century”.364 The next

step in the licensing procedure is the submission by OPC of an application for a construction license

that will undergo full public hearings.

The province of New Brunswick has abandoned the option of adding a second nuclear reactor at its

Point Lepreau site; meanwhile, a massive refurbishment project on the first unit was CAD1 billion

over its CAD1.4 billion budget and three years behind schedule. The unit was shut down in April 2008

and was restarted on 26 October 2012.365

In June 2011, the Canadian Government sold the commercial reactor division of Atomic Energy of

Canada (AECL) to CANDU Energy, a wholly owned subsidiary of engineering company SNC

Lavalin for CAD15 million plus royalty payments from potential future new-build and refurbishment

projects. There is no assurance that such projects will materalize.

In Mexico, two General Electric reactors operate at the Laguna Verde power plant, located in Alto

Lucero, Veracruz. The first unit was connected to the grid in 1989 and the second unit in 1994. In

2012, nuclear power produced 8.4 TWh or 4.7 percent of the country’s electricity (down from a

maximum of 6.5 percent in 1995). An uprating project carried out by Iberdrola between 2007 and

early 2011 boosted the nameplate capacity of both units by 20 percent to reach 765 megawatts (MW)

each. However, work continued until February 2013 while the plant remained officially in operation

but the average load-factor of the two reactors plunged from 84 percent in 2011 to 64 percent in 2012.

The power plant is owned and operated by the Federal Electricity Commission (Comisión Federal de

Electricidad).

In March 2012, former Energy Minister Jordy Herrera stated: “We have to put the option of building

and expanding our nuclear plants on the table”.366 His successor, Pedro Joaquín Coldwell, who was

appointed in November 2012, in a speech to a recent OECD conference, stressed the “extraordinary

potential” of Mexico’s energy industry, “particularly in the renewable and fossil fuels sectors”.367 He

did not mention nuclear power at all.

361 Also called Pickering A reactors

362 NEI, “Pickering A Gets 3-year Licence Extension,” www.neimagazine.com, 2 July 2010.

363 CNSC, “CNSC Extends Operating Licences for Pickering A and B Nuclear Generating Stations, 24 June

2013, see http://www.suretenucleaire.gc.ca/eng/mediacentre/releases/news_release.cfm?news_release_id=462,

accessed 24 June 2013.

364 OPG, “Joint Review Panel issues Licence to Prepare Site”, 17 August 2012, see

http://www.opg.com/nb/index3.asp, accessed 8 May 2013.

365 WNISR, “Canadian Nuclear Power at Full Capacity for the First Time in Nearly Two Decades”,

28 October 2012, see http://www.worldnuclearreport.org/Canadian-Nuclear-Power-at-Full.html.

366 NIW, “Lame Duck Energy Minister Proposes More Nuclear Power”, 16 March 2012.

367 Pedro Joaquín Coldwell, Mexico’s Energy Ministry, Presentation in the panel “Efficient Energy Policy”, at

the Mexico Forum 2013, organized by the OECD, 9 January 2013, see

http://www.energia.gob.mx/portal/Default.aspx?id=2363, accessed 9 May 2013.

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Also, public opinion remains a major headache for the nuclear industry in the country with 74 percent

opposing nuclear power in general, according to a September 2012 update of an IPSOS 24-country

survey.368

United States

The United States has more operating nuclear power plants than any other country in the world, with

100 commercial reactors currently operating. This is the lowest number of operating reactors since

Chernobyl year 1986. The highest number with 108 operating units was reached in 1990.369 Four units

were closed in the first half of 2013, the first time reactors were shut down since 1998.

The U.S. reactor fleet provided 770.7 TWh in 2012, a 2.5 percent drop over the previous year and

4.5 percent less than in the record year 2010. The average load factor dropped by over 3 percent to

83.2 percent compared to 2011.

The production decline is partially attributed to extended outages of four units that were down most of

the year and to a higher level of refueling outages. In 2010, only 49 units were refueled. There have

been only three other times since 1995 that fewer than 60 units refueled during a given year (2001,

2004, 2007).370 Nuclear plants provided 19 percent of U.S. electricity in 2012 (down from a maximum

of 22.5 percent in 1995).

First Reactor Closures in 15 Years

In February 2013, nuclear operator Progress Energy, now owned by Duke Energy, decided not to

complete repairs and uprating of its 36-year old Crystal River reactor that had been offline since late

2009. This was the first plant closure in the U.S. since 1998. The 825 MWe PWR in Florida had been

shut down for regular refueling, maintenance and steam generator replacement when significant

deterioration (delamination or cracks) in the concrete containment was identified. Repair was

evaluated as a possible option but by 2012 it was concluded that the “nature and potential scope of

repairs brought increased risks that could raise the cost dramatically and extend the schedule”.371

Trade journal Nucleonics Week reported that costs of repairing the containment could have ranged

between $1.5 billion and “the worst case”, new walls and dome, $3.4 billion.372 Work could have

stretched between 35 months and 96 months, it was estimated. Under those conditions, Duke Energy’s

CEO Jim Rogers concluded: “We believe the decision to retire the nuclear plant is in the best overall

interests of our customers, investors, the state of Florida and our company.”373 Duke Energy intends to

put the plant into safe enclosure (SAFSTOR) in order to fully decommission it in 40-60 years.

On 7 May 2013, the second shutdown decision in 15 years in the U.S. led to the permanent closure of

the Kewaunee nuclear power plant in Wisconsin. The plant owner Dominion, “one of the nation’s

largest producers and transporters of energy”374 had intended to sell the facility but failed to identify a

buyer. The 39-year old 566 MWe single unit reactor was first connected to the grid on 8 April 1974.

The decision is particularly remarkable because “despite its operating license being extended for a

further 20 years until 2033, no buyer was found”, as the nuclear lobby publication World Nuclear

368 IPSOS, op.cit.

369 Some statistics indicate 111 units as the maximum. This is because 3 additional units were in long-term-

shutdown for many years, which we do not count here as “in operation” in 1990. They were restarted in 1991,

1995 and 2007. The 108 number was reached also in 1991, 1995 and 1996.

370 Nucleonics Week, “Fewer US units to refuel this year than in 2012”, 10 January 2013.

371 Duke Energy, “Crystal River Nuclear Plant to be retired; company evaluating sites for potential new gas-

fueled generation”, 5 February 2013, see http://www.duke-energy.com/news/releases/2013020501.asp, accessed

10 May 2013.

372 Nucleonics Week, “Decision to repair or retire Crystal River-3 may come in spring”, 10 January 2013.

373 Duke Energy, op.cit.

374 Self-presentation on the Dominion website, see https://www.dom.com/about/index.jsp, accessed

23 June 2013.

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News (WNN) notes.375 Indeed, the NRC had issued a lifetime extension only in February 2011376.

Dominion had bought Kewaunee in July 2005. Dominion has stated in the past that the

decommissioning fund of $392 million, transferred when it purchased the plant, would be sufficient to

cover the costs. However, as in the case of Crystal River, the reactor will be placed in SAFSTOR.

On 7 June 2013 Southern California Edison (SCE) announced that despite spending over $500 million

on repairs and replacement power it would permanently close units 2 and 3 at the San Onofre Nuclear

Generating Station (SONGS) after losing a 16 month battle to restart. Unit 1 at the station was closed

in 1992. Californian Senator Barbara Boxer, Chairman of the Environment and Public Works

Committee, said of the decision: “This nuclear plant had a defective redesign and could no longer

operate as intended. Modifications to the San Onofre nuclear plant were unsafe and posed a danger to

the eight million people living within 50 miles of the plant”.377 When announcing the closure Ron

Litzinger, SCE’s President said: “We think that our decision to retire the units will eliminate

uncertainty and facilitate orderly planning for California’s energy future.”378

Aging Reactor Fleet

The last reactor in the US to be completed—in 1996—was Watts Bar-1, near Spring City, Tennessee.

In October 2007 the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) announced that it had chosen to complete the

two-thirds-built 1.2 GW Watts Bar-2 reactor.379 Questions persist about whether this will prove

feasible, let alone economic. Questions persist about whether this will prove feasible, let alone

economic.

The lack of new reactor startups leads to the continuous aging of the fleet. Average age stands at

33.4 years (as of May 2013), amongst the highest in the world, with 22 units—every fifth reactor—

operating for at least 40 years (up to 44 years). Projects are being developed and implemented to allow

reactors to operate for potentially up to 60 years. As of June 2013, 72 of the 100 operating U.S. units

have received an extension, another 18 applications are under review by the NRC, and 9 have

submitted letters of intent covering a period up to 2019.380

First Construction Starts in 35 Years

The George W. Bush administration’s National Energy Policy set a target of two new reactors to be

built by 2010, but this objective was not met. To reduce uncertainties about new construction, a two-

stage license process was developed. Designs of reactors can first receive generic approval, then

utilities need only seek a combined Construction and Operation License (COL) that does not involve

questioning of the reactors’ designs.

As of May 2013, the NRC had received 18 licensing applications for a total of 28 reactors. This

situation did not change over the past year. (See detailed list in Annex 3 of WNISR 2012). All the

applications were submitted between July 2007 and June 2009. Of the 28 reactor projects, eight were

subsequently suspended indefinitely or cancelled and at least 16 were delayed.381

375 WNN, “Kewaunee enters retirement”, 7 May 2013, see http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/C-

Kewaunee_enters_retirement-0705134.html, accessed 10 May 2013.

376 WNISR, “U.S. Nuclear Plant to Close After Failing to Attract a Buyer”, 25 October 2012,

http://www.worldnuclearreport.org/US-Nuclear-Plant-to-Close-After.html

377 NBC, “Socal Edison Retiring San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station”, 7 June 2013, see

http://www.nbcsandiego.com/news/local/San-Onofre-Nuclear-Plant-Closing-Retiring-SONGS-Oceanside-

Reactor-210565761.html#ixzz2VY1EBvlb, accessed 6 July 2013.

378 ENS-Newswire, “California’s Damaged San Onofre Nuclear Plant to Be Retired”, 7 June 2013, see http://ens-

newswire.com/2013/06/07/californias-damaged-san-onofre-nuclear-plant-to-be-retired/, accessed 6 July 2013.

379 For details, see section on Watts Bar-2 in chapter “Unfulfilled Promises” in WNISR-2012,

http://www.worldnuclearreport.org/The-World-Nuclear-Industry-Status-54.html#unpro.

380 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), “Status of License Renewal Applications and Industry

Activities”, see www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewal/applications.html, accessed 9 May 2013.

381 USNRC, “Combined License Applications for New Reactors”, see

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On 9 February 2012, for the first time in nearly three and a half decades, the NRC granted a COL for

Vogtle-3 and -4 units in Georgia. On 30 March 2012, South Carolina Electric & Gas (SCE&G)

received the second COL for units 2 and 3 at its Summer site. In an unprecedented move, Gregory B.

Jaczko, then Chairman of the NRC, voted against the opinion of the four other Commissioners, stating

that the decision was being taken “as if Fukushima never happened”.382 Jaczko subsequently resigned

from his NRC position and is currently writing a book about his experience.

SCANA Corporation, owner of SCE&G, announced the official construction start of the

Virgil C. Summer Unit 2 on 11 March 2013, the second anniversary of the Fukushima disaster. On 15

March 2013, first concrete was poured for Vogtle-3. These were the first time in 40 years that a reactor

project was started that was subsequently connected to the grid – if indeed that ultimately occurs.

As of May 2013, the NRC had granted four Early Site Permits (ESP) and received two additional

applications that are under review.383 This situation has not evolved over the past two years. ESPs are

independent of the construction/operating license.384 Only the Vogtle project has received an ESP, a

COL and a certified design at this stage. The Summer reactors, which received the only other COL

and were to start up in 2016 and 2017, have been experiencing repeated delays. Both projects,

Summer and Vogtle, “face significant challenges in maintaining the project forecast at or below”

budget, the monitor stated.385 The Economist recently reported that Vogtle is “now perhaps 18 months

behind schedule and $737 million over budget. That does not include a further $900 million that is the

subject of legal dispute, plus the extra financing costs that will come with these overruns.”386

New-build Projects in Trouble

By the end of 2008, nuclear utilities had applied for $122 billion in loan guarantees, and in May 2009

the DOE short-listed four companies for the first group of loan guarantees:

• Southern Nuclear Operating Co. for the two AP1000s at the Vogtle nuclear power plant;

• South Carolina Electric & Gas for two AP1000s at the Summer site;

• NRG Energy for two ABWRs at the South Texas Project site in Texas and

• Constellation for one EPR at the Calvert Cliffs site in Maryland.

By then, the limit for coverage of loan guarantees had been increased from 80 percent of the debt to 80

percent of the total cost. In February 2010, Southern’s Vogtle project was the first to have been

awarded a conditional loan guarantee ($8.3 billion) for a nuclear power plant project worth an

estimated $14 billion. The reactors were supposed to start operating by 2016 and 2017. As stated

above, the first units at the Vogtle and Summer sites are now under construction.

The other two projects are in trouble. Constellation Energy abandoned the application for a loan

guarantee for the Calvert Cliffs-3 project after discovering a “shockingly high estimate of the credit

subsidy cost” (11.6 percent or $880 million)-a fee legally required to recompense taxpayers for the fair

market value of the risk they would undertake by issuing the guarantee.387 Constellation has since been

absorbed by Exelon, and on 1 November 2012, the NRC issued an order terminating the adjudicatory

http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/col.html, accessed 9 May 2013.

382 MSNBC, “U.S. licenses first nuclear reactors since 1978”, 9 February 2012.

383 ESP granted: Clinton (Exelon), Grand Gulf (SERI), North Anna (Dominion), Vogtle (Southern). ESP under

review Victoria County Station (Exelon), PSEG Site (PSEG).

384 NRC, “Early Site Permit Applications for New Reactors,” see

www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/esp.html, accessed 23 June 2013.

385 Bloomberg, “Southern’s Nuclear Reactors May Be Delayed, Monitor Says”, 1 June 2012.

386 Economist, “Nuclear power – Fracked off”, 1 June 2013, see http://www.economist.com/news/united-

states/21578690-thanks-cheap-natural-gas-americas-nuclear-renaissance-hold-fracked, accessed, 2 June 2013.

387 Michael J. Wallace, Chairman of Constellation Energy Nuclear Group, letter to Dan Poneman, DOE,

8 October 2010.

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proceeding on the combined license application for Calvert Cliffs 3.388 On 30 August 2012, the NRC

had given French state utility EDF 60 days to find a U.S. based partner for the project to build an EPR

at the Calvert Cliffs site in Maryland. Majority ownership, control or domination of a nuclear power

plant by a foreign entity is illegal in the U.S.389 EDF failed to identify a new partner after Constellation

had pulled out. EDF lost over $1 billion in this unsuccessful U.S. adventure.

The South Texas Project (STP) is facing the same problem as Calvert Cliffs 3. Nuclear merchant

(unregulated) utility NRG, the majority shareholder announced in April 2011 that it was withdrawing

from the project, writing down a $481 million investment and excluding any further investment. NRG

CEO David Crane said that the Fukushima aftermath was “dramatically reducing the probability that

STP 3 and 4 can be successfully developed in a timely fashion.”390 The proposal was to build two

Advanced Boiling Water Reactors (ABWR) at STP, through a company called Nuclear Innovation

North America (NINA). NINA was originally a joint venture between Toshiba American Nuclear

Energy Corporation (TANE) and NRG. However, after NRG pulled out of the project and according

to the NRC letter to NINA “that, although TANE owns about 10 percent of NINA, its overwhelming

financial contributions give it significantly more power than is reflected by this ownership stake”.391

According to Brett Jarmer, an attorney for a coalition of groups opposing the license, “federal law is

clear that foreign controlled corporations are not eligible to apply for a license to build and operate

nuclear power plants. The evidence is that Toshiba is in control of the project and this precludes

obtaining an NRC license for South Texas Project 3 & 4”.392 Considering the fate of the Calvert Cliffs

project, it will be extremely difficult for Toshiba to identify a new U.S. investor.

In early May 2012, Progress Energy, later taken over by Duke Energy, announced that it was delaying

its Levy project in Florida for two AP1000 reactors by three years to start-up the first unit in 2024 and

the second 18 months later. The “shift in schedule will increase escalation and carrying costs and raise

the total estimated project to between $19 and $24 billion”, from a 2008 price tag of $17 billion, the

company announced.393 On 3 May 2013, Duke Energy announced that it had withdrawn the 1998

license request for the construction and operation of two 1000 MWe reactors at the Shearon Harris

plant in North Carolina. The company informed the NRC that the plant was no longer needed due to

sluggish demand growth forecasts. However, others contest the explanation and suggest that Duke

have consistently exaggerated demand growth projections and that the changes in the energy market

mean that utilities can no longer keep locking out competitors, especially rooftop solar.394

Gas prices in the U.S., due to the accelerated development on non-conventional gas, remain low and

increase the uncertainty over the economics of building new nuclear plants. “Let me state

unequivocally that I’ve never met a nuclear plant I didn’t like,” said John Rowe, former chairman and

CEO of Exelon Corporation, the largest nuclear operator in the U.S. with 22 nuclear power plants.

“Having said that, let me also state unequivocally that new ones don’t make any sense right now.”395

One year after John Rowe’s statement, renewables have spectacularly increased their role as a serious

competitor in the power market. In the first three months of 2013, of the 1,546 MWe newly connected

388 see WNISR, EDF’s US Calvert Cliffs 3 Project “Terminated”

389 see WNISR, Final Blow to EDF’s US Adventure?

390 WNN, “NRG Withdraws From Texan Project”, 20 April 2011.

391 WNN, “NINA falls foul of foreign ownership law”, 1 May 2013, see http://www.world-nuclear-

news.org/NN-NINA_falls_foul_of_foreign_ownership_law-0105137.html, accessed 6 July 2013.

392 PR Newswire, “Foreign Ownership Could Halt Licensing Of South Texas Project Nuclear Reactors; NRC

Says NINA Doesn't Meet Their Requirements”, 1 May 2013

393 WNN, “Levy nuclear project moved back by three years”, 2 May 2012.

394 NC Warn / Marketwatch.com, “Demise Of New Harris Nukes Is An Important Public Victory Towards A

Clean Energy Revolution”, 3 May 2013, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/demise-of-new-harris-nukes-is-an-

important-public-victory-towards-a-clean-energy-revolution-2013-05-03, accessed 6 July 2013.

395 Forbes, “Exelon’s ‘Nuclear Guy’: No New Nukes”, 29 March 2012.

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to the U.S. grid, 82 percent were renewables (and 47 of the 82 percent was solar), the rest natural gas

plants396—no coal, no nuclear (see also the section Nuclear vs. Renewables).

Public opposition has also been growing over the past year, according to a March 2012 poll by ORC

International. While supporters of new-build stagnated at 46 percent, opponents increased their share

from 44 to 49 percent. At the same time, people were split over lifetime extensions with 49 percent in

favor and 47 percent opposed. On the other side, 77 percent of the respondents favor the shift of loan

guarantees from nuclear to renewable energies.397

“The long-term outlook for nuclear generation depends on lifetime of existing capacity”, is the title of

an extract of the Annual Energy Outlook 2013 of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE).398 The title

suggests that even the long-term future of nuclear power is not mainly characterized by the number of

new-build projects but by the longevity and number of surviving plants. The DOE has built four

scenarios and concludes:

Projected reliance on nuclear power in 2040 varies across cases, providing between 10% and 20% of

projected total electricity generation with total capacity between 63 GW and 133 GW.

This compares with the current installed capacity of about 100 GW. In the Reference Case of its

Annual Energy Outlook 2013, DOE projects an increase in installed nuclear capacity of about 19 GW

to 2040, of which only 5.5 GW is new-build capacity and the rest would come from uprates. The DOE

“assumes that the operating lives of most of the existing U.S. nuclear power plants will be extended at

least through 2040”.399 Many of the plants would have passed 60-years of operation by then an

astonishing assumption considering the characteristics of the recent Crystal River and Kewaunee

closures. This assumes that such elderly plants will remain economic to run and to keep fixing when

most of them have trouble competing today and when a need for major repairs is often a reason to shut

them down immediately. Energy analyst Amory B. Lovins, analyzing recent industry operating-cost

data, comes to the conclusion: “For economic or other reasons, the gradual phase-out of unprofitable

nuclear power plants, already quietly under way, may accelerate.”400

While the new U.S. Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz is considered a supporter of nuclear power, as

was his prececessor Steven Chu, Government support has remarkedly cooled off. In his February 2013

State of the Union speech to Congress, President Barack Obama “highlighted the potential for solar,

wind and even natural gas – but nuclear power received not a single mention”, complains the

industry’s World Nuclear News.401 It has simply been overtaken in the marketplace.

Asia

China

China started construction of its first commercial reactor only in 1985, but its nuclear sector is

developing fast, with 28 reactors under construction (40 percent of the world’s total). However,

despite this potentially large planned increase as of July 2013, China has only 18 reactors (14 GWe) in

operation, which in 2012 provided 92.65 TWh or 2 percent of the country’s electricity, the lowest

396 Kenneth Bossong, “Renewables Provide 82% of New US Electrical Generating Capacity in 1Q2013”, see

http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2013/04/renewables-provide-82-of-new-us-electrical-

generating-capacity-in-1q2013, accessed 10 May 2013.

397 ORC International, “One Year After Fukushima – American Attitudes About Nuclear Power”, commissioned

by Civil Society Institute, March 2012.

398 USDOE-EIA, “The long-term outlook for nuclear generation depends on lifetime of existing capacity”,

25 April 2013, see http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=10991, accessed 10 May 2013.

399 idem.

400 Amory B. Lovins, “The economics of a US civilian nuclear phase-out”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,

1 March 2013, see http://bos.sagepub.com/content/69/2/44, accessed 12 May 2013.

401 WNN, “Obama neglects nuclear in state of the union”, 13 February 2013, see http://www.world-nuclear-

news.org/EE-Obama_neglects_nuclear_in_state_of_the_union_130213a.html, accessed 17 May 2013.

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nuclear share of any country. The maximum of 2.2 percent was reached 10 years ago in 2003. All of

the units under construction are scheduled to come online before 2018 and would bring the total to 46

reactors (42 GWe).

During 2013 China plans to add 52 GW of non-fossil fueled generating capacity, comprising 21 GW

of hydro, 18 GW of wind, 10 GW of solar and 3 GW of nuclear power402. By comparison the total

fossil fueled capacity expected to be introduced in 2013 is 40 GW.403 During the first six months of

2013, construction did not start on any new nuclear power plant. Thus non-hydro renewables are

closing in on coal-fired plant construction, and their lines should cross shortly, as the government

recently raised its 2015 PV installed-capacity target to an astonishing 40 GW to soak up surplus

production capacity, mostly in China.

In 2010, a revision to the National Nuclear Power Middle and Long Term Development Plan 2005-

2020, was under consideration in 2010, when some officials predicted that a likely target for 2020

would be 80 GW in operation together with a further 50 GW under construction.404 However, in

January 2011, the State Council Research Office (SCRO), which makes independent policy

recommendations to the State Council, suggested that the 2020 target should be restricted to 70 GW of

nuclear power in operation, with another 30 GW under construction, so as to ensure quality control in

the supply chain. It cautioned against the launch of new Gen-II projects, and emphasized the need for

a greater deployment of Gen-III+ projects, notably AP1000s, and that going too fast could threaten the

long-term health of the sector.405

Safety concerns of the domestic designs were also highlighted in a cable from the U.S. embassy in

Beijing from 2008, released by Wikileaks, which stated that the Gen-II CPR-1000 design were copies

“of 60's era Westinghouse technology that can be built cheaply and quickly”406 —so by the time some

of those reactors reached the end of their lives, their design would be a century old. (To be sure, that

characterization may have reflected eagerness to sell newer U.S. technologies instead.) Similar

concerns have been expressed by Tange Zede a member of the State Nuclear Power Technology Corp

(SNPTC) who reportedly said the CPR-1000 could not even meet the national safety standards issued

in 2004, let alone the most up-to-date international standards. Zede stated that “unless, the constructed

Gen-II reactors are renovated, they should not be allowed to load fuel and start operation” 407.

Furthermore, the SCRO report advised that since goals to increase the localization of AP1000s has

proven difficult, efforts needed to be made to de-bottleneck the domestic supply chain for AP1000s. In

addition, the SCRO recommended that the National Nuclear Safety Administration, responsible for

implementing safety regulations, be removed from the authority of the China Atomic Energy

Authority, whose aim is to promote the nuclear industry408.

Contrary to perceptions, Fukushima had a significant impact on nuclear development in China. On

14 March 2011, Xie Zhenhua, vice chairman of the National Development and Reform Commission,

stated that “[e]valuation of nuclear safety and the monitoring of plants will be definitely

strengthened.”409 Then an account of a mid-March 2011 State Council meeting chaired by Premier

Wen Jiabao states: “We will temporarily suspend approval of nuclear power projects, including those

402 Other sources expect 5 GW of new nuclear capacity to start up in 2013, 10 GW in 2014 and 8 GW in 2015,

see Annex 7 for details.

403 NIW, Briefs-China, 8 March 2013.

404 Bo, Y, “China Nuclear Energy Development”, China Nuclear Energy Association, June 2012, published by

the International Atomic Energy Agency, http://www.iaea.org/nuclearenergy/nuclearknowledge/schools/NEM-

school/2012/Japan/PDFs/week1/3-3_Yang_ChinaNuclearEnergyDevelopment.pdf

405 WNN, “Maintain nuclear perspective, China told”, 11 January 2011

406 Wikileaks, “Viewing cable 08Beijing3362, Effective Nuclear Advocacy in China”

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2008/08/08BEIJING3362.html

407 NIW, “Despite Inspections, Post Fukushima Impact on Newbuild is Minimal”, 30 January 2012

408 WNN, “Maintain nuclear perspective, China told”, 11 January 2011

409 Archana Chaudhary, “Nuclear Accident Forces China Policy Review as India Sees Safety Backlash,”

Bloomberg.com, 14 March 2011.

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in the preliminary stages of development.... We must fully grasp the importance and urgency of

nuclear safety, and development of nuclear power must make safety the top priority.”410 As a result, a

new China National Plan for Nuclear Safety with short-, medium- and long-term actions was ordered

and approval for new plants remained suspended until it was approved.411

In May 2012, the State Council announced it had finished inspecting the country’s existing nuclear

plants, and gave preliminary approval to both a revised 2020 nuclear strategy and a post-Fukushima

safety plan. The revised 2020 nuclear strategy is expected to propose a target of 60-70GWe by

2020412. The new much stricter standards for new nuclear construction—especially the call for

elimination of the potential for large radiation releases in units built beyond 2016—suggest that

utilities may abandon Gen II plants and switch to next-generation designs413, which will delay

construction. Despite this, existing designs, were given construction approval at Fuqing 4 and

Yangjiang 4 in November 2012 as well as a High Temperature Gas reactor at Shidao Bay in December

2012. This raises concerns about how effective the new regime will be with critics saying that the

industry’s rules and guidelines are a decade out of date, and that there is no coherent legal system to

govern the use of nuclear energy.414 But, as of early July 2013, no construction starts have occurred

since then.

Safety concerns of the current and future reactor fleet have been raised by Academician He Zuoxiu, a

former state nuclear physicist, who argues that the pace of nuclear development and the diversity of

reactor designs is leading to insufficient actual operating experience, as such he predicts that the “most

probable” period for a nuclear accident in China is between 2020 and 2030.415 He had earlier

compared China’s aggressive nuclear power plans with Mao’s disastrous “Great Leap Forward,” and

urged building new reactors at a more measured pace, with strong attention to safety, and only on the

coast (a policy that has reportedly been quietly adopted) but with tsunami protection.416

Furthermore, public acceptance of new reactors can no longer be taken for granted -a factor of rapidly

increasing relevance in modern China. Historically, nuclear protests had mainly occurred in Hong

Kong against the Daya Bay facility (both before and after the transfer of sovereignty). However, after

Fukushima, greater public concern coupled with reactors being proposed in up to 16 provinces made

wider public engagement on the issue likely. In particular, concerns have been raised over the safety

and public support for inland nuclear power plants. Despite considerable investment in the preparation

for construction projects at Taohuajiang, Pengze and Dafan remain suspended and it is now stated that

no further approval will be given for the construction of inland projects417. The Pengze nuclear power

plant has been subject to on-going local opposition418, which is spreading to other projects in the

region419.

China’s importance to global new-build is not solely due to construction numbers but the types of

reactors now being built, based on the world’s major reactor vendors most advanced designs.

Westinghouse is building four AP1000 Generation III+ reactors at Sanmen and Haiyang. Construction

410 The Guardian “China Suspends Approval for Nuclear Power Plants” 16 March 2011.

411 WNA, “Nuclear Power in China”, May 2012, see http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf63.html, accessed 30

May 2013.

412 Reuters, “China Cabinet Approves Nuclear Safety Plan”, 31 May 2012, see

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/31/china-nuclear-safety-idUSL4E8GV42Z20120531

accessed, 30 May 2013.

413 Zhou, Y, “China Responds to Fukushima”, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 28 June 2012

414 Wang Q, “Nuclear Safety Lies in Greater Transparency”, Nature, 28 February 2013

415 Zuoxiu H, “Chinese nuclear disaster “highly probable” by 2030”, China Dialogue, 19 March 2013

416 Hu Zuoxiu, “China must alter nuclear policy (1),” China Dialog, 12 Oct 2011,

www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/4576, accessed 8 July 2013.

417 China.org.cn, “No restart for three inland nuclear power plants”, 26 February2013

418 Yoshioka K, “Fukushima disaster sparks opposition to nuclear plant in China”, 2 March 2012.

419 Zheng C, “Ex-officials battle plan to build Nuclear Project”, Caixin Online, 9 March 2013

http://english.caixin.com/2012-03-09/100366298_1.html

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began in April 2009 at Sanmen and at the time it was said that operation would begin in August

2013420, although delays of six to twelve months are reported421. For the first unit at Sanmen, this is

said to be due to design changes post-Fukushima, while for the remaining three units due to supply

chain issues relating to increasing local content. In 2009, it was said they would cost $1,940/kW, but

the latest figures range from €2,300 to €2,600/kW422, it is higher than the reported costs for the CRC

1000 at $1,800/kW423. It is suggested that the domestic content across the series of the four reactors

will increase from 30 percent to 70 percent. When purchasing the four reactors China acquired

domestic rights to much of the core AP1000 technology (but not the instrument and control

technology) and the right to sell overseas its own version of the AP1000 with capacities over 1350

MW. Work is underway on the construction of the first domestic hybrids, the CAP 1400, a co-

operation between Westinghouse, the State Nuclear Power Technology Corporation (SNPTC) and

Shanghai Nuclear Engineering Research & Design Institute (SNERDI), with construction expected to

start in 2014424.

In November 2007 AREVA announced the signing of a €8 billion ($11.6 billion) contract with the

China Guangdong Nuclear Power Group, (CGNPC) for the construction of two EPRs in Taishan in

Guangdong Province, and that it will provide “all the materials and services required to operate

them”425. It is said that the cost of the reactors in this deal was €3.5 billion426. At the start of

construction this was 40 percent below the starting price of construction of EPRs in Europe.427 The

power plant will be jointly owned by EdF (30 percent) and CGNPC (70 percent). At the time of the

start of construction, the first of these reactors was expected to be completed in October 2013. The

latest press statement suggests that unit 1 should begin operating in 2014, with unit 2 following in

2015428.

In April 2013 China and France signed a series of agreement to cement their relationship on nuclear

issues. This included co-operation on the further development of nuclear reactors and preliminary

agreements for the sale of equipment for an 800 tonne/year reprocessing facility.429

China has also been broadening its ambitions to export nuclear reactors. The most consistent example

is in Pakistan, where despite its being outside the regime of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), China

has supplied equipment for the two reactors at Chashma, the second of which only entered commercial

operation in May 2011. Construction of units 3 and 4 was said to have begun at the end of 2011 with

the engagement of China Zhongyuan Engineering as the general contractor and China Nuclear

Industry No 5 as the installer, with finance also coming from China and completion expected in 2016

and 2017.430 CGNPC has been in negotiations with Romania’s state-owned Nuclearelectrica to invest

in the completion of units 3 and 4 of the Cernavoda plant in Romania, since other potential partners,

including CEZ (Czech Republic), GDF of France, RWE of Germany and Iberdrola (Spain) have

pulled out.431

420 WNN, “First Concrete at Sanmen”, 20 April 2009

421 NIW, “China, Behind the Sanmen-1 Delay”, 7 December 2012

422 NIW, “Wang Declares AP1000s Back on Track”, 23 March 2012

423 NIW, “AP-1000s Delayed by 6-12 Months SNPTC Says”, 17 January 2012

424 Nucleonics Week, “Westinghouse sees new Chinese AP1000 I&C contracts this year”, 14 February 2013

425 AREVA, “China: AREVA and CGNPC Sign the Biggest Contract Ever in the History of Nuclear Power and

Enter into a Long-term Commitment. AREVA and CNNC Strengthen Their Links,” press release (Paris: 26

November 2007).

426 WNA, “Nuclear Power in China”, 21 March 2013

427 Wang Q, “Nuclear Safety Lies in Greater Transparency”, Nature, 28 February 2013

428 WNN, “First Fuel Produced for Chinese EPR”, 11 March 2013

429 WNN, “China Approaches Reprocessing Commitment”, 26 April 2013

430 WNN, “Chasma 3 gets its dome”, 22 March 2013

431 AFP, “China's Guangdong mulls investing in Romanian nuclear plant”, 31 October 2012

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In recent months, the Chinese industry has also reportedly connected with many other projects around

the world. The April 2012 visit of Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan to Beijing was used to discuss

China’s assistance for a proposed nuclear power station at Sinop.

In January 2013, CNNC and Nucleoeléctrica Argentina SA signed two nuclear agreements, and

discussed further plans on the construction of fourth unit at the Atucha nuclear power plant.432 It is

unclear how many of these proposals will come to fruition, nor whether they would help China’s

domestic nuclear additions by spreading capital costs or perhaps hurt them by diverting scarce

technical resources and attention.

As with most energy sectors, what happens in China about nuclear power has global impact. In many

quarters there is significant confidence that ambitious targets for domestic construction will be met,

but this should be tempered given the remaining strategic questions over nuclear safety standards,

engineering and skills bottlenecks, increasing environmental opposition, siting problems, and even

basic economics. Despite China’s central planning system, its world-leading wind and solar

achievements and their steeply falling price must be expected to put increasing competitive pressure

on new-build nuclear prospects, just as in market economies if perhaps through different channels.

India operates 20 nuclear power reactors with a total capacity of 4.4 GW; the majority of these have a

capacity of 220 MW per unit. In 2012, nuclear power provided a record 29.6 TWh that covered just

3.6 percent of India’s electricity, slightly below the record level of 3.7 percent already achieved in

2001/02 when nuclear generation was only around 17 TWh.

India lists seven units as under construction with a total of 4.8 GW. Most currently operating reactors

experienced construction delays, and operational targets have rarely been achieved. India’s lifetime

nuclear load factor is only 59.3 percent as of the end of 2012, the lowest of any country operating

more than two units.

India’s 1974 nuclear weapons test triggered the end of most official foreign nuclear cooperation,

including invaluable Canadian assistance. The nuclear weapons tests in 1998 came as a shock to the

international community and triggered a new phase of instability in the region, including a subsequent

nuclear test series by Pakistan. Various (and different) international sanctions were imposed on the

two countries.

This state of affairs started to change under U.S. Bush administration’s announcement in 2005 of what

became known as the U.S.-India deal. Following intense lobbying by the United States, supported by

France and Russia, the IAEA approved a “safeguards agreement” with India in August 2008, and on

6 September 2008 the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), a 45-country group regulating international

commerce to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, granted an exception to its own rules. Thus,

although India is a non-signatory of the NPT, has developed and maintains a nuclear weapons

program, and refuses full-scope safeguards,433 it is still permitted to receive nuclear assistance and to

carry out nuclear commerce with other nations. The reasons for this deviation from the previous

nonproliferation consensus appear to be geopolitical and commercial. France has abstained from any

criticism of India’s nuclear weapons program and has strongly encouraged the NSG to grant India

access to international cooperation. A French parliamentary report states:

Grateful for these diplomatic positions in its favour and conscious about the French technological

excellence in this sector, India has logically chosen to make France one of its principal partners.434

432 Powell H, “China/Latin America: Argentina and China sign further nuclear agreements”, Plusa Merica, 21

February 2013 http://www.pulsamerica.co.uk/2013/02/21/chinalatin-america-argentina-and-china-sign-further-

nuclear-agreements/

433 Comprehensive inspection and verification that all nuclear materials and all nuclear facilities have been used

for declared purposes only.

434 Eric Woerth, “Rapport fait au nom de la Commission des Affaires Etrangères sur le Projet de Loi n°4021,

autorisant l’approbation de l’accord entre le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de la

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However, the report also highlights “the problems generated by the law on civil responsibility” that

the Indian Parliament voted in September 2011, in particular because the supplier could be held liable

for potential accidents under some circumstances. Furthermore, a petition filed by prominent lawyer

Prashant Bhushan has requested the Indian Supreme Court to declare the liability legislation

“unconstitutional and void ab initio” [meaning to be treated as invalid from the outset]. The outcome

could mean the application of “absolute liability” to nuclear plants. Vendors will then be faced with

the question “whether they are confident enough in the safety of their reactors to risk potential

bankruptcy”.435 In other words, in India, unlike virtually all Western countries, reactor owners or

operators may need to shoulder responsibility for any harm caused by major accidents at their plants,

rather than having their liability limited by special laws unique to their technology.

In addition, an August 2012 report by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India raises the issue of

the independence of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB). The report points to a number of

inadequacies of the nuclear regulatory system in India. Even the international nuclear lobby’s World

Nuclear News noted:

Other abnormalities in Indian regulation include the lack of a requirement for nuclear power plant owners

to have decommissioning plans and secured funds for the work.436

In December 2010, the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd. (NPCIL) and AREVA signed an

agreement—though not yet a commercial contract—for the construction of two EPRs (and potentially

four more) for a site in Jaitapur and a fuel supply for 25 years.437 The contract reportedly would be

worth some €7 billion ($10 billion) for two EPRs438, a surprisingly low figure considering that the

cost-estimate for the French and Finnish EPRs has escalated to €8.5 billion each. (See Economics

section.)

Even before the agreement was signed, as on other sites, opposition against the Jaitapur project was

massive. The Fukushima events triggered a significant increase in opposition. Two Russian-built

reactors at Kudankulam were mostly completed before 3/11, “since when the sudden growth of a

powerful local protest movement has effectively brought commissioning to a standstill”.439 The Indian

Government, however, appears intent on starting up the reactors, already years behind schedule. In

May 2013, India’s Supreme Court paved the way for the commissioning of the reactors, which had

been legally challenged by citizens’ groups, arguing that the plant is “in the largest interest of the

nation particularly the State of Tamil Nadu”.440 Meanwhile the state of West Bengal has scrapped

another project for up to six Russian reactors at the coastal site of Haripur.441

The current five year plan counts on doubling the currently installed capacity and starting construction

of a further 19 units. Princeton University’s M.V. Ramana concludes a milestone historical assessment

of the Indian program with a question and answer:

Is a rapid and large-scale expansion of nuclear power in India, along the lines projected by the

Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), feasible? The answer that emerges in the course of our excursion

through the history of how the nuclear project has materialized in the country is that is is very unlikely

République de l’Inde relatif à la répartition des droits de propriété intellectuelle dans les accords de

développement des utilisations pacifiques de l’énergie nucléaire”, Assemblée Nationale, 18 January 2012.

435 Suvrat Raju, M.V. Ramana, “A New Twist in the Saga of India’s Liability Law”, NIW, April 2012.

436 WNN, “India’s nuclear regulation must improve”, 24 August 2012, see http://www.world-nuclear-

news.org/RS_Indias_nuclear_regulation_must_improve_2408121.html, accessed 12 May 2013.

437 AREVA, “India: Agreements Between AREVA and NPCIL for the Supply of Two EPR Reactors and Fuel

for 25 Years,” press release, 6 December 2010.

438 “India Signs $9.3 Billion Deal for Areva to Build Two Nuclear Power Plants,” Bloomberg.com,

6 December 2010.

439 WNN, “Cabinet clears way for Kudankulam”, 19 March 2012, see http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-

Cabinet_clears_way_for_Kudankulam-1903127.html, accessed 30 May 2012.

440 WNN, “Kudankulam’s public interest ruling”, 7 May 2013, see http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-

Kundankulams_public_interest_ruling_0705137.html, accessed 14 May 2013.

441 Nucleonics Week, “West Bengal eliminates Haripur as second VVER site: reports”, 25 August 2011.

Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013

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and probably impossible. The principal reasons, among many, for this conclusion are the technical

implausibility of the DAE’s plans, its inability as an organization to learn lessons from its earlier failures,

and local opposition.442

Trade journal Nuclear Intelligence Weekly put it more bluntly: “There’s no reason to believe that the

country can keep this schedule, of course.” Indeed, Indian nuclear planning has been always overly

optimistic, not to say unrealistic. In 1984 a target of 10 GW was set for the year 2000. Almost 30 years

later, not even half of that capacity has been installed. Projections for the future seem even more

astounding (see Table 7).

Table 7: Nuclear Power in India: Planning, Projection or Fantasy?

Capacity

Capacity

Share

Indian Forecasting

„planned“

installed

realized

2.7 GW

in 1984 for 2000

10 GW

27%

in ca. 15 years

4.8 GW

in 2005 for 2012

11 GW

43%

in ca. 30 years

10 GW max

in 2012 for 2017

10 GW

?

in ca. 35 years

+12.7 GW

in 2012 for 2023

27 GW

?

in ca. 10 years?

+58 GW

in 2012 for 2032

63 GW

?

in ca. 20 years?

x 100

in 2009 for 2050

470 GW

?

in 40 years?

© Mycle Schneider Consulting

Sources: various, assembled by MSC

In contrast, Indian entrepreneurs—largely in the vibrant private sector rather than large state-owned

enterprises and agencies—have proven adept at rapidly scaling competitive, modular, short-lead-time,

renewable technologies. India added 2.3 GW of wind turbines in 2012 (the fourth largest addition in

the world) and now has an installed capacity of wind power of 18.4 GW, compared to 4.8 GW of

nuclear capacity with the contribution of the wind sector to electricity supply having overtaken that of

nuclear power in 2012.

Japan

In Japan nuclear power in 2012 provided about 17 TWh or 2 percent of total electricity compared to

18 percent in 2011, 29 percent in 2010 and the historic maximum of 36 percent in 1998.

This result, is obviously a consequence of the tragic events of 11 March 2011 known in Japan and

overseas as 3/11. The triple disaster earthquake-tsunami-nuclear accident that hit Japan on that day

had a profound impact on the nation’s and the world’s environment, economy and energy policy.

In October 2011 the Cabinet office released an energy white paper that dropped the paragraph on the

expansion of nuclear power and instead called for the reduction on the reliance on nuclear power.

Furthermore, the paper stated that the Government “regrets its past energy policy and will review it

with no sacred cows”. 443

Under Japanese law, every nuclear power plant has to be shut down at least every 13 months for

inspection and maintenance. As of 26 March 2012, Japan’s main island Honshu was no longer using

nuclear power, when unit 6 at Kashiwazaki-kariwa shut down for refueling, maintenance and

inspection. Tomari-3 in Hokkaido was the last unit to go offline in Japan and as of 5 May 2012, all 54

Japanese nuclear power reactors were closed. However, in July 2012, two units at the Ohi plant in the

Fukui Prefecture were restarted, but they remain the only reactors in operation across the country.

442 M.V. Ramana, “The Power of Promise – Examining Nuclear Energy in India”, Penguin-Viking, 2012,

366 pages.

443 Bloomberg, “Nuclear Promotion Dropped in Japan Energy Policy After Fukushima”, 27 October 2011.

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Officially, the Japanese Government declared only four of the Fukushima Daiichi units “permanently

shut down”, the other 50 units remaining “operational” and two units “under construction” in the

international statistics. It is virtually impossible to imagine that all reactors will return to operation.

However, once the reactors are declared permanently closed, they become liabilities on the balance

sheets of the utilities. Therefore, changing their status will have a profound impact not only on the

electricity generation but on the economic viability of the companies, potentially leading to their

bankruptcy. Japan is still absorbing former NRC Commissioner Peter Bradford’s remark about the

financial risk revealed by the Three Mile Island accident: “Wall Street learned that a group of licensed

operators no worse than any other could transform a billion-dollar asset into a two billion dollar clean-

up in ninety minutes.” 444 At Fukushima, the accident was triggered by natural disaster, but the

financial reversal was analogous—just one or two orders of magnitude bigger.

On 14 September 2012 the Japanese Government announced that it had adopted an “Innovative

Strategy for Energy and the Environment”, for a zero nuclear power future by the 2030s445. However,

due to lack of clarity, the Government statement immediately gave way to speculations as to the

schedule for the shutdowns, and the future of the plutonium fuel program and of the reactors under

construction.

To further confuse the issue, a statement by the Prime Minster said that “it is rather irresponsible to

make a decisive judgment on the unforeseeable future. We must start with a strategy that has both a

secure direction and the flexibility to cope with changes in the situation, without wavering from the

basic policy and also not excessively restricting future decisions”446.

No reactors can restart until they have conformed to the new guidelines issued by the Nuclear

Regulatory Authority (NRA), which are expected to enter into force in July 2013. The new guidelines

make it compulsory for operators to protect against radiation leaking to the environment through a

review of existing reactors and their protection against external natural hazards such as tsunamis and

earthquakes. This includes a more indepth review of the seismic conditions for the plants, which may

permanently exclude the restart of some reactors. Secondly, the reactors must be retrofitted to

implement additional measures for severe accident management, such as the prevention of hydrogen

explosions447. The safety reviews are expected to take at least six months and therefore no significant

electricity production from nuclear power will be achieved before 2014, and even then it is likely to be

initially only from the more modern PWR designs448. It remains unclear to what extent the NRA will

accept restarts while upgrading is under way. The change of government from the nuclear-skeptical

Prime Minister Naoto Kan (who served during the accident) to the nuclear-friendly Yoshihiko Noda to

the nuclear-enthusiastic Shinzo Abe has influence but is far from decisive when many provincial

Governors and most of their constituents oppose nuclear restart.

The Japanese Government is facing unprecedented opposition to nuclear power in the country.

Opinion polls indicate large majorities in favor of a nuclear phase out. Furthermore, opposition seems

to be growing. The update of the IPSOS Mori’s post Fukushima global opinion poll found that

between April 2011 and September 2012 a further 10 percent of the popoulation went against nuclear

power.449 Massive demonstrations of unprecedented scale have flooded the streets of Japan’s cities. At

a public event in Osaka on 29 June 2013 in advance of Upper House elections the ruling LDP’s

Secretary General Shigeru Ishiba was the only lawmaker out of nine to vote “No” to the question

about favoring moving towards a non-nuclear future for Japan (see Photo 1).

444 Peter A. Bradford, 24 March 2009, see

http://www.nirs.org/reactorwatch/accidents/bradfordtestimony32409tmi.pdf,

445 Government of Japan, “Innovative Strategy for Energy and the Environment, The Energy and Environment

Council, Government of Japan, 14 September 2012.

446 Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda, Energy and Environment Council, 14 September 2012.

447 Deutsche Welle, “Tough rules for Japanese Nuclear Plants”, 24 June 2013.

448 Jefferies, “Japanese Trading Companies Japanese Nuclear Reactors & New Safety Standards”, 24 June 2013

449 IPSOS 2012, op.cit.

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Japanese media, once docile and quietly consored, have turned increasingly critical not only on the

mismanagement of the Fukushima disaster, but also the political pressure that has been brought to bear

to restart the nuclear reactors. In a stinging editorial the Director of the Asahi Shimbun Editorial Board

stated on 29 June 2013:

The nation likely does not have the ability to cope with another accident of a similar scale.

If that is the case, the only alternative will be to reduce the number of nuclear plants as quickly as

possible while making safety standards stricter and implementing measures to prepare for the likelihood

of another accident.

That is the brutally frank reality Japan now faces.

Following a meeting between the new Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and French President

Francois Hollande to cooperate on the development of a nuclear fuel cycle and the export of nuclear

power technology, an editorial in the Japan Times stated: “Mr. Abe’s decision to move forward with

the development of nuclear power technology represents his cynical disregard for the victims of the

Fukushima nuclear crisis”.450

Photo 1: LDP Only Japanese Party to Vote Against Nuclear-Free Japan

Source: Asahi Shimbun, 30 June 2013.

Numerous measures were taken between March and September 2011 to reduce electricity demand.

Their estimated costs ranged from a few yen to a few hundred yen per kWh, in other words from very

cheap to ridiculously high. Now, “METI is studying a ‘Nega-Watt Trade’ and other innovative

programs” and an in-depth revision of the Energy Conservation Law is under preparation.451 Japan’s

target is to cut electricity demand by at least 10 percent by 2030. That target is, according to the Japan

450 Japan Times, “Cease promoting nuclear power”, 11 June 2013.

451 IEEJ, “Japan Energy Brief”, n°18, March 2012.

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Times “a moderate one that could be exceeded if the government supports and enacts its policies more

thoroughly”452.

In the meantime, fossil fuel imports have increased significantly, in particular a 20 percent in the use

of Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) over the past two years. This increase, coupled with increases in other

countries in the region, such as China, resulted in a significantly higher regional price of gas, which

affected Japanese balance of payments. In April 2013, as a result of higher fuel prices and a weaker

Yen, the price per tonne of LNG reached €816, a level not seen since September 2008.453

In the meantime, the government introduced feed-in tariffs for renewable energy that are significantly

higher than those in Germany or any other country. The tariffs became effective on 1 July 2012 and

led to the rapid investment in renewable energy in Japan (chiefly solar, as wind is more constrained by

artificial utility rules). In 2012, according to Bloomberg New Energy Finance, the total investment in

clean energy in Japan reached $16.3 billion, nearly double the previous year. These investments are

essential if Japan is to increase its use sufficiently to meet the 20 percent target by 2020. But there are

already growing signs that the local demonstration of competitive renewables is starting to splinter the

business community’s previously nearly-solid front in support of the old nuclear-centric policy.454

One of the key issues for the future of the power sector in Japan will be its reform and in particular the

liberalisation of the market. This was to be a three stage process starting with the creation of an

independent body to oversee supply and demand, followed by the liberalisation of the retail market

and then the separation of retail and power generation, by 2020. However, in June 2013 the bill to

introduce the first stage of the process was abandoned in the Upper House of Parliament.455

Pakistan operates three reactors that provided 5.3 TWh and 5.3 percent of the country’s electricity in

2012, both historic maxima. The nuclear load factor has been close to 89 percent. The third unit,

supplied by China, came on line only three days after 3/11. During Chinese Prime Minister Wen

Jiabao’s visit to Pakistan in December 2010, it was reported that China might build another two 650

MWe reactors in the country.456 The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) indicated a target

capacity of 8.8 GW with 10 installed units by 2030.457 Construction of two 315 MWe units started in

2011 at the Chasnupp site with the engagement of China Zhongyuan Engineering as the general

contractor and China Nuclear Industry No. 5 as the installer, with finance also coming from China.

According to press reports458, the Finance Ministry has released a modest $4.8 million (465 million

Pakistani rupees) for a fesibility and design study into a second reactor for the Karachi site. The first

unit at the site, KANUPP, a 125 MW CANDU heavy water reactor, was first connected to the grid in

October 1971 and is one of the oldest operating reactors in the world.

In the 1980s, Pakistan developed a complex system to access illegally various components for its

weapons program on the international black market, including from diverse European sources.459

Immediately following India’s nuclear weapons tests in 1998, Pakistan also exploded several nuclear

devices. International nuclear assistance has been practically impossible, given that Pakistan, like

India, has not signed the NPT and does not accept full-scope safeguards, and is currently unlikely to

be granted the same exception as India to the NSG’s export rules. Some Pakistani experts bitterly

complain about the “simply unfair” differential treatment under the international non-proliferation

452 Japan Times, “Renewable energy policy”, 13 May 2013, see

http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/05/13/editorials/renewable-energy-policy/, accessed 30 June 2013.

453 Bloomberg, “Japan Pays Record Price for LNG Imports in April as Yen Weakens”, 31 May 2013.

454 A.B. Lovins, “Asia’s Accelerating Energy Revolution”, 26 March 2013,

http://blog.rmi.org/blog_2013_03_26_2013_Asias_Accelerating_Energy_Revolution

455 Kyodo, “Japan's drive to reform power sector hits snag amid political feud”, 26 June 2013

456 “Nuclear Energy on Agenda as Chinese Premier Visits Pakistan,” Spero News, 17 December 2010.

457 “Ten Nuclear Power Plants Planned,” Dawn.com, 12 January 2011.

458 NIW, 14 September 2012, p.10.

459 See Mycle Schneider, “Nucléaire: Paris, plaque tournante du trafic pakistanais,” Politis (Paris), 1989.

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regime and consider that “participation in the NSG is essential if Pakistan is to be able to acquire the

equipment and expertise needed to build the nuclear plants that will fill this power gap”.460

On the other hand, according to Pakistan’s Alternative Energy Development Board, the country has

vaste potential resources in wind energy, estimated at 350 GW. Several hundred megawatts of wind

projects are currently under development.461 In January 2013, the Korean Solar Energy Company

launched a large 1 GW solar project in Beluchistan that is supposed to help ease power shortages in

the region.

On the Korean Peninsula, the Republic of Korea (South Korea) operates 23 reactors that provided

143.6 TWh (2.4 percent less than in record year 2011) or 30.4 percent of the country’s electricity in

2012 (down from a maximum of 53.3 percent in 1987). In addition, four reactors are listed as under

construction. The first Shin-Uljin unit officially started construction on 10 July 2012. South Korea’s

reactors have shown excellent performance in the past, and held the fourth position of lifetime load

factors with 86.4percent by the end of 2012. However, due to component and quality control issues,

the annual load factor dropped by almost 10 percent in 2012 to 80.7 percent.

Less than a month after 3/11, the Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) presented plans to

double installed nuclear capacity to close to 43 GW by 2030 and bring the nuclear share in the power

generation to 59 percent.462 However, observers see a “dramatic political shift against nuclear power in

the year since Fukushima”.463 The Mayor of Seoul, for example, initiated a program to “save away”

the equivalent amount of energy generated by one nuclear reactor. According to an updated 24-

country study by IPSOS, general support of nuclear power recovered significantly (+18 percent), but

by September 2012 still 51 percent of Korean people polled opposed nuclear energy.464

The newly elected Korean Government under President Park Geun-hye, who came into office in

December 2012, attempts to support the nuclear industry and to restore public trust after a series of

scandals. In April 2012, the CEO of Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP) was forced to resign over

the cover-up of two significant incidents, a 12-minute station blackout at Kori-1 with two emergency

diesels failing to start up on 9 February 2012 and another diesel failure at Yonggwang-2 on

28 March 2012. Both events had not been disclosed for several weeks.465 In November 2012, a

massive quality control scandal broke and up to 74 investigators inquired about tens of thousands of

items at the country’s nuclear power plants. In January 2013, the Nuclear Safety and Security

Commission (NSSC) announced:

Over the past 10 years, 13,794 units of 561 items with falsified quality certificates have been supplied to

KHNP, and 6,949 units of 341 items were found installed curently in the nuclear power plants. Almost all

5,258 safety-related items supplied with falsified documents were replaced under witness of site

investigators.466

A total of 20 suppliers and 215 cases of quality record falsification had been identified. In May 2013,

the scandal widened into safety-class control-command cables. After an anonymous report had tipped

off the NSSC, it was confirmed that test reports had been forged and that the test in fact failed under

loss-off-coolant-accident conditions. Two operating reactors, Shin-Kori-2 and Shin-Wolsong-1, were

460 Zahir Kazmi, “Letter from Pakistan : How an unfair non-proliferation regime undermines nuclear security”,

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 30 August 2012; see http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/letter-

pakistan-how-unfair-non-proliferation-regime-undermines-nuclear-security, accessed 15 May 2013.

461 GWEC, “Global Wind Energy Outlook 2012”, November 2012.

462 Ki Hak Kim, “Fueling the Sustainable Future”, 6 April 2011.

463 NIW, “South Korea: Growing Nuclear Skepticism”, 23 March 2012

464 IPSOS, op.cit.

465 NIW, “Kim Out at KHNP Over Reporting Lapses”, 20 April 2012.

466 NSSC, “NSSC to Announce Investigation Results and Preventive Action Plans”, 9 January 2013, see

http://www.nssc.go.kr/nssc/english/release/list.jsp?mode=view&article_no=3750&pager.offset=0&board_no=50

1, accessed 1 June 2013.

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shut down, and the maintenance period of Shin-Kori-1 was extended in order to replace the faulty

cables. Shin-Kori-3 and -4 as well as Shin-Wolsong-2, all three under construction, also had “forged”

quality-control documents and need to replace the incriminated cables.467

In December 2009, South Korea succeeded in securing its first major overseas nuclear deal,

“snatching” a multi-billion dollar contract with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) from the world’s

largest builder AREVA, backed by French state utility EDF, for building of four 1.4 GW reactors. In

the meantime, however, cost estimates have soared and financing negotiations have been delayed (see

section on UAE in chapter Potential Newcomer).

Taiwan operates six reactors that provided a record 38.7 TWh or 18.4 percent of the country’s

electricity in 2012 (down from a maximum of 41 percent in 1988). Two 1.3 GW Advanced Boiling

Water Reactors (ABWR) have been listed as under construction at Lungmen, near Taipei, since 1998

and 1999 respectively. Their startup has been delayed many times and they are many years behind

schedule. According to the Atomic Energy Council, by April 2013, the first unit was “nearly finished”

and operator Taipower was presently carrying out “on-site testing of operating procedures and systems

functions”.468 In March 2012, the Atomic Energy Minister raised doubt over the safety of the plant.469

In May 2012, media reports gave 2014-15 as the current planned start-up date. Another source has

indicated startup of the first unit “no earlier than March next year”, in 2014, “if there are no further

problems”. 470 The plant is estimated to have cost USD 9.6 billion so far. According to the Minister of

Economic Affairs, the project costs Taipower an estimated NT$400–600 million (USD10–15 million)

for each month of delay.471

Taiwan’s nuclear program has a certain number of very specific problems. The nuclear plants are

located in areas with high population density, high seismicity and tsunami risks. In addition, with the

absence of a long-term waste strategy, the spent fuel pools are filling up and, in spite of re-racking and

dense-packing, the first pools are expected to be full by 2014.472 “The confidence of residents are [sic]

feeble on nuclear safety issue”, admitted Taipower Vice-President Hsu Hwai-Chiung in July 2011.

“The license renewal of NPPs will be suspended until National Energy Policies are clear in near

future.”473

The Taiwanese public is increasingly critical towards the country’s nuclear power program and on

9 March 2013 over 200,000 people demonstrated in various cities against the startup of the Lungmen

plant. An opinion survey released in late March 2013 indicated a 73 percent majority in favor of a halt

to the Lungmen plant. On 26 April 2013, the ruling party introduced a bill in the legislature to

organize a national referendum over the future of the Lungmen project. What appears to be an

exemplary exercise of democracy is seen by many as a manouver to get a silent majority for the

project’s completion. The referendum legislation requires a quorum of at least 50 percent to make the

outcome binding, a score difficult to achieve nationwide.

In November 2011, the Government presented a new energy strategy to “steadily reduce nuclear

dependency, create a low-carbon green energy environment and gradually move towards a nuclear-

467 NSSC, “NSSC Confirms Fake Test Reports of Safety-Class Control Cables”, 29 May 2013, see

http://www.nssc.go.kr/nssc/english/release/list.jsp?mode=view&article_no=3884&pager.offset=0&board_no=50

1, accessed 1 June 2013.

468 Nucleonics Week, “Lungmen critic gives legislators plan for reinspection, oversight”, 2 May 2013.

469 Asia Pulse, “Minister Casts Doubt on Viability of 4th Taiwan Nuclear Plant”, PennEnergy, 15 March 2012.

470 Nucleonics Week, “Lungmen critic gives legislators plan for reinspection, oversight”, 2 May 2013.

471 Focus Taiwan News Channel, “Start Date for Commercial Operation of Nuclear Power Plant Postponed,”

6 January 2011, at http://focustaiwan.tw/ShowNews/WebNews_Detail.aspx?ID=201101060017&Type=aECO.

472 Le Monde, “Taïwan, l’apprenti sorcier du nucléaire”, 8 February 2012.

473 Hsu Hwai-Chiung, “The Impacts on Taipower Nuclear Power Plants after Fukushima Accident”, Taipower,

27 July 2011.

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free homeland”.474 The document released by the Ministry of Economic Affairs’ Bureau of Energy

also announced the shutdown of its oldest reactors at Chinshan (grid connection 1977 and 1978) as

soon as the Lungmen reactors come online and the non-renewal of operating licenses beyond a 40-

year lifetime. That would mean the shutdown of the operating units between 2016 and 2025.

European Union (EU27) and Switzerland

The European Union 27 member states (EU27) have gone through three nuclear construction waves,

two small ones in the 1960s and the 1970s plus a large one in the 1980s (mainly in France). The region

has not had any significant building activity since the 1990s. (See Figure 26.)

In July 2013, 14 of the 27 countries in the enlarged EU operated 131 reactors—about one-third of the

world total—12 fewer than before the Fukushima events and one-quarter below the historic maximum

of 177 units in 1989. (See Figure 27.) The vast majority of the facilities, 112 or 85.5 percent, are

located in eight of the western countries, and only 19 are in the six newer member states with nuclear

power.

In 2012, nuclear power produced 27 percent of the commercial electricity in the EU, down from

31 percent in 2003.475 Nearly half (48 percent) of the nuclear electricity in the EU27 was generated by

one country, France.

Figure 26: Nuclear Reactors Startups and Shutdowns in the EU27, 1956–2013

Source: IAEA-PRIS, MSC, June 2013

474 Bureau of Energy, “Ensure Nuclear Security—Steadily Reduce Nuclear Dependency—Create a Low-carbon

Green Energy Environment & Gradually Move Towards a Nuclear-free Homeland”, Ministry of Economic

Affairs, 3 November 2011.

475 EURELECTRIC, “Key Statistics – Edition 2013”, 7 June 2013.

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Figure 27: Nuclear Reactors and Net Operating Capacity in the EU27, 1956–2013

Source: IAEA-PRIS, MSC, June 2013

With the lack of new reactor construction, the average age of the EU’s reactors now stands at 29 years

(see Figure 28).

Figure 28: Age Pyramid of the 131 Nuclear Reactors Operated in the EU

Sources: IAEA-PRIS, MSC, July 2013

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Western Europe

In Western Europe (EU15), as elsewhere, the public generally overestimates the significance of

electricity in the overall energy picture, as well as the role of nuclear power. Electricity currently

accounts for only about one-fifth of the EU15’s commercial primary energy consumption.

As of July 2013, the EU15 was home to 112 operating nuclear power reactors, or 45 units fewer than

in the peak years of 1988/89.

Two reactors are currently under construction in the older member states EU15, one in Finland and

one in France. These are the first building sites in the region since construction began on the French

Civaux-2 unit in 1991. Apart from the French exception and the Sizewell-B reactor in the U.K.

(ordered in 1987), until the reactor project in Finland, no new reactor order had been placed in

Western Europe since 1980.

The following provides a short overview by country (in alphabetical order).

Belgium operates seven reactors and has the world’s third highest share of nuclear in its power mix, at

51 percent in 2012 (down from a maximum of 67.2 percent in 1986). The nuclear plants achieved their

best productivity level generating 46.7 TWh in 1999 compared to 38.5 TWh in 2012. In 2002, the

country passed nuclear phase-out legislation that required the shutdown of nuclear plants after

40 years of operation, meaning that (based on their start-up dates) plants would be shut down between

2015 and 2025. On 13 October 2009, the Government issued a 10-page general policy statement that

included one reference to nuclear power: “The government has decided to postpone by 10 years the

first sequence of the phase-out of nuclear power.”476 However, that government was voted out in June

2010, just prior to voting on supporting legislation to delay the phaseout. Following Fukushima and

the establishment of a new Government the still existing phase-out legislation was left in place and no

legislative initiative has been taken to overturn it, even if the operator GDF-Suez is lobbying hard to

postpone via an extension of “at least 10 years”.477

In the summer of 2012, the operator identified unprecedented numbers of crack indications in the

pressure vessels of Doel-3 and Tihange-2 with respectively over 8,000 and 2,000 previously

undetected defects. After several months of analysis including international experts, the Belgian safety

authority FANC asked the operator to carry out a specific test program prior to any restart decision.

However, in late January 2013, AIB-Vinçotte, an international quality-control company based in

Belgium, working on behalf of the Belgian safety authority, stated that “some uncertainty about the

representativity of the test program for the actual reactor pressure vessel shells cannot be excluded”.478

The safety authority’s own subsidiary BEL-V concluded at the same time479:

Indeed there exists no validated procedure neither for evaluating flaws having the morphology and

orientation of the hydrogen-induced flaws nor for evaluating thousands of those defects with interactions

between themselves (clustered flaws) because such a situation has never been met (and, as a result,

accepted) in an operating safety-related pressure component like the reactor pressure vessel for which

break exclusion is assumed.

476 Prime Minister of Belgium, “Déclaration du gouvernement relative à sa politique générale,” 13 October 2009,

at http://archive.vanrompuy.belgium.be/files/Statepremier.pdf.

477 Gérard Mestrallet, et al., “Nuclear in Belgium: recent developments”, GDF Suez, 4 November 2011.

478 AIB-Vinçotte, “Synthesis Report Doel165”, 28 January 2013.

479 BEL-V, “Safety Evaluation Report – Flaw indications in the RPVs of Doel 3 and Tihange 2”,

31 January 2013.

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An independent assessment480 equally concluded that “FANC should obtain—before authorizing the

restart of the affected reactors—absolute certainty that the flaws will not lead to the failure of the

reactor pressure vessel. This is obviously not the case at present and will not be the case even if the

complementary tests should prove positive”.

However, on 17 May 2013, FANC issued a statement saying that it “considers it safe to restart the

Doel 3 and Tihange 2 reactor units”.481 The units restarted in spite of the serious concerns by

independent scientists and reached full capacity respectively on 9 and 11 June 2013. The underlying

issue has not gone away.

Finland currently operates four units that supplied 22.1 TWh or 32.6 percent of its electricity in 2012

(down from a maximum of 38.4 percent in 1986). Finland’s load factor has been constantly amongst

the top five nuclear countries. Although it dropped in 2012 by 3.3 percent, with an annual average of

90.7 percent, it is still number four in the world.

In December 2003, Finland became the first country to order a new nuclear reactor in Western Europe

in 15 years. AREVA NP, then comprising 66 percent AREVA and 34 percent Siemens482, is building a

1.6 GWe EPR under a fixed-price turn-key contract with the utility TVO—an arrangement that

AREVA top managers have admitted in private talks they would “never do again”. The project was

financed essentially on the balance sheets of the country’s leading firms and municipalities under a

unique arrangement that makes these customers liable to pay the plant’s indefinite capital costs for an

indefinite period, whether or not they get the electricity—a Capex “fixed price” but “take-or-pay

contract”.

Construction started in August 2005 at Olkiluoto on the Finnish west coast. Close to eight years later,

the project is about seven years behind schedule and now 280 percent over budget (see also

Economics section). The plant is currently expected to start up in 2016 and the cost estimate has been

raised to €8.5 billion. It remains unclear who will cover the additional cost: the vendors and TVO

blame each other and are in litigation. “TVO is not pleased with the situation and repeating challenges

with the project scheduling” and admits that “the plant completion may be further delayed”.483

According to TVO, about 75 percent of the installation work has been completed.

From the beginning, the Olkiluoto-3 (OL3) project was plagued with countless management and

quality-control issues. Not only did it prove difficult to carry out concreting and welding to technical

specifications, but the use of sub-contractors and workers from several dozen nationalities made

communication and oversight extremely complex.

The Finnish regulator STUK has still not yet validated the EPR’s Instrumentation and Control (I&C)

system. TVO stated in February 2013 that “the I&C design has not proceeded as planned” and could

cause further delays.

The repeated construction delays of OL3 are a blow not only to power planning by the utility and to

the 60 large customers involved in the project consortium, but also for the Finnish Government.

In late February 2013, TVO’s Board of Directors proposed a new shareholder loan commitment of

€300 million to its shareholders in order to cope with financing costs and maintain a minimum

480 Ilse Tweer, “Flawed Reactor Pressure Vessels in Belgian Nuclear Plants Doel-3 and Tihange-2”, March 2013;

see http://www.greens-

efa.eu/fileadmin/dam/Documents/Studies/Flawed%20Reactor%20Pressure%20Vessels.pdf, accessed

1 June 2013.

481 FANC, “FANC experts give positive opinion on restart of Doel 3 & Tihange 2 reactor units”, 17 May 2013,

see http://www.fanc.fgov.be/GED/00000000/3400/3430.pdf, accessed 1 June 2013.

482 Siemens quit the consortium in March 2011 and announced in September 2011 that is was abandoning the

nuclear sector entirely.

483 TVO, “Information about the start-up of Olkiluoto 3 nuclear power plant unit”, press release,

11 February 2013, see http://www.tvo.fi/news/32, accessed 1 June 2013.

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25 percent share of shareholders capital or loan. 484 Credit rating agency Fitch nevertheless

downgraded TVO from BBB+ to BBB in late May 2013485 - see Table 4 for more details.

OL3 was part of the government’s strategy to achieve its target of a zero-percent increase of 1990

emissions under the Kyoto Protocol. The lack of an operational OL3 will force Finland to use

emissions trading to compensate for the GHG’s produced in the country.

The problems produced by the OL3 project have not prevented TVO from filing an application, in

April 2008, for a decision-in-principle to develop “OL4”, a 1–1.8 GWe reactor to start construction in

2012 and enter operation “in the late 2010s”.486 The decision was ratified by the Finnish Parliament on

1 July 2010. But already significant delays have emerged. In late March 2012, TVO invited five

reactor vendors—AREVA, GE Hitachi (GEH), Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power (KHNP), Mitsubishi

and Toshiba—to submit bids, which were transmitted in January 2013. A license application is

planned for mid-2015 and start-up “around 2020.”487

In parallel, Fortum Power is planning a similar project, known as Loviisa-3. In addition, in

January 2009, the company Fennovoima Oy submitted an application to the Ministry of Employment

and the Economy for a decision-in-principle on a new plant at one of three locations—Ruotsinpyhtää,

Simo, or Pyhäjoki—which has first been narrowed down to the latter site and to being an EPR or

ABWR. Startup was planned for 2020. Bids were received on 31 January 2012 from AREVA and

Toshiba.488 In August 2012, a group of minority stakeholders left the Fennovoima consortium,

followed by E.ON, which sold its 34 percent share in April 2013 to Voimaosakeyhtiö SF, a

consortium of 60 companies and municipalities, that already held the remaining 66 percent.

Fennovoima ended the formal tender process in February 2013, inviting Toshiba to direct negotiations

over a 1300 MW ABWR design and effectively dropping the EPR from the competition. In addition,

in April 2013, to the general surprise of AREVA and Toshiba, Fennovoima invited Rosatom to direct

negotiations over its 1200 MW PWR AES-2006. Fennovoima stated that it will select the plant

supplier “during 2013”.489 However, while Toshiba and AREVA were explicitly mentioned in

government and parliament planning authorizations, this is not the case with Rosatom. Greenpeace has

already announced it will challenge the decision in court, “if the government shows any signs of

approving a Rosatom deal under the current criteria”.490

France is the worldwide exception in the nuclear power sector. In 1974, the Government launched the

world’s largest public nuclear power program in response to the oil crisis in 1973. After four decades

of unchanged support for nuclear power the new Government under President François Hollande has

promised a significant shift in energy policy.

In 2012, France’s 58 reactors491 produced 407.4 TWh or 74.8 percent of the country’s electricity, a

drop of almost 3 percent. Nuclear generation and its share in France’s power mix reached their

maximum in 2005, with respectively 431.2 TWh and 78.5 percent. The annual load factor dropped

another 2.3 percent to 73.6 percent, compared to countries that exceed 90 percent.

484 TVO, “TVO Board of Directors proposes new shareholder loan commitment to its shareholders”,

27 February 2013, see http://www.tvo.fi/news/39, accessed 1 June 2013.

485 FitchRatings, “Fitch Downgrades Teollisuuden Voima Oyj to ‘BBB’, Outlook Stable”, 24 May 2013.

486 TVO, “Construction of a Nuclear Power Plant Unit at Olkiluoto – General Description – OL4,”

www.tvo.fi/www/page/2840/, August 2008.

487 WNN, “Bidding starts for Olkiluoto-4”, 26 March 2012, see http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-

Bidding_starts_for_Olkiluoto_4-2603124.html, accessed 2 June 2012.

488 Fennovoima, “Fennovoima received bids for nuclear power plant”, press release, 31 January 2012.

489 Rosatom, “Fennovoima invites ROSATOM to direct negotiations”, press release, 5 April 2013, see

http://www.rosatom.ru/en/presscentre/news/2df4ec804f260b62bd2afd2c0ad82648, accessed 1 June 2013.

490 Nucleonics Week, “Fennovoima, considering smaller reactor, opens negotiations with Rosatom”,

11 April 2013.

491 All pressurized water reactors, 34 x 900 MW, 20 x 1300 MW. and 4 x 1400 MW.

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France has a significant base load overcapacity that has led to the “dumping” of electricity on

neighboring countries and stimulated the development of highly inefficient thermal applications of

electricity. A historical winter peak-load of 102 GW in February 2012, (up from 97 GW in

December 2010) is to be compared with an installed capacity of 128.7 GW492. However, during the

coldest days in February 2012, France imported up to 13 GW of power, of which Germany

contributed about 3 GW (see also the following section on Germany).

France’s seasonal peak electricity load has increased rapidly since the mid-1980s, due mainly to the

widespread introduction of electric space and water heating in an effort to absorb the nuclear surplus –

an issue anticipated by critics in the 1970s. Over 30 percent of French households now heat with

electricity, the most wasteful form of heat generation because it results in the loss of most of the

primary energy during transformation, transport, and distribution. The difference between the lowest

load day in summer and the highest load day in winter is now over 70 GW. A drop of 1C° in outside

temperature is equivalent to an increase in capacity of 2.3 GW. Short-term peak load cannot be met

with nuclear power but rather by either fossil fuel plants or expensive peak-load power imports.

Considering its existing nuclear overcapacity’s and the average age of its reactors (28.4 years in mid-

2013), France should not need to build any new units for a long time. In addition, the nuclear share in

the power mix is too high; lifetimes of operating units are planned to be extended; the shutdown of the

gaseous diffusion uranium enrichment plant will save huge amounts of electricity493, and several

nuclear plants should be made redundant through efficiency.

If the French Government and EDF opt to proceed with construction of a new unit, then this is not to

relief capacity constraints but because the nuclear industry faces a serious problem of maintaining

competence in the field.

In December 2007, EDF started construction of Flamanville-3. The FL3 site encountered quality-

control problems with basic concrete and welding similar to those at the Olkiluoto-3 (OL3) project in

Finland, which had started two-and-a-half years earlier. As in Finland, the extensive employment of

foreign workers exacerbated communication and social problems.494 It took until April 2012 for the

French safety authority to judge satisfactory the instrumentation and control (I&C) system solution

proposed by EDF for FL3. The project is now at least four years late and not expected to start

commercial operation before 2016. The price tag has more than doubled since construction start and

has been increased to €8.5 billion in December 2012, €2 billion more than in 2011—a “terrible

publicity”, as trade journal Usine Nouvelle noted. 495 In addition, the Italian partner ENEL that held

12.5 percent of the project decided to quit the project. EDF is obliged to buy back ENEL’s shares for

an estimated €690 million.

Beyond the EPR building problems, the two state-owned companies EDF and AREVA continue to

fight over several strategic issues: follow-up agreements on reprocessed uranium conversion, uranium

enrichment, reprocessing and plutonium fuel fabrication, as well as the overall industrial strategy.

Even before the Fukushima accident, but especially after 3/11, there have been major difficulties with

large investment projects—in Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States—and all are taking a

toll on the balance sheet and credit rating of France’s major nuclear companies. While EDF

492 Capacity increased by 1,865 MW net in 2012, mainly from solar (+1,012 MW or +40 percent), wind

(+757 MW) and natural gas (+981) additions, which largely compensated for the shutdown of just under

1,000 MW of oil and coal plants. Source: RTE, “Bilan électrique 2012”, January 2013.

493 The EURODIF plant at Tricastin consumed the production of up to three reactors and is scheduled for shut-

down by the end of 2012.

494 The French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) notes in an inspection report that a translator, one of only two

French speaking individuals in a team of steel workers, “had difficulties to understand the questions” the

inspectors asked, per ASN, “Letter to the Director of the FL3 Construction Project,” 29 December 2010.

495 Usine Nouvelle, “EDF a évité de pire sur l’EPR de Flamanville”, 7 December 2013, see

http://www.usinenouvelle.com/article/edf-a-evite-le-pire-sur-l-epr-de-flamanville.N187560, accessed

1 June 2013.

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accumulated a huge debt burden that increased through 2012 by €8 billion to €41.5 billion net

($54 billion), AREVA lost €2.5 billion in 2011 and another €100 million in 2012. AREVA’s debt

increased by €400 million—equivalent to an additional provision for OL3—to almost €4 billion.496 In

December 2011, Standard & Poor’s downgraded AREVA to ‘BBB-’ rating as well as its stand-alone

credit profile of ‘bb-’.”497 It has not changed since. AREVA’s share price had plunged in 2012 by up

to 88 percent of its peak 2007 value, while EDF shares had lost up to 85 percent of their value over the

same period, hitting the bottom in January 2013. In December 2012, Moody’s downgraded EDF’s

perspective from stable to negative.498

France also operates many other nuclear facilities, including uranium conversion and enrichment, fuel

fabrication, and plutonium facilities. France and the United Kingdom are the only countries in the EU

that engage in reprocessing, or separating plutonium from spent fuel. The U.K. has announced it will

abandon reprocessing in the near future. France’s two La Hague facilities are licensed to process

1,700 tonnes of fuel per year; however, all significant foreign clients have finished their contracts and

have stopped plutonium separation. The La Hague operator AREVA NC therefore depends entirely on

the domestic client EDF for future business, yet reprocessing’s high cost burdens financially stressed

EDF.

The current Government under President Hollande constitutes without any doubt a major rupture not

only with his predecessor Nicolas Sarkozy, but also with previous administrations. For the first time

since 1974, a French Government has announced plans for the closure of the oldest operating reactors

(Fessenheim-1 and -2, connected to the grid in 1977), the abandoning of a new-build project (Penly-3)

and the systematic reduction of the share of nuclear generated electricity (from about 75 to 50 percent

by 2025). Currently a major national energy debate is ongoing that will lead to framework legislation

to be submitted to the National Assembly before the end of 2013.499

Four days after 3/11, Germany’s conservative and pro-nuclear Government decided to shut down 8 of

its fleet of 17 reactors. Originally for a three-month period, the closure of almost half of the German

reactors turned out to be permanent. Nuclear power plants generated 94.1 TWh net in 2012—a drop of

29 percent compared to pre-3/11 year 2010—and provided 16.1 percent of the electricity (gross) in the

country (1.5 percent less than in 2011 and down from the historic maximum of 30.8 percent in

1997)500.

On 14 March 2011, Chancellor Angela Merkel abruptly announced putting plant life extension plans

on hold and initiated a major re-shift of the country’s nuclear policy. On 6 June 2011 the Government

passed far-reaching energy transition legislation, including a revision (the 13th) of the Nuclear Law

(Atomgesetz). The legislation passed the Bundestag on 31 July 2011 almost by consensus, and came

into force on 6 August 2011. Key characteristics include:

• The operating licenses will expires once the production credit is used up and at the latest

according to Table 5. This meant that the eight units that had been shut down after 3/11 lost

their operating license with the coming into force of the legislation.

496 AREVA, “Résultats annuels 2012”, 28 February 2013.

497 According to Standard & Poor’s (S&P) credit rating categories, BBB- is the lowest S&P investment grade. If

S&P did downgrade AREVA by one additional notch, it would slip into the junk bond category. S&P points out

that AREVA’s current rating incorporates three notches of uplift above the company's SACP [Stand-Alone

Credit Profile] for “extraordinary state support”. In other words, AREVA’s SACP of bb- is already “junk” and

just one notch off “highly speculative”.

498 EDF, “Reference Document 2012”, 5 April 2013.

499 For background see Mycle Schneider, “France's great energy debate", see

http://bos.sagepub.com/content/69/1/27.abstract, 9 p. and Mycle Schneider, “Nuclear power and the French

energy transition: It’s the economics, stupid”, see http://bos.sagepub.com/content/69/1/18.abstract, 9 p.; Bulletin

of the Atomic Scientists, January-February 2013, the site has a paywall, accessed 2 June 2013.

500 These figures are from AGEB, “Bruttostromerzeugung in Deutschland von 1990 bis 2012 nach

Energieträgern”, February 2013.

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• The production credit can be transferred from older to newer plants.

The legislative package included seven other laws ranging from energy efficiency (€3 billion per year

for buildings) and increase in the use of renewable energy (with a new target of a 35 percent share of

electricity by 2020) to natural gas as well as the large-scale extension of the grid system.

The German nuclear phase-out decision has generated widespread interest from other countries and

has led to a number of unfounded claims, such as that ‘Germany would have to replace nuclear

electricity through increased coal consumption or nuclear power imports from France’. In fact,

Germany made notable progress in energy efficiency, and gross electricity consumption decreased by

1.4 percent in 2011 and another 1.3 percent in 2012, while renewable energy generation increased by

32 percent over the same period and represented 22 percent in the power mix in 2012. However, cheap

coal prices on the world market led to perverse effects: while production from natural gas plants

dropped by almost 20 percent over the past two years, lignite plants boosted production by 9 percent

over the same period and coal plants in 2012 reached the same production level as pre-3/11 year 2010.

These effects, however, are expected to be brief and temporary.501

Table 5: Closure Dates for German Nuclear Reactors 2011-2022

Reactor Name

End of license

First Grid

Owner/Operator

(type, net capacity)

(latest closure date) Connection

Biblis-A (PWR, 1167 MW)

RWE

1974

Biblis-B (PWR, 1240 MW)

RWE

1976

Brunsbüttel (BWR, 771 MW)

KKW Brunsbüttel502

1976

Isar-1 (BWR, 878 MW)

E.ON

1977

6 August 2011

Krümmel (BWR, 1346 MW)

KKW Krümmel503

1983

Neckarwestheim-1 (PWR, 785 MW)

EnBW

1976

Philippsburg-1 (BWR, 890 MW)

EnBW

1979

Unterweser (BWR, 1345 MW)

E.ON

1978

Grafenrheinfeld (PWR, 1275 MW)

E.ON

31 December 2015

1981

Gundremmingen-B (BWR, 1284 MW) KKW Gundremmingen504

31 December 2017

1984

Philippsburg-2 (PWR, 1402 MW)

EnBW

31 December 2019

1984

Brokdorf (PWR, 1410 MW)

E.ON/Vattenfall505

1986

Grohnde (PWR, 1360 MW)

E.ON

31 December 2021

1984

Gundremmingen-C (BWR, 1288 MW) KKW Gundremmingen

1984

Isar-2 (PWR, 1410 MW)

E.ON

1988

Emsland (PWR, 1329 MW)

KKW Lippe-Ems506

31 December 2022

1988

Neckarwestheim-2 (PWR, 1310 MW)

EnBW

1989

Notes: PWR=Pressurized Water Reactor; BWR=Boiling Water Reactor

Sources: Atomgesetz, 31 July 2011, Atomforum Kernenergie May 2011; IAEA-PRIS 2012

The key driver behind the increase in hard coal and lignite burning is the price signal on the European

power exchange market, not the nuclear phase-out. Europe has a large structural overcapacity, so in

the absence of a significant carbon price, there has been an increasing incentive to operate existing

lignite and coal fired power plants – especially in 2012 when an unusually cold winter helped drive up

competing natural-gas prices. Germany does not have any capacity problems, on the contrary, the

country never exported more than in 2012 with 23 TWh net, a 3.7 fold increase over the previous year,

501 A.B. Lovins, “Germany’s renewables revolution”, 17 April 2013,

http://blog.rmi.org/blog_2013_04_17_germanys_renewables_revolution, and blog on the disinformation

campaign about Germany’s Energiewende, http://blog.rmi.org, in press, July 2013

502 Vattenfall 66,67%, E.ON 33,33%

503 Vattenfall 50%, E.ON 50%

504 RWE 75%, E.ON 25%

505 E.ON 80%, Vattenfall 20%

506 RWE 87,5%, E.ON 12,5%

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and due to its highly competitive wholesale prices, (which renewable power has sharply reduced in the

past few years), Germany is the only country that consistently exports electricity to France.

The Fukushima events and the political reaction accelerated industrial strategic shifts. Electronics

giant Siemens, which built all of Germany’s nuclear plants and exported more, announced in

September 2011 that, after having left AREVA NP, the joint consortium with AREVA, it would quit

the nuclear sector entirely. Siemens Chairman Peter Löscher declared that “we will not enter into the

overall responsibility or the financing of the construction of nuclear power plants anymore. This

chapter is closed for us. Siemens will be a motor for the German energy transition (Energiewende)”.507

In addition, Siemens entered into a “strategic alliance” with Boeing in the U.S. for the development

and implementation of micro-grids. German utilities RWE and E.ON also pulled out of nuclear

projects in various countries, including in the Bulgaria, Finland, the Netherlands and the U.K.

The Netherlands operates a single, 40-year-old 480 MW PWR that provided 3.7 TWh or 4.4 percent

of the country’s power in 2012 (down from a maximum of 6.2 percent in 1986). For comparison,

renewables, mainly biomass and wind, accounted for over 10 percent in power generation in 2012.508

In June 2006, the operator and the Government reached an agreement to allow operation of the reactor

until 2033.509

On 23 January 2012, the utility DELTA announced it was putting off decision on nuclear new-build

“for a few years” and that there would be “no second nuclear power at Borssele for the time being”.

The company provided the following reasons for its decision: “The financial crisis, combined with the

substantial investment needed for a second nuclear power plant, current investment conditions,

overcapacity in the electricity market and low energy prices.”510

In early 2004, Borssele operator EPZ extended a reprocessing contract with AREVA NC. This is a

curious decision considering that there are no possibilities in the Netherlands of using separated

plutonium. Therefore, EPZ has paid the French utility EDF to get rid of the plutonium. However, more

recently EPZ has applied for a license to load MOX fuel into the Borssele reactor, which was granted

in June 2011.511 The reasons for the change in plutonium management remain unknown. In France, the

extracted plutonium has zero book value and negative market value.

Spain operates seven reactors, an eighth unit was shut down at the end of 2012. Nuclear plants

provided 58.7 TWh or 20.5 percent of the country’s electricity in 2012 (maximum of 38.4 percent in

1989). Beyond the de-facto moratorium that has been in place for many years, the previous Premier

Jose Luis Zapatero announced at his swearing-in ceremony in April 2004 that his government would

“gradually abandon” nuclear energy, while increasing funding for renewable energy. The first unit

(José Cabrera) was shut down at the end of 2006. Zapatero confirmed the nuclear phase-out goal

following his reelection in 2008, and then Industry Minister Miguel Sebastian has stated, “there will

be no new nuclear plants.”512

507 Der Spiegel, “Kapitel abgeschlossen”, 17 September 2011. One month earlier, Siemens had announced that it

had entered a “strategic alliance” with the U.S. company Boeing to develop micro-grids to boost efficiency and

the use of renewable energies. Source: Siemens, Press Release, 8 August 2011.

508 Statstics Netherlands, “More renewable electricity generated”, 26 February 2013, see http://www.cbs.nl/en-

GB/menu/themas/industrie-energie/publicaties/artikelen/archief/2013/2013-3785-wm.htm, accessed

2 June 2013.

509 WNA, “Nuclear Power in the Netherlands,” www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf107.html, accessed 2 June 2013.

510 DELTA, “DELTA puts off decision for a few years, no second nuclear plant at Borssele for the time being”,

press release, 23 January 2012

511 Ministry of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4th National Report of the Netherlands, September

2011, prepared for the Fourth Review Conference of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel

Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, May 2012.

512 “Spain Insists on Energy Saving, Not Nuclear Plants,” Reuters, 21 January 2009.

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Spain has, however, been implementing both uprating and lifetime extensions for existing facilities.

Licenses for the operating units would have run out between 2010 and 2018; however, in 2009 the

Government extended the operating license of the then 40-year old Garoña plant to 2013, and in 2010

it granted the 30-year old Almaraz-1 plant a 10-year extension and a capacity increase of 7 percent.

The 28-year old Almaraz-2 plant also will be uprated.513 In February 2011, the Spanish parliament

amended the Sustainable Energy Law, deleting from the text a reference to a 40-year lifetime

limitation and leaving nuclear share and lifetime to be determined by the government.514

Nevertheless, on 16 December 2012, Garoña was shut down definitively. The operator Nuclenor had

calculated that further operation of the 446 MW plant would not be economic. Not only would

Nuclenor have to invest about €120 million to upgrade the 42-year old plant, but it would also have to

face a new tax of €153 million in 2013 following an energy tax reform that was overdue in Spain.

Spain is one of only three countries that increased opposition to nuclear energy since April 2011,

according to a September 2012 update of a 24-country study by IPSOS: 63 percent of those polled

oppose nuclear power, 6 percent more than in the previous study.515

The added capacity from Spain’s nuclear uprating (64 MW at Almaraz so far) remains negligible

compared to the country’s surge in renewables. With an installed renewable electricity capacity of

34 GW (end of 2012), almost five times larger than its nuclear capacity, Spain is number four in the

world.516 Spain is also number four in the world in installed wind capacity, number six in installed PV

capacity and a leader in concentrated solar power plants with over 2,500 MW installed, with over

800 MW added in 2012 alone.517 Renewables have met over 30 percent of the Spanish electricity

demand for the past three years and over half in spring 2013.

Sweden operates 10 reactors that provided 61.5 TWh or 38.1 percent of the country’s electricity in

2012 (down from a maximum of 52.4 percent in 1996). Sweden’s per capita power consumption is

among the highest in the world, due primarily to the widespread and inefficient thermal use of

electricity. In recent years, however, Sweden has had negative growth rates in residential electricity

consumption.518

Sweden decided in a 1980 referendum to phase out nuclear power by 2010. The referendum took place

at a time when only six out of a planned 12 reactors were operating; the other six were still under

construction. It was therefore effectively a “program limitation” rather than a “phase-out” referendum.

Sweden retained the 2010 phase-out date until the middle of the 1990s, but an active debate on the

country’s nuclear future continued and led to a new inter-party deal to start the phase-out earlier but

abandon the 2010 deadline. The first reactor (Barsebäck-1) was shut down in 1999 and the second one

(Barsebäck-2) went off line in 2005.

On 5 February 2009, the parties of Sweden’s conservative coalition government signed an agreement

on energy and climate policy that defines ambitious renewable energy and energy efficiency targets

and calls for the scrapping of the Nuclear Phase-Out Act. In June 2010, the parliament voted by a tight

margin (174/172) to abandon the phase-out legislation.519 As a result, new plants could again be

built—but only if an existing plant is shut down, meaning that the maximum number of operating

units will not exceed the current ten. This puts Sweden many years away from potential new

construction. Trade journal Nuclear Intelligence Weekly notes: “In 2012 Vattenfall asked the regulator

513 “Spain Approves Increase in Nuclear Power Output, Expansion Says,” Bloomberg.com, 4 January 2011.

514 “No Limits for Spanish Reactors,” WNN, 17 February 2011.

515 IPSOS, op.cit.

516 PEW, “Who is Winning the Clean Energy Race?”, PEW Charitable Trust, April 2013.

517 PEI, “What are the future prospects for utility-scale CSP?”, May 2013.

518 JRC, “Energy Efficiency Status Report 2012”, 2012.

519 “Swedish Government Overturns Nuclear Ban,” www.neimagazine.com, 21 June 2010.

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for more clarity regarding the newbuild process, but 2025 is the earliest date for any new units.”520 In

the meantime utility Vattenfall envisages to extend lifetimes of five of its seven units at Forsmark and

Ringhals to 60 years. The objective for Ringhals-1 and -2 is a 50-year lifetime.521

Operators have pushed uprating projects to over 30 percent: at Oskarshamn-2 a 38 percent capacity

increase is under way while a 33 percent uprate has been implemented at Oskarshamn-3 with a two-

year delay. Work at Oskarshamn-2 is also seriously delayed and not now expected to be completed

before April 2014.522

Swedish public opinion remains split over general nuclear power acceptance. A 2012-update to a 24-

country survey gives proponents a scant 52 percent majority.523

The United Kingdom operates 16 reactors as of 1 July 2013. Nuclear plants provided 64 TWh or

18.1 percent of the country’s electricity in 2012 (down from a maximum of 26.9 percent in 1997). The

first-generation Magnox reactors, with 11 stations, have all been retired, except for one at Wylfa,

which is to close by the end of 2014.524 The seven second-generation stations, the Advanced Gas-

cooled Reactors (AGR), are also at or near the end of their design life, although the owners now plan

to extend their life by seven years to 40 years with retirements only in 2016–29. The newest plant,

Sizewell-B, is the United Kingdom’s only PWR and was completed in 1995.

The industry has a long history of economic and technical problems. (See the chapter Economics of

Nuclear Power), right up through the past decade: In 2004 the government prevented privately owned

nuclear generator British Energy from going into liquidation. While the state-owned nuclear fuel and

technology company BNFL was also effectively bankrupt because it could not meet its liabilities, the

Government split up the company, passing the physical assets (and its costly decommissioning

obligations) to a new agency, the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA), while the capabilities

were privatized.

The NDA is now responsible for decommissioning all Britain’s civil nuclear facilities except those

owned by British Energy, a discounted liability525 estimated in 2013 to be in excess of £58 billion ($90

billion)526, up from less than £34 billion ($53 billion) in 2007. The NDA inherited negligible funds for

this task, relying partly (and increasingly) on government grants and partly on income from the

facilities still in operation, including one remaining Magnox reactor, the THORP reprocessing plant,

and the Sellafield MOX Plant (SMP) a plutonium fuel manufacturing plant. Both of the latter

facilities, however, have been plagued by very serious technical problems that have kept their

operation significantly below expectations, if they were operating at all. An internal Government

report on the SMP, released in June 2013, revealed that the plant had cost the taxpayer £2.2 billion

(US3.4 billion) and that it was “not fit for purpose”527. Both plants are to be retired.

520 NIW, “Potential and Existing Global Nuclear Newbuild Projects Open to International Vendors”,

15 March 2013.

521 Vattenfall, “Vattenfall plans to provide nuclear power for up to 60 years”, press release, 22 May 2013, see

http://www.vattenfall.com/en/pressreleasedetailhidden.htm?newsid=943A721F600C4F72AF3AC1D4F96C601A

, accessed 2 June 2013.

522 OKG, “Early Indication of Delays in Modernisation of Oskarshamn 2”, 23 April 2013, see

http://www.okg.se/en/Media/News/Early-Indication-of-Delays-in-Modernisation-of-Oskarshamn-2/, accessed

2 June 2013.

523 IPSOS, op.cit.

524 Magnox, “Fact and figures”, see http://www.magnoxsites.co.uk/our-sites/wylfa/facts-and-figures, viewed

5 June 2013.

525 The recent Nuclear Decommissioning Authority Annual Reports only give discounted figures. In the 2007/08

report the discounted £40.7 billion turn into an undiscounted £63 billion.

526 Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, ”Annual Report and Accounts 2012/13”, 2013.

527 Independent, “Revealed: £2bn cost of failed Sellafield plant”. 9 June 2013.

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In 2008, the Labour Government of Gordon Brown started to organize the framework of a new-build

program. In July 2011, the Government released the National Policy Statement (NPS) for Nuclear

Power Generation.528 The eight “potentially suitable” sites considered in the document for deployment

“before the end of 2025” are exclusively current or past nuclear power plant sites in England or Wales.

529 Northern Ireland and Scotland530 are not included.

EDF Energy, wholly owned by French state utility EDF and currently the only remaining utility with a

concrete investment plan, was given planning permission to build two reactors at Hinkley Point in

April 2013. In February 2013 Centrica withdrew from the Hinkley project saying that “since our initial

investment [in 2008], the anticipated project costs in new nuclear have increased and the construction

timetable has extended by a number of years531." However, the Government remains in negotiation

with EDF over the electricity price guarantee for the project which is estimated to cost £14 billion for

two EPRs (see Economics of Nuclear Power)532. It is unclear when these negotiations will reach a

conclusion and what impact EU State Aid approval will have. Recent reports suggest that final

European Commission approval of the Government’s Contract for Difference (CFD) scheme will take

at least 18 months, if granted at all, and as of July 2013 the review process had not even begun533.

Therefore, even if EDF and the U.K. Government reach an agreement on the strike price, construction

would only begin before January 2015, if EDF had confidence in the final outcome of the State Aid

review. Independent analysts suggest such confidence may not prove justified.

Two other consortia are considering investment in new nuclear in the U.K.. Horizon nuclear was

bought by Hitachi from E.ON and RWE for an estimated price of £700 million (USD 1 billion). The

company has submitted its ABWR for technical review, whilst making it clear that its continuation in

the project will depend on the outcome of the EDF negotiations with the Government534. The

remaining consortium, Nugen, is now a 50:50 partnership between Iberdrola and GDf-Suez after the

British utility SSE pulled out in 2011. The consortium is planning to make an investment decision

around 2015.

The only non-EU Western European country that operates nuclear power plants is Switzerland. It

operates five reactors that generated 24.5 TWh and covered 35.9 percent of the country’s electricity

consumption in 2012 (down from a maximum of 44.4 percent in 1996). Until after 3/11, the nuclear

phase-out option never gained a sufficient majority, but the “Swiss-style” referenda have maintained

an effective moratorium on any new project over long periods of time. A local referendum on

13 February 2011 saw a slim 51/49 percent majority for future replacement of the 40-year old

Mühleberg reactor that is expected to shut down by 2022. That same day, a cantonal referendum on a

proposed geological repository in Nidwalden turned into a fiasco for its proponents, with 80 percent of

voters refusing the nuclear waste disposal project.535

However, Fukushima had a significant impact in Switzerland. Only three days after 3/11, the

Government suspended the procedures around license requests for new-build. Opinion polls a week

later showed that support for new-build nuclear power had plunged by 34 points, from 55 percent to

528 DECC, “National Policy Statement for Nuclear Power Generation”, July 2011.

529 Bradwell, Hartlepool, Heysham, Hinkley Point, Oldbury, Sizewell, Sellfield, and Wylfa.

530 The Scottish government is opposed to new build and said it would not allow replacement of the Torness and

Hunterston plants once they will be shut down (likely in 2016 and 2023, respectively). Only 18 percent of the

Scottish people supported new build in a pre-Fukushima poll, The Scotsman, “Only 18% of Scots Say ‘Yes’ to

New Nuclear Power Stations”, 27 September 2010.

531 Guardian, “Centrica withdraws from new UK nuclear projects”, 4 February 2013.

532 See also numerous items in the Essential News section on the web www.WorldNuclearReport.org.

533 ICIS, “European approval of UK’s CFD subsidies may set-back launch – DECC”, 21 June 2013.

534 Telegraph, “Hitachi reluctant about UK nuclear reactor plan”, 14 April 2013.

535 “Bern Says Yes to Nuclear Power Plant,” swissinfo.ch, 13 February 2011.

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21 percent in two months.536 On 8 June 2011, the Swiss parliament voted in favor of the phase-out of

nuclear power in the country at the end of the projected lifetime of the last operating reactor in 2034.

Since then, a number of initiatives have attempted to modify the schedule, seeking either to accelerate

or to slow down the process. While there seems to be a durable consensus in the country that any new-

build initiative is off the table, the Government has initiated a process called Energy Strategy 2050

that does not fix any precise shutdown dates and aims to keep the existing reactors operating “as long

as they are safe”. The Strategy includes measures to reduce energy consumption and to boost

renewable energies. The Government intends to articulate its Energy Strategy 2050 as “indirect

counter proposal” to the “Nuclear Phase-out Initiative” (Sortir du nucléaire) launched in early 2013.537

Various environmental, clean energy and anti-nuclear groups have initiated a campaign to limit the

lifetime of the nuclear plants to 40 years and thus shut down the last reactor by 2029. A national

petition drive was launched in late May 2013.538

Central and Eastern Europe

In Bulgaria, nuclear power provided 14.9 TWh or 31.6 percent of the country’s electricity in 2012

(down from a maximum of 47.3 percent in 2002), with generation occurring at the remaining two units

of the Kozloduy plant. Around 14 percent of the electricity produced in Bulgaria is exported. In

reaction to an agreement during the 1992 G7 summit, implemented as part of Bulgaria’s accession to

the EU, the Bulgarian Government agreed to close the four VVER 440-230 designed units at

Kozloduy, two of which were closed in 2002 and two in 2006, as they were deemed unsafe. Bulgaria

has received €870 million ($1.14 billion) from the EU as compensation for the closure, for

decommissioning, waste management and alternative energy sources. Despite this considerable grant,

it is estimated that there remains a €579 million shortfall in the budget to decommission the units and

the Government does not have a commitment to meet this shortfall. “The absence of sufficient funding

arrangements puts the completion of the decommissioning processes at risk.”539

Construction of a reactor at the Belene site began in 1985 but was suspended following the political

changes in 1989 and formally stopped in 1992, due in part to concerns about the geological stability of

the site. In 2004, a call for tender for completion of the 2 GW of nuclear capacity was made and seven

firms initially expressed interest. In October 2006, Russia’s ASE consortium, which involves the

French nuclear constructor AREVA, Germany’s Siemens, and Bulgarian firms, was awarded the

contract, valued at the time at €4 billion ($5.8 billion). However, the deal failed to materialize as the

Western partners pulled out. This led in November 2010 to a new memorandum of understanding

(MoU) with the Russian state energy company Rosatom to re-establish the Belene Power Company

with 51 percent initially being held by NEK. The most recent consortium proposed to start

construction by October 2011. But in September 2011 the Russian company responsible for the export

of reactors (AtomStroyExport) and the state utility (NEK) extended their pre-construction agreement

until March 2012.

The Belene story took another twist in March 2012 when the project was officially cancelled by the

Prime Minister. He stated “We just can't afford to pay the total cost of the project, which will reach

536 AREVA, “Impact of Fukushima event on nuclear power sector – Preliminary assessment”, 25 March 2011.

537 Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft, Bundesrat, “Bundesrat legt Energiestrategie 2050 als indirekten

Gegenvorschlag zur Atomausstiegsinitiative vor”, 15 March 2013, see

http://www.news.admin.ch/message/index.html?lang=de&msg-id=48168, accessed 5 June 2013.

538 Schweizerische Energiestiftung, “40 Jahre sind genug – Jetzt Petition unterzeichnen”, 22 May 2013, see

http://www.energiestiftung.ch/aktuell/archive/2013/05/22/40-jahre-sind-genug-jetzt-petition-unterzeichnen.html,

accessed 5 June 2013.

539 European Court of Auditors, “EU Financial Assistance For The Decommissioning Of Nuclear Plants In

Bulgaria, Lithuania And Slovakia: Achievements And Future Challenges”, Special report No 16, 2011

http://bookshop.europa.eu/en/eu-financial-assistance-for-the-decommissioning-of-nuclear-plants-in-bulgaria-

lithuania-and-slovakia-pbQJAB11014/

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some 10 billion euros. And there is no way we can make future generations pay.”540 Atomstroyexport

announced on 11 September 2012 that it has increased its claim against NEK to €1 billion for losses

connected with the cancelled Belene project.541

However, soon after the announcement, the Cabinet decided to allow construction of a 7th and

potentially an 8th nuclear reactor at Kozloduy, although the Government made clear it will not

participate in the project but will leave it to the private market. In January 2013 the CEO of the

Kozloduy power plant said that negotiations were ongoing with a number of companies and that a new

reactor could be in operation by 2022.542

A referendum was held in January 2013 in which a majority called for the continuation in the use of

nuclear power, although the turnout at 21 percent was far under the 60 percent required to make the

referendum binding, but rather required the Parliament to vote on the issue.543 This vote took place in

March 2013, permanently ending the Belene project. The options for new developments in Kozloduy

was left open, but remain unlikely.

The Czech Republic has six Russian-designed reactors in operation at two sites, Dukovany and

Temelín. The former houses four VVER 440-213 reactors, and the latter two VVER 1000-320 units.

Between them, they produced a record 28.6 TWh, 35.3 percent of the country’s electricity in 2012.

Temelín was the focus of considerable controversy since a decision was taken to restart construction in

the mid-1990s after being halted in 1989. The two reactors were eventually started in 2000 and 2002,

with financial assistance from the U.S. Export-Import Bank and I&C technology supplied by

Westinghouse.

In July 2008, CEZ announced a plan to build two more reactors at Temelín, with construction to start

in 2013 and commissioning of the first unit in 2020. In March 2010, CEZ announced that discussions

had begun with three vendor groups prior to the bid submission: a consortium led by Westinghouse, a

consortium of Škoda JS, Atomstroyexport, and OKB Gidropress; and France’s AREVA. 544 In

February 2011, the final delivery date was shifted to 2025.545 In October 2011 CEZ asked for tenders

from three companies (AREVA, Westinghouse and Atomstroyexport with Skoda) for a turnkey

contract for the construction of two units plus nine years’ worth of fuel. In October 2012, AREVA was

excluded from taking any further part in the process as it was said to have failed to meet the

commercial and technical requirements. AREVA is appealing the decision. However, the other bidders

also have problems and CEZ requested that both the remaining consortium improve their bids in all

areas.546 In July 2013 CEZ announced that negotiations with the consortium would continue until at

least October 2013.547

The financing of any future new-build in Czech Republic, as in the U.K. and other EU countries, is

faced with the basic problem that the current market price for electricity falls below the break-even

point for nuclear new-build. In this case, the Finance Minister has stated the electricity from new

reactors at Temelin would cost €60-65/MWh, well above the current market price of €40.548

Consequently, CEZ is looking for a Contract for Difference, along similar lines to the U.K., which

540 Reuters, “UPDATE 2-Bulgaria abandons Belene nuclear plant plans”, 28 March 2012,

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/28/bulgaria-nuclear-idUSL6E8ES7A420120328, accessed 5 June 2013.

541 NIW, “Russia Fires €1 Billion Claim for Belene Losses After Westinghouse Entry”, 14 September 2012.

542 Novinite.com, “CEO of Bulgaria’s Kozloduy NPP: Unit 7 may be Functional by 2020-22”, 28 January 2013.

543 BBC, “Bulgaria nuclear vote 'invalidated by low turnout'”, 27 January 2013.

544 WNA, “Nuclear Power in Czech Republic,” January 2013. http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-

Profiles/Countries-A-F/Czech-Republic/#.UW_xnaI3vX4

545 Reuters, “Czech CEZ Puts off Temelin Expansion Deadline to 2025,” 18 February 2011.

546 Bloomberg, “CEZ Says Temelin Atomic Plant Bidders Must Improve Offers”, 25 March 2013

547 Wall Street Journal Europe, “CEZ Postpones Deadline for Decision on Temelin Nuclear Tender”, 2 July

2013.

548 Prague Daily Monitor, “Kuba: Decision on Temelín can't be based solely on power prices”, 17 April 2013

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leads to a Government guaranteed electricity price for a fixed, multi-decade, period (see Economics

section for more information).

The Dukovany plants have operated since the first half of the 1980s and have been the subject of

engineering changes to extend the life of the reactors while simultaneously expanding their output by

about 15 percent. The operators envisage that the units will continue operating until 2025.

Hungary has only one nuclear power plant at Paks, which houses four VVER 440-213 reactors that

provided 14.8 TWh or 45.9 percent of the country’s electricity in 2012 (down from a maximum of

51.4 percent in 1990). The reactors started commercial operation in the early 1980s and have been the

subject of engineering works to enable their operation for up to 50 years accompanied by a 20 percent

increase in capacity. In April 2003, the site’s second reactor experienced the country’s worst-ever

nuclear accident, rated on the international scale as a “serious incident” (INES Level 3), which

resulted in evacuation of the main reactor hall and the venting of radioactivity to the outside

environment. The reactor was out of operation for 18 months. Despite this, in December 2012 the

Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority completed a review, set to enable the first unit, which started

operating in 1982, to operate until 2032. Similar approvals are expected for the other units.549

In March 2009, the Hungarian parliament approved a government decision-in-principle to build

additional reactors at Paks.550 The proposed additional units (5 and 6) “will not generate extra power

but make up for the output of the phased-out blocks.”551 Russian assistance seems to be the preferred

option, and Hungary’s foreign minister has indicated that expansion of the Paks plant would be part of

a “package deal” on outstanding economic issues with Russia.552 Prime Minister Viktor Orban said in

December 2011 that the goal is to have nuclear power provide 60 percent of the country’s electricity

needs, compared with around 40 percent now.553 Nevertheless, Hungary has started preparations for a

tender procedure that also should include other designs. It furthermore started a transboundary

environmental impact assessment that notified all EU member states, Ukraine and Switzerland. In

June 2012 it announced that it hoped that a reactor design would be chosen by 2014-15 with

construction to start by 2017-18. A separate company has been set up to build the new units, which

could enable an equity investor of up to 50 percent554. Meanwhile, according to a post-Fukushima

survey, in April 2011, a 62 percent majority of Hungarians opposes new-build and a surprising

80 percent consider nuclear’s viability “limited and soon obsolete”.555 In a September 2012 updated

edition to the survey, opposition to nuclear power shrank but still held a 53 percent majority.556

Romania’s Cernavoda nuclear power plant hosts Europe’s only CANDU (Canadian-designed heavy

water) reactors. The plant project was initiated under the regime of Nicolae Ceausescu in the 1970s

and was initially proposed to house five units. Construction began in 1980 on all the reactors, in part

using funding from the Canadian Export Development Corporation, but this was scaled back in the

early 1990s to focus on unit 1. The unit was completed in 1996 at an estimated cost of around $USD

2.2 billion, nearly a decade late. The second unit, also completed with foreign financial assistance (a

C$140 million [$USD 146 million] Canadian loan and a €223 million [$324 million] Euratom loan)

was connected to the grid in August 2007. The two reactors generated 10.6 TWh or 19.4 percent of

549 World Nuclear news, “New Lease of Life for Paks”, 8 January 2013

550 John Shepherd, “Hungary’s Parliament Paves Way to Build New Reactor Unit,” NucNet, 31 March 2009.

551 Caboodle.hu “Hungary Mulls Plans to Build New Nuclear Blocks.”, 14 January 2011.

552 Realdeal.hu “Hungary, Russia Seek to Resolve All Outstanding Issues in One Package, Says FM”, 21 January

2011.

553 Bloomberg ”Hungary Targets Expansion of Nuclear Energy Use”, 15 December 2011

http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9RL10OO1.htm

554 Nuclear Intelligence Weekly, “Hungary: Newbuild Company Launched”, 10 August 2012

555 IPSOS-2011, op.cit.

556 IPSOS-2012, op.cit.

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Romania’s electricity in 2012 (down from 20.6 percent in 2009). In 2012, Romania had the highest

load factor in the world with 92.8 percent.

Plans are being actively developed to complete two additional units at the power plant. In November

2008, an investment agreement was signed between SNN and ENEL of Italy, CEZ of the Czech

Republic, GDF Suez of France, and RWE Power of Germany (with each having 9.15 percent) as well

as Iberdrola of Spain and ArcelorMittal Galati of Romania (with both having 6.2 percent).

Commissioning of unit 3 was due initially in October 2014 and unit 4 in mid-2015; however, this has

since been revised, with the first unit not expected to be completed until 2016 at the earliest. In

January 2011, two months before Fukushima, CEZ sold its shares to Nuclearelectrica, and GDF Suez,

RWE, and Iberdrola also withdrew from the project, explaining: “Economic and market uncertainties

surrounding this project, related for the most part to the present financial crisis, are not reconcilable

now with the capital requirements of a new nuclear power project.”557

In late 2012, the Government sent letters to CEZ, GDF SUEZ, RWE and Iberdrola inviting them back

into the project, but there has been no reported response to the request. Despite this the Government

believes that it can still complete the project and has given the project until the end of 2013 to find

financial partners. As Minister of Economy Varujan Vosganian stated, “We do not have enough funds

to finance the construction of the reactors 3 and 4.”558 According to the Curierul National, the latest

feasibility study conducted by Ernst & Young shows that the investment required to build reactors 3

and 4 is €7.67 billion - almost double the estimates of 2008 of €4 billion.559 It has been suggested that

China Guangdong Nuclear Power Group (CGN) is in talks to purchase 40 percent of an equity stake in

the two new reactors.560

In Slovakia, the state utility Slovak Electric (SE) operates all four nuclear power plants at two sites:

Bohunice, which houses two VVER 440 units, and Mochovce, which has two similar reactors. In

2012, these provided 14.4 TWh or 53.8 percent of the country’s electricity production (down from a

maximum of 57.4 percent in 2003). Of the three other reactors that once existed at Bohunice, the first,

A1, was closed after two meltdown accidents in the late 1970s. Two older VVER 440-230 reactors

were closed in 2006 and 2008 as part of the 1992 G7 agreement and the EU-accession partnership

agreement. The two remaining operational units were the subject of both uprating (from 440 MW to

505 MW each) and upgrading (extending their operating lives to 40 years), which would enable the

station to operate until 2025.561

In October 2004, the Italian national utility ENEL acquired a 66 percent stake in SE and, as part of its

bid, proposed to invest nearly €2 billion ($2.9 billion) in new nuclear generating capacity, including

completion of the third and fourth blocks of Mochovce. In February 2007, SE announced that it was

proceeding with this initiative and that ENEL had agreed to invest the lower amount of €1.8 billion

($2.6 billion). In July 2008, the European Commission gave a conditioned opinion on the Mochovce 3

and 4 project, noting that the reactor did not have the “full containment” structure used in the most

recent nuclear power plants planned or under way in Europe and requesting that the investor and

national authorities implement additional features to withstand a potential impact from a small

aircraft.562

557 GDF-Suez, RWE, and Iberdrola, “GDF-Suez, RWE and Iberdrola Have Decided Not to Continue to

Participate in the Cernavoda Nuclear Project in Romania,” press release, 20 January 2011.

558 The Diplomat Bucharest, “Power play: the sorry saga of Romania's energy projects”, February 2013

559 Curierul National, “Nuclearelectrica dry before listing”, google translate of original article, 4 April 2013 see;

http://www.curierulnational.ro/Eveniment/2013-04-04/Nuclearelectrica,+uscata+inainte+de+listare

560 Nuclear Intelligence Weekly, Briefs-Romania, 2 November 2012

561 TheDaily.sk, “SE Switches on Two Upgraded Nuclear Power Units,” 11 October 2010.

562 European Commission, “Commission Issues Its Opinion on Units 3 and 4 of the Slovak Nuclear Power Plant

of Mochovce,” IP/08/1143 (Brussels: 5 July 2008).

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Construction at Mochovce restarted on 3 December 2008. The units were expected to commence

operation in 2012 and 2013. Initially €2.775 billion was allocated to the completion of the project.563 It

is now expected that unit three will be completed in 2014 and unit 4 in 2015, with a revised total

budget of €3.8 billion.564

In Slovenia, the Krsko nuclear power plant was the world’s first reactor to be owned jointly by two

countries, Croatia and Slovenia. The reactor, a 688 MW Westinghouse PWR, was connected to the

grid in 1981 and is due to operate until 2021. The output, 5.2 TWh in 2012, is shared between the two

countries and covered 36 percent of Slovenia’s power consumption that year (down from a maximum

of 57.4 percent in 2003). Discussions remain ongoing for the construction of a second reactor at the

site; a decision has been delayed several times in both countries.

In April 2013 the newly appointed Infrastructure Minister, Samo Omerzel, said that he wanted to

focus on completing work on the thermal and hydro power stations and would reconsider the

completion of a second reactor at Krsko.565

The Slovenian state-owned utility, GEN Energija, was reported to be in turmoil in March 2013 after a

judge overturned the board’s decision to dismiss its Director General, Martin Novsak. The reason for

his dismissal was that he concealed a report from IRSN, the Technical Support Organization (TSO) of

the French Nuclear Safety Authorities that advised against construction of a second unit on the

grounds of seismic concerns. In a letter to GEN Energija, IRSN Director General Jacques Repussard

states that “this new and serious finding does not allow concluding in a favorable manner as regards

the suitability of the Krsko II sites for the implementation of a new nuclear power plant”.566 In

addition, Repussard states: “IRSN considers that it is of utmost importance that the possible

implications on the safety of the existing plant of this fault capability, as well as its potential structural

relationship to nearby faults, be addressed without delay.” In a response dated 26 February 2013, GEN

Energija argues that IRSN’s conclusions on site suitability “might be premature” and that GEN “is

currently conducting a comprehensive field investigation to develop a greater understanding of

features on Libna Hill”, the incriminated fault line close to the Krsko site.567

Former Soviet Union

Armenia has one remaining reactor at the Medzamor (Armenia-2) nuclear power plant, which is

situated within 30 kilometres of the capital Yerevan and provided 2.1 TWh or 26.6 percent (down

from 45 percent in 2009) of the country’s electricity in 2012. The reactor is an early Soviet design, a

VVER 440-230, and in 1995, a U.S. Department of Energy document stated: “In the event of a serious

accident… the reactor’s lack of a containment and proximity to Yerevan could wreak havoc with the

lives of millions.”568

In December 1988, Armenia suffered a major earthquake that killed some 25,000 people and led to the

rapid closure of the reactors in March 1989. During the early 1990s and following the collapse of the

former Soviet Union, a territorial dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan resulted in an energy

blockade against Armenia that led to significant power shortages, resulting in the Government’s

decision in 1993 to re-open unit 2, the younger of the two units.

563 WNA, “Nuclear Power in Slovakia”, April 2013, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-

Profiles/Countries-O-S/Slovakia/#.UXeiuaI3vX4

564 The Slovak Spectator, “Mochovce to be completed in 2014/15”, 8 April 2013

565 ANSA Med, “Slovenia: minister, Krsko nuclear plant plan to be reviewed”, 3 April 2013

566 IRSN, DG Jacques Repussard, letter to GEN Energija DG Martin Novsak, dated 9 January 2013.

567 GEN Energija, DG Martin Novsak, letter to IRSN DG Jacques Repussard, dated 26 February 2013.

568 DOE, Office on Energy Intelligence, Most Dangerous Reactors: A Worldwide Compendium of Reactor Risk

(Washington, DC: May 1995).

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The closure of Medzamor is linked, by the Government to the construction of a new nuclear power

plant.569 The EU is critical of this linkage stating: “In the EU’s view it remains doubtful whether such

action is needed in order to generate sufficient replacement capacity. The country has developed

enough alternative energy sources to replace the 400 Megawatt currently stemming from Medzamor.

Current Armenian ideas go however towards export of energy.”570 In October 2012, the Armenia

Government announced that it would operate the Medzamor unit until 2026. This led to Turkish

authorities calling for the immediate closure of the power station.571

The new reactor is planned to be a 1000 MW unit with negotiations continuing with the Russian

authorities, including the signing of an inter-government agreement in August 2010. However, the

Government has yet to attract funding for the project that was estimated by a U.S.-funded feasibility

study to cost at as much as $5 billion572 and commissioning is now not expected until 2020 at the

earliest.

Russia has one of the most aggressive nuclear power construction programs in the world with

10 reactors under construction and suggestions of deals imminent for further projects all over the

world. However, a more careful review shows an industry that has historically over-promised and has

failed to meet its domestic targets and deliver on declared international sales.

In 2012, nuclear power provided 161.1 TWh or 17.8 percent of Russian electricity, the same level as

the record year of 2009. However, across the country there is significant regional variation with for

example nuclear power providing 30 percent in the European part of the country. Russia is one of the

few countries in which nuclear power’s contribution has been increasing, although slowly as twenty

years ago it provided 12 percent. There are 33 reactors in operation, four first-generation VVER 440-

230s and 11 RBMKs (the Chernobyl type), four are small (11 MW) BWRs used for cogeneration in

Siberia, one is a fast breeder the BN-600, and 13 are second-generation light water reactors (two

VVER 440-213s and 11 VVER 1000s).

The life extension of the RBMK reactors is an important issue as the regulator (Rostekhnadzor) issued

the licenses for lifetime extension nuclear units without public hearing and without environmental

impact assessment. However, there are on-going aging problems with the first unit at Leningrad which

was mothballed in the first part of 2013, while it is decided how to address the swelling in the graphite

moderator.573

During 2012 construction started on one reactor, the Baltic-1, a VVER 1200, near Kaliningrad, the

first new construction start for nearly two years. The project is subject to international opposition as

the Environmental Impact Assessment does not comply with Russian norms and has not been

adequately discussed with neighboring countries.574 In May 2013, construction of Baltic-1 was

“reported halted”575, “as the possibility to export its power appears less certain”, due to lower-than-

expected demand and thus lack of investments in transmission infrastructure.576 It was later reported

569 Asbarez “IAEA Head Inspects Medzamor Nuclear Plant”, 18 April 2012 http://asbarez.com/102433/iaea-

head-inspects-medzamor-nuclear-plant/

570 European Commission, “European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, Armenia, Country Strategy

Paper, 2007-2013.” European Neighbourhood Policy

571 USAID, “Turkey renews demands for ‘immediate closure’ of Armenian nuke plant”, 5 November 2012,

USAID web site, http://www.armesri.am/News.html

572 USAID, “Government extends service life of Metsamor NPP for another ten years”, 19 October 2012,

USAID web site, http://www.armesri.am/News.html

573 Nucleonics Week, “Russian regulator gives Smolensk-1 Operating Life Extension to 2022”, 17 January 2013

574 15min.it, “Russian experts join criticism of Kaliningrad nuclear facility”, 19 September 2012

575 Bellona, “Baltic NPP debacle: Construction reported halted, possibly mothballed”, 30 May 2013, see

http://www.bellona.org/articles/articles_2013/baltic_npp_debacle, accessed 23 June 2013.

576 WNN, “Grid concerns for Baltic project”, 11 June 2013, see http://www.world-nuclear-

news.org/NN_Grid_concerns_for_Baltic_project_1106131.html, accessed 11 June 2013.

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that “construction was frozen for two years”,577 while the project remains “under construction”

according to IAEA statistics.

The VVER 1200 is the most widely adopted reactor design in Russia, with four others under

construction and a number of further units planned. However, to date, none are operational and they

have been subject to construction delays. The two units at Novovoronezh, when commissioned in

2009 were expected to start up in 2012 and 2013578, but are now expected in 2014 and 2016.579 There

are two more reactors at Leningrad II, where the first unit is expected to be commissioned in 2014

with the second unit is now only expected in 2016, two years late.580 Controversy remains over the

cooling for the reactors which will extract water from the Baltic Sea; a request to change the design

was supported by the St. Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast Legislative Assemblies.

Included in the IAEA’s list of new-builds are three units that were started in the 1980s. These include

two earlier VVER reactors at Rostov (due for completion in 2014 and 2017) and an RBMK at Kursk,

the latter of which Rosatom (the State nuclear energy corporation) abandoned in February 2012.

Also under-construction is the Beloyarsky-4 (BN-800) a fast breeder reactor. Construction of the

reactor first started in 1985, but was stopped following Chernobyl. At the time of the restart of the

construction, it was said that much of the infrastructure was already completed581 and that it would be

completed in 2012. It is now expected to be completed in 2014 or 2015. The project is said to have

been delayed by lack of funds. Also included in the construction list are two 35 MWe so-called

floating reactors, (KLT-40S), which will be housed on a single vessel. These were ordered in February

2009 and expected to be delivered to the customer at the end of 2012582, but are now expected only in

2014. Critics of the project point out that the risk of accidents on a floating nuclear plant is greatly

increased because it is even more susceptible to the elements, subject to threats of piracy and if

deployed widely will increase the risks of nuclear material proliferation.583

More than most countries a key issue for Russia will be the aging of its nuclear fleet. Currently, the

working life of a reactor is considered to be 30 years and 17 of Russia's nuclear reactors are 30 or

more years old.584 To counter this, plans were announced in 2010 for life extensions of the oldest

reactors, which would include extending the life span and expanding the capacity of the VVER 440s

and RBMK reactors by 15 years and the VVER-1000 for 25 years.

For decades, the nuclear sectors in Russia and the former Soviet Union have promised that it would

increase its electricity production. In 1992, Minatom announced plans to double nuclear energy

577 15 Min.lt, “Rosatom orders conservation of unfinished nuclear power plant at Kaliningrad”, 4 June 2013, see

http://www.15min.lt/en/article/world/rosatom-orders-conservation-of-of-unfinished-nuclear-power-plant-in-

kaliningrad-529-341922, accessed 6 July 2013.

578 WNN, “Construction starts at second Novovoronezh-II unit”, 14 July 2009 http://www.world-nuclear-

news.org/NN-Construction_starts_at_second_Novovoronezh_II_unit-1407094.html

579 WNA, “Nuclear Power in Russia”, February 2013 http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-

Profiles/Countries-O-S/Russia--Nuclear-Power/#.UULxO6LwnX4

580 WNN, “Construction starts at Leningrad II”, 27 October 2009, http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-

Construction_starts_at_Leningrad_II-2710084.html

581 NucNet, “Beloyarsky-4 Construction On Schedule, Says Russia”, 15 December 2006

http://www.analys.se/lankar/Internat/NucNet/internatNucRew50_06.htm, accessed 7 June 2013.

582 NEI “KLT-40S nuclear barge project still afloat”, 9 March 2010, see

http://www.neimagazine.com/features/featureklt-40s-nuclear-barge-project-still-afloat/, accessed 11 March 2013

583 NTI, “Floating nuclear reactors could fall prey to terrorist, experts say”, 13 August 2010, Global Security

Newswire, see http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/floating-nuclear-reactors-could-fall-prey-to-terrorists-experts-say/,

accessed 11 March 2013

584 IEA, “Russia”, US Energy Information Administration, 18 September 2012,

http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=RS, accessed 7 June 2013.

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capacity by 2010585, but instead it increased by only 40 percent.586 In June 2010 the Government

revised its latest target which would see 43 GW of nuclear capacity by 2030, implying a near doubling

of the existing capacity. Rosatom’s long-term strategy for 2050 envisages nuclear providing 45-

50 percent of electricity by 2050 and 70-80 percent by the end of the century.587 Sergei Kiriyenko, the

chief of Rosatom, said that by 2030 it wants to build 38 reactors in Russia and 28 abroad, mainly in

Europe and Asia.588

Russia has exported reactors in the past, including to Iran (where Russian engineers completed the

Bushehr plant), India and China. In addition, most of the plants in Central and Eastern Europe were

built using Soviet designs. The most concrete plans for new-build are in similar areas, including in

China, India and Ukraine, where six reactors are being built. Less defined plans are said to be for

Argentina, Bangladesh, Belarus, Czech Republic, Jordan, Syria, Turkey, Vietnam, and

Venezuela.589,590 (For an assessment of these projects, see national country reports and the Newcomer

section). However, with the majority of these proposed sales to countries that currently don’t have any

nuclear power programs, there are no prospects for rapid construction and a high probability that they

won’t go beyond paper proposals.

Ukraine has 15 reactors in operation with an installed capacity of 13 GW, which provided 84.8 TWh

or 46.2 percent of the country’s electricity in 2012 (down from a maximum of 51.1 percent in 2004).

In addition to the operating reactors, the country has four closed reactors at Chernobyl and two

reactors under-construction at Khmelnitski.

Chernobyl was the site of the world’s worst nuclear accident, in 1986, when unit four suffered a

massive explosion and fire which lead to radioactive contamination across the Eurasian continent.

However, it did not result in the immediate closure of the stations. Instead the remaining units were

restarted and unit 2 operated until it suffered a further fire in 1991. Unit 1 was then closed in 1996 and

in December 2000 as part of an international agreement to finance measures to build a sarcophagus

around unit 4 and undertake remedial work near the station. As of the end of 2010, a total of

$990 million had been pledged by national governments and the European Commission to the

Chernobyl Shelter Fund. This, along with a project build an interim spent fuel store, will require an

additional €740 million.591

Since the Chernobyl accident, construction has not started on any new reactors, although a number of

projects which were started before 1986 have been completed. The most recent was in 2004, the 2nd

unit at Khmelnitsky. Consequently, the average age of reactors in Ukraine is now 25 years. As with

Russia, in Ukraine many of the reactors are now approaching the end of their 30-year design life and

they will either have to close or undergo life extension programs. In March 2013, the European Bank

for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) awarded the state-owned nuclear operator, Energoatom,

a €300 million loan for an upgrading program at all the country’s reactors. The total cost of the

program is expected to be €1.45 billion, with further funding, also of around €300 million, to come

585 Federal Research Division, “Russia Country Studies”, Library of the US Congress, http://countrystudies.us/,

accessed March 2013

586 BP, “BP Statistical Review of World Energy” 2012

587 Nuclear News, “Russia speeds up nuclear investment”, 22 November 2012, see http://www.world-nuclear-

news.org/NP_Russia_speeds_up_nuclear_investment_2211121.html, accessed 7 June 2013.

588 Enformable, “Putin dubs 20 year construction of nuclear power plant ‘renaissance’ of atomic energy”,

12 December 2011, see http://enformable.com/2011/12/putin-dubs-20-year-construction-of-nuclear-power-plant-

renaissance-of-atomic-energy/, accessed 7 June 2013.

589 PowerMag, “Russia’s Nuclear Mission”, 1 August 2010, http://www.powermag.com/nuclear/Russias-

Nuclear-Mission_2867_p4.html, accessed 7 June 2013.

590 WNA, “Nuclear Power in Russia”, February 2013, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-

Profiles/Countries-O-S/Russia--Nuclear-Power/#.UUghJhfwnX4

591 EBRD, “Chernobyl 25 years on: New Safe Confinement and Spent Fuel Storage”, European Bank for

Reconstruction and Development, http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/factsheets/chernobyl25.pdf, 2011

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from the EU through the Euratom loan facility592. The project is expected to be completed by 2017.

Energoatom claims that the upgrading program “will impact only the future scope of works

concerning the lifecycle extension of the operating power units, but will not influence the decision of

life extension”593. This is an artificial separation as the upgrading program is not economic without

extending the operating lives and many of the reactors would have to close before the upgrading

program was complete.

In October 2008, Atomstroyexport, of Russia, was said to have been awarded the contract from the

completion of the 3rd and 4th units at Khmelnitsky, at a cost of $5-6 billion594. In February 2011,

Russia and Ukraine signed an intergovernmental agreement to resume work on the third and fourth

units. Russia is to finance the design, construction, and commissioning of the two reactors, as well as

any services and goods the country supplies. In September 2012 the Verkhovaya Rada (Parliament) of

Ukraine adopted in the first reading the draft laws on the construction of the third and fourth reactors,

with 80 percent of the financing expected to come from Russia and the remainder coming from

Energoatom. Critics of the project highlighted that Ukraine is already a net exporter of electricity.595

Ukraine is rapidly increasing its electricity exports, with a 50 percent increase in 2011 over the

previous year596 and a similar increase in 2012. Electricity exports from Ukraine in 2012 in monetary

terms were estimated at $574.8 million, with exports to Belarus totaling $231.4 million, to Moldova

$52.7 million, Hungary $224.3 million, Poland $50.7 million, Romania $9.9 million, and Slovakia

$5.8 million597. The EBRD claims that their nuclear project will enable Ukraine to increase its exports

and that the project should ”allow Ukraine greater flexibility to trade with the EU”.598

592 EBRD, “Nuclear Power Plant Safety Upgrade Programme”, European Bank for Reconstruction and

Development, accessed March 2013, http://www.ebrd.com/english/pages/project/psd/2011/42086.shtml

593 Energoatom, “Ecological Assessment Report, main report”, 31 January 2012

http://www.energoatom.kiev.ua/atachs/EARMR310112.pdf

594 Moscow News, “Russia signs deal with Ukraine on finishing Khmelnitsky nuclear power plant”, 9 June 2010

595 Little Skylark, “Verkhovna Rada Decided To Finish The Khmelnitsky NPP”, 6 September 2012,

http://littleskylark.com/blog/verkhovna-rada-decided-to-finish-the-khmelnitsky-npp/, accessed 7 June 2013.

596 WNU, “Ukraine Increases Electricity Export by 73%”, 27 August 2012, see http://wnu-

ukraine.com/news/economy-business/?id=2074, accessed 7 June 2013.

597 Interfax, “Ukraine boosts electricity exports 39.3% in Jan and Feb”, 13 March 2013,

http://en.interfax.com.ua/news/economic/144358.html#.UUhfAxfwnX4, accessed 7 June 2013.

598 EBRD, “Nuclear Power Plant Safety Upgrade Programme”, European Bank for Reconstruction and

Development, http://www.ebrd.com/english/pages/project/psd/2011/42086.shtml, accessed 7 June 2013.

Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013

126

Annex 2: Reactor Construction Times 2003-2013

Construction Times (in years)

Startups between 2003 and July 2013

Country

Units Mean Time Min

Max

China

11

5.9

4.4

11.2

India

6

6.7

5.1

8.8

S. Korea

5

4.4

4.0

5.3

Japan

4

4.4

3.8

5.1

Russia

3

23.8

19.2

26.8

Ukraine

2

18.8

18.2

19.5

Iran

1

36.3

36.3

36.3

Pakistan

1

5.3

5.3

5.3

Romania

1

24.1

24.1

24.1

Total

34

9.4

3.8

26.8

Sources: IAEA-PRIS, MSC, 2013

Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013

127

Annex 3: Definition of Credit Rating by the Main Agencies

Moody's

S&P

Fitch

Long-term Short-term Long-term Short-term Long-term Short-term

Aaa

AAA

AAA

Prime

Aa1

AA+

AA+

A-1+

F1+

Aa2

AA

AA

High grade

P-1

Aa3

AA-

AA-

A1

A+

A+

A-1

F1

A2

A

A

Upper medium grade

A3

A-

A-

P-2

A-2

F2

Baa1

BBB+

BBB+

Baa2

BBB

BBB

Lower medium grade

P-3

A-3

F3

Baa3

BBB-

BBB-

Ba1

BB+

BB+

Non-investment grade

Ba2

BB

BB

speculative

Ba3

BB-

BB-

B

B

B1

B+

B+

B2

B

B

Highly speculative

B3

B-

B-

Caa1

CCC+

Substantial risks

Not prime

Caa2

CCC

Extremely speculative

Caa3

CCC-

C

CCC

C

In default with little

CC

Ca

prospect for recovery

C

C

DDD

/

D

/

DD

/

In default

/

D

Source: Wikipedia, 2012

Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013

128

Annex 4: About the Authors

Mycle Schneider is an independent international consultant on energy and nuclear policy based in

Paris. He is a member of the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), based at Princeton

University, U.S.. He has provided information and consulting services, amongst others, to the Belgian

Energy Minister, the French and German Environment Ministries, the U.S. Agency for International

Development, the International Atomic Energy Agency, Greenpeace, the International Physicians for

the Prevention of Nuclear War, the Worldwide Fund for Nature, the European Commission, the

European Parliament’s Scientific and Technological Option Assessment Panel and its General

Directorate for Research, the Oxford Research Group, and the French Institute for Radiation

Protection and Nuclear Safety. Mycle has given evidence and held briefings at national Parliaments in

thirteen countries and at the European Parliament. Between 2004 and 2009, he was in charge of the

Environment and Energy Strategies lecture of an International MSc at the French Ecole des Mines in

Nantes. He has given lectures at eighteen universities and engineering schools around the globe. He

founded the Energy Information Agency WISE-Paris in 1983 and directed it until 2003. In 1997, along

with Japan’s Jinzaburo Takagi, he received the Right Livelihood Award, also known as the

“Alternative Nobel Prize.”

Antony Froggatt works as independent European energy consultant based in London. Since 1997, he

has worked as a freelance researcher and writer on energy and nuclear policy issues in the EU and

neighboring states. He has worked extensively on EU energy issues for European governments, the

European Commission and Parliament, environmental NGOs, commercial bodies, and media. He has

given evidence to inquiries and hearings in the parliaments of Austria, Germany, and the EU. He is a

part time senior research fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs – Chatham House in

London. He is a regular speaker at conferences, universities, and training programs across the region.

Prior to working freelance, Antony served for nine years as a nuclear campaigner and coordinator for

Greenpeace International.

-------------------------------------

Peter A. Bradford, a former member of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

and former chair of the New York and Maine utility regulatory commissions, has taught at the Yale

School of Forestry and Environmental Studies and currently is an Adjunct Professor at Vermont Law

School teaching “Nuclear Power and Public Policy.” Mr. Bradford is also a commissioner on New

York's Moreland Commission on Utility Storm Response and on the Texas/Vermont Low Level

Radioactive Waste Commission. A member of the China Sustainable Energy Policy Council, he

served on a recent panel evaluating the reliability of the Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant, on the

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) Panel advising how best to replace the

remaining Chernobyl nuclear plants in Ukraine, a panel on the opening of the Mochovce nuclear

power plant in Slovakia, and the Keystone Center collaborative on nuclear power and climate change.

He is the author of “Fragile Structures: A Story of Oil Refineries, National Securities and the Coast of

Maine” and many articles. He is a graduate of Yale University and the Yale Law School and is Vice

Chair of the board of The Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS).

Julie Hazemann is the director of EnerWebWatch, an international documentation monitoring

service, specializing in energy and climate issues, launched in 2004. Since 1992, she has maintained a

world nuclear reactors database and undertakes data modeling work for the World Nuclear Industry

Status Report. From 1983 to 2006, she worked in various positions at WISE-Paris, an independent

information service on energy and environment issues that she co-founded. Starting in 1989, she

developed the computerization of the library and electronic information products. Her responsibilities

covered database development, specialized translation and project management, as well as research

activities for specific projects. She is a member of négaWatt (France). She develops EnerWebWatch in

the framework of the Coopaname coop.

Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013

129

Komei Hosokawa, MA, PhD, teaches environmental sociology, development studies and energy

policy issues at the School of Social and Environmental Research, Kyoto Seika University, Kyoto. He

is co-chair of the Pacific-Asia Resource Center (PARC), Tokyo. He also serves as board director of

the Takagi Fund for Citizen Science and of Greenpeace Japan. He is a social scientist by training, and

has longtime field research experience in Indigenous communities and environment in Australia. In

the late 1980s, Australia-Japan uranium issues led him to take an active part in the social movements

concerning nuclear power questions in Japan and abroad. He is accredited member of the Australian

Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies (AIATSIS), Canberra. Recently he was

appointed chief secretary of the Citizens’ Commission on Nuclear Energy (CCNE), an independent

think-tank launched by the Takagi Fund. CCNE aims to deliver alternative, sensible and

comprehensive policy guidelines toward nuclear phaseout in Japan.

Steve Thomas is Professor of Energy Policy and Director of Research for the Business School,

University of Greenwich. Mr. Thomas holds a BSc (honors) degree in Chemistry from Bristol

University and has been working in energy policy analysis since 1976. His main research interests are

reforms of energy industries, economics and policy towards nuclear power, and corporate policies of

energy industry companies. Recent clients include Public Services International, the European

Federation of Public Service Unions, the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (U.S.),

Energywatch (U.K.) and Greenpeace International.

Yukio Yamaguchi, PhD in Engineering (University of Tokyo), studied condensed matter physics at

the University of Tokyo Graduate School of Science. He has taught in Northwestern University,

University of Tokyo, Hosei University and several other schools. He is deeply concerned about the

relations between the problems of science education and the problems of nuclear energy; and

published a number of books in these topics particularly targeted at middle and high school students.

He is familiar with the history of grassroots resistance in Japan. Since 1998, he is co-director of the

Citizen's Nuclear Information Center (CNIC), Tokyo. He is also an enthusiastic supporter and

practitioner of organic farming.

Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013

130

Annex 5: Abbreviations

ABWR – Advanced Boiling Water Reactor

ADR – Alternative Dispute Resolution

AECL – Atomic Energy Canada Limited

AGEB – Artbeitsgemeinschaft Energiebilanz

AGR – Advanced Gas Reactor

APWR – Advanced Pressurized Water Reactor

ASN – French Nuclear Safety Authority

BERR – Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (U.K.)

BNEF – Bloomberg New Energy Finance

BOO – Build, Own and Operate

BOOT – Build-Own-Operate-Transfer

BWR – Boiling Water Reactor

CANDU – Canadian Deuterium Uranium

CCS – Carbon Capture and Storage

CEA – French Atomic Energy Commission

CEO – Chief Executive Officer

CFD – Contract for Difference

CGN or CGNPC – Chinese Guangdong Nuclear Power Company

CHP – Combined Heat and Power

CNEA – Comision Nacional de Energia Atomica – Argentina

CNSC – Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission

CNNC – Chinese National Nuclear Company

COL – Construction and Operation Licence

CSN – Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear – Spain Safety Authority

DAC – Design Acceptance Certificate

DECC – Department of Energy and Climate Change – U.K.

DGEC – Direction générale de l'énergie et du climat – France

DGEMP – Direction générale de l'énergie et des matières premières – France

DOE – US Department of Energy

EBITDA – Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization

EC/EBIDTA – Enterprise Value Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization

EDF - Électricité de France

EIA – Environmental Impact Assessment

EMR – Electricity Market Reform

ENEC – Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation

EPR – European Pressurized Water Reactor or Evolutionary Pressurized Water Reactor#

Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013

131

ERÚ – Czech Energy Regulatory Office

ESBWR – Economic Simplified Boiling Water Reactor

ESP – Early Site Permit

EU – European Union

EU ETS – European Union Emissions Trading System

EVN – Electricity of Vietnam

EWEA – European Wind Energy Association

FANC – Belgian Nuclear Control Authority

FANR – Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation - United Arab Emirates

FCF – Free Cash Flow

FL3 – Flamanville-3

FIT – Feed-in Tariff

GDA – Generic Design Assessment

GWEC – Global Wind Energy Council

I&C – Instrumentation and Control

IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency

IDAC – Interim Design Acceptance Certificate

IEA – International Energy Agency

IEEJ – Institute for Energy and Economics of Japan

INES – International Nuclear Events Scale

INIG – Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Group

IRSN – Institut de radioprotection et de sûreté nucléaire – France

IZES – Institut für Zukunfts Energie Systeme

JAEC – Jordon Atomic Energy Commission or Japan Atomic Energy Commission

JAIF – Japan Atomic Industrial Forum

JNES – Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organisation

JSW – Japan Steel Works

KA-CARE – King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy

KEPCO – Korea Electric Power Corporation or Kansai Electric Power Corporation – Japan

KHNP – Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power

KINS – Korean Institute of Nuclear Safety

K-POPONS – The Korean Professors’ Organization for a Post-Nuclear Energy Society

LTS – Long Term Shutdown

METI – Ministry of Economics, Trade and Industry

MoU – Memorandum of Understanding

MOX – Mixed Oxide Fuel

mSv – millisievert

Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013

132

mSv/h – millisievert per hour

NAIIC – National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission

NDA – Nuclear Decommissioning Authority

NEI – Nuclear Engineering International

NEXI – Nippon Export and Investment Insurance

NINA – Nuclear Innovation North America

NIW – Nuclear Intelligence Weekly

NNB GenCo – Nuclear New Build Generation Company

NPS – National Policy Statement (U.K.)

NPV – net present value

NPCIL – Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd

NPI – Nuclear Power International

NPT – Non-Proliferation Treaty

NNC – National Nuclear Centre (Kazakhstan)

NPP – Nuclear Power Plant

NRA – Nuclear Regulation Authority – Japan

NRC – Nuclear Regulatory Commission – U.S.

NSG – Nuclear Suppliers Group

NSSC – Nuclear Safety and Security Commission – Korea

OECD – Organisation for Economic Development and Co-operation

OFGEM – Office for Gas and Electricity Markets – U.K.

OL3 – Olkiluoto-3

ONR – Office of Nuclear Regulation – U.K.

OPG – Ontario Power Generation

PAEC – Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission

PBMR – Pebble Bed Modular Reactor

PGE – Polska Grupa Energetyczna

PLEX – Plant Life Extension

PPA – Power Purchase Agreement

PRIS – Power Reactor Information System

PSC – Public Service Commission

PV – Photovoltaic

PwC – PricewaterhouseCoopers

PWR – Pressurized Water Reactor

RBMK – Light water cooled, graphite moderated

S&P – Standard and Poor’s

SCRO – State Research Council Office – China

Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013

133

SCE(&G) – Southern California Electric (& Gas)

SE – Slovak Electric

SEA – Strategic Environmental Assessment

SNPTC – State Nuclear Power Technology Corp. – China

STP – South Texas Project

STUK – Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority

Sv – Sievert

Sv/h – Sievert per hour

TANE – Toshiba American Energy Corporation

TEPCO – Tokyo Electric Power Company

TFEU – Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

TVA – Tennessee Valley Authority

TVO – Teollisuuden Voima Tyj

UAE – United Arab Emirates

UBS – Union Bank of Switzerland

VEB – Vnesheconombank

VVER – Light Water Reactor – Russian design

WACC – Weighted Average Cost of Capital

WANO – World Association of Nuclear Operators

WNA – World Nuclear Association

WEC – World Energy Council

WNISR – World Nuclear Industry Status Report

WNN – World Nuclear News

Electrical Units

kW – kilowatt (unit of installed electric power)

kWh – kilowatt-hour (unit of electricity)

MW – megawatt (106)

MWe – megawatt electric

GW – gigawatt (109)

GWe – gigawatt electric

TWh – terawatt hour (1012)

Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013

134

Annex 6. Status of Nuclear Power in the World (1 July 2013)

Nuclear Reactors1

Power2

Energy3

Countries

Operate

Capacity

Average

Under

Share of

Share of

(Reactors)

(MWe)

Age

Construction4 Electricity5

Commercial

(Years)

(Reactors)

Primary Energy

Argentina

2

935

34

1

5%(=)

2%

Armenia

1

375

33

27%(−)

?%

Belgium

7

5 926

33

51%(−)

15%

Brazil

2

1 884

22

1

3%(=)

1%

Bulgaria

2

1 906

24

32%(=)

20%

Canada

19

13 532

30

15%(=)

7%

China

18

13 816

8

28

2%(=)

<1%

Czech Republic

6

3 766

22

35%(+)

16%

Finland

4

2 736

34

1

33%(=)

20%

France

58

63 130

28

1

75%(−)

39%

Germany

9

12 068

28

16%(−)

7%

Hungary

4

1 889

28

46%(+)

16%

India

20

4 388

19

7

4%(=)

1%

Iran

1

915

2

<1% (+)

<1%

Japan

44

38 009

26

2,1%(−)

<1%

Mexico

2

1 530

21

5%(=)

1%

Netherlands

1

482

40

4%(=)

1%

Pakistan

3

725

19

2

5%(+)

2%

Romania

2

1 300

11

19%(=)

8%

Russia

33

23 643

30

9

18%(=)

6%

Slovakia

4

1 816

21

2

54%(+)

21%

Slovenia

1

688

32

36%(−)

?%

South Africa

2

1 860

27

5%(=)

3%

South Korea

23

20 718

18

4

30%(−)

13%

Spain

7

7 112

29

21%(=)

10%

Sweden

10

9 395

34

38%(−)

28%

Switzerland

5

3 263

38

36%(−)

20%

Taiwan

6

5 018

32

2

18%(=)

8%

Ukraine

15

13 107

25

2

46%(=)

16%

United Kingdom

16

9 243

30

18%(=)

8%

USA

100

98 903

34

3

19%(=)

8%

EU27

131

121 457

4

27%(=)6

World Total

427

364 078

28

66

10%(–)3

4,5%

© Mycle Schneider Consulting

Notes

1 Mycle Schneider Consulting, based on IAEA, PRIS database, July 2013, and others.

2 In 2012, based on IAEA, PRIS database, July 2013.

3 BP, “Statistical Review of World Energy”, June 2013.

4 As of 1 July 2013.

5 A +/-/= in brackets refer to change in 2012 versus the level in 2011; a change of less than 1% is considered =.

6 Eurostat, “Electricity Statistics", 2011,

http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php?title=File:Electricity_Statistics,_2011_%28in_GWh%29.png

&filetimestamp=20120507123319, accessed 7 June 2012.

Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013

135

Annex 7. Nuclear Reactors in the World Listed as “Under Construction” (1 July 2013)

Country

Units MWe (net)

Construction Start

Planned Grid Connection

Argentina

… Atucha-2

1

692

1981/07/14

Middle of 20131

Brazil

… Angra

1

1 245

2010/06/01

20162

China3

28

27 790

…Changjiang-1

610

2010/04/25

2014

…Changjiang-2

610

2010/11/21

2015

…Fangchenggang-1

1000

2010/07/30

2015

…Fangchenggang-2

1000

2010/12/234

2016

…Fangjiashan-1

1000

2008/12/26

2013/12

…Fangjiashan-2

1000

2009/07/17

2014/10

…Fuqing-1

1000

2008/11/21

2013/11

…Fuqing-2

1000

2009/06/17

2014/09

…Fuqing-3

1000

2010/12/31

2015/075

...Fuqing-4

1000

2012/11/17

2016/056

…Haiyang-1

1000

2009/09/24

2014/06

…Haiyang-2

1000

2010/06/21

2015/03

…Hongyanhe-2

1000

2008/03/28

2013

…Hongyanhe-3

1000

2009/03/07

2014

…Hongyanhe-4

1000

2009/08/15

2014

…Ningde-2

1000

2008/11/12

2013

…Ningde-3

1000

2010/01/08

2014

…Ningde-4

1000

2010/09/29

2015

…Sanmen-1

1000

2009/04/19

2014/037

…Sanmen-2

1000

2009/12/17

2015/09

...Shidao Bay-1

200

2012/12/09

2016

…Taishan-1

1660

2009/10/28

20148

…Taishan-2

1660

2010/04/15

2015

...Tianwan-3

1050

2012/11/17

2017

…Yangjiang-1

1000

2008/12/16

2013/08

…Yangjiang-2

1000

2009/06/04

2014

…Yangjiang-3

1000

2010/11/15

2015

...Yangjiang-4

1000

2012/11/17

2017

Finland

… Olkiluoto-3

1

1 600

2005/08/12

2016 9

France

… Flamanville-3

1

1 600

2007/12/03

201610

India

7

4 824

…Kakrapar-3

630

2010/11/22

2015/03/31

…Kakrapar-4

630

2010/11/22

2015/09/30

…Kudankulam-1

917

2002/03/31

2013/07 (commercial operation)12

…Kudankulam-2

917

2002/07/04

2014/03 (commercial operation)13

…PFBR

470

2004/10/23

2014 (commercial operation)14

…Rajasthan-7

630

2011/07/18

2016/03/31

…Rajasthan-8

630

2011/09/3011

2016/09/30

Pakistan

2

630

…Chasnupp-3

315

2011/05/28

2016/09/01

…Chasnupp-4

315

2011/12/18

2017/07/01

Country

Units MWe (net)

Construction Start

Planned Grid Connection

Russia 15

9

7 273

…BN-800

78916

198517

201420

Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013

136

...Leningrad-2-1

1085

2008/10/25

2016 (commercial operation)21

…Leningrad-2-2

1085

2010/04/15

2016? (commercial operation)22

…Novovoronezh-2-1

1114

2008/06/24

2014 (commercial operation)23

...Novovoronezh-2-2

1114

2008/07/12

2016 (commercial operation)24

…Lomonosov-1

32

2007/04/15

2019/12 (commercial operation)25

…Lomonosov-2

32

2007/04/15

2019/12 (commercial operation)26

…Rostov-3

1011

198318

2014 (commercial operation)27

…Rostov-4

1011

198319

2017/06 (commercial operation)28

Slovakia

2

880

...Mochovce-3

440

1985/01/0129

2014/1031

...Mochovce-4

440

1985/01/0130

2015/1032

South Korea

5

6 320

…Shin-Kori-3

1340

2008/10/31

2013/09 (commercial operation)33

…Shin-Kori-4

1340

2009/09/15

2014/12 (commercial operation)34

…Shin-Wolsong-2

960

2008/09/23

2014 (commercial operation)35

...Shin Hanul-1

1340

2012/7/12

2017/04 (commercial operation)36

...Shin Hanul-2

1340

2013/6/19

2018/04 (commercial operation)37

Taiwan

2

2 600

…Lungmen-1

1300

1999/03/31

2014-15 (commercial operation)38

…Lungmen-2

1300

1999/08/30

2015 (commercial operation)39

Ukraine

2

1 900

…Khmelnitski-3

950

1986/03/01

2015/01/0140

…Khmelnitski-4

950

1987/02/01

2016/01/0141

United Arab Emirates

2

2 690

…Barakah-1

1 345

2012/07/18

201742

…Barakah-2

1 345

2013/05/30

201843

USA

3

3 399

...Virgil C. Summer-2

1 117

2013/03/09

2017/03/1544

...Vogtle-3

1 117

2013/03/12

mid-201745

...Watts Bar

1 165

1972/12/01

2015/09-1246

Total

66

63 443 1972-2013

2013-2019

© Mycle Schneider Consulting

Sources: IAEA-PRIS, 2013, unless otherwise noted.

Notes

1 Delayed multiple times. This date from Nucleoeléctrica Argentina S.A., “El hombre que logró terminar Atucha II”, accessed

22 June 2012. IAEA-PRIS indicates 1 July 2013.

2 Delayed multiple times. IAEA commercial startup 1 January 2016 reintroduced in 2013,

http://www.iaea.org/PRIS/CountryStatistics/ReactorDetails.aspx?current=26, accessed 22 June 2013.

3 No IAEA startup date for any Chinese reactor (except Fuqing-3 and Changjiang-2). The estimate for all reactors are drawn or

derived from www.world-nuclear.com/info/inf63.html, accessed 15 June 2013.

4 This date was introduced by IAEA-PRIS at a much later date. The WNA gives 2011 as construction start, see http://www.world-

nuclear.com/info/inf63.html, accessed on 22 June 2013.

5 IAEA gives 31 July 2015 as commercial operation date, see

http://www.iaea.org/PRIS/CountryStatistics/ReactorDetails.aspx?current=935, accessed 22 June 2013.

6 Operation previously announced for 2017 by WNA (December 2012). Last estimate May 2016 from www.world-

nuclear.com/info/inf63.html, WNA, Nuclear Power in China, updated 7 June 2013, accessed 15 June 2013.

7 WNA says Sanmen -1 "is expected to load fuel in 2013 and begin operation in 2014 with the second about one year later",

WNA, “Chinese Nuclear Energy”, Updated 30 April 2013, see http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-A-

F/China--Nuclear-Power/#.UYEjs4UgpGw, accessed 1 May 2013.

8 Commercial operation for Taishan reactors 2014 & 2015, WNA, “Chinese Nuclear Energy”, Updated 30 April 2013 -

http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-A-F/China--Nuclear-Power/#.UYEjs4UgpGw, accessed 1 May 2013.

9 After numerous revisions of the original planned commissioning in 2009, the date refers to “commercial operation”.

Teollisuuden Voima (TVO) is preparing for the possibility that the start of the regular electricity production of Olkiluoto 3 nuclear

Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013

137

power plant unit may be postponed until year 2016" TVO, Information About the Start-up of Olkiluoto 3 Nuclear Power Plant

Unit, 11 February 2013, http://www.tvo.fi/news/32, accessed February 11, 2013.

10 Delay of at least four years from original planning. EDF maintains this target date for first “commercialization of electricity” in

spite of persisting major building issues (concreting, maintenance bridge…), see EDF, “Remplacement des consoles du pont de

manutention du bâtiment réacteur”, Note d’information, 16 mars 2012.

11 Announced only in February 2012.

12 Delayed numerous times. No IAEA or WNA startup date. The latest IAEA date (2011/02/28) was simply dropped without being

replaced. Construction at least 5 years behind schedule. Commercial operation 2013/07 according to NPCIL, Plants Under

Construction, Kudankulam, http://www.npcil.nic.in/main/ConstructionDetail.aspx?ReactorID=77, accessed 15 June 2013

13 Delayed numerous times.. Construction at least 5 years behind schedule. No IAEA start-up date. Commercial operation 2014/03

according to NPCIL, Plants Under Construction, Kudankulam,

http://www.npcil.nic.in/main/ConstructionDetail.aspx?ReactorID=77, accessed 15 June 2013

14 Delayed numerous times. No IAEA start-up date. This estimate for commercial operation from www.world-

nuclear.org/info/inf53.html, delayed from 2012 to 2013 a year ago, and to 2014 in latest versions. According to update from 1 May

2012, reactor was 86 percent complete, M.V. Ramana, personal communication, 14 June 2012.

15 Note on the Kursk-5 project: We decided to pull it from the list. No IAEA startup date is given and it was deleted from the

WNA construction list. WNA states on its website: “In February 2012 Rosatom confirmed that the project was terminated.”

Kursk-5 is based on an upgraded RBMK design.

Note on Baltiisk (Baltic nuclear plant): We have withdrawn the project from the list after reports that construction was halted and

the reactor replaced by a smaller design, see http://www.bellona.org/articles/articles_2013/baltic_npp_debacle, accessed 23 June

2013.

16 Capacity increased from 750 MW to 789 MW since July 2012.

17 The IAEA Power Reactor Information System (PRIS) database curiously provides a construction start date as 2006/07/18. Until

2003, the French Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) listed the BN-800 as “under construction” with a construction startup date of

“1985.” In subsequent editions of the CEA’s annual publication ELECNUC, Nuclear Power Plants in the World, the BN-800 had

disappeared.

18 Originally construction started in 1983 and it resumed after interruptions in September 2009, from http://www.world-

nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-O-S/Russia--Nuclear-Power/, accessed 4 May 2012.

19 Originally construction started in 1983 and, after interruptions, “first new concrete” was poured in June 2010, from

http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-O-S/Russia--Nuclear-Power/, accessed 4 May 2012.

20 Delayed numerous times; no IAEA startup date. This estimate from http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-

Profiles/Countries-O-S/Russia--Nuclear-Power/, accessed 4 May 2012.

21 No IAEA startup date. This estimate from http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-O-S/Russia--Nuclear-

Power/, accessed 16 June 2013 (previous estimate 10/2013 in December 2012).

22 No IAEA startup date. This estimate from http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-O-S/Russia--Nuclear-

Power/, accessed 16 June 2013.

23 [No IAEA startup date.] Delayed from 2012/12/31. 31/12/2014 from PRIS, Novovoronezh-2-1 Reactor Details

http://www.iaea.org/PRIS/CountryStatistics/ReactorDetails.aspx?current=898, accessed 15 June, 2013.

24 No IAEA startup date. This estimate from http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-O-S/Russia--Nuclear-

Power/, accessed 16 June 2013.

25 IAEA commercial operation date. Commercial operation originally planned for 2010 at Severod. Since moved to Lomonosov

and delayed by two years.

26 IAEA commercial operation date. Commercial operation originally planned for 2010 at Severod. Since moved to Lomonosov

and delayed by two years. Then delayed by another two years to 2014.

27 No IAEA startup date. This estimate from http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-O-S/Russia--Nuclear-

Power/, accessed 15 June 2013.

28 Delayed from 2016. No IAEA startup date. This estimate from http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-

O-S/Russia--Nuclear-Power/, accessed 15 June 2013.

29 On 11 June 2009 construction officially resumed.

30 On 11 June 2009 construction officially resumed.

31 Delayed numerous times. This date from PRIS, Mochovce-3 Reactor Details, Updated 14 June 2013 -

http://www.iaea.org/PRIS/CountryStatistics/ReactorDetails.aspx?current=544, accessed June 15, 2013.

and The Slovak Spectator, “Mochovce to be completed in 2014/15”, 8 April 2013

Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013

138

32 Delayed numerous times. This date from PRIS, Mochovce-3 Reactor Details, Updated 14 June 2013 -

http://www.iaea.org/PRIS/CountryStatistics/ReactorDetails.aspx?current=544, accessed June 15, 2013.

and The Slovak Spectator, “Mochovce to be completed in 2014/15”, 8 April 2013.

33 No IAEA startup date. Delayed. This date from www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf81.html, accessed 16 June 2013.

34 No IAEA startup date. Delayed. This date from www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf81.html, accessed 16 June 2013.

35 No IAEA startup date. Delayed. Startup date of 2012/05/28 withdrawn from IAEA-PRIS. This date from www.world-

nuclear.org/info/inf81.html, accessed 16 June 2013.

36 New name for Shin Ulchin. Commercial operation date of 2017/04 from www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf81.html, accessed 15

June 2013, whereas Commercial date introduced by IAEA in late May (Shin Hanul-1 Reactor Details, Updated 30 May 2013) is

06/2016 http://www.iaea.org/pris/CountryStatistics/ReactorDetails.aspx?current=887 accessed 31 May 2013;

37 No IAEA mentioning as of 29 June 2013; Commercial operation date of 2017/04 from www.world-

nuclear.org/info/inf81.html, accessed 29 June 2013.

38 No IAEA startup date. Delayed many times from original start-up date of mid-2006. This date according to media reports,

including http://mobile.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/120305/taiwan-nuclear-power-plant-longmen-lungmen,

accessed 5 May 2012 and Nucleonics Week, “Lungmen critic gives legislators plan for reinspection, oversight”, 2 May 2013.

39 No IAEA startup date. Delayed many times from original start-up date of mid-2006. This date according to media reports,

including http://mobile.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/120305/taiwan-nuclear-power-plant-longmen-lungmen,

accessed 5 May 2012 and Nucleonics Week, “Lungmen critic gives legislators plan for reinspection, oversight”, 2 May 2013.

40 Delayed numerous times.

41 Delayed numerous times.

42 No IAEA startup date. This estimate from WNA, Nuclear Power United Arab Emirates, Updated May 2013 - http://www.world-

nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-T-Z/United-Arab-Emirates/#.Ubx_sIUgojo, accessed 15 June, 2013.

43 No IAEA startup date. This estimate from WNA, WNA, Nuclear Power United Arab Emirates, Updated May 2013 -

http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-T-Z/United-Arab-Emirates/#.Ubx_sIUgojo, accessed 29 June, 2013.

44 No IAEA startup date. “Substantial completion”, according to SCE, “Quarterly Report to the South Carolina Office of

Regulatory Staff”, Quarter Ending 31 March 2013.

45 No IAEA startup date. This estimation from WNA, Nuclear Power in the USA, Updated April 2013 - http://www.world-

nuclear.com/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-T-Z/USA--Nuclear-Power/#.UYFBUoUgqiY, accessed 1 May, 2013.

46 Delayed again. Now scheduled for startup by December 2015, see TVA press release, “Watts Bar 2 Progress Remains on

Track”, 11 April 2013, see http://www.tva.com/news/releases/aprjun13/wbn2.html, accessed 22 June 2013.

Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013

139

Document Outline

- 20130710-Couve-HD

- 20130713MSC-WorldNuclearReport2013-V3

Table of Contents

20130710-Couve-HD

20130713MSC-WorldNuclearReport2013-V3