Populism in Central

and Eastern Europe –

Challenge for the Future?

Documentation of an Expert Workshop

Edited by Szymon Bachrynowski, PhD

Populism in Central and

Eastern Europe –

Challenge for the Future?

Documentation of an Expert Workshop

October 2012

Edited by Szymon Bachrynowski, PhD

With support of:

This report

was published by:

3

Table of Contents

Foreword

4

POPuliSm in CEnTral EurOPE – challenge for the future!

5

an introduction to the workshop and open debate

Prof. Wawrzyniec K. Konarski, PhD (Jagiellonian university)

POlanD

10

From periphery to power: the trajectory of Polish populism, 1989-2012

Dr. Ben Stanley, PhD (uKSW Warsaw)

GErmanY

20

Populism in Germany

lionel Clesly Voss llB (hons), ma, PhD student of Political Science

(Friedrich-alexander-universität Erlangen-nürnberg)

auSTria

25

1. right-wing populism in austria: just populism or anti-party party normality? 25

Dr. manfred Kohler, PhD (European Parliament & university of Kent)

2. Populist parties in austria

30

Karima aziz, mmag.a (Forum Emancipatory islam)

SlOVaKia

34

Populism in Slovakia

Peter učeň, PhD (independent researcher)

CZECH rEPuBliC

43

Populism in the Czech republic

maroš Sovák, PhD (masaryk university)

HunGarY

48

Populism in Hungary: Conceptual remarks

Dr. Szabolcs Pogonyi, PhD (CEu Budapest)

aFTErWOrD

52

Populism in Central Europe – challenge for the future! –

Europe Facing the Populist Challenge

Prof. Dick Pels, PhD (Bureau de Helling, The netherlands)

4

Populism in Central and Eastern Europe – Challenge for the Future?

Foreword

With ‘Populism in Central and Eastern Europe

CEE region was a matter of intense debate and

– Challenge for the Future’ we present a collec-

exchange of opinions. The discussion focused on

tion of contributions to a seminar and an open

questions of populist politics (based on political

panel debate organised by the Green European

thought/ideology content) and at the same time

Foundation (GEF) with support of the Heinrich

presented the populist way of doing politics with

Böll Foundation Warsaw and the Warsaw School

several examples from the region. is there a way

of Social Sciences and Humanities (SWPS) on

of changing the narrative from a ‘politics of fear’

October 22nd and 23rd 2012 in Warsaw, Poland.

to a politics of ‘freedom and security’ in Central

and Eastern Europe? With the region’s high rep-

These events were part of a multiannual GEF project

resentation of populist politics in government

which built on the book publication ‘Populism in

and the overt presence of populist ideology in

Europe’ (2011), which was translated and pub-

the public sphere this remained one of the most

lished in German in 2012 as ‘rechtspopulismus in

pressing questions of the debates.

Europa’. This GEF publication presents the issue

of right-wing populism from a variety of thematic

We express our sincere thanks to those who

angles and national perspectives. it touches upon

made this project a reality. First, project coordina-

the similarities as well as the differences between

tor Szymon Bachrynowski, PhD from the Warsaw

European cases of populism, and several authors

School of Social Sciences and Humanities, who has

discuss how Greens and progressive parties in

put a lot of effort into the workshop and the report

particular should respond to this phenomenon. as

alike and who was assisted by lila religa from the

a follow on, book presentations and round tables

Heinrich Böll Stifung Warsaw office. This collection

were organised by GEF and its partner organisa-

would not have been possible without the experts

tions in venues as diverse as malta and Finland,

participating being willing to summarise their

athens and ireland to continue the discussion.

thoughts into articles – a big thank you for sharing

your expertise! and last but not least our thanks go

a year into these debates the political context had

to Prof. Wawrzyniec K. Konarski, PhD, from Poland

shifted. in the wake of Europe’s economic and

and Dick Pels, PhD, from the netherlands who con-

social crisis, the (right-wing) populist argumenta-

tributed their opening and concluding remarks to

tion had partly moved from a cultural to a socio-

the seminar and this collection.

economic one, playing with European north-south

/ east-west divisions. Political cleavages along the

if – as Dick Pels puts it in his concluding article

left-right axis came back to the fore, and we wit-

– ‘resistance to European integration and to the

nessed an accompanying rise of traditional and

local elites which promote it’ will truly become

populist movements on the left side of the politi-

the point of convergence for populist movements

cal spectrum. many election results throughout

and parties across the East-West divide in Europe

Europe paid tribute to the fact that political pop-

– the debate we document in this report is here

ulism seems to have become a permanent feature

to stay. We hope you will find this collection of

of our democratic political systems.

articles an interesting read and it will enrich your

reflection on the topics at hand.

With this in mind we considered it highly impor-

tant to focus specifically on the cases of CEE

countries in 2012, as the challenges of pop-

leonore Gewessler

ulism have become equally pressing here while

Director, Green European Foundation

at the same time seemingly less documented. in

a two-day workshop with young scientists from

małgorzata Kopka

Poland, austria, Germany, the Czech republic,

Program Coordinator Dialogue Forum Europe,

Slovakia and Hungary, the rise of populism in the

Heinrich Böll Stiftung Warsaw office

5

PoPulism in CEnTral EuroPE – challenge for the future!

an introduction to the workshop and open debate

Prof. Wawrzyniec K. Konarski, PhD (Jagiellonian university)

an introduction to the workshop

and then an open debate, which summed up the

and open debate

former. The panel-workshop was organized in

Foreword article by prof. Wawrzyniec

Warsaw, on October 22-23, 2012, with the debate

K. Konarski1, PhD (Jagiellonian university)

on October 23, in the afternoon. The three partners

were responsible for both initiatives: the Warsaw

The basic difference in analysing populism is

office of Heinrich Böll Stiftung, the Green European

caused by the broad scope and diverse forms of

Foundation and the Warsaw School of Social

organisation of this phenomenon. This has been

Sciences and Humanities. i had the opportunity and

noticed first during the experts’ panel-workshop

pleasure to be a moderator of both undertakings.

1 Short biographical note about the author: Wawrzyniec K. Konarski (1957) is Professor of Political Science, Chair of Ethnocultural Politics at the Jagiellonian university in Cracow, Poland. Ph.D. at the university of Warsaw (1985). Graduate of the Summer institute in the american Political System (Washington D.C., Philadelphia, 1995) and a research fellow of the international Salzburg Seminar (Salzburg, 1996). His scientific interests concern widely understood connections – analyzed in a modern historical perspective – between ethnicity and politics, including ethnic aspect of political systems, nationalism, and ethnoregionalism. He has been lecturing extensively as a visiting scholar in more than ten countries in Europe and both americas.

author and co-author of eleven monographs and almost 150 articles, expert appraisements, and critical reviews. He comments extensively Polish and international politics in manifold Polish and World media. member of Polish and international scientific organizations, a.o.: Polish Committee of Cooperation with the Club of rome (deputy president since 2011), Polish Political Science association (PPSa, Polish, 2003, deputy president in 2007-2010), and international Political Science association (iPSa, 2008).

6

Populism in Central and Eastern Europe – Challenge for the Future?

They were organised to discuss the collective

anti-elitist character, and the notion of elite itself

publication Populism in Europe, issued by the

is frequently and intentionally left imprecise.

Green European Foundation in 2011. The aim of

the publication was to collect and classify the

a synthesis of these two approaches makes it

experiences of West European populism and to

possible to formulate one more definition of pop-

make partial references to its character at the

ulism. Thus it may be understood as a collection

area of Central Europe. The issues, which are the

of deliberately selected values of anti-elitist

outcome of the current understanding of pop-

nature, emerging from various ideologies (and

ulism in that region of Europe, were discussed

not from only one separate & cohesive ideol-

both during the panel-workshop and the debate.

ogy) and applied in practical activity in order to

They were linked by the common title Populism in

achieve political influence on society and state

Central Europe – Challenge for the Future.

institutions, including the possession of power,

however not for a very long time.

Experts from seven countries: austria, the Czech

republic, the netherlands, Germany, Poland,

The populist slogans gain social response espe-

Slovakia, and Hungary, took part in the workshop.

cially when two interdependent processes occur at

all the above-mentioned countries had and have

the same time. These are: the growing alienation

a substantial experience with populism. That

of the society from the rulers and the increased

is why the opinions of the experts from these

oligarchic tendencies within the political class

countries were a particularly interesting source

and thus within the power elite, and within the

of information and an inspiring base for an ani-

legal, namely internal opposition. i understand

mated debate.

the political class mainly as a group distinguished

only according to the stratification principle and

it is understandable that during the above-men-

not as a group of people with class, i.e., the ones

tioned open debate, references were made to

verified by a positive social response. This nega-

the claims formulated during the workshop and

tive opinion is an outcome of a prolonged obser-

these claims were creatively developed. in the

vation of behaviour and statements made by the

debate, five experts from three countries: the

people involved in political activeness. i am also

netherlands, Poland, and Slovakia, took part.

aware of the popular view that politicians are to

During its course they presented their approaches

a great extent an emanation of their electorate.

to local and external sources of populism, mainly,

On the one hand, this is not a comforting knowl-

but not only, in Central Europe, and also dis-

edge, but on the other one, it is the politicians who

cussed to what degree populist movements are

are particularly responsible for creating models

organised and what the relations between politi-

legitimating the rulers in the eyes of the society.

cal culture and populism are.

it seems quite evident that such a belief is quite

alien to a large majority of the political class in

Both the workshops and the open debate have

Central Europe but not only there.

proved that there is no uniform perception of

research approaches. This remark is quite under-

The analysis of the common methods of mak-

standable as it is based on different experiences

ing politics allows us to distinguish its several

from many countries. namely, populism is per-

negative characteristic features. They are very

ceived by some academic milieus as a concrete

common, but their presence has had a particu-

ideology containing right- or left-wing designates

larly negative impact in Central Europe or rather

but also able to compile them depending on the

Central-Eastern Europe. The especially harmful

socio-economic-political character of a given

phenomena also strengthening the processes of

country. From populism perceived as an ideology

de-legitimisation of the system of power are in

derives the adopted form of political strategy. For

my opinion the following: the political rentierism,

other experts’ milieus it may be mainly a com-

i.e., the profit-oriented, mercantile approach to

bination of a rhetoric based on a concrete axiol-

politics; the pollocracy, i.e., excessive subordina-

ogy combined with a form of activeness or simply

tion by politicians of their activities to the results

political behaviour considered as useful. These

of current public opinion polls at the expense of

two general approaches are linked by the black-

earlier formulated promises; and the re-election

and-white perception of the socio-political reality

obsession, which is the outcome of the two former

visible in the populist division into ‘us and them’. it

phenomena. an additional factor is the existence

assigns to all the versions of populism a definitely

of two types of political parties: a party-cartel,

Executive summary

7

i.e., one directed at gaining profits from the state

Part of the electorate in the democratic countries

resources, mainly governing one and a doctrinar-

manifests mostly in the tribalistic approach, i.e.,

ian party, mainly in opposition. The rhetoric used

one based on a strong and usually uncritical loy-

by them significantly hinders the political dia-

alty to their party which they associate with tribal

logue, strengthening at the same time the above-

relations. The tribal effect is enhanced by the

mentioned oligarchic but also tribalistic image of

social apathy demonstrated by a large propor-

modern politics.

tion of the society, which often results in a high

level of electoral absenteeism. This high absen-

The above-presented phenomena help consid-

teeism may be explained by a disappointment

erably to strengthen the social, economic and

in the course and results of the process of the

stricte political consequences, unfavourable

socio-economic-political transformation. as for

for the image of the state. This is closely con-

Poland, a substantial change in the preferences

nected with populism. The consequences may

of the electorate may occur if this large, but inac-

be presented as a continuum composed of sev-

tive group were persuaded to take part in the

eral stages. First, there occur the social conse-

elections. The politicians are not really interested

quences: anomy and alienation, which signal

in taking actions which may make these inert vot-

the occurrence of the passive social contesta-

ers break the electoral lethargy. So far, the rivalry

tion process with respect to the political elites

between the parties has shown that they mainly

– both the ruling one and the opposition – as it

fight to persuade those who generally take part

has been said above. The statistical proof of the

in the elections. as a result many mediocre peo-

occurrence of this process is the constant high

ple who care only for surviving their term without

level of electoral absenteeism. its scale is par-

making effort and do not wish to initiate important

ticularly disturbing in Poland, which for a long

actions become entrenched in politics. This regu-

time has held an inglorious record in this respect

larity was mentioned by richard von Weizsaecker,

among the European states. The next stage is the

a former German President, in his famous arti-

active social contestation, i.e., some form of the

cle published in Die Zeit on February 27th, 2003,

revolt of the masses against the elites – to quote

even though he referred it to a broader context.

José Ortega y Gasset. its extreme expression, i.e.,

This results in an evident shortage of true states-

one directed at overthrowing the existing sys-

men in current modern politics, both at the local

tem of power, would be, obviously, a revolution.

and global scale. The outcome is that the two

However, a more realistic manifestation of such a

processes enhance one another: the apathetic

revolt, but one consciously using the democratic

society observing the mediocrity of its represent-

mechanisms, is populism. Of course, existing

atives loses interest in elections, and its formally

experiences, in this respect, have been shared by

elected representatives, seeing this apathy, feel

many countries, not only the Central European

exempt from the duty of increasing the quality of

ones. However, the ‘young’ age of the democratic

their work. in consequence, the long term elec-

systems in this region does not warrant an auto-

tion absenteeism and unwillingness to under-

matic correction of the errors made by the rulers

take other forms of citizen participation heralds

and thus increases the level of social uncertainty

the above-mentioned passive social contestation.

in the nearest future. The persistence of the neg-

The change to the active form of anti-elitist social

ative features in the image of politics may make

revolt, but one using democratic instruments for

populism more vital, both with respect to its

its purposes, brings about, in turn, active social

electoral impact, and to the prolonged existence

contestation. it is expressed by populism. its sta-

of these conditions. it should be remembered

tistically high, and prolonged in time, electoral

that populists use either left-wing or right-wing

influence depends on the level of sensitivity to

argumentation depending on the situation, but

the populist slogans of exactly that, so far apa-

also both of them: this depends on the charac-

thetic but numerous part of the electorate, i.e.,

ter of the social conflict in a concrete time and

the people who, colloquially speaking, ‘vote with

milieu, which they want to use for their political

their legs’. Their mobilisation by a skilled leader

purposes. Thus the current utility of the adopted

using socially catchy slogans may be the reason

argumentation is what only matters and that is

why populism as a movement questioning the

why populism by its very nature undergoes axi-

status quo at a scale earlier unheard of may gain

ological changes.

importance. adequate examples of such politi-

cal processes in Central Europe are Hungary and

Slovakia. Poland may be another one.

8

Populism in Central and Eastern Europe – Challenge for the Future?

Finally, i presume populism as relatively new

in Western Europe may be rooted in 1. the post

phenomenon:

World War ii phenomenon of the neo-fascist ide-

ology, and 2. the manifold periods of economic

may be generally perceived in three ways, as:

decline after 1945 resulted in economically, cul-

1. one, thin-centered ideology, 2. a rhetoric and

turally, and mentally motivated xenophobia of

a way of behavior, and 3. a collection of ideologi-

well-off societies against the new and non-Chris-

cally diversified factors, right-, left-, but also dis-

tian immigrants in particular;

regarding the left-right antagonism or binding

them in one eclectic entity; all three understand-

in latin america may be placed in historically

ings are linked to each other by sharing the anti-

identified socio-economic and political injustice

elitist approach;

verified on a large quantitative scale.

in Central (and Eastern) Europe may be rooted

Populism feels at its best as a reviewer of the

in some predominantly 1. communal, and also 2.

democratic principles. its animators however,

ethno-nationalistic (ethnically exclusivist) tra-

do not hesitate to use its instruments for their

ditions against the background of recent his-

extemporary purposes, including gaining power,

tory; hence it has modern historical origin and is

even for a short time, as it was said already. all in

placed rather within the right-wing option or at

all ,everyone likes the taste of power.

least the ideologically eclectic one than the evi-

dently left-wing;

i would like to recommend the presented report

and wish everyone an interesting reading.

references:

Konarski, Wawrzyniec. 2009. isolationism, Dependency and Clientelism as Traditional Features of the Paraguayan Foreign Policy. Politeja, 2 (12): 277-298.

Konarski, Wawrzyniec. 1994. modern nationalist Tradition in Poland. in: Democratic legitimacy in Post-Communist Societies, ed. andrás Bozóki. Budapest: T-Twins Publishers.

Konarski, Wawrzyniec. 2007. Polens Parteien nach der Wahl.

liberal: Vierteljahreshefte für Politik und Kultur 49: 43-45.

meijers, Erica (ed.). 2011. Populism in Europe. Brussels: Green European Foundation/planetVErlaG.

mény, Yves & Surel, Yves. (ed.). 2002. Democracy and the Populist Challenge. Basingstoke: Palgrave macmillan.

mudde, Cas. 2011. radical right Parties in Europe: What, Who, Why? Participation 35 (1): 12-15.

Palonen, Emilia. 2010. unkari – populismin paratiisi. idäntutkimus –

The Finnish review of East European Studies 3: 29-40.

9

PolanD

From periphery to power: the trajectory of Polish populism, 1989-2012

Dr. Ben Stanley, PhD (uKSW Warsaw)

From popular protest to elite-led

toward democracy. The geopolitical uncertain-

transition, 1989-1991

ties of early 1989 compelled Solidarity to accept

the communist leader General Jaruzelski as (in-

in response to a wave of strikes and social un-

directly elected) president and ‘guardian’ of the

rest in the summer of 1988, Poland’s communist

round Table compromise.

government made overtures to representatives

of the banned trade union and social move-

However, in the semi-free parliamentary elections

ment Solidarity (Solidarność) and other opposi-

of June 1989, candidates of the Solidarity Citizens’

tion movements that had continued clandestine

Committee (Komitet Obywatelski ‘Solidarność’,

activities during the 1980s. The two sides held a

KO ‘S’) won 160 of the 161 parliamentary seats

round Table during February and april 1989. The

they were permitted to contest and 99 out of the

common purpose of these talks was to negotiate

100 freely contested seats in the newly-created

a path out of the current impasse; however, at

Senate. alone, Solidarity could not form a gov-

this stage negotiations were not intended to lead

ernment, but neither could the communists.

10 Populism in Central and Eastern Europe – Challenge for the Future?

The post-electoral stalemate was finally broken

ity closed ranks to ensure Wałęsa triumphed over

in September 1989 when Tadeusz mazowiecki be-

Tymiński in the second round, the divide between

came prime minister of a Grand Coalition domi-

Solidarity elites would, in the longer run, prove in-

nated by Solidarity. The onset of rapid changes

superable. as Hall (2011, 31) observes, the round

elsewhere in the eastern bloc in the latter half of

Table became a locus of contestation between

1989 gave the mazowiecki government an oppor-

these two camps. a ‘golden legend’ emerged from

tunity to bring about a wholesale transformation of

the ‘clan’ and the ‘retinue’, according to which the

the Polish economy. On 1 January 1990 a package

communists ‘freely consented to give up power,

of economic laws (dubbed the ‘Balcerowicz Plan’

opening up the path to democracy’. according

after leszek Balcerowicz, mazowiecki’s Finance

to the ‘dark legend’ espoused by the ‘court’ the

minister), enacted ‘shock therapy’ on the ailing

round Table constituted a ‘conspiracy by the elites

economy and laid the foundations of the new cap-

of both camps’, with the conspirators agreeing to

italist economic order. as the withdrawal of Soviet

share economic and political power.

‘supervision’ meant that transition to democracy

became an increasingly realistic prospect, the

Enmities between former Solidarity allies deep-

mazowiecki government cautiously extended the

ened during the remainder of the 1989-1991

scope of reforms to the political sphere.

parliamentary term. Chafing at the perceived

lack of pluralism in Polish political life, Jarosław

Solidarity’s moral status reinforced the opposi-

Kaczyński set up a new party, the Centre accord

tion’s claim to popular legitimacy, and the 1988

(Porozumienie Centrum, PC), which attracted

strikes had initially forced the hand of the PZPr,

a number of smaller parties and groupings criti-

yet Polish transition remained very much an elite

cal of the mazowiecki government. PC became

project. The Solidarity element of the mazow-

the nucleus of a post-Solidarity current that con-

iecki government comprised in large part those

tested the ‘orthodox’ transition consensus that

intellectuals whose involvement in Solidarity

coalesced around the mazowiecki government

was more strategic and advisory than direct and

and its allies in the media.

participatory. These politicians had borne direct

witness to the extraordinary power of Solidarity

The ‘war at the top’ between post-Solidarity elites

as a mass movement, and were concerned that

came to a head after Poland’s first fully free par-

in conditions of democratisation these energies

liamentary elections of the post-communist era,

might destabilise the processes of reform. Even

held in October 1991. no clear winner emerged

prior to the formation of the mazowiecki govern-

from these elections, but Jarosław Kaczyński

ment, there was a sense of unease at the possi-

oversaw the eventual creation of a fragile minor-

bility of an outbreak of populism in conditions of

ity coalition of post-Solidarity parties centred on

political freedom. in June 1989, the liberal dai-

PC, with Solidarity lawyer Jan Olszewski as pre-

ly Gazeta Wyborcza (1989) defined populism as

mier. The Olszewski government claimed a man-

‘a particular type of demagogy’ that appealed to

date to pursue the politics of acceleration, since

the simple worker, impatient as he was at the

it was the first government created under con-

hair-splitting formulations of the intellectual.

ditions of full democracy. as a minority admin-

istration with significant internal tensions and

Competing ambitions, ideologies and conceptions

a weak base of support in a fractious parliament,

of transition politics ruptured the unity of Solidar-

it struggled to make headway with this agenda. in

ity, with the fundamental dividing line between the

mid-1992 the government attempted to push for-

cautious, incremental approach espoused by maz-

ward its objective of decommunisation through

owiecki, and the ‘acceleration’ (przyspieszenie) ad-

‘lustration’ (the provision of information about

vocated by Wałęsa and his advisors. The struggle

the collaboration of public functionaries with

for supremacy on the Solidarity side expedited the

the security services), with minister of the inte-

holding of direct presidential elections in novem-

rior antoni macierewicz presenting to parliament

ber-December 1990. it also accelerated the deep-

a list of alleged collaborators that implicated many

ening of the divide, since the two main competitors

serving politicians, including Wałęsa himself. This

were Wałęsa and mazowiecki. The consequences

act led to the immediate passing of a vote of no

of the rent in Solidarity were made plain when in

confidence in the Olszewski government.

the first round of voting an expatriate Polish busi-

nessman, Stan Tymiński, emerged from nowhere

The events of this ‘night of change’ (nocna zmi-

to attract a quarter of the votes. although Solidar-

ana) became ‘the most significant generational

POlanD – From periphery to power: the trajectory of Polish populism, 1989-2012

11

experience of part of the Polish right’ (Janicki and

the political system. aside from Tymiński, the

Władyka 2007, 167), strengthening their conviction

most significant of these was the agrarian pro-

that self-styled mainstream political actors were

test movement Self-Defence, which comprised

conspiring to restrict full political pluralism in

a trade union, a social movement and a political

post-communist Poland. in a speech to parliament

party. This organisation was founded to protect

prior to his ousting, Olszewski contended that,

the interests of indebted farmers in the north-

west of Poland, but grew into a nationwide move-

‘from today onwards the stake in this game is

ment that sought to represent all those who had

something other than simply the question of

– or could be persuaded to believe they had – lost

which government will be able to execute the

out as a result of transition. Self-Defence’s lead-

budget to the end of the year; at stake is some-

er andrzej lepper achieved notoriety for leading

thing more, a certain image of Poland: what sort

direct action protests that often descended into

of Poland it is to be. To put it another way, whose

violence. However, the party failed to make any

Poland is it to be?’ (Jan Olszewski, cited in Sejm

significant progress at the polls during the 1990s,

stenographic transcript, term 1, session 17, day

declining to such an extent that in the elections

1 [04.06.1992], Sejm rzeczypospolitej Polskiej

of 1997 it gained a mere 0.1% of the vote and ap-

1993, emphasis added).

peared to be moribund.

This question could be interpreted in a number of

During the 1990s, hitherto unknown challengers

ways. While Olszewski’s emphasis lay on the con-

like Tymiński and lepper failed to make a con-

sequences that the delay to decommunisation

sistent impression on the electorate. The inher-

might have for the quality of Poland’s democratic

ited ‘regime divide’ marked the dominant line of

transition, it also resonated with those who had

division between parties, and dictated the shape

suffered material losses as a result of the eco-

of the nascent party system. The revival of the

nomic politics of transition, and with those who

post-communists in the form of successor alli-

feared the effects of ‘imitative modernisation’ on

ance (and subsequently party) the Democratic

Polish national identity and culture.

left alliance (Sojusz lewicy Demokratycznej,

SlD) prompted the formation of an uneasy and

Populism at the margins: the hegemony

short-lived ‘umbrella coalition’ of post-Solidarity

of the “regime divide”, 1993-2001

parties, Solidarity Election action (akcja Wyborc-

za Solidarność, aWS). The regime divide provided

initially, it seemed that the elite compact of 1989

a clear heuristic for voters disoriented by the re-

was likely to unravel as voters deserted estab-

markable proliferation of political parties in the

lished elite figures for new populist entrepreneurs.

first few years of transition. it also cut across

The performance of Tymiński in the 1990 presi-

the ideological debates of transition, diminishing

dential election appeared to confirm liberal fears

their political potential. Parties with strong ide-

about the immature and biddable character of the

ological profiles but no regime-divide pedigree

Polish electorate. as Ost (2005, 109) observes,

were simply irrelevant to the main locus of politi-

Solidarity liberals began to ‘shun[…] applause’, to

cal competition.

‘equate popularity with “populism”’, and to treat

‘their own lack of support as the surest sign of the

Poland’s political earthquake: the

justness of their cause’. Despite the initial assent

breakthrough of populism, 2001-2005

for an elite-led transition from communism, the

process of transition to democracy threatened the

There are no neat explanations for why the Polish

return of ‘an elitist and ritualistic style of politics

party system changed so dramatically in 2001.

defined by the rift between the governing elite and

However, in light of subsequent developments,

the governed’ (Puchalska 2005, 816).

three significant factors can be distinguished: the

volatility of Polish voters, a decline in public atti-

From the beginning of 1991 onwards, the public

tudes to the politics and political elites of transi-

mood significantly worsened, with a majority of

tion, and the inadequacy of the regime divide as

Poles concerned that the country was heading

a means for the articulation of emerging political

in the wrong direction (CBOS n.d.). neverthe-

interests and differences.

less, movements and parties that founded their

political appeal on populist critiques of the poli-

long-term survey trends show that while in the

cies and elite of transition remained marginal to

mid-nineties Poles were generally more positive

12 Populism in Central and Eastern Europe – Challenge for the Future?

than in previous years about the direction of

transition elites from both sides had ‘had their

change and less negative about the political and

turn’ (oni już byli). instead, lepper insisted, ‘[o]ur

economic situation in their country, from 1998

country should be ruled by the people and the rep-

onwards there was a clear decline in these atti-

resentatives of their majority’ (lepper 2002a, 196).

tudes (CBOS n.d.). The public reacted badly to the

‘second wave’ of economic reforms implemented

The league of Polish Families (liga Polskich

by the 1997 – 2001 post-Solidarity coalition (com-

rodzin, lPr) emerged just prior to the 2001 elec-

prised of the aWS and the liberal Freedom union

tion, drawing on Catholic-nationalist currents

[unia Wolności, uW]) and support for the govern-

that had remained outside the political main-

ing parties declined precipitously. although dis-

stream in the first decade of transition. lPr at-

satisfaction with transition grew in most sections

tacked post-communist politics in its entirety

of society during the first decade of transition,

as a ‘socio-economic experiment’ with greatly

it started to become more clearly differentiated

deleterious effects on the Polish family, that ‘el-

in relative terms. The old, those living in small

ementary unit of the life of the nation’ (liga Pols-

towns and villages, those of lower educational at-

kich rodzin 2006, 5–6). This discourse echoed the

tainment, those in the lower income quartile, the

concerns of the Catholic-fundamentalist media

unemployed, retired, and those receiving invalid-

empire centred on radio maryja and its charis-

ity benefit were increasingly more likely to state

matic proprietor Father Tadeusz rydzyk. The ra-

that post-1989 reforms had negatively affected

dio maryja movement was, and is, an example of

them (Czapiński 2006, 184).

a rare phenomenon in post-communist Europe:

a genuine, self-sustaining movement of civil so-

The souring of the public mood created new op-

ciety. The extension of the activities of the radio

portunities for populists to appeal to these ‘tran-

station into a newspaper, college of further edu-

sition losers’. From 1998 onwards, Self-Defence

cation, television station and even mobile phone

returned to prominence through the organiza-

network constituted a set of alternative institu-

tion of numerous protests that went beyond the

tions founded in large part on volunteer labour

party’s agrarian constituency to appeal to small-

and grassroots initiatives. These institutions con-

town and urban ‘transition losers’ on both sides

stituted ‘a place in which less privileged mem-

of the regime divide. The party’s ideological ap-

bers of society are able to maintain social ties

peal was not dogmatically anti-capitalist. rather,

and create networks of social interaction outside

it inveighed against the alleged failure of suc-

the direct influence of the state’ (Burdziej 2008,

cessive governments to make the transition to

28). The apparently ‘authentic’ nature of this so-

capitalism work to the benefit of the majority,

cial movement lent credibility to claims that it

demanding the realisation of positive rights: ‘the

represented a broad constituency of ‘ordinary

right to work, for appropriate remuneration, the

Poles’ whose shared interests and values were

right to have housing needs satisfied, the right to

expressed through natural human interaction

health and healthcare, the right to education and

rather than dictated by elites.

equal life chances’ (Samoobrona rzeczypospo-

litej Polskiej 2003, 8). This appeal was couched in

Together, SO and lPr gained just under a fifth

textbook populist rhetoric. The party’s challenge

of the votes in the 2001 parliamentary elections.

was, contended its leader andrzej lepper, simply

This ‘unexpected political earthquake’ (Szc-

another iteration of an age-old pattern:

zerbiak 2002) saw both governing parties ousted

from parliament, and the emergence of two new

‘[t]he authorities in Poland can be called ‘them’.

post-Solidarity parties, Civic Platform (Platforma

They rule, they make laws, they give, they take, they

Obywatelska, PO) and law and Justice (Prawo

permit – or not – others to live. The greatest success

i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) alongside the populists.

of Self-Defence is that when talking about us, Poles

The unconventional and obstructive behaviour of

do not say “them”, but “us”’ (lepper 2002a, 9).

Self-Defence and lPr in parliament was deeply

alarming for political elites, and contributed to

Self-Defence made a virtue of its lack of attach-

a marked decline in public approval both for par-

ment to either side of the regime divide and the

liament and for the present administration (see

fact that it had not been involved in the implemen-

CBOS n.d.). Both parties were quick to exploit

tation of transition. The party’s electoral appeal

the difficulties of the beleaguered post-commu-

portrayed post-Solidarity and post-communist

nist administration. Self-Defence relentlessly at-

formations as indistinguishable, and argued that

tacked an economic strategy that remained within

POlanD – From periphery to power: the trajectory of Polish populism, 1989-2012

13

the liberal paradigm (lepper 2002b), seeking

the stability of this new arrangement and protect

wherever possible to bolster its credentials as

the interests of the new oligarchy, it was neces-

defender of the interests of the ‘little man’ and

sary to exclude patriotic and traditional values

opponent of ‘big-business’ privileges. Both par-

from the political mainstream, and to delegiti-

ties were particularly active in criticising the con-

mise any political actors who might pose a threat

cessions made by Polish negotiators during talks

to its interests. The promulgation of the 1997

on Poland’s accession to the European union,

Constitution saw this system reach maturity,

raising the spectre of foreign ownership of Polish

crystallising unequal access to state institutions,

land, exposure of Polish firms to asymmetric

the media and the market (Kaczyński 2006).

competition, and the loss of Polish identity and

sovereignty so soon after their recovery.

aside from a shared interest in enrichment, the

common element that held this elite together

Both Self-Defence and – to a lesser extent – lPr

was the content of communist-era secret police

increased their standing at the polls as a result

files, the compromising nature of which was evi-

of their greater visibility over the 2001-2005 par-

dent by virtue of the refusal of successive govern-

liamentary term. However, they were not the only

ments to engage in meaningful decommunisation

beneficiaries of an increasingly radical mood.

(Kaczyński 2011, 43–5). according to Kaczyński

This period saw more attention than ever before

(2011, 73), the układ was interested only in set-

turned upon the issue of corruption; the ‘rywin-

ting up basic democratic institutions and the free

gate’ scandal – in which the government were al-

market, and not in creating a genuinely new state

leged to have been involved in an attempt to solicit

and establishing a ‘new social hierarchy’. in these

a bribe from a media organization in return for

circumstances, the special purpose of PC was to

changes to a proposed media bill – afforded Poles

furnish Poland with a new ‘counter elite’ to oppose

‘a window on the world of political networks, busi-

the remnants of the nomenklatura and the Solidar-

ness links to politics, and general intrigue’ (millard

ity figures they had co-opted (Kaczyński 2011, 49).

2006, 1011). PiS began to exert a greater influ-

ence on the course of public debate as the issues

in the interest of ordinary Poles:

it prioritised – corruption and decommunisation

Poland’s populist moment, 2005-2007

– meshed in the public consciousness.

Prior to the dual presidential-parliamentary elec-

in policy and personnel, PiS constituted the re-

tions of September-October 2005, there was no

vival of PC, and hence a return to the themes and

reason to suppose that populists would come to

arguments associated with the Olszewski admin-

power. neither Self-Defence nor lPr looked likely

istration. although the party entered parliament

to improve their standing, and everything indicated

on the back of the substantial popularity lech

that PiS and PO would form a post-Solidarity coali-

Kaczyński had gained as a hardline Justice min-

tion government. However, the intertwining nature

ister during a spell prior to the 2001 elections, it

of the two campaigns had a crucial influence on

was Jarosław Kaczyński who shaped PiS’s nar-

subsequent events. With PiS’s lech Kaczyński and

rative and ideological priorities. For Kaczyński2,

PO’s Donald Tusk the front-runners in the presi-

the exposure of numerous instances of alleged or

dential race after the withdrawal of the post-com-

proven corruption confirmed that his diagnosis of

munist candidate Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, PiS

the pathologies of transition was indeed accurate.

and PO – two parties with a significant element

of ideological overlap – were forced to emphasise

Kaczyński’s thesis ramified in response to events

their differences. Seizing the initiative, PiS recast

but in essence remained the same as it was in

itself as the ‘social’ alternative to the liberal PO.

the early 1990s. actually existing transition con-

The campaigns became increasingly acrimonious,

sisted, he argued, in a compact between the

and by the time PiS – victorious in both elections

communist-era nomenklatura and liberal Soli-

– commenced coalition negotiations with PO, rela-

darity, whereby the former yielded power to the

tions had deteriorated to the point that no agree-

latter in exchange for ‘certain guarantees’. The

ment was forthcoming.

agreement resulted in the ‘covert cooperation’ of

a network (układ) spanning the political, admin-

PiS was reluctant to risk sacrificing its slim advan-

istrative, business and media sectors. To ensure

tage in new elections. after a period of minority

2 For the avoidance of repetition, any references to ‘Kaczyński’ by surname alone refer to Jarosław Kaczyński.

14 Populism in Central and Eastern Europe – Challenge for the Future?

government, the party signed a ‘stabilisation

an ordinary, authentic, legitimate ‘people’ against

pact’ with Self-Defence and lPr and subsequent-

an illegitimate and usurping elite.

ly a formal coalition agreement in may 2006. The

formation of this ‘exotic threesome’ (Paradowska

The government’s attempts to implement the

2006) was greeted with widespread shock. While

content of the coalition agreement drew it into re-

no explicit cordon sanitaire was erected around

peated conflict with institutions of state, the ma-

these parties during their time in opposition, it was

jor opposition parties, and leading politicians and

generally assumed that all ‘mainstream’ parties

public figures associated with the Third repub-

would continue to treat them as uncoalitionable.

lic. These conflicts were particularly evident in

the case of state reform. PiS gave priority to the

The coalition declaration outlined an ambitious

reform of the institutions of state as a means to

programme for comprehensive reform in the

extirpate vested interests. Even prior to the for-

direction of a new ‘Fourth republic’ (Czwarta

mation of the coalition it purged the board of the

rzeczpospolita, iVrP) (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość,

national Council of radio and Television (Krajowa

Samoobrona rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, and nar-

rada radiofonii i Telewizji, KrriT), transforming

odowe Koło Parlamentarne 2006). The flagship

it from an institution in which the parliamentary

policies of this pact could be distilled into four

opposition enjoyed representation into one peo-

categories: reforming the state and public insti-

pled entirely by candidates of the ruling coalition.

tutions, ‘reclaiming’ foreign policy, engineering

Subsequently, the coalition – or more precisely

a moral and cultural renewal, and legislating for

PiS, which held the relevant ministries – legis-

a more socially-sensitive economy. reflecting

lated to make significant changes to the proc-

PiS’s dominance, the agreement was more rep-

ess of recruitment for the upper echelon of the

resentative of their priorities than those of SO and

civil service, dissolve the military intelligence

lPr, with reform of the state looming largest.

Service (Wojskowe Służby informacyjne, WSi),

and increase ministerial oversight of the judi-

While the October 2005 – may 2006 minority ad-

cial system. a new ‘lustration’ law3 sought both

ministration was relatively restrained in its ap-

to restart the process of decommunisation and

proach and emollient in style, the formation of the

to widen its scope. With substantial cross-party

three-party coalition and the assumption of the

and public support, the coalition also created

office of prime minister by Jarosław Kaczyński

a Central anticorruption Bureau (Centralne Biuro

introduced a more confrontational kind of politics

antykorupcyjne; CBa).

centred on a distinctly populist discourse. a par-

ticularly aggressive parliamentary speech given

in the course of implementing these reforms,

by Kaczyński just prior to his assuming office de-

the coalition came into repeated conflict with

lineated the basic structure of the model, at the

the Constitutional Tribunal, most prominently in

heart of which was the aforementioned concept

the case of the lustration law, which the Tribu-

of an układ – a system of connections binding to-

nal found in repeated violation of the constitution.

gether the elite of the Third republic. in language

Jarosław Kaczyński’s response to the stance of

that would foreshadow a particularly fertile period

the Tribunal was characteristic of the coalition’s

for new rhetorical coinages, Kaczyński attacked

reaction to the institutional obstructions it en-

the ‘mendacious elites’ (łże-elity) of the Third

countered: he argued that attention should be

republic; a ‘front for the defence of criminals’

paid to the ‘structure [of the Tribunal] and the

(front obrony przestępców) whose elimination

political connections of particular judges’ rather

from public life was a matter of urgent priority.

than treating it as a ‘body of wise men who make

The coalition would restore order ‘in the inter-

decisions in accordance with the law in every

est of ordinary people, ordinary Poles’ (Jarosław

case’ (cited in Siedlecka 2006). PiS’s conflict with

Kaczyński, cited in Sejm stenographic transcript,

the Tribunal culminated in an unsuccessful at-

term 5, session 10, day 3 [12.05.2006], Sejm rzec-

tempt to amend the act on the Constitutional Tri-

zypospolitej Polskiej 2007). in tackling the układ,

bunal through legislation that would have made it

the coalition would act as the representatives of

more susceptible to political interference.4

3 ‘lustration’ refers to the measures taken by a state to restrict or otherwise regulate the participation in public life of citizens who, during the communist era, were involved in controversial activities, in particular collaboration with the secret services.

4 The most naked example of this was the proposal to reduce the term of the Tribunal’s president from nine to three years, thus ensuring that it would potentially be possible for ‘disobedient’ presidents to be subject to the discipline of the same President (of the republic) who had been responsible for their nomination.

POlanD – From periphery to power: the trajectory of Polish populism, 1989-2012

15

These reforms also deepened and entrenched the

– had no interest in treating Poland as an equal

enmity between the coalition parties – in particu-

partner. This stance resulted in a number of

lar PiS – and the ‘Third republic’ elite, reaching

contretemps between Poland and other member

a high point during the tense and emotional pub-

states, often couched in rather undiplomatic lan-

lic debate over the lustration law in the spring of

guage. a representative incident occurred at the

2007. many prominent legalists, academics and

June 2007 European Council summit concern-

media figures – all of whom the new law would

ing negotiations for the Eu reform Treaty, prior

affect in significantly greater measure than be-

to which Jarosław Kaczyński argued that Polish

fore – regarded this law as an instrument tailor-

voting power in the Eu should reflect the greater

made for disciplining opponents of the coalition,

population it would have had if not for the Second

and several announced their refusal to comply

World War (Kuźniar 2008, 283). Poland threatened

with a requirement to submit affidavits about

to use its veto unless its demands were ad-

their past contacts with the secret services. Out

dressed, leading to a deal reverting temporarily to

of this milieu emerged the short-lived ‘movement

the relatively favourable 2001 nice Treaty provi-

for the Defence of Democracy’ (ruch na rzecz

sions. This episode encapsulated the spirit of the

Demokracji), which sought to defend the achieve-

new foreign policy, marrying a sense of entitle-

ments of the Third republic against the actions

ment to an uncompromising negotiating stance,

of a government with ‘a fundamentally different

underscored with emotive anti-German rhetoric.

concept of the state and its role, not understand-

ing the essence of democracy, neglecting the rule

The content and style of PiS’s foreign policy pro-

of law, and striving for the ‘party-isation’ (upar-

voked a strongly negative reaction at home as

tyjnienia) and ideologisation of the state’ (ruch

well as abroad. When President lech Kaczyński

na rzecz Demokracji 2007).

cancelled a meeting of the Weimar Triangle -

a diplomatic summit of the Polish, French and

a similar pattern emerged in the case of foreign

German heads of state – after the German gov-

policy, where PiS also pursued a policy of elite

ernment refused to condemn a critical article

replacement. PiS saw the diplomatic corps as

about his presidency published in a German

a ‘corporation’ dominated by the figure of

newspaper.5 This act drew sharp condemnation

Bronisław Geremek, who had been intimately in-

from previous foreign ministers, all of whom

volved in foreign policy from the beginning of tran-

signed a letter criticising this action as detri-

sition, serving as chairman of the parliamentary

mental to good relations between the countries.

Committee on Foreign affairs between 1989 until

For PiS, a coordinated response by politicians of

1997, after which he assumed the post of Foreign

both post-communist and post-Solidarity prov-

minister. in Kaczyński’s opinion, the dominant role

enance furnished further evidence of the hostility

of the układ in the diplomatic corps had resulted

of the układ. Deputy minister of Defence antoni

in a foreign policy conducted on bended knee, with

macierewicz baldly alleged that the majority of

successive Foreign ministers pursuing essentially

the signatories were former agents of the Soviet

the same course of concession and supplication

secret services.

to foreign powers, regardless of which party they

happened to belong to. The coalition agreement

if the national interest was to be defended

stressed that the new government would inaugu-

abroad, it needed to be articulated and reinforced

rate a new era in foreign policy, with the objective

at home. PiS and lPr envisaged a key role for

of defending a clearly articulated national interest

the state as patron and pedagogue of cultural

(Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, Samoobrona rzeczypo-

traditions and patriotic feelings, with schools

spolitej Polskiej, and narodowe Koło Parlamen-

a particular site for the inculcation of such values

tarne 2006, 19).

(Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, Samoobrona rzeczypo-

spolitej Polskiej, and narodowe Koło Parlamen-

This conception of the national interest was fired

tarne 2006, 15). more important than legislative

by a sense of historical injustice. PiS regarded it

activity – or the lack thereof – was the moral dis-

as morally correct that Western European pow-

course of the coalition. a vital part of the coali-

ers recognise Poland’s status as a substantial

tion’s agenda was the ‘politics of history’ (polityka

player in Europe. However, it also nursed the con-

historyczna), ‘a conscious effort to analyze, dis-

viction that these powers – particularly Germany

cuss and present the past in a way that leads to

5 The official reason for the cancellation was illness, but few believed this explanation.

16 Populism in Central and Eastern Europe – Challenge for the Future?

the strengthening of the nation’s sense of iden-

PiS rapidly superseded lPr as proprietors of the

tity and purpose’ (Kochanowicz 2007, 2-3). The

Catholic-nationalist narrative of transition poli-

politics of history would restore national pres-

tics. it was Kaczyński, not Giertych, who stood

tige through the exposition of narratives in which

alongside Father rydzyk at Jasna Góra, a site of

‘Poland and Poles become key players of modern

Catholic pilgrimage, declaring to the throng that

history’ with due recognition of their contribu-

‘[t]oday, Poland is here. i can say that with full

tions and sufferings (nijakowski 2008, 198).

conviction and belief’ (mamoń 2007). rydzyk’s

transfer of patronage from lPr to PiS was a boon

in PiS’s interpretation of recent Polish history,

for the latter; the radio maryja movement provid-

the Warsaw uprising constituted the moment

ing organisational resources and disciplined par-

at which the Poles of the Home army (armia

ticipants for the large public rallies and marches

Krajowa, aK) rose against the German occupier

that were a hallmark of this period. Protests by

and in pre-emption of the Soviet incursion, in

students and teachers were a regular feature

a doomed attempt to assert the sovereignty of the

of Giertych’s tenure as minister of Education;

legitimate Polish nation. The division between

skinhead and nationalist groups – including the

a ‘Home-army Poland’ (Polska aK-owska) and

lPr-affiliated all-Polish Youth (młodzież Wszech-

‘People’s-republic Poland’ (Polska Prl-owska)

polska, mW) – staged counter-demonstrations

was a key theme of lech Kaczyński’s 2005 presi-

against gay pride marches, and pro-choice and

dential campaign, and was easily adapted to the

anti-abortion groups clashed over the politics of

social / liberal divide. affiliation to the aK was

life and death (Grzymski 2008, 28). Public sector

one term of a binary discourse of martyrological

workers struck for better pay and conditions on

patriotism versus cynical collaborationism, the

several occasions, to the evident discomfort of

latter term of which could embrace post-com-

a nominally social-solidarist government. These

munists (collaboration with the Soviet union) and

distinct acts of protest coalesced into larger pub-

liberals (collaboration with post-communists).

lic movements: on one weekend in October 2006

approximately 20,000 people marched either for

With the post-communist/post-Solidarity di-

or against the coalition, with all major parties in-

vide still a potent source of emotional respons-

volved in organising these rallies.

es but no longer reflective of political divisions,

PiS strove to annex it to the social / liberal divide.

The populist reckoning

against the mainstream pantheon of Solidarity

and its aftermath, 2007-2012

heroes – particularly Wałęsa – PiS promoted dis-

sident figures such as anna Walentynowicz and

The high political and emotional temperature of

andrzej Gwiazda, two Solidarity pioneers who

the 2005-2007 parliamentary term had a signifi-

had long accused Wałęsa of collaboration with

cant impact on the relationships between parties;

the secret services and who shunned the round

both within the coalition and across the opposi-

Table settlement and the politics of liberal tran-

tion divide. Both the stabilisation pact and coali-

sition. in a controversial speech at the Gdańsk

tion agreement were fragile from the outset. in

Shipyard, Jarosław Kaczyński asserted that ‘we’,

part this was due to the headstrong character of

those gathered in support of PiS, ‘stand where we

all three party leaders, but structurally the coa-

stood back then’ [in 1980 – B.S.]. ‘They’, those op-

lition was always likely to experience problems

posing the creation of the Fourth republic, ‘stand

due to the nature of its formation and composi-

where the ZOmO stood’6 (Kaczyński 2006b). This

tion. it became commonplace to refer to SO and

schema placed many prominent Solidarity ac-

lPr as the ‘appetisers’ (przystawki) vulnerable to

tivists – many of whose involvement with the

being ‘eaten’ by their larger partner. This vulner-

Solidarity movement was more substantial than

ability was confirmed by the turbulent history of

Kaczyński’s – together with the historical op-

the coalition, where the minor parties’ attempts

pressor, ranged against those whose defence of

to assert their position in light of the growing rad-

Poland’s authentic interests, values and identity

icalism of PiS resulted in numerous inter-coali-

inhered in a refusal to recognise the legitimacy of

tion ructions. The period of coalition government

post-communists and liberals alike.

lasted from 5 may 2006 to 21 October 2007, dur-

ing which it saw five changes of government.

6 The ZOmO (Zmotoryzowane Odwody milicji Obywatelskiej; motorized reserves of the Citizens’ militia) was a crack police unit infamous for repressive policing.

POlanD – From periphery to power: the trajectory of Polish populism, 1989-2012

17

PiS always maintained that it had only engaged

and future PiS mEP marek migalski (2008) praised

with parties of SO and lPr’s ilk with the greatest

the party for its good deed in ‘eliminat[ing] … the

reluctance. Jarosław Kaczyński explained that PiS

populists’. Yet PiS had eliminated populists in

did not wish to pass up the opportunity it had been

large measure by internalising their populism.

afforded for undertaking substantial reforms.

if the PiS-SO-lPr coalition government owed its

‘We took the decision that we would try to change

origins to a fortuitous collocation of contingent cir-

Poland in such circumstances as existed. anyone

cumstances, its downfall was entirely in line with

who has seen – as i have – the history of Poland

the structural logic of the populist dynamic. The

over the last 30 years from up close, knows that

determination of PiS to press ahead with reforms

at many moments it was necessary to work with

in spite of the moral hazard of coalition with lPr

the kind of people who were there and not the

and SO led PiS into a deeply antagonistic relation-

kind of people we would like to be there.’ (Gmyz

ship with other political actors. if the minor coali-

and Janke 2006).

tion parties swiftly ceased to be taken seriously,

liberals and socio-democratic post-communists

However, the choice of coalition with SO and lPr

alike viewed PiS as a potent adversary and laid

was rather more than the unfortunate mathe-

aside their own differences to oppose what they

matical expedient PiS professed it to be. it was

commonly perceived as a threat to liberal de-

a decision to pursue a more radical path that, in

mocracy. it would be hyperbolic to suggest that

hindsight, was more attuned to the logic of its

Poland in 2007 was analogous to Slovakia in 1998:

reform project than a more moderate PiS-PO

the future of democracy itself was not in question.

coalition would – indeed, could – have been. al-

However, the counter-mobilisation against PiS

though in mid-2005 a PiS-PO coalition seemed

was a clear indication that for a substantial sec-

the obvious choice, it is very unlikely that such an

tion of Poland’s political elite, the will to uphold

arrangement would have been any more stable

the principles of the liberal-orthodox transition

than the PiS-SO-lPr coalition, given PiS’s deter-

model trumped historical-cultural differences

mination to pursue their reform programme in

along the post-communist divide. although the

the teeth of all opposition.

future potential of this divide could not at that

point definitively be ruled out, by the formation of

Szczerbiak (2008, 27) characterised the early

the new PO-PSl government in november 2007 it

election of October 2007 as ‘a plebiscite on a po-

could safely be said to have become subordinate

larising and controversial government’. This was

to a social / liberal ‘transition divide’.

as much a result of PiS’s determination to defend

its record as of the attacks conducted by the op-

Subsequent events have confirmed the lasting

position. To recall the schema proposed earlier,

impact of Poland’s populist moment on its par-

the election was the ‘reckoning’ that follows an

ty politics, with the april 2010 Smoleńsk tragedy

intense populist moment. This impression was

and the bitter exchanges that followed it driving

heightened by the truncated nature of the par-

a seemingly insuperable wedge between two

liamentary term, which deviated from the ordi-

parties once thought to be natural coalition part-

nary, predictable electoral rhythm established

ners. although the party system is not yet entirely

since 1993. in many ways the 2005-2007 term

stable, the basic line of division is more clearly

was reminiscent of the 1991-1993 term in its high

defined than in previous years, running as it does

emotional register and the focus on the differ-

between two very different conceptions of the

ence between mainstream, orthodox parties and

role of the state, Poland’s role in Europe and the

radical, unorthodox parties. However, the line of

world, and the values and priorities that should

competition in 2007 was much clearer than in

guide policy-making. PiS’s turn to populism did

1993, essentially running between PO and PiS.

not ultimately help it to realise its objective of

elite replacement, but it furnished Polish politics

The ‘appetisers’ were rapidly eaten, but proved dif-

with an alternative elite.

ficult to digest. Some, including political scientist

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references

Burdziej, Stanisław. 2008. ‘radio maryja a społeczeństwo obywatelskie.’ Znak (640): 17-28.

CBOS. ‘Trends.’ http://www.cbos.pl/En/trends/trends.php (accessed January 5, 2012).

Czapiński, Janusz. 2006. ‘Stosunek do przemian systemowych i ocena ich wpływu na życie badanych.’

in Diagnoza Społeczna 2005: Warunki i jakość życia Polaków, eds. Janusz Czapiński and Tomasz Panek.

Warszawa: Wyższa Szkoła Finansów i Zarządzania w Warszawie, p. 182-189.

Gazeta Wyborcza. 1989. ‘SŁOWniK DEmaGOGii: Czego chce prosty robotnik.’ Gazeta Wyborcza.

Hall, aleksander. 2011. Osobista historia iii rzeczypospolitej. Warszawa: rosner i Wspólnicy.

Kaczyński, Jarosław. 2011. Polska naszych marzeń. lublin: akapit.

Kaczyński, Jarosław. 2006. ‘The Fall of Post-Communism: Transformation in Central and Eastern Europe.’ http://www.heritage.org/about/speeches/the-fall-of-post-communism-transformation-in-central-and-eastern-europe (accessed may 1, 2012).

Kochanowicz, Jacek. 2007. ‘right turn: Polish politics at the beginning of the twenty-first century.’

Eurozine.

Kuźniar, roman. 2008. Droga do wolności. Polityka zagraniczna iii rzeczypospolitej. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo naukowe Scholar.

lepper, andrzej. 2002a. lista leppera. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo KamEa.

lepper, andrzej. 2002b. ‘Strategia gospodarcza rządu.’

http://www.samoobrona.org.pl/pages/21.archiwum/01.Klub/05.Odezwy/index.php?document=08.

strategia.html

liga Polskich rodzin. 2006. ‘Skrót programu gospodarczego.’ in Wybory 2005: Partie i ich programy, eds. inka Słodkowska and magdalena Dolbakowska. Warszawa.

millard, Frances. 2006. ‘Poland’s Politics and the Travails of Transition after 2001: The 2005 Elections.’ Europe-asia Studies 58(7): 1007-1031.

nijakowski, lech. 2008. Polska polityki pamięci: esej socjologiczny. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo akademickie i Profesjonalne.

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ithaca: Cornell university Press.

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Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, Samoobrona rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, and narodowe Koło Parlamentarne.

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http://www.pis.org.pl/download.php?g=mmedia&f=zalacznik_nr_1.pdf.

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POlanD – From periphery to power: the trajectory of Polish populism, 1989-2012

19

Samoobrona rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. 2003. Program Społeczno-Gospodarczy Samoobrony.

Warszawa: Samoobrona rzeczypospolitej Polskiej.

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http://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/Debata5.nsf (accessed January 4, 2012).

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The September 2001 Parliamentary Election.’ Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 18(3): 41-76.

20 Populism in Central and Eastern Europe – Challenge for the Future?

GErmanY

Populism in Germany

lionel Clesly Voss llB (hons), ma

PhD student of Political Science – Friedrich-alexander-universität Erlangen-nürnberg Populism – as a tool not an ideology

can therefore say that populism is the appeal to

the masses, the people, often in conjunction with

When discussing the concept of populism in re-

the proclaimed aim of fighting against an elitist

lation to Germany it is first of all necessary to

system, which allegedly privileges the few instead

outline a definition. according to albertazzi and

of the many. alternatively the threat may also be

mcDonnell populism is ‘[a]n ideology which pits

emanating not from the elite but a ‘dangerous

a virtuous and homogeneous people against a set

other’. a frequent example of the latter not nec-

of elites and dangerous “others” who are together

essarily being the same as the former, is that of

depicted as depriving (or attempting to deprive)

populism against immigration. in such cases im-

the sovereign people of their rights, values, pros-

migrants are portrayed as a burden to society and

perity, identity and voice.’7 Broadly speaking we

as harming economic and social sustainability.

7 albertazzi, Daniele and Duncan mcDonnell, Twenty-first century populism: The sceptre of Western European Democracy, Palgrave macmillan, February 2008, p. 3.

GErmanY – Populism in Germany

21

We can therefore reduce the definition to three

identifying migration as the root of economic

parts:

hardship and argues openly in nationalist rheto-

ric used during the Third reich.

a supposedly virtuous/ homogenous group of

people with common interests;

The political outlook in German politics is gener-

this group positions itself against an elite/ dan-

ally more conservative than in France but more

gerous other;

left-wing than in the uK. indeed, within the main

the elite or dangerous other is depriving the

German political parties we have recently seen a

group of its interests.

further rapprochement of policies. The Christian

conservatives have swayed in favor of formerly

relying on this basic definition we can assume

alien policies, such as the abolition of conscrip-

that firstly a simplification of issues takes place,

tion or the end of nuclear energy. Similarly the

in order to find broader appeal in society. as we

liberals had to let go of their plans to lower taxes.

will see, this assertion is supported by the fact

Previously the social democrats under Gerhard

that populism is inherently steered towards the

Schröder’s leadership introduced a stiffer wel-

less informed parts of society. This over-simpli-

fare system as regards social benefits and pen-

fication may express itself by identifying a single

sion rights. likewise the green party had to admit

threat and/or perpetrator and then continuing to

in government, with Joschka Fischer as foreign

expose a problem in a one-sided way. The propa-

secretary, that in certain cases military action is

gated populist policies will usually defy a main-

in fact necessary.

stream way of life or an accepted structure and

claim to expose an evil. as part of this populist

This rapprochement has been an ideal breeding

reasoning it follows that the supposedly ‘danger-

ground for more populist parties to fill the vac-

ous other’ or elite needs to be contained in order

uum. The red-green change of position to some

to avert the ongoing harm to the virtuous people.

left-wing policies was a major contributor for the

linke to grow stronger and reach comfortable

although this is the definition this author also sub-

levels of support.

scribes to, there are some commentators main-

taining that populism is not simply a process of

The more recently created Piraten party on the oth-

creating support but in fact an ideology. This is not

er hand is still trying to find a permanent position in

the case. Populism can find application within dif-

the left-wing arena. The party’s main pet-project is

ferent ideologies, but lacks the very inherent na-

freedom of expression in connection to the internet.

ture of an ideology, a set of values and political

The Piraten are largely benefiting from the liberals

and economic ideals. at best it can be said that the

staunchness to protecting intellectual property and

necessary ideology to feed populism can be vary-

business interests in the new media.

ingly complete and may have few conceived goals.

Both the linke and the Piraten are in this au-

a rapprochement of policies

thor’s opinion using populism as an instrument

to promote their goals. applying the definition,

in Germany the political system is fairly cen-

we can find that both are promoting certain main

trist. With recent experiences of far right-wing

interests (social welfare/ freedom of expression).

movements (Third reich) as well as far-left wing

Furthermore, both parties identify the elitist capi-

movements (GDr) both paths are generally fringe

talist system as the dangerous other. Finally, both

movements. However, the linKE (far left party)

parties argue that this system is harming society

enjoys a fairly broad appeal in the former GDr

by depriving them respectively of a fair share of

– partly resulting from economic challenges af-

the created wealth and the perceived endanger-

ter German reunification and partly because

ment of internet freedom.

of a rapprochement of the mainstream parties.

Equally the nPD (far right nationalist party) has

in this context it does not seem unlikely for a sim-

its main base of voters in eastern Germany, prob-

ilar party to come into existence to the right of the

ably because of the same economic difficulties.

Christian conservatives and the liberals, espe-

The former is reminiscent of a better past where

cially because of the latter’s current unpopular-

everyone was taken care of, i.e. the political elite,

ity. alternatively, the nPD (nationalist right) could

capitalism and Western German money is seen

attract these votes if the party were to become

as the dangerous other; the latter is actively

less extreme and more respectable.

22 Populism in Central and Eastern Europe – Challenge for the Future?

We will now briefly look over the main instru-

are many smaller parties, which could also be

ments populism uses in the German example.

mentioned and some commentators would in-

clude the green party (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen).

instruments of populism

The latter was probably a populist party to begin

with but now seems to be a solid part of society

instruments for populist politics in Germany in-

with a comprehensive set of policies, which are

clude mainly different sorts of media. as we will

no longer expressed as a populist discourse.

see in our case studies these include books, news-

papers and the media in general. The German

The three parties we will briefly look at are, on

media landscape as such, is, in its political out-

the one hand important as they represent the

look, also fairly centrist; if that is because it re-

two main extremes: left- and right-wing politics

flects society, or vice versa, is a matter of opinion.

(linke/ nPD), and on the other hand as they are

although the Bild newspaper is the most widely

the major fringe parties in German parliaments

read tabloid newspaper in Europe with around

(regional and federal level). However, all three

11.5 million readers a day it has no firm politi-

parties are very different in the way they are es-

cal inclination and is chiefly opportunistic so as

tablished in society. The Piraten party is fairly new

to generate the greatest reader attention. Other

and therefore only represented in some regional

newspapers may have a certain slant such as the

parliaments, as it has not had the chance of stand-

broadsheets Frankfurter allgemeine (more con-

ing for election to the Bundestag. The nPD on the

servative) or the Süddeutsche (more left-wing).

other hand has not met the 5% threshold needed

to gain seats in the Bundestag, whereas the linke

The television landscape is similar in that cer-

is a strong opposition party at federal level, though

tain channels may be prone to expose a problem

mainly thanks to votes from eastern Germany.

more from one or the other political perspective.

This is also true for the state television channels.

We will now look at the three parties mentioned. it

will be broadly outlined what these stand for, and

Other instruments may include banners or post-

what kind of voters/members support the party.

ers to generate support (e.g. elections). For less

organized movements demonstrations are some-

Die linke – The left

times the main way of generating attention in the

media, especially when lacking sufficient funds.

Die linke is a party which is largely reminiscent

of the GDr system, which is also why the party

The new media internet is probably one of the

had a much higher share of votes in the East than

most important ways populist movements can get

the West during the last general election. The

organized. it is a fairly inexpensive and speedy way

linke is the successor party of the Sozialistische

of communicating to a potentially vast amount of

Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED), which was

people. an interesting example may be Kreuz.net

the governing party in the GDr. The party’s mem-

an internet site operated by supposedly religious

bers tend to be older (68.1% are over 60 years

far right extremists who demonize homosexuals

and only 3.9% under the age of 30) and it has the

and Jews in the name of Christian Catholicism.

highest percentage of female membership of all

German parties (44.4%). The election results in

lastly, political parties are probably the most or-

2009 showed that voters are more likely to be

ganized and structured expression of populism in

male and, according to 1990s figures of the inter-

society. Currently, there are three major populist

ceding party of the democratic socialism (PDS),

parties in Germany, which we will now briefly ex-

a large percentage are from formally better edu-

amine in general before shedding more light on

cated backgrounds (26% have a degree opposed

them individually.

to the 11% average in other parties).8

Established populism

Piraten Partei – the Pirates Party

There are three main populist parties, namely the

The Piraten Partei (pirates’ party), is a relatively

linke, the Piraten and the nPD. Of course there

new phenomenon. its main raison d’être is free-

8 German federal centre of political education (bpb) website, Dossier – Parties in Germany, Die linke, http://www.bpb.de/politik/

grundfragen/parteien-in-deutschland/42138/waehlerschaft-und-mitglieder, retrieved 28th november 2012

GErmanY – Populism in Germany

23

dom of expression in relation to the internet and

Contemporary examples

intellectual property rights. it was founded in

of populism in Germany

September 2006 and based of the Swedish an-

ti-copyright organization Piratbyrån, which was

Thilo Sarrazin’s book is a good example of a

founded in January 2006.

mainstream populist right-wing movement. many

conservatives agree with him on the notions he

The voters tend to be male, young and relative-

put forward in his book entitled ‘Deutschland

ly educated (having higher education entrance

schafft sich ab’ (‘Germany makes away with it-

qualification rather than a university degree).

self’). However, in general the book was criti-

Furthermore, based on these statistics one may

cized as being racist and demonstrating a belief

extrapolate that the voters are either predomi-

in eugenics under the cover of speaking about

nantly unemployed or self-employed and unaffili-

‘cultural differences’. Such notions included the

ated with any religion.9

idea that Jewish and muslim people have certain

genes and that the Turks living in Germany are

nPD – the nationalists

only productive as market traders and otherwise

a burden on the welfare state. nonetheless, the

The nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands

book was a bestseller in 2010 and has so far sold

(nPD) is a nationalist party reminiscent of the Third

around 1.5 million copies.

reich. it is largely the successor of the Deutsche

reichspartei (DrP), which was founded 1964.

The debate, which followed from the publication

created greater interest in the debate surround-

The voters tend to be young, male and less ed-

ing immigration and integration. Some con-

ucated. in a regional election in mecklenburg-

servative circles saw it as a courageous step of

Vorpommern in 2006 it could be observed that

speaking-out a truth that was evident but seen

the highest approval rate came from the under 30

as politically incorrect to mention. The left and

age group (16,8%) and decreased with age to as

the mainstream in society condemned the social

little as 1,6% with the over 60s. The same is true

democrat and member of the Executive Board of

as regards educational background. Whereas the

the German Bundesbank as being racist and as

approval rate of voters with only primary school

having produced fallacious conclusions on figures

level education was at 8.1% and that of junior

with which he was claiming scientific reliability.

high school level education at 10.4%, voters with

abitur or university degree represented only 4.7%

The Occupy movement is a good example of left-

and 2.3% respectively. Following on from that, it

wing populism that occurred recently in 2011.

is not surprising that the party’s supporters are

although the original movement was created

often unemployed and/or from socially disadvan-

in the uS there was some support for it also in

taged backgrounds.10

Germany. The movement is positioned against

social injustice, speculative banking business

To illustrate what populism in Germany may look

and the influence of industry on politics. The main

like when not party-affiliated we will now look at

threat is perceived as coming from the finance in-

three fairly recent examples, which received wide

dustry, which is amassing the bulk of wealth in

media coverage. as emphasized before populism

society and exerting illegitimate influence on the

is fairly moderate in Germany and better exam-

political system. The movement was of relatively

ples can surely be found abroad to illustrate the

limited success in Germany as the country has

concept. nonetheless, they are good demonstra-

been less directly affected by the financial crisis.

tions of how the supposedly virtuous group claims

that certain things are not working properly and

another, even more current example of populism

that there was a taboo, which needed breaking in

in Germany is that of Günter Grass who formu-

order of achieving positive change and end a cer-

lated criticism as regards israel and its role in

tain threat to society.

the middle East in a poem. The nobel laureate

of literature stated in his poem, entitled ‘Was

gesagt werden muss’ (‘What needs to be said’),

9 Frankfurter allgemeine Zeitung website, Piratenpartei – Jung, männlich, gottlos, 20.04.2012, http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/piratenpartei-jung-maennlich-gottlos-11724563.html, retrieved 28th november 2012.

10 German federal centre of political education (bpb) website, Dossier – Parties in Germany, nPD, http://www.bpb.de/themen/ZmQY7O,0,Wer_w%E4hlt_rechtsextremistisch.html, retrieved 29th november 2012.

24 Populism in Central and Eastern Europe – Challenge for the Future?

that it was necessary to speak-out against israel

as regards the populist political parties in

endangering world peace. Furthermore, he dis-

Germany we can say that these are essentially

approved Germany’s role in relation to israel, as-

fulfilling the role of giving an impulse to the po-

serting it was not possible to criticize israel in the

litical process. Quite often these parties are the

Germany of today without automatically being

call of last resort for voters despairing over, what

seen as an anti-Semite. His work was published

is for them, an unacceptable situation. in order

on 4th april 2012 in the Süddeutsche newspaper

for established parties not to lose ground and not

as well as in la republica and El Pais.

to get out of touch with their constituents these

worries have to be addressed in form of adapted

The poem was widely seen as bordering on anti-

policies. These may include integration policies,

Semitism and received little approval in the

updating intellectual property rights, protecting

media. it did however reignite a controversial de-

the environment or addressing social injustice.

bate how Germany should handle its Holocaust

heritage and deal in German-israeli relations.

all three examples of populism we briefly looked

although Grass was exaggerating the situation it

at illustrate that populism, especially in such

seems likely that his criticism did hit a nerve in

a mild form as in Germany, is not necessarily

German society explaining why the poem created

harmful. it is probably the opposite. in all three

so much attention in the German media.

cases there were discussions and exchanges

about these challenges to society afterwards.

a benefit to democracy

This polarization that populism brings with it-

self supports an adversarial exchange of thought

in conclusion populism in Germany is not as pro-

throwing up all sorts of arguments and ensuring

nounced as in other countries. The definition we

that a complex of problems receives adequate at-

proposed in the beginning seems to be applica-

tention. if such a created debate remains factual

ble. moreover, we find in the German example,

and balanced, as we argue it is in Germany, pop-

populism-defined groups of people trying to po-

ulism will actually benefit the democratic proc-

larize debate by making often-exaggerated state-

ess in society.

ments about a challenging situation. as we have

seen, a single person may also ignite the popu-

list debate by claiming that he is breaking a taboo

and speaking out for society at large against an

evil or unacceptable situation.

auSTria – 1. right-wing populism in austria: just populism or anti-party party normality?

25

ausT

aus ria

T

rig

1. h

r t-wing populism in aus

ight-wing populism in t

aria

us : just po

tria: jus pulism or a

t populism nti-party party normality?

Dr. manfred Kohler, PhD (European Parliament &

or anti-party party normality?

university of Kent)

Dr. manfred Kohler, PhD (European Parliament & university of Kent)

Conventional literature on populism often de-

is still endorsed by first generation populist par-

scribes populist parties as new parties or even

ties, such as the austrian Freedom Party. The two

movements (see, e.g. Decker 2006). Others see

austrian ‘populist’ parties (now three including

a new type of populist parties emerging especially

the single-man party running for the 2013 national

in Western Europe, classified by Dick Pels (2011)

elections called ‘Team Stronach’ founded by the

as a new kind of ‘national individualism’ – as it has

austro-Canadian millionaire, Frank Stronach),

occurred, for instance, in the netherlands (Pim

the Freedom Party of austria (FPÖ) and its rather

Fortuyn and Geert Wilders) and Belgium (Bart

weak Haider-initiated break-off, the alliance for

de Wever’s new Flemish alliance). This new type

the Future of austria (BZÖ), are very hard to locate

has abandoned the notion of a uniform and ho-

within the populism research spectrum.

mogenous Volksgemeinschaft, the latter of which

26 Populism in Central and Eastern Europe – Challenge for the Future?

One reason is that they are both rooted in austria’s

a clearly demarcated ideology, which is that of

traditional third camp of German-nationals.

ethno-nationalism (see e.g. Smith 1998) and the

another reason is that, while they purport to

idea of a pure Volksgemeinschaft of austrians. as

be movements and anti-elite parties, they have

opposed to other European populist parties which

more or less existed in alternating forms before

have embarked on a journey towards more indi-

and after World War ii, with its national-socialist

vidual nationalism (Pels 2011), the predominant

roots protruding most in their genealogy. a third

anti-party party of austria, the Freedom Party,

reason is that both of them have formed part of

has not abhorred the notion of uniform Germanic

coalition governments, albeit always in the role

(austrian) peoplehood, even if, at times, the lat-

of junior partners. While the Freedom Party

ter is less emphasized against the background of

of austria has successfully marketed itself as

challenges like the Euro crisis. nevertheless one

a non-traditional party constituting the voice of

can posit that the Freedom Party makes heavy use

the people, it has in fact never really acted differ-

of the dualisms applied by conventional populism.

ent from the other two major traditional parties in

it undeniably markets itself as a modern move-

austria, Social Democrats (SPÖ) and the austrian

ment or new party, the voice of the people, the an-

People’s Party (ÖVP). This is especially true when

tagonist of the local political and European elites,

the Freedom Party had to assume a position of

and the protector of the native Volk as well as

responsibility in government. Whenever forming

the guarantor of popular (austrian, not anymore

part of a governing coalition, it became hard for

German) sovereignty against the corrupt and im-

the latter to maintain its non-traditional image as

pure elite at the national and European levels.

the voice of the people. in fact, government par-

ticipation led to intra-party conflict and break-

instruments of Populism in austria

offs (‘BZÖ’) and declining election results.

First of all, all austrian anti-party parties are lo-

Characteristics of Populist

cated to the right or at least center-right of the

Parties in austria

political spectrum. The Freedom Party, which

has always had the potential to muster between

While the excellent contribution by Karima aziz

15-30% of the electoral vote ever since the as-

(in this volume) focuses more on the history, ev-

cendance of Jörg Haider in 1986, has used the

olution, and manifestations of austrian populist

following populist tools to succeed in regional,

parties, this contribution takes a closer look at

national and European elections: the first is to

the characteristics of and tools applied by what

attack the political establishment and the cor-

i prefer to call austrian ‘anti-party parties’ (see,

responding austrian consociational democ-

e.g. Pallaver & Gärtner 2006; Frölich-Steffen

racy model (see, e.g. lijphart 1981), also called

2006), rather than austrian populist parties. The

‘Proporz’, which is based upon the consensus

author does so because he thinks that the evolu-

among the Social Democrats (SPÖ) and the con-

tionary reality of austrian politics is very strongly

servative austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) to share

co-featured and shaped by the Freedom Party of

power in the governance and administration

austria, which has, since the 1950s, well market-

of austria (see, e.g. Pelinka 2008). The second

ed itself as a party using populist style rhetoric

populist strategy is to base the party organisa-

and tools to highlight its purported anti-systemic

tion upon a charismatic leader, who is marketed

character, while at the same never shaking the

as the representative of the ordinary man (‘Der

constitutional foundations of austria’s Second

kleine mann’) – a political messiah. This leader,

republic after 1945, even when in government.

Heinz-Christian Strache of the Freedom Party,

This contribution departs from the general idea

constantly appeals to the need of strengthen-

that populism is more of a political instrument

ing and implementing popular sovereignty in the

and stylistic means to create a dualism between

form of a stronger plebiscitary democracy, a no-

‘we’ and ‘them’, e.g. the elite, the muslim or the

tion which is very popular among austrians, as

European union here. Populism is thus conceived

the representative sample below demonstrates.

as a means to make use of multiple ideologies,

but not representing one itself. Embarking from

this conception of populism, however, makes it

harder to define the Freedom Party, which i will

focus on here, as a classical populist party. This is

because the latter party is indeed endowed with

auSTria – 1. right-wing populism in austria: just populism or anti-party party normality?

27

What do you expect from politicians (responses in percent)

New elections

12

More personality voting

21

Big reforms in education and health

43

More referenda

57

None of the above

5

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Source: author’s own depiction. Data from: http://diepresse.com/home/politik/innenpolitik/708004/

Die-Ergebnisse-der-Presseumfrage?direct=707911&_vl_backlink=/home/politik/innenpolitik/707911/index.

do&selChannel= (accessed 11 December 2012)

One of the reasons why the alliance for the Future

another populist aspect that makes the Freedom

of austria is less successful than its ‘big broth-

Party attractive is that it aims to overcome clas-

er’, the Freedom Party, is that its leader, Josef

sical cleavages by taking right and left positions,

Bucher, is non-charismatic and hardly known.

which makes it palatable to a wider electorate,

not just to ‘losers of modernization’ (see, e.g.

The charismatic leader’s call for more direct de-

Pelinka & Wodak 2002). The strategies and tools

mocracy is aimed at establishing a ‘direct’ link

of agitative speech, resorting to common sense,

between himself and the people. This link is re-

radical solutions, the polarization between the

affirmed by the alliance with and reliance on lo-

elite and the grass roots of society, between ‘we’

cal and austria-wide tabloids and newspapers,

and ‘them’ (muslims), conspiracy theories, taboo

like the Kronen Zeitung, to advocate ‘real’ popu-

breaches, intentional provocation, violent meta-

lar rule. another populist strategy is to brand the

phors, biologistic rhetoric and fear-mongering

party (leader) as the saviour of the austrian cul-

all constitute a poisonous but indeed tasty cock-

ture from the invasion of immigrants and asylum

tail to the people - ‘opium for the people’ in a dull

seekers (‘Daham statt islam’).

and rigid political landscape.

The impact of populist

strategy in austria

One of the major impacts of populist rhetoric and

strategy is the fact that the traditional governing

coalition parties, the Social Democrats and the

austrian People’s Party, have steadily lost ground

in national elections.

Source: Web archive of Heinz-Christian Strache’s

homepage. See online: http://web.archive.org/

web/20071105204733/http://www.hcstrache.at/index.

php?style=7 (accessed 11 December 2012)

28 Populism in Central and Eastern Europe – Challenge for the Future?

austrian national Council elections since 1945

60 %

50 %

40 %

ÖVP

SPÖ

FPÖ

30 %

Grüne

BZÖ

20 %

andere

10 %

0 %

1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

Source: See online: http://www.nationalratswahl.at/ergebnisse.html (accessed 11 December 2012) another impact of populist politics in austria is

increasing tightening of immigration and asylum

the widespread anti-Eu attitude among the citi-

rules over the past ten years, and this process

zens. austrians are among the most Eu-sceptic

was not only driven by the austrian right wing

Europeans among all 27 member states of the

parties, the FPÖ and the BZÖ, when they were

European union (European Commission 2012).

in government from the beginning of 2000 until

The current sovereign debt crisis increases this

2006, but it was further intensified by the cur-

trend, while the anti-European Freedom Party

rently ruling government coalition of the austrian

uses the crisis to depict the austrian Chancellor,

People’s Party and the Social Democrats, the lat-

Werner Faymann, and the Vice-Chancellor and

ter of which even supported tight immigration and

Foreign minister, michael Spindelegger, as politi-

asylum laws while being in opposition. instead of

cians who just sell austria’s neutrality, the pillar

fighting negative stereotypes on foreigners, mi-

of austrian identity after World War ii, for the sake

grants and Greeks in the case of the current Euro

of creating a European super-state. Other rheto-

crisis, the ruling parties have decided to band-

ric expressly accuses the austrian government of

wagon with the Freedom Party and thus popular

pouring millions of Euros generated by austrian

opinion. This may have the most damaging long-

taxpayers into the European Stability mechanism

term impact on the socio-cultural as well as

(ESm), thus helping out the ‘lazy’ Greeks. This

public spheres in austria. But are populist tools

strategy of forming internal (austrians vs.

and strategies all that negative from a normative

muslims) versus external dualisms (austrians

or moral perspective? Or do they also highlight

versus Greeks) does not only strengthen popu-

problems that cannot be ignored in the long-run?

lar support for the Freedom Party especially,

but, in the latter case, it also potentially shakes

is Populism destructive?

the foundation of European integration, which is

based upon the growing together of nation-states

in the case of austria, the answer as to whether

upon equal terms.

populism is destructive or not has to be answered

with a clear ‘Jein’, that is yes and no.

last but not least a powerful impact of austrian

populism is that anti-immigration attitudes

Yes, because austrian populist instruments have

among austrians have not just prevailed, but con-

contributed to widening the gap between ‘we’ and

tinue to exist. This is best reflected in the ever

‘them’, whoever the latter stands for, be it the

auSTria – 1. right-wing populism in austria: just populism or anti-party party normality?

29

muslim, the immigrant in general, the political

‘from the cradle to the grave’ is no longer a so-

establishment or even the European union. This

cial reality, just like the long-standing party camp

is a tremendous success for austria’s anti-party

mentalities that have widely eroded. The social

parties, particularly the Freedom Party. But when

cleavages between secularism and religion or

it comes to, for instance, anti-Eu sentiments

capital and labour have been widely closed due to

among austrians, this also highlights the fact

the consociational democracy model established

that the European union’s political system is not

after World War ii in austria, which placed em-

tangible and conceivable to the citizens of Europe

phasis on power sharing between the two major

due to a weakly developed principle of represen-

political parties, the SPÖ and ÖVP. However, this

tation at European level, with a weak popularly

successful system of consociationalism is now

elected European Parliament confronted with the

questioned by many austrians, probably rightfully

almighty heads of state and government in the

so since it served its purpose of maintaining peace

European Council. Other destructive impacts of

within a once divided society made up of Social

populist strategy in austria are an intolerant cli-

Democrats and ÖVP members. a leap towards

mate towards foreigners and the questioning of

more personality voting and more competitive de-

the achievements of liberal representative de-

mocracy is thus a legitimate claim. Taking citizens

mocracy in favour of ‘real’ popular rule, which in

on board in a liberal representative democracy is

itself bears the seeds of authoritarianism.

a huge challenge at both the national and European

levels. Populist parties in Europe and the anti-par-

The advantage of anti-party party politics with its

ty party, the FPÖ, are not just destructive, but can

populist elements is that it has shown that society

also be correctives in liberal representative de-

in austria has changed towards more moderni-

mocracies that sometimes do not come to terms

zation and individualism. Being a party member

with the principle of representation.

references

Decker, Frank (ed.)(2006) Populismus in Europa. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung.

European Commission (ed.) (2012) ‘Public Opinion in the European union’, Standard Eurobarometer, 77, Brussels.

Frölich-Steffen, Susanne (2006) ‘rechtspopulistische Herausforderer in Konkordanzdemokratien.

Erfahrungen aus Österreich, der Schweiz und den niederlanden’, in Frank Decker (ed.) Populismus in Europa. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, pp. 144-164.

lijphart, arend (1981) ‘Comment, Consociational Democracy’, Comparative Politics 14 (2), pp. 355-60.

Pallaver, Günther & reinhold Gärtner (2006) ‘Populistische Parteien an der regierung – zum Scheitern verdammt? italien und Österreich im Vergleich’, in Frank Decker (ed.) Populismus in Europa.

Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, pp. 99-120.

Pelinka, anton & ruth Wodak (eds.) (2002) The Haider Phenomenon in austria. Transaction Publishers.

Pelinka, anton (2008) ‘Gesetzgebung im politischen System Österreichs’, in Wolfgang ismayr (ed.) Gesetzgebung in Westeuropa, Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag, pp. 431-461.

Pels, Dick (2011) ‘The new national individualism’, in meijers (ed.) Populism in Europe.

Smith, anthony D. (1998) nationalism and modernism, london-new York: routledge.

30 Populism in Central and Eastern Europe – Challenge for the Future?

2. Populist parties in austria

Karima aziz, mmag.a (Forum Emancipatory islam)

in the austrian political scene there is primarily

the party. The resistance of the German national-

one party which can be defined as a populist par-

ists under Jörg Haider grew, and after his election

ty. The Freedom Party austria, Freiheitliche Partei

as the new party leader in 1986 the coalition broke

Österreichs FPÖ, applies to both approaches of

up. under Jörg Haider the FPÖ went through a radi-

‘populism’ as an ideology as well as an instru-

cal repositioning as a right-populist protest par-

ment of politics. However, the FPÖ also needs to

ty, which could win votes in even the traditional

be identified as a right-wing, or even extreme-

worker’s strongholds. in the middle of the 1990s

right, party (see below). There are other smaller

the FPÖ changed from a rather diffuse protest

movements, such as the BZÖ, which emerged as

party with broad voter coalitions to an articu-

a split from the FPÖ, and for example the new

lated right-populism with an electoral focus on

Team Stronach. These are often described as

the lower social and educational classes. at the

populist in how they conduct their style of poli-

same time, Jörg Haider expressed controversial

tics. The following paper describes the history

comments on the nS regime and thereby kept the

and representation of the FPÖ as well as the BZÖ,

traditional electorate close to the party. Following

as a successor in a certain sense; the geographi-

the referendum ‘austria first’ in 1993, which was

cal differences; the social stratification of the

launched by the FPÖ, the liberal wing of the party

electorate as well as the level of radicalisation.

split off and founded the liberal Forum liF, at the

Furthermore, the links of the FPÖ to other coun-

same time the FPÖ left the liberal international.

tries are exemplified and a short look into a pos-

sible future, as ascertained from current opinion

after the takeover by Jörg Haider the FPÖ’s elec-

polls, will be presented.

tion results (see Bmi) continuously went up – 1986:

9.7 %, 1990: 16.6 %, 1994: 22.5 % – and reached

History & representation

their peak in 1999 with 26.9 %. The FPÖ was then

the second largest party in austria and the strong-

The Freedom Party of austria (see Bauer 2012:

est right-populist party in Europe. in 2000 the ÖVP

53 ff.) (FPÖ) was constituted on the 7th of april

and the FPÖ formed a coalition, which led to sanc-

1956 as the successor to the association of the

tions being imposed on the austrian Government

independent, Verband der unabhängigen Vdu,

by the other 14 Eu Governments. in 2002 a snap

which brought together former national social-

election was held due to the FPÖ internal dis-

ists, German nationalists and liberal pan-Ger-

putes between the pragmatic governing wing and

mans. The goal of the FPÖ was the establishment

the followers of Jörg Haider, who did not occupy a

of a 3rd camp to compete with the major parties

ministerial position. at this snap election the FPÖ

of Social Democrats SPÖ and the Christian-Social

lost a lot of votes and reached only 10 %. With the

party ÖVP. The FPÖ grew to be a German national-

ÖVP emerging as the winner of the election, the

ist party, which reached between 5.5% and 7% of

two parties continued their coalition.

the vote, and was used as a bargaining chip in ne-

gotiations by the two major political parties. For

The FPÖ couldn’t sustain the balancing act (see

a long time two groups within the FPÖ were fight-

Bauer 2012: 55-56) between a populist anti-es-

ing for predominance; the radical-nationalist

tablishment party and a governing party support-

against the economic liberal wing. at the party

ive of the state. Previously critics of corruption

congress in 1980, the economic liberal wing won

and nepotism, the FPÖ soon became subject

and, after the national elections in 1983 in which

of such scandals, and flawed personnel policy

the FPÖ achieved its lowest result of 5%, formed

made it difficult for their ministers to conduct

a coalition with the SPÖ and therefore was part of

their work. after disastrous results in state and

a government for the first time.

European elections in 2004 (23.4% to 6.3% in five

years) the party leaders including Jörg Haider left

Despite the liberal orientation (see Bauer 2012:

the FPÖ in 2005 and founded the alliance for the

54-55) a lot of German nationalist voters re-

Future of austria, Bündnis Zukunft Österreich

mained attached to the party, which led to irrita-

BZÖ. The BZÖ was not really a new party, but rath-

tions amongst the governing coalition and within

er the successor of the FPÖ in order to be able

auSTria – 2. Populist parties in austria

31

to continue participation in government. in april

in Vienna the FPÖ was the second strongest party

2005 Heinz-Christian Strache was elected as the

in the city elections of 2010 with 26%. in Vorarlberg,

new FPÖ party leader. Strache also acts as a right

the FPÖ achieved a similar result with 25 %. after

populist, but has stronger ties to the German na-

Vienna and Vorarlberg, the FPÖ is strongest in

tionalist scene than Haider did. almost the whole

upper austria with 15%, in the other states the

Carinthian FPÖ transitioned into the BZÖ; in the

FPÖ polls between 9 % and 13%, the BZÖ is mean-

other regions the FPÖ was able to stay dominant.

ingless almost everywhere except Carinthia.

The federal state elections brought up weak re-

sults for the FPÖ and the BZÖ, but they continu-

During national elections, the BZÖ was able to

ously improved.

reach more votes than in state elections, espe-

cially in its results in Carinthia with 38.5%, but

at the national elections in 2006 the FPÖ reached

also in the other federal states between 4% and

11% of the votes and due to its good results in

even 13%. also, the FPÖ received more votes at

Carinthia the BZÖ reached 4.1 % nationally and

the national elections than at the state ones, be-

thereby passed the 4% threshold for parliamen-

tween 7% and 20%.

tary representation.

in snap elections in 2008, both parties benefit-

social stratification of the electorate &

ed from dissatisfaction with the ruling Grand

level of radicalization

Coalition and won 18% (FPÖ) and 11% (BZÖ),

both outpolling the Greens. Combined, this re-

The FPÖ is itself an ‘old party’, altpartei (see

sult would make them the second largest party

Bauer 2012: 54), as its politicians used to de-

in austria. Two weeks later Jörg Haider passed

scribe the SPÖ and ÖVP and their tendency to-

away in a car accident. in December 2009 the

wards corruption and nepotism. FPÖ politicians

Carinthian BZÖ broke from the national BZÖ and

lack distance from the nS regime, use anti-

entered into a cooperation alliance with the FPÖ.

Semitic (see Schiedel) undertones, or rather

at the Viennese city election in 2010 the FPÖ re-

‘overtones’ – as most recently HC Strache pub-

ceived 26% of the votes and is now the second

lished a cartoon (see Der Standard 20.08.2012) of

strongest party in Vienna. The FPÖ is currently

a stereotype of a Jew with a hook nose and a Star

represented in the national assembly, in all of

of David posing as a bank being fed all the food,

the nine state assemblies and a number of lo-

sitting across from starving people – and formu-

cal councils. at the elections for European par-

late clearly racist statements.

liament the FPÖ managed to double its votes

from 6.3% in 2004 to 13.1% in 2009, but was still

in its populist orientation (see Bauer 2012: 57) it

below expectations since it lost a lot of votes to

is patriotic of austria and can attract protest vot-

the Eurosceptic populist Hans-Peter martin, who

ers, the so called “losers of the modernisation

reached 17.9% and who clearly distanced himself

process”, who are susceptible to right-populist

from extreme right and racist positions.

phrases, especially concerning topics such as the

European union and migration. Voters with lower

Geographical differences

educational levels as well as men vote dispro-

portionately highly for the FPÖ. it reaches those

Concerning geographical differences (see Bmi)

voters who were released from their traditional

in the results of the FPÖ and the BZÖ there is

party ties by the modernisation process, which

of course one major difference, which is the lo-

is connected to the transition of the FPÖ from

cal situation in Carinthia. Carinthia was always

a former middle-class party to a more proletarian

a stronghold of Jörg Haider, so when he founded

party, thus using anti-European and anti-interna-

the BZÖ, almost the whole Carinthian FPÖ tran-

tionalist rhetoric against all that is foreign. The

sitioned into the BZÖ. Currently it calls itself FPK

party is evidently a right-wing party and is pre-

(Freedom Party Carinthia) and is again in cooper-

ferred by those on the right who are disappointed

ation with the FPÖ. in Carinthian state elections

by the system. What differentiates the FPÖ from

the FPÖ reached 42.4% in 2004, but in 2009 after

most other right-populist parties is its traditional

the establishment of the BZÖ, the BZÖ got 44.9%

stance within the austrian party system and its

and the FPÖ only 3.8%.

huge early successes. The FPÖ has also been

so successful because of the austrian system of

high political stability and the separation of all

32 Populism in Central and Eastern Europe – Challenge for the Future?

areas of life between spheres of influence of the

movement pro Köln and the Swiss people’s party.

SPÖ and the ÖVP. During the erosion of this con-

The FPÖ used to be part of the European parlia-

cordance system (see Frölich-Steffen 2006: 153),

mentary fraction identity, Tradition, Sovereignty

the FPÖ transformed itself from a former nota-

(see Bauer 2012: 113-115). Following Eu enlarge-

bility party to a protest party in an outsider role.

ment, the nationalist, right-wing parties man-

aged to bring together enough members of the

Fritz Plasser and Peter ulram (see Plasser / ulram

European Parliament to form their own group.

2000: 225-242) argue that only 40% of the FPÖ

already in 2005 some extreme right and right-

voters are the core of the party, the majority are

populist parties met in Vienna and published the

protest voters who vote the FPÖ because of their

‘Viennese declaration’ against mass immigra-

populist politics. The FPÖ states that they received

tion, islamization etc. in January 2007 they were

a large share of the youth vote, while the SOra in-

able to be recognised as a group in the European

stitute (see Die Presse) analysed that the lower the

Parliament, but already in november 2007 it was

youth’s educational background and their parents’

dissolved due to its own xenophobia. in 2008 there

educational level, the more likely they were to vote

was again a meeting of extreme right and right-

for the FPÖ. Votes from former Yugoslavians are

populist parties in Vienna, where they planned

also disproportionately high for the FPÖ.

the establishment of a new right-populist, ex-

treme-right European party. in February 2011 the

The main focuses of the FPÖ are austrian patriot-

European alliance for Freedom was registered

ism, the ‘foreigner problem’ and Eu scepticism.

as a European party, with the FPÖ as a member.

The FPÖ is successful among people with low-

Since summer 2011 the FPÖ is also cooperating

er education and workers (see Plasser / ulram

with the Slovakian national party.

2000: 232), especially young men without union-

or religious-ties and a pessimistic outlook on life.

a look into the future: opinion polls

Since the FPÖ is also a proletarian party, parts

of its protest can be characterised as left-popu-

austria has a new politician – Frank Stronach. His

list. The FPÖ mobilises the marginal and hard-

agitation is described as soft populism (see Sperl

working against the elites, the austrians against

2012), he promotes the abolition of the Euro and

the foreigners, the Christians against islamiza-

wants to go back to the Schilling or an “austrian

tion and so on. The FPÖ can be characterized as

Euro” and he poses as the saviour of austria and

a right-populist party with extremist phrasing

the austrian soul. in opinion polls (see profil.at)

(see Weisenbericht 2000: 28). anton Pelinka (see

he continuously gains votes, mostly at the ex-

Pelinka 2005: 92 ff.) argues that the combination

pense of the FPÖ. Stronach now reaches between

of the intensity of the right-populist rhetoric with

9% and 11% in polls. if next Sunday there were

its tradition including the nSDaP past justifies de-

elections, the FPÖ would reach between 19% and

fining the FPÖ as, at least partially, extreme-right.

21%, the BZÖ is always around the 4% threshold.

Before Stronach’s appearance the polls estimated

links to other countries

the FPÖ to receive between 24% and 29%, but at

the time of writing this article all parties lose vot-

The FPÖ maintains strong contacts (see Bauer

ers to Stronach. The austrian election year 2013

2012: 60) with other right-populist and extreme

will show whether this trend will be sustained.

right parties such as Vlaams Belang, people’s

auSTria – 2. Populist parties in austria

33

internet:

Official website FPÖ: http://www.fpoe.at/

H.C. Strache: http://www.hcstrache.at/

Official website BZÖ: http://www.bzoe.at/

Official website team Stronach: http://www.teamstronach.at/

literature:

Frölich-Steffen, Susanne (2006): rechtspopulistische Herausforderer in Konkordanzdemokratien.

Erfahrungen aus Österreich, der Schweiz und den niederlanden. in: Frank Decker, Populismus, 144-164.

Plasser, Fritz / ulram, Peter a. (2000): rechtspopulistische resonanzen. Die Wählerschaft der FPÖ.

in: Fritz Plasser et al. (ed.), Das österreichische Wahlverhalten, 225-242.

Pelinka, anton (2005): Die FPÖ: Eine rechtspopulistische regierungspartei zwischen adaption und Opposition. in: Susanne Frölich-Steffen et al. (ed.), Populisten an der macht, 87-104.

Online:

Bauer, Werner T. (2012): rechtsextreme und rechtspopulistische Parteien in Europa, Österreichische Gesellschaft für Politikberatung und Politikentwicklung. On 27.11.2012: http://www.politikberatung.or.at/typo3/fileadmin/02_Studien/6_europa/rechte_Parteien.pdf Bmi: Wahlen und Volksbegehren. On 27.11.2012: http://www.bmi.gv.at/cms/Bmi_wahlen/

Der Standard (20.08.2012): Streit um antisemitisches Bild auf Strache-Seite. On 27.11.2012: http://derstandard.at/1345164507078/Streit-um-antisemitisches-Bild-auf-Strache-Seite Die Presse: Jungwähler: FPÖ und Grüne fast gleichauf. On 27.11.2012:

http://diepresse.com/home/politik/wienwahl/601074/Jungwaehler_FPOe-und-Gruene-fast-gleichauf Profil.at. On 27.11.2012: www.profil.at

Schiedel, Heribert: Die FPÖ und der antisemitismus – Ein lange verdrängter aspekt. On 27.11.2012: http://www.doew.at/thema/fpoe/schiedel.html

Sperl, Gerfried (08.10.2012): Von Haider zu Stronach: Die Populismuskeule, Der Standard.

On 27.11.2012: http://derstandard.at/1348285285817/Von-Haider-zu-Stronach-Die-Populismuskeule Weisenbericht (2000): Bericht von martti ahtisaari, Jochen Frowein und marcelino Oreja.

On 27.11.2012: http://derstandard.at/upload/images/bericht.pdf

34 Populism in Central and Eastern Europe – Challenge for the Future?

sloVaKia

Populism in Slovakia

Peter učeň, independent researcher

an experience confirms that more often than not

it.’ Therefore, it is inevitable to present briefly

any discussion on populism is impaired by the

my preferred approach to populism before pro-

gravely differing opinions of participants on what

ceeding to the description of populist politics in

populism actually is. many people automatically

Slovakia. after all, that description is predictably

apply the approach ‘we do not know what it is

marked by the chosen definition.

but will recognise it immediately when we see

SlOVaKia – Populism in Slovakia

35

Defining populism for the research

concepts which define which major areas of the

and ‘policy’ purposes

politics the ideology refers to. (Those areas, in

case of grand mainstream ideologies, are typi-

Obviously, the prevailing motivation in choosing

cally related to the problems of social justice, dis-

any definition should be the methodological one;

tribution of resources, and conflict-management

the definition should provide for a meaningful sci-

of societies (Freeden 2003, 99).

entific inquiry and analysis. There are, however,

cases when the notion, such as populism, starts

The morphological approach to populism – and to

to live the life of its own and most of that life takes

any other ideology for that matter – then rests on

place outside of the realm of scholarship. Various

identifying the concepts in its ineliminable core.

groups and public in general adopt the notion in

The unique combination of these concepts makes

their discourse for their own particular goals and

ideology distinct. Freeden’s morphological view of

tracing this inflated usage of the term inevitably

ideologies is far from being ahistorical. it is based

leads a methodology-minded scholar to a single

on the fact that traditional ‘grand’ ideologies have

conclusion – conceptual stretching. a scholar often

been created by concrete actors and that they

moving between academia and policy development

evolved around important historical traditions.

realm (‘think tanking’), is regularly confronted

Those are specimens of established, distinct and

with the dilemma of choosing different definitions

‘full’ ideologies. in order for ideology to be estab-

for different occasions to tackle the conceptual

lished, it needs to ‘manifest a shared set of con-

stretching outside of academia: in my case, for the

ceptual features over time and space’ (Freeden,

sake of (comparative) political research i prefer an

1998, 749). To be a distinct one, ideology’s core

approach which considers populism to be a ‘thin-

‘will have to be unique to itself alone’ (Freeden

centred ideology,’ while for the sake of ‘think

1998, 750) vis-à-vis other thought-patterns.

tanking’ and debates with public i often resort to

defining it as ‘the particular way of doing politics

The essence of this section of the text is to claim

informed by the populist ideology, ’ followed by the

that populism can be justified as distinct, yet thin-

next logical step, that is defining populist ideology.

centred ideology. Cas mudde referred to this rea-

soning when providing a definition of populism in

a ‘thin-centred ideology’ approach comes from

his seminal article (mudde 2004) as well as in his

the morphological approach to ideologies devel-

later book where populism was featured as a part

oped by michael Freeden [Freeden 1996, 2003]. in

of a definition of the party family of the populist

it, the conventional notion of ideology as a ‘set of

radical right (mudde 2007). For mudde, populism

political ideas, beliefs and attitudes that involve

is ‘a thin-centred ideology that considers society

the adoption of practices which explain, support,

to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous

justify or contest socio-political arrangements,

and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus

and which provide plans for action for public po-

‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics

litical institutions’ (Freeden 1998, 749), has not

should be an expression of the volonté générale

been challenged; but Freeden regards ideologies

(general will) of the people’ (mudde 2007, 23).

as ideational phenomena with a capacity of influ-

mudde’s approach assumes three concepts to be

encing how we perceive and behave in political

present in the ideological core of populism: ‘the

realm. Paraphrasing the author, while ideolo-

people,’ ‘the elite’ and ‘popular sovereignty.’

gies indeed compete over plans for public policy,

they do it primarily through the competition over

Further, drawing on Freeden, Ben Stanley elabo-

the control of political language; and they do it in

rated on conceptualisation of populism along the

a special way (Freeden 2003, 54). This way is to be

same lines, but in greater detail. He defined the

discerned through the analysis of morphology of

thin core of the populist ideology by pointing out its

ideologies as structured and patterned systems

following ‘four distinct but interrelated’ concepts:

– assemblages of political concepts – where the

functions to a great degree hinge upon they way

(1) ‘The existence of two homogeneous units of

the concepts are configured. in sum, ‘[a]n ideol-

analysis: ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’

ogy is,’ Freeden affirms, ‘a wide-ranging struc-

(2) The antagonistic relationship between the peo-

tural arrangement that attributes meanings to

ple and the elite

a range of mutually defining political concepts’

(3) The idea of popular sovereignty

(Freeden 2003, 52). Each ideology consists of its

(4) The positive valorisation of ‘the people’ and

core – a fundamental and ineliminable class of

denigration of ‘the elite’’ (Stanley 2008, 102)

36 Populism in Central and Eastern Europe – Challenge for the Future?

Stanley argues, and i subscribe to this argument,

in practical terms then, treating populism as

that an interaction of the four core concepts of

a distinct yet highly combinable ideology means

populism results in a distinct, yet incompre-

attempting in analysis:

hensive, interpretation of the political. The core

concepts depict the structure as well as logic of

(a) to recognise the presence of its core concepts

the populist political. as those concepts can be

in the messages of parties and leaders;

identified in messages of actors across many

(b) to identify the forms those concepts may assume;

temporal and territorial instances of the populist

(c) to assess the relative weight they are assigned

politics, and they manifest a quality of an exclu-

in those appeal (some may be ‘more populist

sive thought-pattern, it is reasonable to assume

than anything else’, others ‘more anything else

that populism qualifies for being considered an

than populist’);

established and distinct ideology.

(d) to disentangle their interplay with components

of other ideologies present in party messages.

Consequences of conceptualization

By the same token, spotting the manifestations of

Compared to grand narratives such as socialism

the core concepts of populism in party messages

or liberalism – which we conventionally consider

facilitates analytical treatment of diversity within

the ideologies – the slim ideology of populism,

populism (or among populisms). Variety which

with its restricted conceptual core, can not

the core concepts themselves may exhibit gives

achieve what grand ideologies do: (1) to define

a promise of successfully accounting for an ar-

an anthropological conception of man; (2) to pro-

ray of real-life cases of populism. While all ‘pop-

vide justification and blueprint for an institutional

ulisms’ have to be similar in sharing the basic

structure of the (complex) polities; and, (3) to give

concepts, they may (and indeed will) differ in their

reason for policy preferences and supply the set

manifestations and relative weight. Explaining the

of policies for (modern) societies. rather than

array of ‘populisms’ means also taking into ac-

providing all those nice things, populism, instead,

count that populist arguments will be at variance

quite monotonously reiterates that the people

as to how they define ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’

has been denied is legitimate place in politics by

(who belongs to it, who does not, and why so), and

the elite, that this aberration has to be put right,

what are the exact forms, and manifestations of

and that politics should be an expression of the

their antagonistic relationship (how the elite harm

popular will. Therefore, a very frequent conse-

people). Tracing variance should also include the

quence of the conceptual thinness of populism is

recommended means for restoring the primacy of

that many observers and scholars refuse to con-

the people in the political realm (even though here

sider it an ideology and regard it as the political

the responses can be rather obscure).

style at most. This lone ambition of populism to

argue in favour of restoring the legitimate place

a viable comparative strategy can be then con-

of the people also makes a search for distinctive

ceived based on these assumptions as indicated,

political institutions of populism – even the pro-

for example, by Stanley’s thoughts regarding the

verbial referenda and other instruments of direct

expectations of such research:

democracy – a rather futile enterprise.

‘at any given point, certain parties and social

another consequence thereof is combinability,

movements will be ‘more populist’ than others,

meaning that the thin and largely impractical ide-

in that populism is a more salient aspect of their

ology of populism almost never stands alone and

appeal. Some may retain over time a consistent

it willingly and, frankly, inevitably combines with

combination of populism and another, full ideol-

elements of other ideologies in party messages.

ogy. Others may hitch their populism to a variety

When looking for populist appeals, we typically

of passing ideological bandwagons. Still others

find them in conjunction with various ‘host-ves-

may keep to a consistent full ideology with a wax-

sels’ (the term taken from Freeden). (The primary

ing or waning populist element. Finally, in some

example of this feature of populism is mudde’s

cases they may exhibit no particular ideological

analysis of the empirically prevailing instance of

consistency, thin or full. amidst all these divaga-

populism – the party family of the populist radical

tions, the identification of populism will continue

right (mudde, 2007). This feature, however, also

to be a demanding and controversial task, but no

makes this approach to populism amenable to

less important or relevant for all that’ (Stanley

comparative political research.

2008, 108).

SlOVaKia – Populism in Slovakia

37

Conventional notion of populism

pirically prevailing form of radical nationalism. in

the second place the term absorbs practically any

Before proceeding to populism in Slovakia, it will

form of the challenge to the established actors,

be useful to compare the above scholarly defi-

ideas, practices and institutions on the level of the

nition with a conventional notion of populism,

nation state. On the level of Eu it in addition de-

which - being a child of the conceptual stretching

notes ‘Euroscepticism,’ that is any criticism of the

and moralistic outrage – (1) is heavily moralisti-

mainstream conception of the European integra-

cally charged, often elitist, and marked by econo-

tion – its nature, direction, pace, speed, range, and

mist reductionism and technocracy; (2) tends to

procedures involved – or, any objection against the

consider populism a style rather than ideology;

fact that established powers in Europe are eligible

and, (3) judges populism based on its host ide-

to define the future nature of the integration with-

ologies or their flagship policy preferences rather

out making a detailed plans or obtaining a prior

than on populism’s own merit.

legitimacy from the European peoples. The vulgar

journalistic version of the conventional notion, fi-

in its conventional notion, populism is treated as

nally, sees populism as a synonym to the poten-

the wrong and illegitimate – factually, but mainly

tially violent extremist politics of the right.

morally – (way of doing) politics carried out by

wrong and illegitimate actors. Populism is por-

To sum up, the contemporary prevailing conven-

trayed as the wrong way of obtaining popular

tional notion treats populism as elusive but at the

support by, for example, courting the public mood

same time clear and present threat to democracy.

and giving irresponsible promises. The (alleged)

at best it concedes that under certain conditions

populists are criticised for turning to the people

populism could be a litmus test, an indicator of

and speaking on its behalf – as if democratic pol-

the health of democracy.

iticians had any more urgent and important task

than that – or, in more sophisticated accounts,

although most of the assumptions of the con-

doing these things in an illegitimate way. This is

ventional treatment are wrong – especially when

the essence of populism as an elitist epithet and

judged from the position of scholarly rigor – the

a politically correct term of abuse.

notion itself is understandable as a result of the

widespread demand for a single word – rather

The deprecation of populism as the legitimate

than a complicated scholarly definitions full of

way of doing politics also typically rests on judge-

caveats – denoting the motley crew of all ‘prob-

ment of the ‘host vessel’s’ populism, often com-

lematic’ actors in contemporary democracies

bined with – notably in the case of nationalism

and justifying ‘we recognise it when we see it’

– the proposed policy positions, such as immigra-

approach to stigmatisation of an opponent. a hy-

tion control, which are, again, often formulated

brid of a methodological mistake and a deliberate

by these host ideologies rather than by populism

political calculus, the conventional notion of pop-

itself, which tends to be just a voice in service of

ulism also satisfies the demand for the politically

such arguments.

correct term of abuse applicable to the political

rivals, namely the newly emerging challengers.11

So, in its conventional usage populism became a

stigma for various kinds of criticism of establish-

Populism in slovakia

ment, namely:

Slovakia is no exception from a general rule of

nationalism;

the overstretched and deliberately misused con-

‘Euroscepticism’;

cept; after all, practically all of its relevant par-

new challengers (party- as well as movement-

liamentary parties were at one point or another

based), such as

accused of populism. in reality, the incidence of

• anti-establishment reform parties; and

populism in Slovakia is lower than one would ex-

• movements demanding accountability.

pect and it is a subject to a remarkable variation

in ‘intensity.’

What the term ‘populism’ in Europe describes in

the first place is the populist radical right, the em-

11 The scholarly equivalent of the conventional notion of populism is an effort to construct a single populist family; given the nature of its conceptual core, it is practically impossible for populism to constitute a distinct party family.

38 Populism in Central and Eastern Europe – Challenge for the Future?

in general, when it comes to the most articu-

party’s moderate national conservative element

late instances of populism in the country’s poli-

deserted and merged into the nascent main-

tics, it has been combined with nationalism (and

stream right while SnS became the populist radi-

authoritarianism) in two cases (Slovak national

cal right party.

Party and the politics of Vladimír mečiar) and

with the non-ideological or generically leftist ide-

SnS participated in governments three times –

ological outlooks in one case (robert Fico).

two times as a junior coalition partner for mečiar

and once for Fico. While its support potential re-

The radical right politics

mained stable – around 10-12 per cent – the party

of the slovak national Party (sns)

went through ups and downs in the form of dam-

aging disunity and splits which prevented it from

SnS is a member of the populist radical right

parliamentary participation in 2002 and probably

family as defined by mudde (2007). as the poli-

also in 2012.

tics of radical nationalism it combines in its ideo-

logical core the triad of nativism (the belief that

The distinguished feature of SnS political conduct

states should be inhabited by the natives and

was the peculiar way in which it tamed its nation-

that the non-native elements constitute harm),

alist animosities and suppressed expressions of

authoritarianism (belief that the society should

the nativist wrath for the sake of government ac-

be hierarchically organized and transgressions

ceptability and related consumption of spoils. in

against authority should be punished) and pop-

general, SnS is considered to be a very corrupt

ulism (in the sense of definition above).

party, a sort of a business brotherhood selling na-

tionalism to interested constituencies and cash-

The nature of nationalism of SnS – and of oth-

ing enormous political but mainly materials gains.

er East Central European radical right parties,

in the aftermath of the recent electoral demise of

for that matter – differs from the nationalism of

the party and resignation of its long-time leader

their Western counterparts. it is marked by the

Ján Slota, concerns emerged that the end of SnS

different historical experience and includes the

as Slota’s ‘political ltd’ and resulting waning of

remnants of various historical traditions of the

pragmatic impediments could lead to party’s radi-

Slovak nationalism of the nineteenth and twen-

calization or a shift of its supporters towards the

tieth century (romanticising national emancipa-

more radical and previously less popular forma-

tion movement under Hungary and the autonomy

tions of the radical right that have been resenting

movement under Czechoslovakia respectively).12

SnS opportunism for a long time now.

The wrath of SnS nativism has been aimed mainly

The social populism of robert Fico

against the local magyar-speaking minority – and

the Czechs before that – which have been de-

Even though robert Fico, skilful demagogue and

picted as foreign elements harmful to the Slovak

popular communicator, originates in the (nomi-

nation. Verbally, however, the Slovak nativist are

nally) social democratic Party of the Democrat-

also well versed in ‘western’ nativist topics such

ic left (SDĽ) – and previously in the Communist

as damaging impact of immigration and the coun-

Party of Slovakia (KSS) – the beginnings of his

ter-Jihadist themes, regardless of the lack of both

party Smer (Direction) were marked by a great

immigrants and islamist radicals in the country.

deal of the non-ideological ‘common sense’

pragmatism and distancing from the traditional

SnS as one of the oldest parties in Slovakia,

ideological politics.

formed in march 1990 as a general nationalist

party with articulate separatist tendencies which

Smer appeared in the late 1990s, as a general

advocated Slovak national sovereignty within –

anti-establishment party benefiting from the re-

but increasingly outside – of the Czechoslovak

sentment of the part of electorate over the culmi-

federation. after the crisis in 1993 and 1994 the

nating ideological war between mečiar and rising

12 in general, the current ideology of SnS – as well as of other, less successful incarnations of the radical right in Slovakia – can be characterised as a modernised version of the ludak ideology. The ludak nickname stands for the political outlook of the members of the Hlinka’s Slovak People’s party of the 1920s and 1930s, which acted as semi-loyal opposition and the dominant representative of the Slovak autonomist movement in interwar Czechoslovakia. The party’s ideological outlook was generally Christian conservatism with authoritarian leanings and its many wings included Christian socials, Christian conservatives – the mainstream faction of admirers of Salazar and Pilsudski (rather than Hitler) – as well as indigenous Fascists and tactical allies of the German nazism.

SlOVaKia – Populism in Slovakia

39

anti-mečiar opposition. it came up with eclectic

alism (see učeň 2011), compared to the radical

appeals ranging from invocation of non- or an-

right and mečiar his populism was always milder

ti-ideological, ‘no-nonsense’ solutions to tough

and primarily appealing to different emotions.

stance on law and order issues actually resem-

Practically since 2005, the essence of Fico’s ap-

bling more the attitudes of radical right than liber-

peal has been the ‘subtle populist promise of reu-

al left. after 2002 elections the party transformed

niting the people and the politics.’ as much as

its anti-establishment appeal - moving inside the

Fico successfully united the camp of people who

mainstream politics – and moved to the left. after

did not feel comfortable in the socio-economic

the short period of flirting with the (particularly

and psychological regime of the two Dzurinda’s

interpreted) concept of the Third Way, the party

governments (1998-2006) policies of which were,

decided to attach its aspiration to the mainstream

in general, informed by the neo-liberal logic

ideology of the European social democracy.

(učeň 2011, 81-2), he also managed to come up

with the ‘positive appeal:’

The often mocked and challenged process of so-

cial-democratisation took place, which brought

‘Fico’s challenge to the ‘SDKÚ world’ took the

ideological as well as organisational changes.

form of a ‘strong social state’ which integrated

ideologically, the party in opposition (2002-2006)

explicitly welfarist, but also other kind of as-

defined itself as the ‘radical social alternative

sumptions and offers. Prima facie, this alterna-

to the anti-social right-wing government.’ Smer

tive world included a promise of a welfare state

also endeavoured to attain the membership in

that would be equally – or more – extensive, just

the transnational Party of the European Social-

as available, and strong (ready to pay greater al-

ists (PES) and the Socialist international (Si).

lowances). But it went further and deeper by of-

against certain odds caused by the internation-

fering the hope of different treatment of people

al reaction to joining coalition with mečiar’s ĽS-

also on ‘non−welfarist’ plane. While the concept

HZDS and Slota’s SnS, the declaratory allegiance

implicitly hosted an offer that the national iden-

to the European social democratic mainstream

tity and the ‘national interest’ are taken care of,

proved to be a successful strategy. in organiza-

it also included an appeal to the alienated via

tional terms, even before its electoral victory in

a promise of being treated in a dignified way re-

2006 Smer managed to absorb practically all

gardless of their actual socio−economic status.

small parties tending towards social democracy

The anti−establishment aspect of Fico’s appeal –

thus monopolizing the entire left-of-the-center

blaming elite conduct for the misery of the people

space of the political spectrum.

– was supplemented by a subtler populist pledge

of reuniting the people and politics. it was to take

Since then the political competition in Slovakia be-

the form of a relationship in which nobody was

came reduced to the contest of the two alterna-

left behind any more and somebody interested

tives: one of them is Smer with its potential – but

in ordinary people’s problems was always avail-

increasingly electorally feeble – illiberal partners,

able to take care of them and lift their burden.

i.e. ĽS-HZDS and SnS. another one is composed

This was cleverly juxtaposed with the ‘cold,’ tech-

of the traditional parties of the mainstream right

nocratic and individualistic nature of the ‘SDKÚ

(SDKÚ-DS, KDH, magyar minority party – this time

world’ in which, allegedly, it was inevitable that

most – Híd) occasionally complemented in fragile

somebody could – or, indeed, was meant to – be

and unpredictable alliances by the newly mobi-

left behind.’ (učeň 2011, 82).

lized anti-establishment groupings of the right-of-

the-center origins (SaS, OĽanO). it was probably

also, in spite of the mentioned drift towards the

only the absolute majority of seats obtained by

mainstream, the nature of Smer’s social democ-

Smer in early elections of 2012 that precluded –

racy has remained different from the Eu main-

or just postponed? – another landmark develop-

stream, in that it underemphasizes the topics of

ment in the Slovak politics taking place: that of the

liberal freedoms (the minority rights, namely the

mainstream party of the right crossing the line and

life style minorities, including the sexual ones),

joining forces with Smer in the governing coalition.

and tends to interpret the mission of a social

democratic party as primarily social defence and

regarding Smer’s and Fico’s populism, it has al-

taking care of the ‘bread and butter’ issues of the

ways been distinct and different from the other

working people. all in all, even though the form of

populist actors. Even though Fico’s appeals has

robert Fico’s populism has changed and evolved

not been recently free from instrumental nation-

over time, it is probably still more adequate to

40 Populism in Central and Eastern Europe – Challenge for the Future?

classify the party as the populist radical left or

it was stronger and more articulate than that of

the social populist (see march and mudde 2005;

SnS or robert Fico. it was also more directly con-

march 2012) rather than a social democratic par-

nected to the post-transition economic hardship

ty (with the rich populist genetic legacy).

and the concerns regarding the national identity

and the position of Slovakia in the international

environment:

nationally charged populism of Vladimír mečiar

‘in general, Slovak opposition... reacted both to

Vladimír mečiar was the populist actor of the Slo-

social deprivation (SDĽ) and to a perceived un-

vak politics. He emerged in the aftermath of the

fairness of the form of the state (SnS, KDH). But

1989 regime change within the nominally liberal

it was Vladimír mečiar, heading the opposition

democratic camp as a pure populist. He used his

within the (nominally) civic liberal camp, who

populist skills to incite the opposition within the

mixed the “remedy” of national populism for all

Slovak anti-Communist movement and assume

Slovak ails. First, he successfully combined the

the position of the leader of the dominant politi-

social and the national aspects of the Slovaks’

cal force built on its ruins.

disillusionment with the new order in his (party’s)

appeal to the people making the national inter-

He soon made the shift of focus from ‘the people’

pret the social. Second, he added a strong popu-

to ‘the Slovak people’ thus becoming a populist na-

list ingredient to the movement by both defining

tionalist. He carried on the successful opposition

the people (members of the Slovak nation affect-

strategy into the political program and, according

ed by the post−transition deprivations) and point-

to some, even to the ruling regime. He ended up

ing out the harmful elite which, ill−serving or

as populist nationalist with authoritarian lean-

betraying the people was to be blamed for those

ings, which became unequivocally pronounced

deprivations. Finally, he provided a suggestion for

in the late 1990s effort to defend his power posi-

a solution (a “bearable transition”) appealing to a

tion and to pre-empt its inevitable decline. So, he

noteworthy number of Slovaks, that meant taking

started as the champion of the idea that politics

(some) economic and political power to “Slovak

should be an expression of the will of the people

hands”, those hands being the hands of people

and ended up as a schemer trying to obscure and

that understood the needs and would not fail the

constrain the revelation of the very same popular

people – Vladimír mečiar himself and his move-

will. mečiarism then represents a peculiar combi-

ment for Democratic Slovakia.’ (učeň 2010, 28).

nation of populism and nationalism which should

not be confused with that of the radical right SnS

more concretely, his populist skills and under-

– the nature of mečiar’s nationalism was different

standing of popular frustrations and predicaments

than nativism of SnS as was different his populism

enabled him to convincingly define his – ethnically

and their mutual entanglement.

Slovak – opponents as a privileged and anti-Slovak

elite. He ‘characterize[d] Slovakia’s political com-

The key aspect of mečiar’s politics and appeals

petition as a fundamental conflict about the future

were that by use of majority rule he tried to hollow

of Slovakia fought between the Slovak people and

out the underdeveloped Slovak liberal democratic

the anti-Slovak elite’ (Deegan-Krause 2012, 188,

polity of its liberal elements. it took the form of

original emphasis). He mobilised a relative major-

encroachments on institutions of horizontal ac-

ity of voters on this message and maintained it for

countability (and in one case also attack on the

several years. ‘mečiar’s most notable success lay

popular sovereignty core of Slovak democracy).

in his ability to sustain the image of the underdog

fighting against a unified elite even while he exer-

regarding his nationalism, he managed to unite

cised the full power of the state’ (Deegan-Krause

practically all forms of nationalist sentiments

2012, 187).

in the country – with the exception of the radi-

cal nativism of SnS – and to reliably cement

His rule and influence was brought to the end only

the affinity between the preference for the Slo-

when authoritarian excesses endangered coun-

vak nation(alism) with the vote for his movement

try’s prospects for integration into the European

for Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) party (Deegan-

union and his many former supporters had to

Krause, 2004). When it comes to his populism,

make their mind as to which option they preferred.

SlOVaKia – Populism in Slovakia

41

Conclusion: populist prospects

rivals. namely the People’s Party – Our Slovakia

(ĽS-nS), a small but conceivably more radical

mečiar’s party as well as the politics it represent-

movement suspect of being open to cadres and

ed is dead. it has long become an ideologically

ideas of the neo-nazi kind of extremism, could

empty political vehicle serving solely the purpos-

pose such challenge. The 10-15 per-cent elec-

es of its leader and owner. Since it failed to make

toral potential for the nativist politics is, however,

it to the parliament in 2010 and 2012 elections, it

here to stay. The only unknown is by whom it is

even ceased to fulfil that function. With the caveat

going to be mobilised.

that it is difficult to tell the impact of populism

from that of its ‘ideological companion,’ i.e. na-

Finally, the only relevant populist force that will

tionalism, the legacy of Vladimír mečiar has been

continue to influence Slovak politics is robert

twofold: First it indicated to the populist hopefuls

Fico and his Smer party. it will have to tackle

that many avenues for populist mobilisation are

the predicaments of public policies that will at

potentially open, be they based on nationalist or

the same time try to fulfil Eu’s requirements for

other fundaments. The second lesson was that

balanced budgets and persuade local popula-

populist success has a price. Therefore, another

tion that its standards of living are not going to

upsurge of populist mobilisation comparable in

be compromised by such policies. This can prove

scope to that of mečiar – and other than current

to be extremely difficult. Fico’s ‘subtle populist

‘subtle populism’ of robert Fico masked as the

promise’ is suitable for all but explaining to peo-

perfectly mainstream politics – is most proba-

ple that they have to suffer further sacrifices for

bly conceivable only as a part of a process of the

the sake of the ‘system’ and its future prosper-

grave deterioration of the constraining capacities

ity. (This represents after all the very situation

of the Eu.

which Fico masterfully used to challenge the

‘neo-liberal’ word of his predecessors.) Haunted

When it comes to the radical right populism of

by the fear of failure and afraid of a challenger

SnS, it seems currently to be in crisis. it has re-

that could outbid Fico in populism, the success

cently faced the split and the drain of votes to-

of Smer in this formidable task will determine its

wards Fico’s party, and it is hypothesized that it

future development – towards the mainstream or

could be confronted with the similar challenge

towards the revived and transformed populism.

vis-à-vis its so far less successful radical right

42 Populism in Central and Eastern Europe – Challenge for the Future?

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CZECH rEPuBliC – Populism in the Czech republic

43

CZECH rEPuBliC

Populism in the Czech republic

maroš Sovak, PhD (masaryk university)

introduction

never been precisely defined. moreover, the term

is starting to be used more often in our politi-

in past two decades the term ‘Populism’ has been

cal struggles as a semiotic weapon. if a political

almost constantly present in political debates

party or politician wants to adroitly and effectively

both in Western and Central-East Europe. and it

criticize the opponent, it is enough to use the la-

seems that the more it is being used, by various

bel “populist” - even though it is, very often, not

actors and in various contexts, the more difficult

clear what this term means exactly’ (see musil

it is to comprehend the real meaning of the word.

2007). This paper provides a very short overview

as professor musil once pointed out ‘the phe-

of one basic definition of populism, which then

nomenon of populism is, no doubt, a very diverse

serves as a point of departure for a description of

one which has taken numerous historical and

the two most visible examples of Czech populism.

regional forms, is constantly changing and has

44 Populism in Central and Eastern Europe – Challenge for the Future?

Defining populism

One of the most cited definitions of radical right-

for comparative purposes

wing populism is provided by mudde (2007). in his

work mudde defines radical right-wing populism

in this short discussion post on Czech populism

as an ideology based on three core elements: na-

i will build on a minimal definition of populism,

tivism, authoritarianism and populism (as defined

which follows the works of Canovan (1999) and

above). radical right-wing populism was at the

especially mudde (2000, 2004, 2007).

center of interest of political scientists working

in the field of populism throughout the last dec-

margaret Canovan offers a minimalist structur-

ade, and it is still (for its empirical and theoreti-

al definition of populism. Populism, according

cal relevance), dominant today. On the other hand,

to her, in modern democratic societies it is best

učeň (2007) points out, that the distinction must

seen as an appeal to ‘the people’ against both the

be made between this old authoritarian right-

established structure of power and the dominant

wing populism and the new form of neoliberal or

ideas and values of the society. Within democrat-

centrist populism which focuses its enthusiasm

ic systems that often means an attack on the es-

against established power structures towards

tablished parties. But anti-system mobilization

partisan platforms of government accountabil-

is not enough by itself, Canovan says, to identify

ity and transparency, and which begins to prevail

populist politics, for that description would also

in the real-life politics after the turn of the mil-

take in the new social movements, generally ac-

lennium. The new populism is an ideology in the

knowledged to be something else. The crucial

service of a political strategy aimed solely at gain-

difference is that while both are anti-system,

ing power. it is anti-authoritarian and economy-

populism challenges not only established pow-

centred, but it shares the populist appeal to the

er-holders but also elite values. Populist animus

ordinary people against the corrupt and ineffec-

is directed not just at the political and economic

tive elite with its radical right-wing counterpart.

establishments but also at opinion-formers in

academia and the media. it is a challenge to de-

Czech radical right-wing populism:

mocracy (as it works) in the name of democracy

Worker’s Party

(as it is imagined). This structural feature in turn

dictates populism’s characteristic legitimating

The Worker’s Party (Dělnická strana) is currently

framework, political style and mood.

the most visible and electorally most success-

ful radical right-wing populist party in the Czech

Cas mudde follows Canovan’s crucial people/elite

political scene. Despite the party not winning

antagonism but understands it as an ideational

enough votes to enter national or European par-

rather than structural division. He defines pop-

liament bodies in any of the previous elections it

ulism as an ideology that considers society to be

participated in, it was able to significantly influ-

ultimately separated into two homogeneous and

ence political life in the Czech republic.

antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the

corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should

The Worker’s Party was established by the

be an expression of the volonté générale (general

former members of another radical right-wing

will) of the people. as a distinct ideology, however,

populist party association of the republic – The

populism does not possess the same level of intel-

republican Party of Czechoslovakia, later known

lectual refinement and consistency as, for example,

as the republicans of miroslav Sládek, which was

socialism or liberalism. it is only a thin-centred ide-

fairly successful especially in the first half of the

ology (see also Stanley 2008), exhibiting a restricted

90s. it was officially registered by the ministry of

core that, at the same time, can be easily com-

interior of the Czech republic in December 2002

bined with (very different) other ideologies (mudde

under the name ‘new Power’. Few months later,

2004). Populism, thus, can have different contents

in January 2003, the party changed its name to

depending on the establishment it is mobilizing

Worker’s Party which it preserved until it was dis-

against (Canovan 1999; see also mudde 2000).

solved under the decision of the Supreme admin-

istrative Court in February 2010 (Vejvodová 2011).

From these different kinds of populism this paper

after the dissolution, members of the party con-

will concentrate on the two forms that are pre-

tinued to operate under new label ‘Worker’s Par-

vailing in current political life in Czech republic:

ty of Social Justice’.

(old) radical right-wing (or national) populism

and (new) neoliberal (or centrist) populism.

CZECH rEPuBliC – Populism in the Czech republic

45

in the first years of its existence, the Worker’s Party

identity. This led to intensified contacts and coop-

presented itself mainly as an advocate of all Czech

eration with nPD along with the Worker’s Party’s

employees. Employment policy and social issues,

traditional ally, The Slovak Togetherness.

topics otherwise typical for standard left-wing par-

ties, was the core of its political agenda and its

another element of the party’s public activities

program was focused chiefly on exploitation of em-

was the creation of the so-called Protection Forces

ployees, increasing unemployment and support of

of Worker’s Party, a paramilitary organization

the right to strike. it also opposed the then-ongo-

created for the sake of ‘protection of party repre-

ing process of accession of the Czech republic to

sentatives and helping citizens with various prob-

the European union (mareš, Vejvodová 2010).

lems’ (mareš, Vejvodová 2010). in this they took

inspiration from Jobbik in Hungary, a fact often

From about the year 2007, the Worker’s Party

mentioned by the representatives of the party.

started to radicalize both its program and its pub-

The most notorious of Protection Forces’ actions

lic appearance. The party shifted to ethnic issues,

were Gay Pride march in Brno and the so-called

the roma (gypsy) problem, immigration, xeno-

‘fight for Janov’, a violent clash with police in the

phobia, and anti-gay-rights activism. General cri-

excluded roma community housing estate Janov

tique of political establishment and government

in the northern-bohemian city of litvínov.

policies also became an important part of party’s

agenda. in particular, the roma issue became

The openly racist program, public appearanc-

crucial for the party, later on overshadowing all

es and violence finally led to above-mentioned

other issues. The party thus effectively used the

dissolution of the party under the decision of

generally very negative attitude of Czech majority

the Supreme administrative Court in February

towards the roma population to gain more vis-

2010. The court stated that the Worker’s Party

ibility and media attention.

is controlled by militant racists and confirmed

its connection to neo-nazi groupings national

The Worker’s Party’s program is characterized

resistance and autonomous nationalists. The

by three issues shared among many other radi-

Court further stated that the party seeks to re-

cal right-wing populist parties: immigration (and

move the foundations of the democratic state and

national minorities); security; and corruption.

the rule of law and highlighted xenophobic, rac-

Typical claims that illustrate the party’s affinity

ist and chauvinist aspects of the party’s program

especially with exclusive nationalism and rac-

(nejvyšší správní soud 2010).

ism was their proposal to change the Constitu-

tion in order to enable determination according

‘new’ Czech populism: Public affairs

to nationality, which should be stated on per-

sonal identification documents (Vejvodová 2011;

Public affairs (Věci veřejné) represent differ-

Černoch et al. 2011).

ent kind of populism than the radical right-wing

Worker’s Party. Their version of populism is not

They do not refer to themselves as being either a

xenophobic, nor authoritarian, but (or at least

left or right-wing political party, stating that this

was) an electorally much more successful one.

is an obsolete concept. instead they divide politi-

cal parties under either liberal or popular head-

Public affairs started as a civic association active

ings. The party then presents itself as popular and

in Prague 1 municipality in 2001 and in 2002 they

national opposition against the corrupted regime.

were transformed into a political party, officially

registered by the ministry of interior. at first they

Throughout the radicalization process the Work-

were focused primarily at Prague’s communal

er’s Party became very active in the streets, or-

policy, trying to eliminate common problems of

ganizing public demonstrations, which were

local importance such as rent deregulation, noise

widely attended by members of neo-nazi scene.

in the city or difficult communication between cit-

This ‘fight for the street’, inspired by the German

izens and the municipal authorities (Havlík 2010).

nationaldemokratische Partei (nPD), was seen

as a significant tool to increase party’s pres-

around 2006 the nature of the party changed sig-

ence in the public space and to mobilize young

nificantly. This was caused by a growing influence

activists (mareš, Vejvodová 2010). nPD was also

of a business sphere on the party’s affairs. Public

important source of inspiration for the Worker’s

affairs became personally and financially inter-

Party in other aspects of building its new radical

linked with the Committed Businessmen Club,

46 Populism in Central and Eastern Europe – Challenge for the Future?

including Vít Bárta – éminence grise and later the

also drafted some anti-corruption bills. Yet, para-

official leader of the party, which interpreted its

doxically, it was they who turned out to engage in

activities as an effort for transparent sponsoring

many of corruption scandals of the current Czech

of political parties. as a reaction to this many of

government. in the most notorious case, the par-

the previous civic activists left the party.

ty leader Vít Bárta was convicted of bribery and

conditionally sentenced to 18 months of impris-

The first step towards a higher public profile for

onment in april 2012. as a result the party ef-

the party was the 2009 European parliament

fectively broke up, with some members of Public

election. although they did not manage to enter

affairs leaving the party and starting a new, simi-

the parliament, thanks to an extensive electoral

larly populist, parliament faction called ‘liDEm’

campaign they were able to gain wider public and

(For the people) which remained as a member

media attention on the national level for the first

of the government coalition. The rest of Public

time, and also get support from several public

affairs is currently in opposition.

figures, e.g. former journalist and writer radek

John who eventually became a chairman of the

Conclusion

party. The first real electoral success came in

the 2010 national elections. Public affairs made

Populism in Czech party politics takes the two

use of a dissatisfaction of former voters of the

most visible forms with different impacts on

two largest parties – Social Democrats and Civic

Czech political life. On the one hand it is the radi-

Democrats – and gained nearly 11% of the votes

cal right-wing populist Worker’s Party (of Social

and, thus, entered the Chamber of Deputies (the

Justice), openly xenophobic, racist and authori-

lower chamber of the Parliament of the Czech

tarian party which presents itself as a true ad-

republic). afterwards the party became a mem-

vocate of common working people (of Czech

ber of the center-right government coalition, led

nationality) against a corrupt establishment and

by liberal-conservative Civic Democratic Party

inadaptable layabouts and criminals. although

(Občanská demokratická strana) (see Černoch et

the party has never gained enough votes for

al 2011).

parliamentary representation, thanks to organ-

izing controversial public demonstrations with

Public affairs characterize themselves as an ex-

high police and media attention and misusing

plicitly centrist party and refuse a clear attachment

a generally bad attitude of Czech public towards

to the traditional right or left. Their program is ec-

roma population, they are able to significantly

lectic, concentrated on bringing (often simplistic)

influence public discourse on dealing with the

solutions to concrete problems, without any obvi-

so called roma problem. On the other hand it

ous ideological affiliation. The only distinguishable

is the new populist protest party Public affairs,

slightly coherent focus of the party is their anti-es-

making use of the general dissatisfaction of the

tablishment and anti-partisan appeal, represent-

Czech public with the political establishment and

ed by a demand for the deepening of democratic

the ‘old‘ parties. Public affairs are not racist,

tools, more direct democracy and no corruption in

nor authoritarian but they share anti-elitist and

public funding. Their main slogan in 2010 electoral

anti-establishment populist appeal with its radi-

campaign was ‘remove all the old dinosaurs from

cal right-wing counterpart. as members of the

politics’ – a claim for the personal exchange within

government coalition after 2010 elections, Public

political structure (Černoch et al. 2011).

affairs had a serious potential to influence Czech

politics but after a series of corruption scandals

Public affairs emerged in Czech political scene

and break-up of the party, their current role in the

as a party with very strong anti-corruption appeal

political system is rather limited.

and actually, as members of government, they

CZECH rEPuBliC – Populism in the Czech republic

47

references

Canovan, m. (1999). Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy, Political Studies, 47(2), pp. 2-16.

Černoch, F., Husák, J., Schutz, O., Vít, m. (2011). Political parties and nationalism in Visegrad countries.

Brno: masaryk university.

Havlík, V. (2010). Politické strany a jejich systém v letech 2006-2010. in Balík, S. (Ed.).

Volby do Poslanecké sněmovny v roce 2010. Brno: Centrum pro studium demokracie a kultury.

mareš, m., Vejvodová, P. (2010). Dělnická strana: profil české pravicově extremistické strany.

rexter, 8(2), pp. 42-74.

mudde, C. (2000). in the name of the Peasantry, the Proletariat, and the People: Populisms in Eastern Europe. East European Politics and Societies, 14(2), pp. 33-53.

mudde, C. (2004). The Populist Zeitgeist. Government and Opposition, 39(4), pp. 542-563.

mudde, C. (2007). Populist radical right Parties in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge university Press.

musil, J. (2007). reflections on Czech Populism. in nekvapil, V., Staszkiewicz, m. (Eds.).

Populism in Central Europe. Prague: amO – association for international affairs, pp. 76-81.

nejvyšší správní soud, (2010). rozsudek ze dne 17. 2. 2010, č.j. Pst 1/2009-348, http://www.nssoud.cz/docs/Delnicka_strana_original.pdf

Stanley, B. (2008). The thin ideology of populism. Journal of Political ideologies, 13(1), pp. 95-110.

učeň, P. (2007). Parties, Populism, and anti-Establishment Politics in East Central Europe.

SaiS review, 27(1), pp. 49-62.

Vejvodová, P. (2011). Dělnická strana. in Bastl, m., mareš, m., Smolík, J., and Vejvodová, P. Krajní pravice a krajní levice v Čr. Praha: Garda.

48 Populism in Central and Eastern Europe – Challenge for the Future?

HunGarY

Populism in Hungary: Conceptual remarks

Dr. Szabolcs Pogonyi, PhD (CEu Budapest)

Populism is one of the favorite buzzwords and

capitalist messages); and arthur mas, leader of

rhetoric trumps of politicians, journalist and pun-

Catalonia’s nationalist party (for his promise to

dits from all across the political spectrum. in the

seek secession from Spain). if we wanted to guess

major English language dailies, the term has in

the meaning of the term on the basis of contem-

the past week been used in relation to american

porary public discourse, we would most probably

President Barack Obama and Vice President Joe

find that it is often used as a synonym for ‘dema-

Biden (for their promises to strengthen welfare

gogy’. The Greek word ‘demagogue’ is the combi-

provision and increase the level of redistribu-

nation of the words ‘demos’ (people) and ‘agogos’

tion); the lithuanian labor Party and the Order

(leader), and is used to denote political agitators

and Justice (for their anti-establishment elector-

and entrepreneurs who without qualms rely on

al campaign); Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez

prejudice, and excite hatred and irrational emo-

(for his socialist rhetoric); alexis Tsirpas, leader

tions in order to entrench their power. But while

of the Greek radical left-wing SYriZa (for his anti-

‘demagogy’ has from the ancient times been

HunGarY – Populism in Hungary: Conceptual remarks

49

used as a pejorative adjective, populism until re-

fight to defend Hungarian national sovereignty

cently had no negative connotations. Populism

against foreign speculators and international

as a political concept originates in the late 19th

organizations including the Eu and the imF. all

century.13 it was used by the uS Populist Party,

these measures have been labeled populist by

an agrarian party demanding state funded loans

the pro-market opposition parties.

for farmers and advocating the privatization of

railroads. The anti-establishment and protec-

Second, ‘populist’ is the common ornamental

tionist Populist Party, which stepped up against

epithet of the far-right Jobbik party for its racist,

crony capitalism and political elites, borrowed its

anti-Semitic, anti-roma messages, protection-

slogan (‘candidates of the people, by the people

ist and statist economic principles, law and order

and for the people’) from abraham lincoln. at

rhetoric and open Eu-skepticism. interestingly,

the same time in russia, the narodnik movement

the left wing liberal opposition parties as much

followed similar agrarian populist principles.

as the center-right Fidesz likes to label the Job-

bik as a populist party, while they accuse each

Historically, populism can be identified with an-

other for its emergence. Fidesz claims that the

ti-elite rhetoric framed as democratic politics.

radical anti-establishment Jobbik gained ground

in this regard, american Presidents including

as a result of the harsh neoliberal policies of the

andrew Jackson, and Franklin Delano roosevelt

former Socialist-liberal coalition, while the left

(for his declared pride in representing the opin-

contends that Jobbik only offers an even more

ions of everyday americans) can be labeled popu-

extreme populist version of Fidesz’ rhetoric, and

list, as well as Jimmy Carter, who once proudly

thus ideologically the center-right party paved

declared himself a populist, rather than identify-

the way of Jobbik to Parliament.

ing either as a liberal or a conservative.

Third, the Socialists (mSZP) have also been criti-

in the Hungarian context, three prevalent uses of

cized for their populist welfare policies by liberals.

populism can be traced in public discourse. First,

between 2005 and 2010 the governing left-wing

it is not at all unique that in public discourse po-

Socialists and the liberal Free Democrats have

litical concepts are used without clear definitions

been criticizing the campaign promises of Fidesz

or in a theoretically completely confusing and in-

by calling them populist demagogy. The center-

coherent way. it is, however, far more intriguing

right party while in opposition advocated anti-

and surprising that the same confusion regard-

establishment measures and announced that it

ing the meaning of the term is present in political

wanted to protect the interest of everyday Hun-

theory as well. Three distinct meta-approaches

garians. Since its landslide victory at the 2010

can be identified in the study of populism. First,

parliamentary election, the Fidesz government

as a consequence of its ambiguous use in public

translated the campaign rhetoric into govern-

discourse, some scholars propose that we should

ment policy. The center-right government initi-

not see populism as a singular political idea. Peter

ated a large scale nationalization program, which

Wiles considers populism as a syndrome, rather

included the renationalization of private pension

then as a coherent political doctrine.14 in a similar

funds, the main gas provider (mOl), and the rába

fashion, isaiah Berlin pondering the elusive nature

automotive company in order to make sure that,

of the term compared populism to Cinderella’s

as the government claims, these firms will fur-

shoes: it can be forced on a number of different

ther national interests instead of serving the in-

political ideas, but fits none exactly.15 Ernest Gell-

terest of foreign investors. as a cornerstone of

ner contemplating the theoretical debates around

policy, the government levied surplus taxes on

populism remarked that scholars seemed to

energy suppliers, telecom companies, banks and

agree only in that populism is a dangerous politi-

international retail chains, which, the accord-

cal concept – whatever it may eventually mean.16

ing to the government is the alternative of tax

hikes and austerity measures. Pm Viktor Orbán

a second possible approach is exemplified by

declared that his government waged a freedom

margaret Canovan’s efforts to construct a nuanced

13 Canovan, margaret: Populism. new York: Junction Books. 1981.

14 Wiles, Peter. a Syndrome, not a Doctrine: Some Elementary Theses on Populism. in. ionescu, Ghiţa – Ernest Gellner (eds.).

Populism. its meanings and national Characteristics. london: Weidenfeld and nicolson. 166-179.

15 qtd. in allcock, J. B. ’Populism’: a Brief Biography. Sociology. Sept. 1971. 5. 371-87.

16 ionescu, Ghiţa – Ernest Gellner (eds.). Populism. its meanings and national Characteristics. london: Weidenfeld and nicolson. 1.

50 Populism in Central and Eastern Europe – Challenge for the Future?

typology to analytically investigate different cur-

by restrictive policies both in terms of the eco-

rents of populist politics.17 She distinguishes four

nomic freedom and personal freedom.

main types: agrarian, dictatorial, democratic and

reactionary populisms. although Canovan’s in-

terpretation is well-thought and goes beyond

the hopeless efforts to find the core doctrine of

populism, it has some serious practical short-

cLASSIcAL LIBERAL/

LEFT/LIBERAL

comings. Just to briefly mention the most im-

LIBERTARIAN

portant one, even without offering an in-depth

analysis of this typology, it is clear that Canovan

L

uses ‘populism’ as an umbrella term. if populism

can take both dictatorial and democratic forms,

cENTRIST

one wonders if we can indeed find commonalities

which can meaningfully be called ‘populism’ and

whether we should at all use a single term to re-

R

fer to such different political strategies.

RIGHT/

Third, some scholars argue that populism should

POPULIST

cONSERVATIVE

be seen as a radical version of democracy. as

Peter Worsley pointed out, every regime, party

and political movement in the developed world

since the beginning of the 20th century had to

a certain extent been populist in the sense that

By narrowing down the scope of the term, in the

they claimed to represent ‘the people’ and tried

Hungarian context the label populist could be re-

to gain legitimacy by popular support.18 Follow-

served for the Jobbik party. By doing so, we could

ing this line of argument ralf Dahrendorf noted

single out the most important Hungarian party,

that it did not make sense to distinguish populism

which shares the most commonalities with West-

from democracy. The two terms denote the same

ern European populists. although Jobbik is often

thing, the difference lies only in the eye of the be-

referred to as a far-right or radical party, in the

holder: “one man’s populism is another’s democ-

nolan Chart could not be called a genuine right-

racy, and vice versa”.19

wing party. in the nolan Chart, the left-right axis

is reserved for economic policies, in which regard

Taking all this into account, it seems that it would

the Jobbik clearly is on the far-left end of the

be futile to try to define populism as a single and

scale. Jobbik staunchly criticizes what it calls ne-

coherent political doctrine. On the other hand, it

oliberal economic principles and promises to sig-

is also fruitless to attempt to view it as a specific

nificantly restrict the rights of foreign investors

mobilizing tool, since then it could not be distin-

(whom they consider ‘speculators’) and banks in

guished from democracy. This, however, does not

order to help indebted Hungarians suffering to

imply that populism cannot be used as a legiti-

service their debt accrued in foreign currencies.

mate analytical category in political analysis. One

Jobbik also promises to significantly increase

can offer a working definition for populism and

welfare spending and renationalize strategic

apply the term accordingly in a specific context

sectors, including utility and energy providers

without assuming the generalizability of the con-

(aims that are also dear to the current center-

cept. For the sake of simplicity, i would propose

right Fidesz government). as an important sym-

that in the Hungarian context, the populist label

bolic measure, Jobbik would restrict the rights

is reserved for socially conservative nationalists

of foreigners to acquire land and buy real estate

advocating anti-market protectionist measures

in the country. as for personal freedom, Jobbik

in the economy. in terms of the somewhat modi-

supports an authoritarian ideology. anti-Semitic

fied nolan Chart (see figure), populism is marked

and anti-roma slurs and hints are regular themes

17 Canovan ibid.

18 Worsley, Peter. The Concept of Populism. in. ionescu, Ghiţa – Ernest Gellner (eds.). Populism. its meanings and national Characteristics. london: Weidenfeld and nicolson. 212-250.; see also mudde, Cass. The Populist Zeitgeist. Government and Opposition. Volume 39, issue 4, pages 542–563, autumn 2004 and Taggart, Paul. The new Populism and the new Politics: new Protest Parties in Sweden in Comparative Perspective. new York: St. martin’s Press. 1996.

19 Dahrendorf, ralf. acht amnerkungen zum Populismus. in. Transit. Europäische revue. 25 (2003). 156.

HunGarY – Populism in Hungary: Conceptual remarks

51

for the party leadership and Jobbik mPs. Jobbik

the possibility for non-resident ethnic Hungar-

endorses harsh law and order policies, including

ians to apply for Hungarian citizenship without

the restoration of gendarme and the death pen-

residence in the country, Jobbik suggested that

alty. Similarly to other East Central European and

this should be the first step in the reunification

Western European populist parties, Jobbik op-

of Greater Hungary by the reincorporation of the

poses European integration fearing that it would

territories which were annexed to the neigh-

severely restrict national self-determination. lu-

boring states by the 1920 Paris Peace Treaties.

minaries of the party have suggested that once

Borrowing one of the main themes of Western

they get into power, they initiate that Hungary

European xenophobic populist parties, Jobbik

quits the European union. in addition, Jobbik is

also staunchly opposes the immigration of non-

an ardent supporter of the inclusion of ethnic

Hungarians, although Hungary is not considered

Hungarians living in the neighboring countries.

as a popular destination for trans-migrants.

after the Fidesz government in 2010 opened up

52 Populism in Central and Eastern Europe – Challenge for the Future?

aFTErWorD

Populism in Central Europe – challenge for the future!

Europe Facing the Populist Challenge

afterword article by Prof. Dick Pels, PhD (De Helling, The netherlands) in our book Populism in Europe we emphasize,

populism is not alien to our political traditions,

firstly, that the new rightwing populism is not the

but comes closer than expected, forcing us into

rehearsal of something old but represents a new

serious self-criticism and towards a reinvention

political phenomenon, and secondly, that it is not

of our own ideals of liberty, democracy, identity

an unfortunate incident or accident but is here to

and tolerance. it offers a special challenge to us

stay: as a stable addition to or extension of the

Greens since, as will be illustrated below, the

current landscape of European politics. if so,

green and populist movements are interconnect-

populism offers a much more serious challenge

ed in unexpected ways, representing adversarial

to the theory and practice of liberal democracy

sides of the same cultural politics which (in the

than is often acknowledged, not solely in terms

West) has emerged since the educational and

of its media-political and organisational style, but

meritocratic revolution of the 1960s and 1970s.

also in terms of its ideology. The new rightwing

aFTErWOrD – Populism in Central Europe – challenge for the future! – Europe Facing the Populist Challenge 53

aFTErWorD

after more than three decades, we cannot but

a corrupt elite, the demand for direct popular rule,

notice that the new nationalist populism has set-

distrust of party competition and professional poli-

Populism in Central Europe – challenge for the future!

tled securely all across Europe. as of June 2011,

tics, and the precedence of popular common sense

Europe Facing the Populist Challenge

populist rightwing parties were represented

(and hence majority opinion) over minority opinion

in almost half of the 27 national parliaments.

and ‘elitist’, including scientific, expertise. in this

afterword article by Prof. Dick Pels, PhD (De Helling, The netherlands) Currently at a 15-17% high, averaging 13% across

perspective, populism is not anti-democratic but

Europe, they muster almost twice as much elec-

rather radicalizes the democratic principle by tak-

toral support as the green parties. instead of

ing it literally (directly).

presenting an anomaly or a form of pathology,

populism has entered the political mainstream,

Three Distinctions

changing the content and tone of political compe-

tition in many countries. rather than assimilating

it is crucial to draw a few distinctions, which at

it to the historical movements and parties from

once ‘break up’ this encompassing definition: 1.

the thirties, we need to situate it in the novel con-

That between leftwing and rightwing populism;

text of a much more securely settled democratic

2. That between first and second generations

culture, a media-saturated political landscape,

of populist movements, and 3. That between

and the collective framework built by more than

Western and Eastern European varieties of pop-

65 years of European integration. as a pan-

ulism. The first distinction implies that populism

European phenomenon, it represents the sever-

also features a strong leftwing tradition, includ-

est internal challenge to and test for the viability

ing significant similarities between left and right

of the European project that has emerged to date.

(among which count a strong anti-elitist, anti-

party and anti-bureaucratic sentiment, as well

By way of definition, let me settle upon a mini-

as a penchant for direct democracy). indeed, in

mal characterization, which focuses upon three

a number of European countries, one may cur-

closely interdependent features: nativism, au-

rently discern a shift in the populist protest vote

thoritarianism, and popular sovereignty (mudde

from right to left, while the traditional main-

2007). nativism is a weaker variety of nationalism,

stream parties continue to crumble (cf. Greece,

which nevertheless demands that states should

where the political middle barely holds, the rise

be inhabited exclusively by natives or the in-born,

of the Piratenpartei in Germany, the success of

while non-natives or foreign-born should be seen

Beppe Grillo’s Cinque Stelle movement in italy,

as fundamentally threatening to the homogene-

the Socialist Party in the netherlands and per-

ous community. This presumption of homogeneity

haps also the Palikot movement in Poland). This

implies a penchant for authoritarianism: the be-

increased traffic between the radical right and

lief in a morally cohesive and strictly ordered so-

left can be fruitfully charted by replacing the

ciety. The same presumption of popular unity or

traditional one-dimensional ‘wing’ model of the

homogeneity translates into the notion of a domi-

political spectrum by an alternative two-dimen-

nant political division between a ‘pure’ people and

sional ‘horseshoe’ model:

Populism in the horseshoe

Established Elite

‘Our Kind of People’

‘Them’

hold on to

what you got

CENTRE

LEFT

RIGHT

things could be better

LEFT

RIGHT

Everything must change

The ‘People’

Ordinary folk

We

54 Populism in Central and Eastern Europe – Challenge for the Future?

The second, generational distinction appears to

nationalist themes into a kind of ‘national indi-

overlap to some extent with the West-East dis-

vidualism’ (Pels 2011a; 2011b). Crucially different

tinction. First-generation parties such as the

from the collectivist temper of the thirties (‘Du

Front national (founded 1972), the Flemish Block

bist nichts, dein Volk ist alles’), it tends to iden-

(founded 1979), the FPÖ (which became a signifi-

tify the people as a ‘people of individuals’ (or even

cant political force from 1986 under Jörg Haider’s

individualists). The ideal of individual self-asser-

leadership) and lega nord (founded 1991) tend

tion (the consumerist ‘me first’) and that of na-

to root more strongly in the radical nationalist,

tional self-determination and cultural preference

anti-semitic and homophobic past. This applies

(‘my people first’) do no longer contradict but

with even less restriction to parties such as the

complement each other. This liberal populism is

British national Front, the German nDP, ataka in

primarily about ‘holding on to what you’ve got’,

Bulgaria, the Slovakian national Party, Jobbik in

both as regards material wealth and in terms of

Hungary and Golden Dawn in Greece.

cultural and national identity.

But there has emerged a second generation of

in the recent national election campaign, Geert

populists who are careful to take their distance

Wilders has interestingly ‘swopped enemies’,

from this disreputable ‘brown’ past. more re-

substituting Europe for islam and Brussels for

cently established parties such as the Dansk

mecca as his main symbolic targets of attack.

Folkeparti (founded 1995), the True Finns, the

Turning away to some extent from defending

Sverige Demokraterna (under new leadership

Dutch national culture and identity against the

since 2000), the Dutch lPF (Pim Fortuyn’s par-

threat of islamization, he currently focuses upon

ty, founded 2002), Geert Wilders’ Freedom Party

the excessive funding by hard-working Dutch tax-

(founded 2005) and the new Flemish alliance in

payers of ‘lazy’ and ‘corrupt’ Southern countries

Belgium, have all adopted a more civic, centrist

such as Greece, italy and Spain. Wilders’ new

and liberal-democratic face, having emerged in

anti-European campaign hence implies a much

quite a few cases as offshoots of established lib-

more banal, economically self-interested view

eral parties. in France, this generational shift is

of national sovereignty (‘our money first’ rath-

perhaps literally performed in the recent succes-

er than ‘my people first’). This policy move has

sion of marine le Pen to the leadership of Fn.

brought the Freedom Party closer to the more

The biological racism (especially antisemitism),

traditional conservative liberalism of the VVD,

militarism and territorial nationalism of the older

generating disappointing results in the national

movements is displaced by a softer cultural na-

ballot of 12 September 2012 (but still maintaining

tionalism, which urges the defence of an indig-

itself at 10% of the electorate).

enous ‘lead culture’ and national identity against

a generalized Other which is often (but not neces-

let us also briefly look at the austrian case.

sarily) identified as islam.

While Haider’s FPÖ never entirely escaped the

suspicion of cultivating ties to the national-so-

The netherlands, austria, Belgium

cialist past, the current leadership under Heinz-

Christian Strache appears to favour a cleaner

Before exploring the West-East divide, let us

and more moderate profile. However, while the

take a closer look at three cases, which may il-

FPÖ still presents itself as a conservative patri-

lustrate this generational shift: the netherlands,

otic force protecting austrian national identity

austria and Belgium. The Dutch electoral revolt

both against immigrants and against European

of 2002 and the rise and tragic demise of Pim

integration, its rival the BZÖ (founded in 2005 by

Fortuyn perhaps offers a paradigmatic example

Haider in a split-off from the FPÖ) more promi-

of this softer, more liberal and democratic pop-

nently adopts the liberal and meritocratic terms

ulism (Pels 2003). Fortuyn’s assassination on 6

of a tax cut party defending the interests of hard-

may 2002 provided the dramatic intensity which

working austrians. This liberal tendency is even

inescapably drove home his political message:

more pronounced in the movement led by the

an unprecedented cocktail comprising anti-is-

austro-Canadian billionaire Frank Stronach,

lamism, nationalism ‘lite’ and the defence of the

which likewise mixes the ambition to ‘clean out

libertarian values of the sixties (‘i don’t want to

the political stables’ with economic liberalism,

do the emancipation of women and gays all over

patriotism and Euroscepticism, entirely avoiding

again’). His successor Geert Wilders has simi-

racist prejudice and anti-immigrant language.

larly mixed anti-islamic, liberal-democratic and

aFTErWOrD – Populism in Central Europe – challenge for the future! – Europe Facing the Populist Challenge 55

However, the most dramatic example of this gen-

This picture of the shifting balance between cul-

erational shift is offered by the recent Belgian

tural and economic axes of conflict may gain

municipal elections, in which the new Flemish

some depth by introducing what many research-

alliance led by Bart de Wever gained around 30%

ers take to be a newly emerging political matrix

of the vote (37.7% in antwerp), all but replacing

in European politics (e.g. De lange, Van der Brug

(if not sucking empty) Filip Dewinter’s Vlaams

& Baller 2011: 53, 62). it combines two axes of po-

Belang. The n-Va proclaims a ‘humanitarian

larization, socioeconomic and cultural (or mate-

nationalism’ as part of its master plan to split

rialist and post-materialist), which are positioned

Belgium and have Flanders enter as an inde-

at right angles to one another, dividing the politi-

pendent member state into the European union.

cal spectrum into four quadrants or fields which

islamophobia no longer plays a prominent role.

allow us to distribute the relative positions of vari-

neither does Euroscepticism, which turns the

ous political movements and parties. The hori-

n-Va into a quite exceptional case in the broader

zontal division addresses socioeconomic themes

family of populist nationalisms. all evils are pro-

such as the relative role of state and market and/

jected upon the Belgian federal level: excessively

or income distribution, while the vertical divi-

high taxes, a rampant social parasitism, the open

sion covers value-oriented themes such as im-

borders policy which permits too many ‘passive’

migration and integration, law and order, climate

immigrants to enter, but especially the exces-

change and ethical issues around abortion and

sive transfer payments made by hard-working

euthanasia. Populists typically activate the verti-

Flemish to the ungrateful and lazy Walloons. in

cal axis while downplaying the division between

this fashion, Belgium represents a miniature

left and right, while mainstream social-demo-

version of Europe, emphasizing an unbridge-

cratic and liberal parties typically focus upon the

able cultural and economic gap between a thrifty,

left-right opposition and tend to view cultural divi-

hard-working and honest north and a lazy, para-

sions as derivative or secondary. The political con-

sitical and mendacious South.

flict hence rages to a large extent over the power

to define which fault line is the dominant one.

a materialist Turn

Hence populism, at least in Western Europe, ap-

C

pears currently to take a materialist, liberal-eco-

osmopolitan-na

Greens

nomic turn, softening the cultural polarization

around issues such as immigration, islam and

national identity. While political debates during

ian dimension

Social

the noughties were dominated by the impact of

tar

Democrats

Liberals

tionalist dimension

9/11 and other religiously inspired terrorist at-

tacks, the beginning of the second decade of

ian-liber

Radical

the 21st century is governed by the bank insol-

Left

itar

?

vency and state debt crisis, which has meanwhile

Populist Right

turned into a full-scale euro crisis which jeop-

Author

ardizes the entire European project. as a result,

a general shift in attention has occurred from

Socio-economic (left-right) dimension

cultural to economic issues and from cultural to

economic chauvinism. While it would be exagger-

ated (and perhaps a product of wishful thinking)

The four-square table has the added benefit of

to claim that the polarization around islam is over

alerting us to the historical co-emergence and

in Western Europe, it has nevertheless died down

structural conjunction of populist and green

to a certain extent, having been demoted in fa-

parties. it is intriguing to notice that green and

vour of more traditional left vs. right issues. The

brown parties have risen together, the first group

populist defence of national sovereignty has ac-

emerging during the 1970s, often from left-wing

cordingly shifted from the Kulturkampf against

populist beginnings, while right-wing populist

islam towards the economic struggle against the

parties started to emerge a decade later. The up-

costly euro and the undemocratic transfer mech-

per left or left libertarian quadrant constitutes

anism, which is called the European union.

the heartland of the green party family. radical

right-wing populist parties are located in the

opposite lower right quadrant of the graph. in

56 Populism in Central and Eastern Europe – Challenge for the Future?

taking opposite positions along the vertical axis,

ulisms essentially different, or may we discern

these ideological adversaries hence represent

the beginnings of a social, political and cultural

two faces of a new cultural polarization, which is

convergence, of a veritable Europeanization of

closely connected to the rise in the general level

the populist challenge?

of education in Western societies. However, the

increase in meritocratic educational mobility has

Without being able to answer these questions,

also opened up a new sociological divide between

let me offer a few suggestions for further reflec-

higher and lower educated groups, which has to

tion and discussion. First of all, populist parties

some extent absorbed the traditional socio-eco-

in CEE countries appear more strongly rooted in

nomic class division. Horizontal ‘class voting’ has

pre-modern agrarian-based and religion-infused

to some extent given way to vertical ‘cultural vot-

traditionalism, while religious divisions in the

ing’, resulting in an unexpected inverse electoral

West have generally faded as a result of the rise of

movement between working class voters shift-

secular individualism and urban lifestyles. While

ing to the populist right, and (new) middle class

individualist modernism has become a major ele-

voters tendentially shifting to the libertarian left

ment of national identity in (at least some) West

(Houtman, achterberg & Derks 2008).

European countries, to be defended against reli-

gious and other forms of conservative collectivism,

indeed, authoritarianism and xenophobia appear

in East European countries it is instead considered

not so much to emerge from low income condi-

an enemy of the people. Populism in these coun-

tions but from low levels of education, hence not

tries tends to gravitate towards more reactionary

from a lack of economic capital but from a lack

types of nationalism and xenophobia, which are

of cultural capital. While higher educated vot-

closer to the first than to the second generation

ers generally display higher levels of trust in the

of populism, if they do not hark back to the revo-

established system of political representation,

lutionary nationalisms of the thirties. Since liberal

lower educated voters tend to have a lower trust

modernity, democracy and secularization enter

in political institutions, especially in mainstream

through the door of European integration, resist-

political parties. While the higher educated are

ance against liberal, free-thinking and secular val-

more sympathetic to sustainable development,

ues inevitably takes the form of anti-Europeanism

climate protection and responsible lifestyles,

and the defence of conservative Christian tradi-

lower educated groups are more prone to cli-

tions. But there are also first inklings of a more

mate skepticism or outright ‘climate denial’ and

liberal polarization around cultural issues, as is

to materialistic or hedonistic lifestyles. While the

exemplified by the individualistic, secularist and

former embrace European integration, the latter

Europhile Palikot movement in Poland.

tend towards Euroscepticism, the defence of na-

tional sovereignty and a return to national cur-

Secondly, we must signal and account for the

rencies. While the former support multi-ethnic

greater incidence of governmental populism in

and multicultural ideals, the latter favour a sub-

East European countries. Whereas rightwing

stantial decrease in the number of immigrants,

populist parties have participated on governmen-

if not the actual closing of the frontiers to them.

tal levels in austria, italy, Switzerland, Denmark

and the netherlands, a number of Eastern

Differences and Convergences

European countries have elected governments

which were entirely dominated by national-pop-

Perhaps this two-dimensional typology may help

ulist parties. One example is the regime of the

to explain some of the differences between the

Kaczynski brothers in Poland from 2005 to 2007,

Western and Eastern European varieties of pop-

where at one point three populist parties par-

ulism. What is the relative salience, in Eastern

ticipated in the coalition government (Bachmann

European societies, of socioeconomic and cul-

2006). a more serious example is the majoritarian

tural conflict lines? Have post-1989 marketiza-

single-party regime of Fidesz in Hungary, while

tion and neoliberal modernization reintroduced

also the former meçiar governments in Slovakia

more traditional capitalist class divisions, e.g.

and the Klaus presidency in the Czech republic

between rich and poor? To what extent has the

exemplify features of governmental populism.

rise in levels of education promoted the emer-

One explanation for this high incidence might

gence of a new meritocratic middle class and

once again be found in the political weight of

the spread of post-materialist values? in other

a still overwhelmingly rurally based, lower edu-

words, are Western and Eastern European pop-

cated population which fears the transition

aFTErWOrD – Populism in Central Europe – challenge for the future! – Europe Facing the Populist Challenge 57

towards a modern internationally oriented knowl-

resistance to European integration and to the lo-

edge economy and the attendant rise of an educat-

cal elites which promote it, increasingly appears to

ed, individualistic and cosmopolitan urban class.

emerge as a point of convergence for movements

and parties across the East-West divide.

Thirdly, the shift from islamophobia towards

Europhobia in Western populist parties (with the

summing up: nationalist populism, both in the

exception of the Flemish n-Va) not only exemplifies

West and the East, has become the most acute

a turn from cultural towards economic self-inter-

challenger of the European integration project.

est, but also demonstrates the essential flexibility

Everywhere we encounter a conservative and

and substitutability of the populist ‘enemy image’

nationalist backlash against Europe as a mod-

and the practice of scapegoating. Depending on

ernizing, civilizing and liberalizing force. in many

the local context, the enemy of the people (the

member states, populist parties target Europe as

stranger, the foreigner) can be identified in many

both a cultural and an economic threat, favour-

different ways, ranging from anti-semitism and

ing a return to national self-determination. The

anti-islamism through hatred of roma, ‘boat

hopeful paradox dwelling in this populist con-

people’, lazy Southerners, Walloons or, as in the

vergence is that, if successfully resisted, this

case of the Polish law and Justice party, tradi-

Europe-wide anti-Europeanism may actually

tional neighbours such as Germans and russians.

further European integration.

references

Bachmann, Klaus (2006) ‘reason’s Cunning. Poland, Populism, and involuntary modernization’, Eurozine 18.8.2007.

Decker, Frank (ed.)(2006) Populismus. Gefahr für die Demokratie oder nützliches Korrektiv?

Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwisenschaften.

De lange, Sarah l., Wouter van der Brug & inger Baller (2011) ‘adversaries or Competitors?

The rise of Green and radical-rightwing Populist Parties’ in meijers (ed.) Populism in Europe.

Houtman, Dick, Peter achterberg & anton Derks (2008) Farewell to the leftist Working Class.

new Brunswick nJ: Transaction.

meijers, Erica (ed.) Populism in Europe. Vienna/Brussels: planetVerlag/GEF.

mudde, Cas (2007) Populist radical right Parties in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge university Press.

Pels, Dick (2003) De geest van Pim. Het gedachtegoed van een politieke dandy. amsterdam: ambo.

Pels, Dick (2011a) Het volk bestaat niet. amsterdam: De Bezige Bij.

Pels, Dick (2011b) ‘The new national individualism’, in meijers (ed.) Populism in Europe.

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