Marginal Oil

What is driving oil companies dirtier and deeper?

Aerial view of the oil on the sea surface, originating from the leaking of the Deepwater Horizon wellhead disaster, slowly approaching the

coast of Louisiana East of the mouth of the Mississippi river. The BP leased oil platform exploded April 20, 2010 and sank after burning,

leaking an estimate of more than 200,000 gallons of crude oil per day from the broken pipeline into the sea. © Daniel Beltrá / Greenpeace

Front cover:

Left: Fen and the Boreal Forest near McClelland Lake , north of Fort McMurray, Alberta, Canada. This area has been leased for future oil

sands development. Right: Syncrude Aurora Oil Sands Mine, north of Fort McMurray, Canada. © Peter Essick 2009. All rights reserved

Preface

Boreal forest of spruce, poplar and aspen, east of Peace River in northern Alberta, Canada. © Jiri Rezac / Greenpeace

With conventional oil production in decline, the global oil In November 2010 we therefore jointly organised a

industry is investing heavily in dirtier and riskier forms of networking and strategy meeting for civil society activists from

unconventional oil such as heavy crude, tar sands, and oil North America, Europe, Africa, and Latin America. The aim

shale. These investments pose a challenge to the climate, the was to share information and experiences and better coordinate

environment, and local communities. One new frontier for tar global efforts to fight marginal oil investments and promote a

sands development is sub-Sahara Africa, a region that is highly clean and sustainable energy future globally.

dependent on the export of raw materials, but at the same time

is highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and the

To this end we will also work with decision makers both in the

subsequent suffering due to the effects of extractive industries’ European Union and globally to ensure that the right policies are

projects. Other affected regions include the Orinoco Belt in in place and that the voices of the communities are respected.

Venezuela and the Western Amazon in Brazil – biodiversity hot

spots and home to a number of indigenous peoples.

This paper was prepared as a background document for

the strategy meeting. It describes the drivers behind marginal

Apart from making a mockery of climate protection, experience oil investments and gives an overview of existing and potential

shows that tar sands production in Canada – currently the biggest projects across the globe. Since it contains important analysis

producer of tar sands globally – has resulted in serious damage that we believe should be public knowledge, we have decided

to local communities and the environment, including destruction to publish it and hope it will productively feed into the ongoing

of the boreal forest and increased pollution, which has impacted debate, from Cancun to Durban to Rio and beyond.

the health and livelihoods of indigenous peoples. In countries with

weaker political and environmental governance frameworks – such

We would like to thank the two authors of this study, Sarah

as Congo Brazzaville, Nigeria, and Madagascar – the consequences Wykes and Lorne Stockman, for their excellent work and unfailing

of its expansion are likely to be even more devastating.

commitment, but we also want to thank all participants of the

strategy meeting for their important input and feedback. A special

Having worked with partners around the world on climate, thanks goes to Alex Quero for making this exciting but rather dry

energy, and resource issues for years, the Heinrich Böll topic look nice.

Foundation and Friends of the Earth Europe are very concerned

about the increasing investments into “marginal oil”. We see it Lili Fuhr, Heinrich Böll Foundation

as one major wrong “solution” to the energy crisis the world is

facing and we are concerned about the challenges and risks it Darek Urbaniak, Friends of the Earth Europe

poses for local communities as well as the climate.

Marginal Oil - What is driving oil companies dirtier and deeper?

1

Table of Contents

Preface

1

Executive Summary

4

Introduction

5

1 Driving over the cliff: What’s behind the increasing exploitation of marginal oil?

8

1.1 International oil companies: The problem of diminishing “easy oil”

9

1.2 Decreasing access for IOCs

9

1.3 Continuing resource nationalism: An increasingly harder bargain for IOCs

9

1.4 Friendly, stable fields in decline

10

1.5 The challenge from “international” NOCs and service companies

10

1.6 Investor pressure: Is the tail wagging the dog?

11

1.7 Growing in the margins

13

1.8 Increasingly marginal reserves

15

1.9 Energy security – Does marginal oil really bring security?

18

1.9.1

Energy Security Argument No. 1:

Marginal oil from non-OPEC sources reduces the power of the OPEC cartel

18

1.9.2

Energy Security Argument No. 2:

More marginal oil is less money for unsavory regimes and sponsors of terrorism

18

1.9.3

Energy Security Argument No. 3:

Marginal oil protects oil importers from “oil as a political weapon” and supply crises

19

1.10 Supply and demand: Hard truths or convenient assumptions?

19

1.11 China leading demand growth

20

1.12 Tight supply and demand triggers policy shifts

20

1.13 Declining demand will hit marginal oil first

20

1.14 “Business as usual” or “business as urgently required”?

20

1.15 Getting behind demand reduction: The key to killing marginal oil?

22

2 Key marginal oil developments: A brief survey

23

2.1 Bitumen and extra-heavy oil

24

2.2 Tar sands in Africa

27

2.3 Marginal oil in sub-Saharan Africa: Onshore and offshore “frontier” oil

28

2.4 Deepwater investments

29

3 Conclusion: Protecting the global climate, local communities and ecologies

33

Endnotes

34

Acknowledgements

40

List of Abbreviations

40

This Report has been also produced with the financial assistance of the European Union as a part of “Making

Extractive Industries work for Climate and Development” project. The content of this Report is the sole responsibility

of Friends of the Earth Europe, Friends of the Earth France, CEE Bankwatch, Milieudefensie, and can under no

circumstances be regarded as reflecting the position of the European Union.

2

Marginal Oil - What is driving oil companies dirtier and deeper?

List of Figures

1 Continuum from conventional to unconventional oil resources

7

2 Oil production by source

8

3 IOCs and NOCs access to reserves and share production

9

4 Reserves Replacement Ratio of top 25 IOCs 1995-2006

11

5 Estimated tar sands reserves additions as percentage of reserves additions 2005–09

12

6 Reserves Replacement Ration for the period 2005–2009

12

7 A chart of Shell’s deepwater engineering milestones showing the different types of

rig designs developed for deepwater

13

8 Production costs by resource

14

9 BP proved and non-proved reserves 2009

15

10 Shell total resources 2008

15

11 Chevron total resources 2010

15

12 ExxonMobil resource base 2010

16

13 Total proved and probable reserves growth 2004–2009

16

14 ConocoPhillips total resources by region 2009

16

15 ConocoPhillips 2010–2014 reserve additions

16

16 Unconventional oil production by type of resource

23

17 Global unconventional oil resources

24

18 Tar sands and extra-heavy oil resources

24

19 Venezuelan Orinoco Belt extra-heavy oil projects

26

20 Emissions for diesel by source

27

21 Global oil shale deposits

29

22 Oil and gas wells drilled by leading companies in water depths of 400 meters or more –

number of wells in parentheses

30

23 The Brazilian pre-salt deposit

31

24 Frontier developments in the Amazon – the Western Amazon region

31

25 Oil blocks in the Western Amazon region

32

List of Boxes

1 Definitions

6

2 Reserves terminology

12

3 The high costs of marginal oil

13

4 The “resource curse”: Is “rent seeking” another driver of marginal oil development?

17

Marginal Oil - What is driving oil companies dirtier and deeper?

3

Executive Summary

This paper was written for a workshop on the expansion of

The IOCs response has been to develop technologies to access

investment in tar sands, in their current centre of production in “difficult oil.” The past decade has seen increasing involvement of

Canada and beyond, and particularly the prospect of investments IOCs in offshore production at ever-greater depths, Canadian tar

in developing countries. Tar sands development in Canada has had sands production, the development of gas-to-liquids (GTL), and

serious negative impacts on local communities and ecosystems. technologies to produce oil shale. Analysis of the top six IOCs’

Current and new developments pose a significant threat to global reserves profile reveals that they all increasingly rely on such

climate protection efforts, given the highly carbon-intensive marginal resources.

nature of the production process and the fact that protecting

Alberta’s tar sands industry is feeding the Canadian government’s

However, the push into the margin means spiralling costs for

opposition to national and international mitigation efforts.

the IOCs as, almost without exception, these resources are more

expensive to develop and produce than conventional oil and thus

However, tar sands development is both a symptom and rely on a high oil price to be profitable. Marginal oil is a symptom

manifestation of a broader underlying trend: a drive to exploit of high prices and excessive demand rather than a means of

unconventional oil resources that are more difficult and costly to combating either.

produce – and usually more carbon-intensive – than conventional

oil. Oil companies are increasingly bent on accessing the world’s

This is why the arguments deployed by the oil industry and

remaining conventional oil resources found in “frontier” its supporters that increasing development of marginal resources

locations, where their development often involves a high risk is the key to improving the energy security of major importing

of irreversible damage to local ecologies and communities. states such as the United States are fundamentally flawed.

Current exploration projects include bitumen-type resources in Development of expensive-to-produce and limited supplies

Venezuela and in Africa, deep offshore oil in Africa and Brazil, of non-OPEC marginal oil will not reduce OPEC’s hold on the

and heavy oil in the remote Western Amazon.

market. Unlike marginal resources, OPEC oil is relatively cheap

and easy to bring onstream, and its market share will grow even

Both these trends represent an ongoing drive towards what can if marginal oil is developed.

be called “marginal oil” with potentially devastating implications:

for global and local efforts to curtail carbon emissions by transitioning

For the same reasons, more marginal oil will not mean less

away from a fossil fuel-based energy model; for the energy security money for unsavoury regimes, so long as overall demand increases.

of importing countries; and ultimately for sustainable growth in The supply and demand balance that supports marginal oil is also

developed, emerging, and developing countries.

a boon for OPEC producers, because it supports high oil prices.

Finally, marginal oil production will not protect oil importers from

The paper begins by exploring the “macro” forces driving the a supply crisis because of the global nature of the oil market. No

search for marginal oil. Fundamentally, oil exploration is driven marginal oil sources (such as Canadian tar sands) have significant

by the economics of global supply and demand. Global oil demand spare capacity to address a supply crisis.

is on an upward path, mainly due to increasing demand from

emerging economies such as China, according to the International

The only sure answer to improving energy security is cutting

Energy Agency (IEA). However, concerns about China’s rapid oil demand. Otherwise, the “business as usual” energy scenario

demand growth may be overblown and need to be balanced with will see marginal oil development inevitably expand beyond its

an awareness of the country’s efforts to curtail domestic demand current centre in North America, with companies pushing to open

in the longer term.

up ever more risky and challenging resources with potentially

devastating consequences for the climate, as well as local

However, while concerns about peaking oil supply are a factor, ecosystems and communities in producer countries.

it is in fact lack of access by international oil companies (IOCs)

to the remaining “easy-to-produce” oil that is driving them in

Arguably, the United States is still the pivotal market in terms

search of the “marginal barrel.” In the 1960s, IOCs had access of its impact on global oil demand. Roll-out of existing technologies

to around 85 percent of global oil reserves: today that has shrunk combined with robust government interventions across the board

to only 6 percent.1 OPEC controls the vast majority of the world’s could potentially cut US oil consumption by 40 to 50 percent by

remaining “easy” oil, which means the majority of future non-

2030, setting it on a downward trajectory thereafter and more

OPEC production growth will be in unconventional oil.2

than counteracting growth in demand from China.

The IOCs’ decreasing access is mainly due to geopolitical

However, even if successful, reducing demand for oil in the

factors such as the continued rise of resource nationalism in medium term must be combined with a coherent supply-side

key producer countries, as well as rising oil prices. In addition, approach. Governments cannot cut demand while also putting

what little remaining access IOCs enjoy comes with much less into place policies aimed at maximizing supply of oil and other

favorable terms attached. They also face increasing competition fossil fuels, undercutting the political and economic case for clean

from national oil companies (NOCs) that are becoming more energy. In addition, reducing oil demand alone will not resolve

technically competent or business savvy and are cash rich. the fundamental environmental and social justice issues facing

This insecurity of access has been further exacerbated by the local communities at the frontline of oil development.

accelerating depletion of oil fields located in politically stable

and “friendly” territories.

For climate protection and for environmental and social justice

reasons, further oil investments must be monitored and challenged

IOCs also face pressure from investors to keep adding new oil to prevent the ongoing environmental and social damage they entail

reserves to replace existing production. In some cases, the deals and also to prevent states and other actors from getting “locked

now available to IOCs fail to deliver new reserves, as ownership of in” to a resource extraction model that makes the transition to a

the reserves tends to remain with the producer state or NOC.

truly sustainable development path more remote.

4

Marginal Oil - What is driving oil companies dirtier and deeper?

Introduction

The Syncrude tar sands mine, Alberta, Canada. The mining operations strip away boreal forest and mine up to 100 metres into the earth.

© Chris Evans / The Pembina Institute

This paper was designed as input for a workshop convened by investment in tar sands is therefore dependent on a “business

the Heinrich Böll Foundation and Friends of the Earth Europe as usual” energy scenario where fossil fuels, especially oil,

in Berlin from November 15–16, 2010.3 Participants comprised remain the primary source of power and transport fuel, and

activists and researchers working mainly on tar sands where demand for oil – and the oil price – remains high.

development in Canada and energy issues at the European level.

Several Southern activists whose countries could soon face new

This paper has now been revised for publication in the

tar sands or extra-heavy oil investment also participated in the hope that it will be of interest to a wider audience interested in

discussion (for a definition of terms such as tar sands and other the energy dimensions of the climate crisis and in the social,

terms, as used in this paper, see Box 1).

environmental, and developmental impacts of continued

investment in fossil fuel extraction.

Both the decision to hold the workshop and the paper’s

production were initially triggered by specific concerns

However, it inevitably still bears the limitations of its

among activists and researchers over the threat of expansion original conception. One is that it was primarily conceived

of tar sands within and beyond their current centre of as a tool to assist advocacy groups in their strategic

production in Canada – particularly into developing countries planning and coordination. As such, it does not offer a

such as Madagascar and the Republic of Congo (RoC) – and comprehensive overview or discussion either of current/

over potential imports of tar sands-derived fuel into the EU. potential developments in the oil sector or of advocacy

Concerns centred on the impacts of such developments on and campaigns research in the field, but rather presents a

the livelihoods and health of local communities and local particular argument with supporting evidence aimed at a

ecosystems – impacts already being felt by First Nations specialist audience.

communities and on the Athabasca River and the Canadian

boreal forest in the case of Canadian tar sands.

Furthermore, it also assumes a working knowledge

of the climate, energy security, and local environmental

In addition to their potentially disastrous local social and and social impacts associated with tar sands development

environmental impacts, ongoing tar sands development has in Canada. Research and advocacy groups, including

serious implications for the global climate crisis – and for long-

the Pembina Institute, the National Resources Defence

term energy security of oil-importing countries, including Council, Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, and Platform,

the United States and the EU. Such resources are highly have discussed such issues in detail in previous briefings,

carbon-intensive to produce, involving emissions per barrel and any reader wishing to find out more about tar sands

that are three to five times higher than with conventional development in Canada and its critiques should consult this

oil. Such developments also incur high costs and continuing rich vein of material.

Marginal Oil - What is driving oil companies dirtier and deeper?

5

Box 1 Definitions

Tar sands (or oil sands as they are called in the oil

industry) are deposits of sand and clay saturated with

bitumen. The tar sands in Alberta, Northern Canada, are

the second largest oil deposits in the world and extend

over an area the size of England that includes 4.3 million

hectares of boreal forest. They are now producing over a

million barrels of oil per day and the number one export

destination is the United States.

Bitumen is oil in a solid or semi-solid state that

requires unconventional extraction methods (either

mining or, in the case of the deeper deposits, steam

injection to get it to flow to the surface) and then

processing or “upgrading” to convert it into synthetic

crude. Large amounts of fossil fuels are burned and

large amounts of water used in these processes. NGOs,

scientists, and local residents have expressed serious

concerns about the irreparable environmental and

social damage tar sands projects have caused, including

serious health impacts from contamination of the

Athabasca watershed.

In addition, production of a barrel of Canadian tar

sands emits on average between three to five times more

carbon than production of a barrel of conventional oil.

The clearance of enormous areas of boreal forests is also

having a huge impact on the sequestration of carbon

emissions from greenhouse gases.

Location of Alberta’s bituminous sands.

Unconventional oil

Source: Global Forest Watch Canada

According to the International Energy Agency (IEA):

“There is no universally agreed definition of

unconventional oil, as opposed to conventional oil.

Roughly speaking, any source of oil is described as produce resources requiring processing that usually

unconventional if it requires production technologies involves higher levels of carbon emissions.

significantly different from those used in the mainstream

reservoirs exploited today.”4 The IEA’s definition of High carbon oil

unconventional oil includes extra-heavy oil (with that

from Canada and from Venezuela’s Orinoco Belt seen When discussing unconventional oil, we have

as the resources currently viable), natural bitumen (oil substituted the term “high carbon” oil – as shorthand for

sands) from Canada, chemical additives, gas-to-liquids, “high carbon-intensity oil” (i.e., oil that involves carbon-

coal-to-liquids, and oil shales.5

intensive production processes). This is on the grounds

that this term best sums up the key problem with the

The US Energy Information Administration (EIA) drive to develop these more difficult-to-access resources:

notes that: “What has qualified as ‘unconventional’ at They represent a “recarbonization” or intensification of

any particular time is a complex interactive function the carbon content of our energy supplies at a time when

of resource characteristics, the available exploration we need to be moving in the opposite direction to protect

and production technologies, the current economic the climate.

environment, and the scale, frequency, and duration

of production from the resource. Perceptions of these Frontier oil

factors inevitably change over time and they often

differ among users of the term.”6 In the 1960s and 70s, Frontier oil means exploring for resources in new

“unconventional” referred to the deepwater resources geological areas where costs and risks (technical and

being accessed by, at the time, new technology.

financial, although it can also mean political) are high.

For instance, a recent report named the following as

Thus, the definition of “unconventional” is mutable: being the next “new oil frontiers”: West Africa (Sierra

Other bodies may classify resources as unconventional Leone, Liberia, Sao Tomé and Principe), ultra-deepwater

according to the density or gravity of the hydrocarbon in the Gulf of Mexico, Western Sahara, the Falkland

resource or the location of the reservoir – excluding Islands, Uganda, the Bahamas, and the Arctic.7 The

the technology used to access it. In this paper, term “frontier oil” is usually used to cover exploration

“unconventional” is an umbrella term referring to for conventional rather than unconventional resources,

lower-grade and more technically difficult to access and whether onshore or offshore.

6

Marginal Oil - What is driving oil companies dirtier and deeper?

Figure 1: Continuum from conventional to unconventional oil resources

Note: The size of the bubbles indicates recoverable resources. Reservoirs with similar properties in each geographical area have been grouped;

the smallest bubbles each represent approximately 1 billion barrels of recoverable resources.

Source: World Energy Outlook 20108

Overall, the argument of this paper is that tar sands Section One explores the key underlying causes – or “macro”

development in Canada is both a symptom and manifestation forces – that are driving this push by oil companies to develop

of a broader, underlying trend: increasing investment by oil resources “at the margins” of the industry’s current technical

companies in what is termed unconventional oil. The latter or financial capabilities. It argues that, fundamentally,

term is applied, simply put, to oil resources that are (currently) this trend assumes a “business as usual” scenario of ever-

more technically difficult and costly for companies – and increasing oil demand and high oil prices. Such a scenario will

usually more carbon-intensive – to access and exploit than take us inexorably toward a potentially unmanageable rise in

conventional crude oil (see Box 1 for further information).

global temperature,9 as well as exacerbate energy insecurity

in importing countries.

Such resources are also often (but not always) located in

remote areas of high biodiversity or ecological sensitivity and/

Section Two surveys some key current and potential marginal

or have potentially serious effects on local communities and oil investments outside Canada, using specific criteria raised

their livelihoods. This is the case with tar sands in Madagascar by the issues outlined in this paper. These include: the

or the RoC.

likelihood of project development; its potential impacts on

vulnerable communities and ecologies; the attitude of host

In tandem, the race is on to exploit the world’s remaining communities to the investment; the openness of political

conventional oil resources. While these may not be so carbon-

space in the host country; and the involvement of European/

intensive to produce, they are located in “frontier” regions and US-listed companies.

are more remote or technologically difficult to access and/or

more environmentally/socially high-risk than current fields.

Examples are the deep offshore fields extending from the Arctic

to Brazil and Africa, and the Western Amazon.

For this reason, the authors have opted to use the term

“marginal oil” to refer to resources that are both at the margins

of profitability in financial terms (what is sometimes referred

to by the industry as the “marginal barrel”) but also high-risk

in terms of their potential impacts on local ecosystems and

communities as well as their implications for global climate

protection efforts.

Marginal Oil - What is driving oil companies dirtier and deeper?

7

1 Driving over the cliff: What’s behind the increasing

exploitation of marginal oil?

Figure 2: Oil production by source

120

60%

Unconventional oil

100

50%

Other OPEC

80

40%

Middle East OPEC

d

60

30%

mb/

Non-OPEC

40

20%

OPEC market share

(right axis)

20

10%

0

0%

2000

2008

2015

2030

Note: Excludes processing gains. Conventional oil includes crude oil, natural gas liquids (NGLs), extra heavy oil from Venezuela and chemical additives.

Source: World Energy Outlook 200913

In 2008, the IEA forecast that of the 70 million barrels per day oil and that is certainly important. But it is mostly political

(Mbpd) of conventional oil in production in 2007, 43 Mbpd factors that restrict access to the remaining easy-to-produce

would not be available in 2030.10 In order to meet rising oil and therefore, the drive into the margins is primarily driven

demand, in a policy environment that is little changed from by the major international oil companies. In some cases, such

today’s (what the IEA calls the “Reference Scenario”) 64 Mbpd as the pre-salt ultra-deepwater resources of Brazil or extra-

of new capacity will have to be brought on stream by 2030.11

heavy oil in Venezuela, national oil companies are playing a

leading role, but it is IOCs that have generally developed the

Much of this demand is likely to be met by OPEC, which technology to enable them to do so.

retains control of the vast majority of the world’s remaining

“easy-to-produce” oil (see Figure 2). The IEA suggests that

The actions of both types of companies are driven by the

non-OPEC conventional oil production will peak around economics of global supply and demand, and by concerns

2010 and that the majority of future non-OPEC production about future energy security. However, given the ever-

growth will be in unconventional oil.12

increasing costs of exploiting these resources – financial,

social, and environmental – the question of limits arises. In

In line with these trends, for the last 10 years the oil other words, is the status quo in terms of energy policy being

industry has been moving increasingly toward the production maintained to the point where the costs to society outweigh

of unconventional oil such as tar sands and pushing into the benefits? To what extent does this inertia undermine the

“frontier” zones, such as ultra-deepwater and the offshore transition to cleaner and more efficient energy systems?

Arctic. These oil resources share in common their tendency to

intensify the already high social and environmental impacts

In addition, are oil company statements about the

of current oil production and their high financial costs. For dynamics of supply and demand accurate or are they self-

this reason, we have labelled them “marginal oil.”

serving and designed to maintain the status quo? Arguably,

to date the public debate on energy security, particularly in

What are the economic and political factors driving this the United States, has focused largely on supply-side issues

push into marginal oil? This section will not discuss the rather than demand-side solutions.

specific drivers of every marginal oil project but outline the

macro-forces that underpin the general trend.

This section will begin by looking at IOCs and the difficulties

they face accessing the world’s “easier” oil resources, their

The main factor behind the push into marginal oil is struggle to replace reserves, and their increasing reliance on

generally thought to be the depletion of “easier-to-produce” marginal resources. It will also discuss energy security, its

8

Marginal Oil - What is driving oil companies dirtier and deeper?

misconceptions, and the inadequacy of supply-side solutions. Figure 3: IOCs and NOCs access to reserves

Finally, demand scenarios will be considered, as well as the and share of production

extent to which policies aimed at demand reduction can Access to reserves:

undermine the economics of marginal oil.

78% Reserves held

1.1 International oil companies: The problem of

by NOCs ‘Limited

diminishing “easy oil”

Equity Access’

In 2008, Shell’s (then) CEO, Jeroen van de Veer, announced that

6% Reserves to which

the era of “easy-to-find” oil was coming to an end.14 It would

IOCs have ‘Full Access’

perhaps have been more accurate to say that for IOCs such as

Shell the era of “easy-to-produce” oil is well and truly over.15

6% Reserves to which

There is certainly truth to the proposition that the easy

IOCs have ‘Full Access’

oil is running out. While there are 70,000 known oil fields in

the world, around 100 “giant” fields account for roughly half

of global production.16 Many of these fields are past their

peak or expected to reach their peak in the near future.17 In

10% Reserves held by

some places, such as Iraq, easy oil exists but political and

NOCs ‘Equity Access’

security concerns are likely to constrain production for the

foreseeable future.18

Share of production:

22% Other Companies

Awareness of the accelerating depletion of conventional

oil fields and scepticism about the industry’s ability to

18% Other IOCs

bring sufficient new capacity on stream has triggered

concerns about “peak oil” – the idea that the world has

either reached, or will soon reach, the limits of its capacity

12% Saudi Aramco

to increase oil production.

5% NOC Iran

However, there is much debate about the peak oil

proposition, primarily because the oil industry has consistently

4% Pemex

learned to stretch oil resources further through technological

breakthroughs that enable access to oil previously considered

3% Exxon Mobil

inaccessible or uneconomic to produce. This technological

development has primarily been driven by the IOCs because

3% BP

for many years they have been excluded from, or given only

very limited access to, the easy-to-produce oil.

2% Shell

1.2 Decreasing access for IOCs

31% Other NOCs

In the 1960s, IOCs had unlimited access to around 85 percent Source: Arthur D. Little, January 201021

of global oil reserves. Today that access has declined to

around 6 percent.19 The decrease in access primarily stems

from rising resource nationalism in oil-producing countries,

However, one of the first attempts at wholesale

which restricts and denies the IOCs access to the world’s nationalization in the Middle East ended so calamitously

most prolific resources. The exhaustion of oil fields, primarily for its proponents that it served as a cautionary tale for

located in the North Sea and the United States, which were other countries, explaining the slow pace of nationalization

mainstays for IOCs from the 1970s to 90s, has also diminished in the decades that immediately followed.23 In 1951, the

their reserves in recent years.20

democratically elected Prime Minister of Iran, Mohammad

Mossadegh, attempted to wrest control of the nation’s oil

1.3 Continuing resource nationalism: An increasingly

resources from the Anglo Iranian Oil Company (later to

harder bargain for IOCs

become BP). This resulted in two years of economic and

political turmoil in the country, as the oil industry ground

Resource nationalism – defined here as the tendency of oil-

to a halt and Britain, with some assistance from the United

exporting states to limit access to IOCs and to assert state States, sponsored various opposition factions, eventually

control over the development of oil resources – is nothing leading to a coup in 1953.24 Mossadegh lived the rest of his

new.22 Up until the 1960s, much of the Middle East’s oil was life under house arrest and Iran’s oil reverted to the hands of a

still being produced by British, French, and American oil consortium of foreign-owned companies.

companies, which had unlimited access through the power

of the colonial governments they represented – a fact that

While the 1960s saw some renegotiation of terms, as

may explain the enduring attraction of resource nationalism Middle Eastern states struggled to capture more of the

in the region.

revenues issuing from oil production, it was only in the 1970s

Marginal Oil - What is driving oil companies dirtier and deeper?

9

that these states finally wrested back full control of their oil war, as well as the growing backlash against globalization.

reserves from the IOCs.25 Low oil prices from the mid-1980s In many of these states, particularly in the Middle East, the

onwards, however, caused oil-producing states to seek ways presence of IOCs is especially unpopular at present, further

to increase revenues through increasing production. With buoying their underlying and enduring ideological support

more difficult-to-produce reservoirs a challenge for the for resource nationalism.

NOCs, some states in the region (excluding Saudi Arabia)

invited back the IOCs.26

Therefore, the oil boom of the first decade of the new

millennium did not leave the IOCs more secure in terms of

When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1989, a whole new access to the world’s reserves. This insecurity of access has

region of potential resources opened up for the IOCs. Newly been further exacerbated by the accelerating depletion of

independent states such as Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan oil fields located in politically stable and friendly territories

invited IOCs to help them access resources that the Soviet that, over the past three decades, have been the mainstay

state had failed to exploit. Russia signed deals that were, in for the oil companies. These areas are primarily the North

some cases, so favourable to the IOCs that they became “part Sea, including Norway, the United States and conventional

of corporate lore […] analysed in business school textbooks resources in Canada.

for years to come.”27 Although many of these projects were

more difficult to develop than the Middle Eastern oil that was 1.4 Friendly, stable fields in decline

lost to resource nationalism in the 1970s, the IOCs enjoyed a

resurgence and many grew exponentially in this period, on While the IOCs were losing access to resources in the

the back of a wave of mergers and acquisitions.

Middle East in the 1960s, their losses were to some extent

compensated by the emergence of offshore oil in politically

But the resurgence did not last long. In the early and mid-

stable and friendly countries. The North Sea, in the heart

2000s, Russia, Kazakhstan, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia of northern Europe, became the most significant new oil

either took back into state control entire fields from the IOCs, province for the IOCs from the early 1970s onwards. North

or renegotiated agreements that favoured the state.28 A new Sea oil boomed during the 1970s and 80s but production

wave of resource nationalism was clearly underway.

peaked between 1999 and 2001. It now has one of the fastest

rates of decline in the world.34 While exploration continues

Rising oil prices in this period are thought to have been and some progress has been made on extending the life

a major driver behind these compulsory renegotiations. of North Sea oil fields, there is only hope of slowing, not

When prices are low, available capital is reduced and states reversing, the decline. The North Sea oil boom is well and

are in a weaker position, as competition for resources truly over.

among oil companies is limited. States tend to agree to

easier terms to encourage inward investment. As prices

In the most mature oil province in the world, the onshore

rise, states begin to covet the revenues being generated “lower 48 USA”,35 oil production has been in decline since the

and seek to rake back a larger proportion of the wealth they 1970s. In the 1970s and 80s, onshore production in Prudhoe

consider rightfully theirs.29

Bay, Alaska, was a major source of growth for IOCs. However,

this area now has the steepest decline of all major production

The rising oil prices in the 2000s also helped fuel civil zones in the United States.36 In Canada, where tar sands

unrest and conflict in poorly governed oil-exporting states production now dominates oil production, conventional oil

in Africa. Conflicts in Nigeria, Chad, and Sudan disrupted has been in decline for a number of years.37

oil production and jeopardized new projects, undermining

the hopes of some IOCs that Africa could become a major

Oil resources in other countries considered friendly and

new source of production.30 These conflicts, while not stable for IOCs, such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, and

completely closing these countries to IOC access (except New Zealand, are also limited. These countries have never

for Sudan), have severely hampered the prospects for really provided the major growth potential that the IOCs seek

production growth.

and their limited resources are already in decline.38

A more recent example is the way Exxon was forced to

Thus, there is little prospect for the IOCs to maintain

retreat from buying a $4 billion stake in Ghana’s huge new current levels of conventional or easy oil production. This

offshore Jubilee field. As one source put it: “The oil giant was is due to declining production in regions where access is

compelled to cancel the deal due to extreme pressure from relatively straightforward or because access is severely limited

Ghana government and strong resistance from the state oil or too risky in regions where easy and abundant reserves

company, Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC).”31

of conventional oil still exist. The IOCs have therefore been

Reportedly, GNPC wanted the final say on which companies grappling with access and depletion issues for some time.

form the joint venture operating what is a key economic This explains why their response has primarily been the

element for the country. This included the option of the state development of technology to access increasingly difficult

company bidding itself for a stake, financed with Chinese and marginal sources of oil.

money, and potentially bringing in Chinese company CNOOC

plus another oil major to the deal.32

1.5 The challenge from “international” NOCs and

service companies

The resurgence of resource nationalism in the 2000s is

thought by some commentators to be a particularly potent Another factor increasing pressure on the IOCs to move into

and durable phenomenon.33 Not only because oil prices are marginal resources is the emerging strength of national oil

expected to remain high for some time, but also because of companies in the international arena. NOCs are forging

other factors supporting the view that resource nationalism partnerships with each other, such as that between the Chinese

in the oil-producing states will endure. The emerging role of state company China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC)

NOCs as partners in overseas oil production is one factor (see and Venezuela’s Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), and

Figure 3). Another is the huge political fallout from the Iraq also increasingly with private oilfield service companies.39

10

Marginal Oil - What is driving oil companies dirtier and deeper?

Where once NOCs looked to the major IOCs for technical

While RRR is just one of many metrics used by analysts,

assistance as well as capital investment, they may now look to it is one that demands strong performance in an area other

independent service contractors for technical help and finance than simple profit generation or return on investment:

the project from their own vast reserves of capital.40 Recent constant reacquisition of a fast-disappearing commodity.

evidence of this is Petrobras’ successful share issue of $70 While investors are not forcing companies to acquire risky

billion in September 2010, the biggest in corporate history.41

reserves in order to maintain RRR levels, there is a mutual

expectation that the status quo in terms of reserves must

Some expert analysts see this trend as putting “the current be maintained.

business model of the international oil companies (IOCs)

in question, possibly as dramatically as did the shift that

Poor RRR was a feature of the top IOCs’ performance in

occurred in the late 1960s and early 1970s.”42 Not only are the late 1990s and early 2000s (see Figure 4 below). Companies

IOCs losing deals to NOCs, the nature of the deals that remain were accused of focusing on generating short-term profits at

on offer is also changing. Rather than gaining an equity share the expense of reserves replacement.46 The issue caught the

in an oil field through production sharing agreements, IOCs attention of the wider world when the Shell reserves scandal

increasingly have to accept new arrangements such as partial broke in early 2004.47

equity sharing and fees-for-services arrangements.43

Following the revelation that Shell had been booking

There are certainly profits to be made from these new some of its probable reserves as proven reserves for years,

arrangements, but they fail to deliver a key factor of oil the company had to downgrade 4.47 billion barrels of oil

company value: reserves replacement. Many of these equivalent, around 20 percent of the proven reserves on

arrangements involve ownership of the reserves in question its books. Shell’s share price plunged, heads rolled, and the

remaining with the state or NOC. This is particularly company has spent the last six years struggling to regain its

problematic when investors look to oil companies to maintain reputation and improve its reserves levels. Shell’s subsequent

reserves replacement ratios above 100 percent despite the acquisitions of tar sands resources have resulted in 30 percent

increasing difficulty of doing so.

of its total resources now consisting of Canadian tar sands.48

1.6 Investor pressure: Is the tail wagging the dog?

Figure 4: Reserves Replacement Ratio

IOCs are publicly traded companies, that is, owned by of top 25 IOCs 1995-2006

shareholders who trade shares on stock exchanges around 300

the world – in the case of the big five IOCs, their shares

trade in London and/or New York (or Paris and New York for 250

Total). Institutional investors – pension funds, investment

companies, mutual funds, and insurance companies – hold the

bulk of shares.

200

44 These investors employ analysts to assess the

value of individual companies and make recommendations 150

as to whether to buy or sell shares in a particular company.

Often analysts specialize in a sector such as oil and gas or 100

pharmaceuticals and so on.

50

Four times a year, the IOCs publish and present financial

results to investors and analysts. They also report annually

0

via their General Meetings and produce a Strategy Update

– the latter in particular is focused on communicating with

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

2002

2003 2004 2005 2006

the specialist sector analysts. Overall, there is tremendous

100% Replacement

Big 5

Next 20

pressure on the companies to show that they are performing

well and making the right strategic decisions to maintain Source: Jaffe and Soligo, 2007

strong performance into the future.

The analysts examine a number of key value indicators to

Figure 4 shows how for the biggest IOCs, their RRR was

assess the performance of companies. For oil companies an disappointing for much of the decade between the mid-

important indicator is reserves replacement ratio (RRR). RRR 1990s and mid-2000s (in this analysis, the “Big 5” are BP, Shell,

measures the amount of proved reserves added to a company’s ExxonMobil, ChevronTexaco, and ConocoPhillips). However,

reserve base during the year relative to the amount of oil and toward the end of this period, it starts to improve.

gas produced.45

A recent analysis49 of the top IOCs reserves additions

Investors want to see a ratio above 100 percent. This shows that many of these companies have maintained higher

means, if a company extracts a billion barrels of oil in a year, RRR rates since 2005 by increasingly relying on tar sands to

the investors want to know it has gained access to another replace the production of fast-disappearing conventional

billion barrels for production at a later date. If RRR persistently oil. Four of the top six IOCs could not have achieved 100

comes in at less than 100 percent, then the company is percent RRR without the addition of tar sands reserves (see

essentially running out of oil and gas reserves.

Figures 5 and 6).

Marginal Oil - What is driving oil companies dirtier and deeper?

11

Figure 5: Estimated tar sands reserves additions as a percentage of reserves additions 2005-0950

As percentage of total

As percentage of total liquids

Company

reserves additions

reserves additions

ConocoPhillips51

39%

71%

ExxonMobil52

20%

51%

Shell53

16%

34%

Total54

10%

26%

Chevron55

3%

7%

BP

0%

0%

Average (excl. BP) 56

19.8%

42.6%

Source: Oil Change International, Greenpeace UK and Platform, 201157

Figure 6: Reserves Replacement Ratio (RRR) for the period 2005-0958

Company

RRR

RRR excluding tar sands59

ConocoPhillips

145%

88%

ExxonMobil

114%

89%

Shell60

127%

106%

Total

85%

76%

Chevron

101%

98%

BP

100%

n/a

Average61

112%

92%

Source: Oil Change International, Greenpeace UK and Platform, 201162

Box 2 Reserves terminology

Oil and gas companies are required by financial

The new rules also allow companies to report

regulators to report their reserves according to defined unconventional sources of oil such as bitumen and coal

standards. Reserves estimation is not a precise science that is intended for coal-to-liquids production as oil

and therefore reserves are divided into categories such reserves, whereas in the past such resources had to be

as: proven, probable, and possible, among others. There recorded as mining reserves.

is also a wider estimation used called total resources

(TR). Standards for making estimations have been Proven reserves are defined as follows: an estimated

developed by the Society of Petroleum Engineers.

quantity of oil and gas that geological and engineering

data demonstrate with reasonable certainty to be

For the biggest IOCs, whose shares are listed on the recoverable in future years from known reservoirs under

New York Stock Exchange, the reporting of reserves existing economic and operating conditions.63

follows the rules of the Securities and Exchange

Commission (SEC). Up until January 2010, the SEC only Total resources generally refers to all the oil and gas a

allowed companies to report proven reserves. New rules company expects to extract in the future. It is a category

now allow, but do not require, companies to report not recognised by the SEC. However, the occasional

probable reserves. Shell’s reserves scandal in 2004 was disclosure of TR has shed light on the level of future

primarily about its reporting of reserves as proven, dependence on marginal oil for many companies. For

which under SEC rules should have been technically example, tar sands resources made up around 8 percent

defined as probable, and therefore not reported at all to of Shell’s proven reserves in 200864 but some 30 percent

the SEC as reserves.

of its TR.65

12

Marginal Oil - What is driving oil companies dirtier and deeper?

Figure 7: A chart of Shell’s deepwater engineering milestones showing

the different types of rig designs developed for deepwater67

ange

akap

s

s

ac

s

winkle

Cogn

Bull

Mensa

Na Kika

1978

1988

Auger

1993

Mars

1996

Ram-Powel

1997

Bonga

2005

Ormen L

2007

Ursa

1999

Gumusut K

in progres

1997

BC-10

in progres

2003

Perdido

in progres

600 m

800 m

1 000 m

1 200 m

1 400 m

1 600 m

1 800 m

2 000 m

2 200 m

2 400 m

Source: Royal Dutch Shell, 2008

1.7 Growing in the margins

The IOCs’ development of technology to access “difficult oil” 5,000 ft (1,524 m) is officially known as “ultra-deepwater”

can probably be traced back to the North Sea offshore oil and is now the new frontier for the offshore oil industry, as

boom of the 1970s and 80s. The North Sea presented drillers shallower resources become scarcer.69 The first oil discovered

with frequently harsh weather conditions, with high winds in ultra-deepwater was in the Gulf of Mexico in 1986.70

and waves a regular feature of the offshore environment. It However, regular production has only occurred over the last

was here and in the Gulf of Mexico that the IOCs developed decade and current ultra-deepwater production stands at

the engineering skills and technology to find and produce oil around 200,000 bpd.

in treacherous and increasingly deep waters.66 The political

and contractual stability that companies enjoyed in these

While pushing back frontiers in offshore drilling has

regions was essential to balancing the financial risks of become one of the key engineering and technology pursuits

developing cutting-edge technology to access and produce of the IOCs, it is not the only one. The past decade has

the resources.

seen increasing involvement of IOCs in the offshore Arctic,

Canadian tar sands production, the development of gas-to-

By the early 1990s, drilling in waters over 1,000 ft (305 liquids, and research and development of technologies to

m) deep, generally considered deepwater, had become produce oil shale. For example, in 2007, research on oil shale

commonplace.68 Drilling for oil and gas in waters deeper than extraction was the largest component of Shell’s R&D budget.71

Box 3 The high costs of marginal oil

The development of high carbon oil resources and the then requires upgrading before it can enter a refinery to

push into the margin is more a symptom of high oil prices be processed into products (or if diluted with lighter

than a solution to them. Almost without exception, these products, it can be refined in complex refineries). Mining

resources are more expensive to develop and produce projects also have to deal with large land reclamation

than conventional oil.

and water treatment costs.

Canadian tar sands: exploration costs are low as the

Shell’s Jackpine 1 tar sands mining project, which

resource is shallow and onshore. The problem with this is in the final stages of construction and includes the

resource, however, is establishing how much can be expansion of Shell’s upgrading capacity to process

extracted and at what cost. The thick, heavy bitumen the mined bitumen, was described recently by a Shell

is burdened with sand, clay, and water and requires executive as “some of the most expensive production

intensive processing before it can be refined into useful that we have.”74 The $14 billion project will have a

products. With the shallower resources, companies maximum capacity of 100,000 b/d and is said to require

can be confident of extracting a large percentage of the oil prices of at least $70–75 a barrel to turn a profit.

resource through opencast mining, but the processing

required is intense.

Deeper tar sands resources requiring in situ

production rely on heating the bitumen underground

After mining, the bitumen has to be separated from using high-pressure steam. Initial infrastructure costs

the soil using large amounts of heated water, creating can be lower than in mining projects but profitability

huge amounts of waste known as tailings.73 The bitumen depends on low natural gas prices ( cont.overleaf)

Marginal Oil - What is driving oil companies dirtier and deeper?

13

Figure 8: Production costs by resource

150

140

130

120

c

110

R

r

Arcti

100

l

R

l

iodieselB

90

l

nal oi

EO

Other EO

80

2

BTL

CO

Oil

Ethano

shales

CTL

70

nal oi

entio

All deep wate

GTL

Heavy oil

60

entio

bitumen

Production cost (2008 USD) 50

Other Conv

40

30

MENA Conv

20

Already

produced

10

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

8000

9000

10 000

Available oil in barrels

Competing fuel sources

Source: IEA Resources to Reserves (forthcoming)72

(continued) and the stability of the reservoir in terms The frontiers: More extreme conditions, higher costs

of its steam-to-oil ratio. Some in situ projects have not

achieved, or maintained for long, the expected ratio.75 The push into deeper water is also accompanied by

Raising the steam-to-oil ratio requires more natural gas, spiralling costs. For both ultra-deepwater and offshore

thereby raising costs.

Arctic production, this starts with escalating exploration

costs. Finding oil in ever-remoter locations, thousands

Another cost issue challenging the growth in tar of meters deep, drilling into rock and behind salt layers,

sands production in Alberta is the intense competition quadrupled exploration costs between 2003 and 2008.83

for labor, equipment, and services in the region. The

market in Alberta is among the most expensive in the

Exploration and production rigs are becoming

world for oil field services and equipment and due to its increasingly specialized, requiring more highly paid

remote location and the specialized nature of the skills personnel, more sophisticated equipment, and more

and equipment required, the situation is unlikely to steel. Drilling 10,000 ft deep requires 10,000 ft of steel

change much.76

tubing, and steel prices have been booming. In the Arctic,

drilling costs are increased by extreme conditions,

Generally, Canadian tar sands production is regarded leading to shortened drilling seasons, as the winter

as the most expensive oil production in the world and freeze shuts downs operations. This can mean that

has been described by the IEA as “the marginal barrel.”77 wells may take multiple seasons to complete. Additional

Minimum oil prices required for new projects to be hazards such as icebergs require ships to be at hand to

profitable are variously quoted as between $60 and $90 push them from the path of the rig. Particularly large

per barrel.78 The IEA claimed in December 2010 that at icebergs will require rigs to cease drilling and move from

mid-2010 prices, “most new oil-sands projects are thought their path.84

to be profitable at oil prices above $65 to $75 per barrel.”79

The IEA produced the above graph (Figure 8) as a

However, as the IEA also stated: “the attractiveness guide to the costs of various forms of oil production. It

of investing in unconventional oil is highly sensitive to highlights the high cost of Arctic production, which is

the outlook for oil price, the extent of the introduction of listed here as potentially more expensive than bitumen.

penalties on CO2 emissions and the level of development However, the graph states that carbon pricing has not

costs relative to conventional oil.”80

been factored in, while various other sources suggest

that for tar sands (bitumen) – and perhaps some of the

Thus in the longer term, the minimum cost of tar sands other unconventional oils – the top end of this price scale

is likely to rise as carbon costs and other environmental would almost certainly be higher.85 Finally, according

remediation costs are factored in. Under the IEA’s 450 to the IEA, while the breakeven oil price for Canadian

Scenario, for example, a projected price of carbon of tar sands projects is “comparable to that of deepwater

$120/ton would add an extra $5 per barrel of oil produced. offshore conventional oil projects [tar sands] production,

One research report put the long-term price required to and therefore investment payback periods, is spread over

implement all proposed Canadian projects by the 2040s a much longer time period.”86

as between $119 and $134 per barrel at 2009 prices.81

Also worth noting is the low cost of Middle Eastern

This extra cost, combined with a lower oil price – given and North African (MENA) conventional oil and other

reduced demand under scenarios such as the IEA’s 450 –

conventional oils. The prospect of lower demand is much

“would make the economics of new oil-sands projects less of a threat to MENA producers and the resource

marginal and cast doubt over the most expensive projects.”82

remains sufficient, especially at lower rates of demand.

14

Marginal Oil - What is driving oil companies dirtier and deeper?

1.8 Increasingly marginal reserves87

Another way to examine the role of marginal oil in the future Figure 10: Shell total resources 2008

production of IOCs is to look at their disclosure of total

resources. The term “total resources” generally refers to all the

oil and gas a company expects to extract in the future from

Heavy oil & EOR

its current resource base. These disclosures are not guided by

SEC regulations and are inconsistent between the companies.

Deepwater

Nevertheless, their graphic representation does demonstrate

Traditional

the growing role of marginal resources in the companies’

long-term resources, as can be seen below.

LNG

Figure 9: BP proved and non-proved reserves 2009

Sour

Tight gas

Conventional oil

‘Proved’: 18.3 bn boe

GTL

Deepwater oil

Source: Shell 2008 Strategy Update92

Water-flood viscous

Shell has one of the highest concentrations of Canadian

and heavy oil

tar sands in its total resources of all six companies. In 2008,

it stated that this graph represented 66 billion barrels of

Unconventional gas

oil equivalent (boe) of which 20 billion barrels (30%) were

Canadian tar sands.93

Conventional gas

‘Non-proved’: 45.3 bn boe

In subsequent publications, Shell has claimed that, of

its proven reserves, only 8.4 percent is tar sands, while the

LNG gas

resource will represent 4 percent of its production in 2011

when its latest tar sands mining expansion comes fully on

Source: BP 2010 Strategy Update88

stream.94 The heavy weighting of tar sands resources in its

unproven reserves suggests that at some point these figures

BP conveniently separates proven reserves from the rest will rise sharply. Shell also has significant deepwater resources

of the resource base, enabling some insight into the changes and is actively exploring for oil in the offshore Arctic and for

in its production base that may take place in the future. This oil shale in Jordan.

graph precedes the Macondo disaster and so does not reflect

the asset sales that BP has had to make as a result.

Figure 11: Chevron total resources 2010

In the proven reserves, “water-flood, viscous and heavy

oil” is the smallest slice and this reflects BP’s lack of tar sands

projects currently producing or under construction. These

Deepwater

proven reserves are most likely primarily related to equity

shares in heavy oil projects in Venezuela.

Heavy oil

Arctic

In the non-proved reserves section, this heavy oil category

grows enormously. This reflects the tar sands resources in the

Oil sands

company’s equity share in the Sunrise steam-assisted gravity

drainage (SAGD) project, which will move into the proven

LNG

category in next year’s accounts following project sanction

on November 29, 2010.89 It also reflects resources in the Kirby

Conventional

region of Alberta that BP has held for some time and may be

brought into production in collaboration with Devon Energy

following deals made in early 2010.90

Source: Chevron 2010 Upstream Strategy Update95

Shortly before publishing this graph, BP also acquired

a stake in Value Creation’s Canadian tar sands resource.91

Chevron has a very large percentage of its resources

It seems unlikely that these resources are accounted for in deepwater. It also has significant heavy oil resources

in the graph. We therefore expect this category to grow concentrated in California, Indonesia, and the Partitioned

substantially in subsequent reports. BP’s concentration in Neutral Zone in Saudi Arabia. Heavy oil is generally produced

deepwater production appears strong in both sections of using steam-flooding – a technique similar to the SAGD

the graph. BP is also actively exploring for new resources in method used in tar sands production. Chevron also has

the offshore Arctic.

significant Canadian tar sands and Arctic resources.

Marginal Oil - What is driving oil companies dirtier and deeper?

15

Figure 12: ExxonMobil resource base 2010

Figure 14: ConocoPhillips total resources by region 2009

80

Unconventional gas

E

Liquefied natural gas

BBO

Acid/ sour gas

40

Conventional

Deepwater

Arctic

Heavy oil/ oil sands

Canada SAGD

Australia

Asia Pacific

0

Canada syncrude

Middle East and Africa

Canada Arctic

Year End 2009

Alaska

Russia Caspian

Canada gas

Source: ExxonMobil analysts presentation 201096

Lower 48

North Sea

Source: ConocoPhillips March 2010 analyst meeting, New York98

The heavy oil category in ExxonMobil’s graph is very large

and probably represents its Canadian tar sands reserves,

much of which is being developed by its 70 percent-owned

Canadian subsidiary, Imperial Oil. ExxonMobil is less Figure 15: ConocoPhillips 2010–2014 reserve additions

concentrated in deepwater but has significant resources in

the Arctic.

Figure 13: Total proved and probable

reserves growth 2004–2009

20

Unconventional gas

E

LNG

BBO

Deep offshore

10

Canada

Middle East and Africa

Alaska

Heavy oil

Lower 48

Australia

Exploration

North Sea

Asia Pacific

Russian Caspian

Gas

Source: ConocoPhillips March 2010 analyst meeting, New York99

Liquids

ConocoPhillips’ Canadian tar sands resources are

primarily in situ resources that will be produced through the

0

SAGD method and are its biggest single resource. Our analysis

2004

2009

of its reserves additions in the past five years shows that these

Source: Total 2009 results and outlook97

resources made up 39 percent of its total reserves additions

and a staggering 71 percent of its total liquids additions, far

Total’s report, rather than showing total resources as greater than any of its competitors.

the others do, illustrates the growth in proved and probable

reserves between 2004 and 2009, which gives a reasonable

The second chart above shows that the company also

idea of reserves added in the period. We can see that while the expects to make greater additions from these resources in the

reserves base has grown between 2004 and 2009, conventional coming five years. In its presentation, the company shows

liquids have shrunk substantially while deep offshore, heavy that it expects to see a compound annual growth rate of 20

oil (including tar sands), and LNG have grown significantly.

percent in SAGD production through to 2019.100 The company

also holds substantial resources in the Canadian and Alaskan

Arctic, some of which is offshore.

16

Marginal Oil - What is driving oil companies dirtier and deeper?

Box 4 The “resource curse”: Is “rent seeking” another driver of marginal oil development?

Over 50 countries worldwide are defined as natural

resource-rich.101 In sub-Saharan Africa, nearly half of

the population lives in oil- and mineral-rich countries,

which account for about 70 percent of Africa’s GDP and

receive most of the foreign direct investment into the

continent.102 Yet most of these countries have low human

development.

Resource-rich

developing

countries

are associated with high levels of poverty and income

inequality, poor governance, high levels of corruption

and authoritarianism, higher spending on military and

security forces, a higher likelihood of civil war and social

instability, high child mortality, low life expectancy, low

spending on health, low levels of primary education, and

high levels of illiteracy.103

This has led economists and development specialists

to develop the notion that resource-rich developing A girl collects food for her community in the Congo

countries are characterized by “the paradox of plenty” rainforest. © Greenpeace / Davison

or “the resource curse.” Poor development outcomes are

particularly notable in the case of oil wealth. Equatorial

Overall, developing-country oil producers are

Guinea, for instance, sometimes called the “Kuwait of associated with a decrease in government accountability

Africa,” is sub-Saharan Africa’s fourth-largest oil-producing and a weakening of state institutions, as “easy”

nation with the continent’s highest GDP per capita (over (unearned) money renders governments non-reliant on

$30,000). This is comparable to that of wealthy nations earned income (e.g., from taxation106). “If pre-existing

like Italy and Spain. But its Human Development Index institutions are weak or the state is only partially formed,

ranking is 118 out of 182 countries, and on the Human the influx of rents from petroleum tends to produce

Poverty Index, which measures the average progress of a a rentier state – one that lives from the profits of oil. In

country in human development, it ranks in the bottom 25 rentier states, economic power and political power are

percent of countries.

especially concentrated, the lines between public and

private are very blurred, and rent-seeking as a strategy for

Oil is a finite or non-renewable resource, bringing large wealth creation is rampant.”107

revenue inflows to a country, but over a limited time period.

Oil revenues are also highly subject to price volatility,

As a logical extension of this, “rent-seeking” and

which means that without policy measures to address this, corruption can be additional drivers of development of

oil-dependent countries are exceptionally vulnerable to oil resources in countries with weak state infrastructure.

“boom and bust” cycles, making budgetary forecasting Corrupt elites may seek to attract investment in order to

and provision difficult for governments. In addition, rapid cash in on the “honey pot” of unearned revenue flows to the

oil sector development can cause “Dutch Disease,” that state resulting from oil development. In turn, companies

is, currency appreciation and inflationary movement that and middlemen may seek to exploit rent-seeking behavior,

weakens the non-oil sectors of the economy, rendering as they stand to benefit from lack of institutional capacity

non-oil exports in particular less competitive.104

and oversight in obtaining terms for accessing resources

that are favorable to them and which may divert wealth

Other economic and fiscal impacts of sudden oil wealth into the pockets of ruling officials, but offer a poor deal for

are the increased likelihood of governments engaging in the country’s citizens.108

unplanned public spending sprees, leading to a loss of

fiscal control (their effectiveness may also be hampered

In oil-rich Angola, for instance, the OECD states that

by weak administrative capacity); the strengthening or the business climate is characterized by “major bottlenecks

creation of patronage systems with political effects, that due to endemic corruption, outdated regulations and

is, the undermining of democratic pressures; and an rent-seeking behaviour.”109 There is no reason to suppose

increase in foreign debt with some countries taking out that – without concerted and far-ranging policy reforms

expensive “oil-backed loans,” ostensibly to fund public to increase transparency and combat corruption – rent-

investment programs but often as a cover for illicit seeking would not equally be a factor driving development

diversion of funds.105

of marginal resources in weak states.

Marginal Oil - What is driving oil companies dirtier and deeper?

17

1.9 Energy security – Does marginal oil really

growing, despite development of unconventional oil and

bring security?

other marginal resources, from 44 percent in 2008 to 52

percent in 2030.115

Over the last decade, rising oil prices and growing concern

over peak oil has pushed energy security toward the top of

As non-OPEC, marginal oil is so expensive to produce,

government agendas around the world. In the United States, the IEA suggests that with reduced demand under the 450

energy security has been repeatedly cited as a national Scenario, OPEC’s share of the global oil market would,

security priority, trumping climate protection concerns in fact, be slightly higher at 55 percent because lower oil

surrounding Canadian tar sands extraction.110 The popular prices in this scenario would render many marginal oil

argument goes: Canada represents a stable and friendly sources uneconomic.116

source of oil that is not prone to the multiple threats of anti-

Americanism, terrorism, or resource nationalism. Industry

However, this situation is still more secure for oil

and government supporters often use this argument in importers, as they will be importing significantly less oil.

defence of tar sands production.111

For example, US oil imports in 2030 will likely be around

15 percent less than in 2008 under the Reference Scenario,

US energy security concerns are driving the call (postponed but double that, 33 percent less, in the 450 Scenario.117 OPEC

in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon spill) to open up new will export less oil in the 450 Scenario and with lower prices

offshore exploration on the US continental shelf, as well as the will have lower revenues. While its market share will be

drive into the offshore Arctic regions of Alaska and Canada.112 slightly higher, its overall production will be lower, in line

It can also be argued that increasing attention is being paid to with lower demand and prices.

West African oil resources by Washington energy hawks.113

The supply and demand balance that optimises energy

Energy security is equally a concern for Jordan in its quest security comes down to simple market principles. If demand

to develop its oil shale resources, given it lacks any other remains at the edge of suppliers’ ability to supply, then prices

oil resources.114 Indeed, for any net oil-importing country, will be high and consumers will be at the mercy of suppliers’

the opportunity to open up previously inaccessible oil whims. Reducing demand turns the tables. OPEC may have

resources – either domestically or in friendly, neighbouring, more market share in a reduced demand scenario but it also

or even distant countries – is a strategy that has become has far less power, because demand for its products will be

increasingly urgent in the past decade. China’s bilateral in decline. In such a situation, suppliers will have to compete

deals with oil producers from Kazakhstan to Venezuela, for customer access rather than the other way around.

discussed below, are a good example of this latter strategy.

The power will increasingly shift toward the consumer.

This argument is also worth bearing in mind in relation to

In the United States and to some extent in China, a “resource curse” developing-country oil producers whose

concern about overdependence on imports from Middle economies are heavily dependent on oil exports (see Box 4).

Eastern oil producers is the main focus of energy security

fears. However, on closer inspection, the energy security 1.9.2 Energy Security Argument No. 2: More marginal oil is

arguments for opening up marginal resources are at best less money for unsavory regimes and sponsors of terrorism

weak, particularly if the drive into marginal oil is presented

as the only solution to energy security concerns. Indeed, The intuitive wisdom of this theory is also undermined by

without aggressive demand reduction, no amount of the simple facts of the global oil supply-demand balance. If

“friendly, stable,” and/or domestic oil production can Middle Eastern regimes and other OPEC members such as

ensure energy security for the big oil importers.

Venezuela are the source of oil importing countries’ concern,

as they generally are, the revenues lost to those countries from

This discussion will now look at some of the (essentially the opening of marginal oil resources will be negligible.

weak) arguments in favor of energy security and how they

do not stand up to close scrutiny.

In fact, the drive to develop these expensive and risky

resources signals to OPEC that the market can tolerate high

1.9.1 Energy Security Argument No. 1: Marginal oil from prices, allowing the cartel to set the floor for prices at the

non-OPEC sources reduces the power of the OPEC cartel

level marginal oil demands for its development to be viable.

This trend is likely to continue: The IEA stated in December

This argument runs: if more non-OPEC oil is produced, 2010 that “unconventional oil, together with deepwater and

then less OPEC oil will be needed, reducing the power of the other high-cost sources of non-OPEC conventional oil, is set

cartel to manipulate the market (revenues will be discussed to play a key role in setting future oil prices.”118

in the following section).

Using tar sands as an example, at $75 a barrel, the roughly

This would seem intuitively to be correct. However, 900,000 b/d of tar sands oil the United States imported in

because the bulk of remaining non-OPEC oil is capital-

2009 resulted in revenues of around $24 billion for Canada. In

intensive, expensive-to-produce marginal oil, while most comparison, OPEC countries netted $971 billion in 2008 and

OPEC resources remain relatively cheap and easy to bring will have estimated earnings of around $730 billion in 2010

onstream, OPEC’s grip on the market is only likely to grow, and over $800 billion in 2011.119 The $24 billion they are not

particularly as demand increases. The IEA Reference earning because of the tar sands barely impacts their bottom

Scenario forecasts OPEC’s domination of global oil supply line – especially because of the way the cartel operates.

18

Marginal Oil - What is driving oil companies dirtier and deeper?

As non-OPEC production increases, OPEC has the supply crises and arguably have done so successfully for the

choice to either maintain its production levels, allowing past 30 or so years. Decreasing demand will make SPRs even

prices to drop, or cut its production and maintain prices. more effective and reduce further the likelihood of oil being

The former spreads the loss between all members, whereas used as a political weapon. SPRs were created in response

the latter primarily affects those members with the largest to the first oil crisis in 1973 and were one of the reasons the

spare capacity – predominantly Saudi Arabia. Either way, IEA was established in 1974. Today, the combined SPRs of

the effect on any one producer is marginal. Therefore, any IEA member countries can respond to a supply disruption

OPEC members intent on using their oil wealth to suppress totaling 4 Mbpd for one year.122 China, India, and Thailand are

their people or sponsor international terrorism will not be also now building SPRs, with the effect of further insulating

prevented from doing so by the diversion of oil funds to a the global market from a major supply disruption.

non-OPEC country. As explained above, only when demand is

brought under control will the wealth, and hence the power,

The development of SPRs has severely undermined the

of these countries be curtailed.

effectiveness of the “oil weapon,” as is evidenced by the non-

reoccurrence of any event similar to the 1973 oil embargo. Most

Additionally, it is clear that if demand is allowed to rise, major supply disruptions since have been caused by natural

more revenues will go to OPEC producers over the next two disasters such as Hurricane Katrina – when SPRs released

decades than ever before, despite the production of marginal 60 million barrels to calm the market – and political events

oil encouraged by high demand. The IEA estimates that OPEC that cause general supply disruptions such as the invasion

export revenues will grow enormously under both of its of Iraq, the Iranian revolution, or the ongoing conflict in the

scenarios, with Reference Scenario revenues of around $4 trillion Niger Delta. Whatever the cause of supply disruption, the

more than in the 450 Scenario for the period 2008–2030.120

inability of marginal oil suppliers to maintain spare capacity

means they can only ever play a minor role in maintaining

So while higher demand supports the high oil prices that existing supply and have no ability to bring extra production

will open up marginal oil, the production of that marginal on stream in times of need.

oil will not make any oil-importing countries more secure.

Marginal oil is a symptom of high prices and excessive demand

These three main arguments form the basis of energy

rather than a means of combating either one. The supply and security concerns in oil-importing nations. As such, they

demand balance that supports marginal oil is also a boon for are weak arguments for expanding marginal oil, primarily

OPEC producers, because it supports high oil prices.

because the high costs and risks of marginal oil only increase

energy insecurity. In addition, for the United States in

1.9.3 Energy Security Argument No. 3: Marginal oil protects oil particular, the additional cost of military deployment to

importers from “oil as a political weapon” and supply crises

protect sources of oil overseas, estimated at over $137 billion

a year, further supports the view that a more efficient energy

Marginal oil production will not adequately protect oil path is urgently needed.123

importers from a supply crisis because of the global nature

of the oil market and the fact that no marginal oil sources are 1.10 Supply and demand: Hard truths or

likely to have significant spare capacity on hand to address a

convenient assumptions?

supply crisis.

The global demand for oil in 2010 is likely to average over

Should OPEC or any other major exporter suffer a drastic 87 Mbpd.124 Around 5 Mbpd of this demand is currently met

loss of output or choose to cut off supplies to any country or by deepwater production, while ultra-deepwater currently

group of countries, supply shortages and a price spike is likely provides only around 0.2 Mbpd.125 Canadian tar sands

to affect every major importing country regardless of how production is expected to provide on average around 1.4

much marginal oil is in production. The only producers who Mbpd in 2010.126 Production from other unconventional

could ameliorate the effects of such an event would be those oil and offshore Arctic developments is insignificant at this

with enough spare production capacity to raise production point in time.

quickly to meet the shortfall.

However, the long lead-in times required for major oil

The high capital intensity and financial risks of bringing projects – particularly those in frontier regions or using

marginal oil production on stream require companies to unconventional or new production techniques – means that

pump as much as they can whenever they can. In other words, oil companies are constantly looking ahead, in some cases

spare capacity is simply not something they can afford. There decades, to long-term forecasts of supply and demand.

is no spare capacity in the Canadian tar sands that could be

brought on stream quickly in an emergency. On the contrary,

To facilitate their forward planning, companies need to

tar sands production generally operates at around 20 consider the trajectory of oil demand. Generally, only one

percent under capacity due to maintenance and unplanned kind of trajectory has ever been considered: upwards. The

stoppages.121 Only a handful of OPEC members can afford pace of this upward demand trajectory, however, has been

to maintain spare capacity, principally Saudi Arabia, which keenly debated and there have been periods of relatively

currently maintains about 4 Mbpd of spare capacity.

slow growth (1980s and 1990s) and periods of much faster

growth (1960s and 2000–2007). One accepted rule for

In fact, it is importing countries’ strategic petroleum forecasting oil demand is that when per capita income

reserves (SPRs) that do the job of cushioning them against reaches a certain level, oil demand “takes off”: The IEA

Marginal Oil - What is driving oil companies dirtier and deeper?

19

estimates this take-off point at around $3,000–$4,000 a

What is also becoming clearer is that the related threats

year.127 The high rate of growth in demand in the past decade of reaching “peak oil” and the economic impacts of high oil

has been primarily driven by rapid economic development prices are having an influence on energy policy in developing

in China and other Asian emerging economies, as well as in and developed oil-importing countries.139 There is greater

Latin America and the Middle East.

recognition that seeking to maximize supply alone cannot

guarantee energy security and that improving energy

1.11 China leading demand growth

efficiency must be part of the solution.

In the IEA’s Reference Scenario, by 2030 China’s projected

Yet governments are still not doing as much as they could

consumption of oil could be 16.3 Mbpd.128 In terms of total do to constrain demand, while oil companies and their

global energy-related emissions, China will account for three-

business associations are actively undermining such efforts

quarters of the projected 11 gigatons increase to 2030.129 by fighting to maintain “business as usual,” justifying this

Chinese demand as a driver of future investment in marginal position by pointing to supposedly inevitable growth in future

oil in developing countries is therefore critical.

demand, and choosing to ignore the vital role of demand

reduction in achieving climate goals.140

The country is investing heavily in both domestic and

overseas oil exploration, both in conventional oil projects, as 1.13 Declining demand will hit marginal oil first

well as tar sands in Canada. According to one source: “Over

the past year alone Chinese state-owned companies have The issue of demand reduction is central to the debate

signed major deals to extract or export oil, gas, coal, uranium on marginal oil because the very marginality of these oil

and other key natural resources from Canada, Venezuela, resources means their production is highly vulnerable to

Iraq, Australia, Turkmenistan and South Africa,” with around policy measures aimed at conserving oil. In short, the less oil

$70 billion going into oil-for-loan deals, plus refinery joint-

we consume, the less marginal oil will need to be produced.

ventures and pipeline agreements.130

This effect is primarily driven by price. As demand

In addition, China is implementing a synergetic increase declines, oil prices should stabilise and the resources that

in domestic refining capacity and levels of crude imports are more expensive to produce become uneconomic. As

aimed at enabling the country to be self-sufficient in oil discussed above, Figure 8 highlights the production/cost

products. Industry analysts Wood Mackenzie see this as a parameters of various types of oil production, demonstrating

“marked shift” in strategy.131 The country is also attempting the vulnerability of marginal oil sources to lower oil prices.

to diversify its oil supply (to the limited extent possible) away

from its current 85 percent dependency on Middle Eastern

Unfortunately, this is not as simple as it first appears. The

imports: Hence the loans have mainly targeted its Central expected decline in currently producing oil fields is so steep

Asian neighbors and Latin American producers.132

that even the most aggressive demand-reduction scenario

would still require new production to be brought on stream.

On the other hand, it is a moot point whether recent The IEA has calculated that of 68 Mbpd of conventional oil

high growth rates will continue.133 Recent data from the IEA production available in 2009, only 16 Mbpd will be available in

suggests that the annual growth rate of oil demand is slowing 2035.141 New oil production capacity will inevitably be created

down.134 In addition, although increasing supply appears to to replace these depleting fields. However, the key challenge

be a key medium-term strategy, it can also be argued that appears to be to reduce demand as much as possible in order

China is equally concerned with demand reduction as a long-

to minimize the need for new production and so that as little of

term energy strategy.

this new production comes from marginal sources, with their

particularly intense environmental and social impacts.142

Its national climate plan proposes a cut in energy

consumption per unit of GDP of 20 percent (from 2005 to

The production cost curve in Figure 8 shows that if oil

2010), and a 10 percent cut in emissions of pollutants. In prices were lowered due to reduced demand, Middle East

the transport sector, the government is subsidising hybrids, and North African oil would meet most of the world’s oil

electric cars, and fuel cell vehicles and incentivising the use demand. This, of course, means OPEC would retain more

of smaller cars through its taxation policies.135 In addition, 10 overall market share, but as discussed in relation to energy

percent of the huge $600 billion national stimulus package security, allowing oil demand to grow freely will hand even

China introduced in response to the global economic crisis is more money and power to OPEC. Where will oil demand head

directed toward low-carbon projects, mainly rail transport.136

without any change in current policies and where might it go

if effective efficiency policies are adopted?

1.12 Tight supply and demand triggers policy shifts

1.14 “Business as usual” or “business as

Meanwhile, oil demand in the developed economies of the

urgently required”?

OECD has peaked in the view of many observers.137 Per capita

car ownership has reached its limits, population levels are IOCs regularly quote IEA forecasts when discussing the

either stable or shrinking, and the fuel efficiency of private future of oil supply and demand. In communications with

car fleets is set to improve. The only probable challenge activist shareholders in 2010, both Shell and BP quoted IEA

to this is the continued growth in aviation and associated forecasts to support their claims that oil demand in 10 and 20

demand for jet fuel.138

years would be adequate to justify the expense of developing

20

Marginal Oil - What is driving oil companies dirtier and deeper?

Canadian tar sands resources.143 They highlighted that the

The IEA also suggests that offshore Arctic production

IEA forecasts 40 percent growth in primary energy demand and some of the more extreme deepwater projects would be

between 2007 and 2030, when around 80 percent of energy affected by the 450 Scenario.

demand would still be met by fossil fuels.

“…the need for exploration to find and then develop

They did not misquote IEA figures, but these figures

reservoirs that are as yet unknown is only two thirds

were drawn from the IEA’s 2009 Reference Scenario. The

of that in the New Policies Scenario, a difference of

Reference Scenario is provided by the IEA as a guide to how

almost 60 billion barrels. This reduction is equivalent

energy supply and demand will develop under current energy

to two-thirds of the estimated volume of oil that is

policies. In other words, it presumed that no new measures

thought to remain to be found in the Arctic and is

will be adopted to address climate change or energy security

comparable to the total volume of oil discovered

concerns. As such the IEA warns that: “Continuing on today’s

during the past five years. As the oil industry typically

energy path, without any change in government policy,

develops easy-to-find oil first, this reduced need to

would mean rapidly increasing dependence on fossil fuels,

bring on new capacity allows the industry to dispense

with alarming consequences for climate change and energy

with some of the more costly and more

security.”144 It goes on to explain that:

environmentally sensitive projects.”148

“The rate of growth of fossil-energy consumption

“Investment in oil supply in the 450 Scenario is 21

projected in the Reference Scenario takes us

percent lower than in the New Policies Scenario, with

inexorably towards a long-term concentration of

the bulk of the reduction coming after 2020. This drop

greenhouse gases in the atmosphere in excess of

results from the reduced need to bring on new

1000 ppm CO -eq. The CO concentration implied

production capacity, including the most costly

2

2

by the Reference Scenario would result in the global

deepwater offshore oil projects.”149

average temperature rising by up to 6°C. This would

lead almost certainly to massive climatic change and

These statements and figures do suggest that reducing

irreparable damage to the planet.”145

demand in line with climate goals dispenses with some of

the more destructive and expensive oil production. But it

Thus it appears that the oil companies are basing their appears that it would not dispense with them altogether.

business plan and future growth strategy on the collective The precipitous decline of conventional oil production,

failure of governments to address emissions and a scenario particularly in non-Opec fields, appears to ensure a future for

of runaway climate change. They would almost certainly a proportion of these resources. Perhaps offshore Arctic is the

contest such a claim, but beyond their public statements most vulnerable as it has not actually started yet, is potentially

referring to the Reference Scenario, their increasing reliance very expensive (see Figure 8) and risky, and will require huge

on marginal resources is evidence that they lack any strategy capital investments at precisely the time that demand could

for accommodating the shift to a low-carbon future. The IEA be stabilizing.

states that in order to avoid the consequences of its Reference

Scenario, future oil demand must be reduced, which will

However, the IEA forecasts are merely an example of

severely impact production of marginal oil.

a demand trajectory based on a model using a particular

set of policy instruments and a number of economic and

The IEA’s 450 Scenario forecasts the trajectory of energy political assumptions.

supply and demand necessary to stabilize the concentration

of CO2-equivalent in the atmosphere at 450 parts per million

The 450 Scenario assumes a very limited set of policy

(ppm). The IEA uses this concentration level as the level changes to bring about the desired reduction in oil demand.

necessary to prevent average global temperatures rising more They are primarily based on sectoral reforms – for example

than 2°C, which it claims will constrain climate change at a higher vehicle efficiency standards for private light duty

manageable level.

vehicles that would encourage manufacturers to produce

more efficient internal combustion engines and support the

However, there is in fact no consensus on the 450 ppm market penetration of hybrid and electric vehicles. Efficiency

figure and many experts and groups advocate that a “safe” improvements are also expected in the aviation sector.150

level of CO2 concentration is the much lower 350 ppm. The There is no expectation in the IEA model of behavioral

IEA describes the impact of its 450 Scenario on oil production change, nor is there much analysis of the impact of wider

as follows: “Lower global oil demand in the 450 Scenario policies to reduce demand, such as urban planning policies

results in a lower oil price than in the Reference Scenario. that reduce demand for travel or encourage greater use of

This, coupled with the introduction of CO2 emissions targets public transport.

in OECD+ countries, renders production in higher-cost fields

uneconomic, particularly in the OECD+ region.”146

Additionally, in using 450 ppm as a basis for climate

stability, the IEA recognises that this has only a 50 percent

Unconventional oil production still grows in the 450 chance of stabilizing the climate at a 2°C average temperature

Scenario but is some 33 percent less in 2035 than it would rise. It is thus the bare minimum necessary and, given the

be in the baseline scenario.147 Canadian tar sands, being the latest findings of climate science, likely too little too late.151

most advanced of the unconventional sources, is reduced by To properly ensure climate stability, we need to be aiming

about 28 percent.

for greater emissions reductions using a wider and deeper

Marginal Oil - What is driving oil companies dirtier and deeper?

21

range of policy interventions. If this were to happen, the would more than cancel out demand growth in China. If this

window of opportunity for marginal oil production would reduction were matched – in whole or part – by action in

shrink much further.

China, Europe, and elsewhere, global oil demand would be

on an inexorable downward path.

1.15 Getting behind demand reduction: The key to

killing marginal oil?

Thus, while the responsibility to constrain oil demand

is shared by all nations, including the emerging economies,

In order to avoid the current disastrous business as usual it is arguably action by the United States that will have the

energy path, any policy measures taken will need to have most significant impact. This can be done by deploying

what the IEA calls “a considerable impact on [global] energy technologies available for roll-out on a commercial scale

demand, notably for fossil fuels.”152 Arguably, the inadequacy today, potentially cutting US oil demand by 40 to 50 percent

of the IEA’s proposed level of demand reduction – based on by 2030 and putting it thereafter on a steady downward

a limited set of policy interventions – makes tougher action trajectory toward very limited demand.

even more urgent.

The debate is, perhaps, over the extent to which this can

In fact, the requisite policy instruments and associated be achieved through existing technology. Such a reduction

technology exist to achieve significantly deeper cuts in will certainly take more than improved vehicle efficiency

oil demand than the IEA is advocating. The United States standards, requiring a whole range of policy mechanisms

currently accounts for 22 percent of global oil demand153 and, being rolled out to address every level of oil use in the

in the words of Deutsche Bank, constitutes “the last market-

American economy, from disincentivising private transport

priced, oil inefficient, major oil consumer.”154 As such, it is to greater efficiency in freight and aviation.161

the pivotal market whose transformation could have major

repercussions across the global oil market.

However, hybrid vehicles are already available on the

market, with electric vehicles not far behind. What is required

It is also close to many marginal oil fields – ultra-

is increased and concerted government support to accelerate

deepwater in the Gulf of Mexico, offshore Arctic in Alaska, their market penetration. Equally, addressing oil use by

Canada, and Greenland, and the Canadian tar sands, not to changing freight delivery systems, reducing travel through

mention the vast oil shale resources in Utah and Colorado. better planning and, crucially, increasing access to public

Given the influence of US energy security concerns, the transport, could all result in significant savings.

transformation of US oil demand would considerably impact

on the attractiveness of future marginal oil investment.

In the United States, for instance, 97 percent of private

car trips are for distances of under 40 miles, with 91 percent

Reducing demand in China is also important, given the under 20 miles.162 This illustrates the vast potential of planning

country will account for an estimated 40 percent plus of global interventions through mixed-use development and better

oil demand growth in the period to 2030.155 However, arguably provision of public transport.

China’s actions to improve efficiency are already starting to

shed doubts on how far its demand growth will continue.156

Analysis by Deutsche Bank, for instance, has also pointed

out that the high density, stop-start driving conditions

Some analysts point to China’s reduction in consumption characteristic of these trips means that the hybrid car offers

subsidies, adoption of vehicle efficiency standards that are massive fuel savings over the internal combustion engine

similar to the EU’s (and significantly more stringent than those (it consumes no gasoline while idling and driving at slow

being introduced in the United States), and tax incentives for speeds). Based primarily on the hybrid’s efficiency potential,

the purchase of efficient vehicles as evidence that China can Deutsche Bank predicted that the “end is nigh for the age

and will constrain its demand to more sustainable levels.157 of oil” and that a global peak in oil demand would occur

Its current investment in public transport infrastructure around 2016.163

has been described as “the greatest boom in mass-transit

construction in history.”158

It further warned that the “value of high [capital

expenditure or] capex intensity, long lead time, currently

Moreover, even with the aggressive demand growth un-developed oil, such as undeveloped Canadian heavy

forecast in the IEA’s Reference Scenario, with a demand level of oil sands, oil shales, and Brazilian pre-salt and other

16.3 Mbpd in 2030, China’s consumption would still not reach ultra-deepwater plays could be far lower than the market

the United States’ current 18.5 Mbpd consumption.159 Indeed, currently expects.”164

China’s per capita oil use is unlikely to ever reach the level of

the United States. US per capita oil consumption in 2030 under

Deutsche Bank’s assessment may be accurate. Perhaps

the 450 Scenario would still be around 230 percent higher than the hybrid car is enough of a game-changer to ensure that

China’s under the “business-as-usual” scenario.160

global oil demand will peak. However, its analysis points to

a plateau in demand and only a very modest decline by 2030.

If the United States were able to achieve cuts in oil use To reduce demand enough to kill marginal oil will probably

of around 50 percent by 2030 (around 8–10 Mbpd), this require a much more concerted effort.

22

Marginal Oil - What is driving oil companies dirtier and deeper?

2 Key marginal oil developments: A brief survey

Figure 16: Unconventional oil production by type of resource

9

Additives*

8

Oil sands - mining

7

6

Oil sands -

d

5

mb/

4

Extra-heavy oil

3

Gas to liquids

2

1

Coal to liquids

0

2007

2010

2015

2020

2030

*Methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) and other chemicals.

Source: World Energy Outlook 2008165

The IEA’s 2010 definition of unconventional resources

Apart from (relative) ease of access to the resource, or

includes extra-heavy oil, including from Venezuela’s Orinoco viability of current or future development, the principle of

Belt, natural bitumen (oil sands), chemical additives, gas-to-

selection for the projects discussed is their fulfilling all or a

liquids and coal-to-liquids, and oil shales.166

significant number of the following criteria:

The following discussion will focus firstly on extra-

Project size, hence potential impacts in terms of

heavy oil in Venezuela, with some discussion of other

climate damage;

bitumen and unconventional resources. One main reason

Potential local impact on vulnerable community,

for this is that, according to the IEA, in all of its demand

ecology, and/or economy (developing country);

scenarios the approximately 10 percent of world demand

Critical attitude of local indigenous or host community

that will be met by unconventional resources will be

to the project;

dominated by Canadian tar sands and Venezuelan extra-

Participation in the project of European or US-listed

heavy oil.167

companies or significant financing by US/EU entities;

Level of national and local civil society activity in the

However, also taking into account that the continuum

host country and/or “openness” of political space at the

between what are currently defined as unconventional

national level.

and conventional resources (see Figure 1), it also considers

some key conventional projects such as deep or ultra-deep

The list of developments is, however, not intended to

offshore in Brazil and West Africa, heavy oil development be exhaustive. Nor does this section offer an overview of

in the Western Amazon and the rush to develop as yet marginal oil resources worldwide. In terms of the world’s

unexplored basins in sub-Saharan Africa.

key unconventional oil resources, a May 2010 briefing by

Friends of the Earth Europe (FoEE), Tar sands: Fuelling the

Such marginal developments are of interest for the climate crisis, undermining EU energy security and damaging

following reasons, as outlined in Section One. Firstly, they development objectives, outlined many of these. This paper

are high-risk in terms of their structural implications, that refers readers in search of more detail directly to the FoEE

is, they embody and illustrate the drive to access previously report. Mappings of unconventional resources and associated

inaccessible or uneconomic resources and will further data – and particularly of proven reserves –169 can also be found

deplete our remaining carbon budget and exacerbate energy in publications such as the World Energy Council (WEC)’s 2007

insecurity. Secondly they also risk (further) damaging Survey of Energy Resources or the IEA’s World Energy Outlook

vulnerable communities and ecologies in the South.

or on company websites (for instance, see Figure 17).

Marginal Oil - What is driving oil companies dirtier and deeper?

23

Figure 17: Global unconventional oil resources

Source: FoE 2010168

2.1 Bitumen and extra-heavy oil170

Canada and Venezuela hold the vast majority of the world’s “both countries also have large volumes of undeveloped,

reserves in bitumen and extra-heavy oil (that is, oil with and undoubtedly less costly conventional oil.”173 The IEA

an API gravity of less than 10). According to the 2003 US concurs that “[c]urrent economics favour the exploitation

Geological Survey, Canada contains around 80 percent of large conventional oil resources.”174

of the world’s bitumen. Outside Canada “359 natural

bitumen deposits are reported in 21 other countries.”172

With that caveat, after Canada and Venezuela, “the

The largest deposits after these two countries are found in Tatarstan Republic region of Russia, which is thought to have

Kazakhstan and Russia.

more than 20 billion barrels of extra-heavy oil and bitumen

ultimately recoverable resources and an economy highly

However, the WEC points out that development of these dependent on very depleted conventional fields, is the most

resources is unlikely in the short to medium term since likely location for the start of larger scale development.”175

Figure 18: Tar sands and extra-heavy oil resources

Proven reserves

Ultimately recoverable resources

Original oil in place

Canada

19.0

≥ 800

≥ 2 000

Venezuela

60*

500

≥ 1 300

Russia

-

350

850**

Kasakhstan

-

200

500

United States

-

15

40

United Kingdom

-

3

15

China

-

3

10

Azerbaijan

-

2

10

Madagascar

-

2

10

Other

-

14

30

World

230

≥ 1 900

≥ 5 000

* As reported by the Oil & Gas Journal (O&GJ, 2009); the national oil company, PDVSA , currently reports 130 billion barrels as proven.

** From BGR (2009); Russian authors report significantly smaller resources, of the order of 250 billion barrels; the same applies to Kasakhstan. Bitumen resources in particular are poorly known , as a high percentage is located in the vast and poorly explored region of eastern Siberia. BGR reports 345 billion barrels recoverable, which is more in line with Russian publications.

Sources: BGR (2009); USGS (2009a); IEA analysis.

Source: World Energy Outlook 2010171

24

Marginal Oil - What is driving oil companies dirtier and deeper?

Yet even if this resource were developed, it would not

The IEA concurs that “[p]rimary production with

change the big picture. The IEA states that “only Canada multilateral horizontal wells, which gives higher recovery

and Venezuela are likely to play a significant role in the rates than in Canada, due to lower oil viscosity, is significantly

exploitation of [bitumen and extra-heavy oil] in the cheaper.” However, the agency puts the average cost of new

timescale of [our] projections [i.e., to 2035]. This is because of Orinoco projects at around a third lower than Canadian tar

the size of their resources and the facts that they are already sands projects on a per-barrel basis.189

in production, plans exist for their further development,

significant reserves are considered as proven and they are

However, some experts disagree, arguing that

geographically concentrated; their decline is not an issue development of the Orinoco reserves will be “very

over the 25-year horizon of these projections.”176

expensive and complex and can only be monetised if the

long term price forecast of oil is over the range of [US]$75

The largest extra-heavy oil deposits in the world after to $85 per barrel.”190 Further research is required to

Canada are located in Venezuela’s Eastern Orinoco Belt, determine where these extra costs lie, but question marks

accounting “for about 90 percent of the discovered plus over the viability of this marginal resource would arise

prospective extra-heavy oil in-place [worldwide].”177 if environmental costs had to be factored in or overall oil

In 2009, the US Geological Survey (USGS) estimated demand declined, as discussed in Section One, as well

oil resources in the Orinoco Belt in the range of “380 to as if local political factors interrupted or delayed the

652 billion barrels of oil (at a 95 and 5 percent chance project cycle.

of occurrence, respectively)”178 with 513 billion barrels

technically recoverable, making it “one of the world’s largest

In addition, there is a question mark over PDVSA’s

recoverable oil accumulations.”179

ability to provide its share of the capital investment of

$120 billion currently estimated to be required to produce

In 2010, the IEA put the figure for total resources lower, around 3 Mbpd. PDVSA has to provide 60 percent of this

at 1.3 trillion barrels in place, but concurred that “it is likely figure and its increasing levels of debt may cast doubt on

that a large fraction of [the USGS’s estimate of 500 billion its ability to finance the annual investment needed. One

barrels of technically recoverable oil] is economically analyst cites the view of a recent IEA report on heavy oil,

recoverable at current prices.”180 Once Venezuela finishes the which sees the 3 Mbpd production figure as “remote with

process of registering the Orinoco deposits, some analysts the present investment regime” and instead projects

estimate it will overtake Saudi Arabia as having “the world’s a production rate of around 250–300,000 bpd by 2015,

biggest certified crude reserves,”181 with PDVSA estimating which would “only partly offset declining production

there proven reserves of 230 billion barrels.182 Development elsewhere in Venezuela.”191

of the resource is due to bring Venezuela around $80 billion

in investment with production due to begin by 2013.183

Adding to the uncertainty over PDVSA’s financial

health are the political risks faced by foreign investors.

Overall, the government intends to expand production Although PDVSA needs foreign capital and expertise to

in the Orinoco Belt from 940,000 bpd currently to 2.09 Mbpd develop the Orinoco resource, investors may be deterred

by 2015 (see below on the credibility of such projections).184 by the volatility of the political situation, with concerns

However, according to the IEA: “Taking into account over stability of contracts to the fore in the wake of a wave

project lead times and delays, total capacity is unlikely to of nationalizations,192 a general lack of transparency

exceed 2.0 mb/d by 2020.”185

with the sector and the high technical and human

capital requirements of the Orinoco development.193

Along with Alberta, Venezuela could therefore soon The Information Energy Administration’s “high price”

become a frontline for investment, as in situ viscosity-

scenario, for instance, assumes that access restrictions

reduction techniques developed in Canadian tar sands will still limit production of Venezuelan heavy oil.194

production are applied to the Orinoco Belt.186 In the view

of the USGS, the successful implementation of tar sands

IOCs currently have equity shares or prospecting rights

extraction technologies in Alberta and the Orinoco Oil Belt in all four of the Orinoco license areas, principally in the

will in turn provide further proof that “these resources can Junin and Carabobo areas (see Figures 17 and 18).196 The

be extracted and upgraded at rates that make an important companies currently involved are: Chevron, ENI, Repsol,

contribution to each country’s petroleum supply and at Galp, BP (through TNK-BP), and several Russian companies

costs that are currently competitive with conventional (Rosneft, Gazprom, Lukoil, TNK-BP, and Surgutneftegaz),

non-Opec resources.”187 Successful deployment of such along with Asian companies, including CNPC.197 The

technologies in Venezuelan production could therefore most significant potential campaigning targets would be:

promote their export to other regions.

Eni, with a 40 percent stake in Junin 5; Chevron, with a 34

percent interest in Carabobo 3; and Repsol, with 11 percent

Projected production costs per barrel for the Orinoco of Carabobo 1.

resource are estimated by some sources to be considerably

lower than for Canadian tar sands or Brazil’s pre-salt,

Venezuela’s planned Orinoco expansion will also

because of the fluidity and reservoir conditions. The WEC raise similar concerns over its likely climate and other

states that “[c]urrent estimates of the supply costs for the environmental and social impacts. According to a study

Orinoco extra-heavy crude oil are as little as half of the carried out by the US National Energy Technology

supply cost for Canadian bitumen.”188

Laboratory (NETL) in 2009, Venezuela’s ultra-heavy

Marginal Oil - What is driving oil companies dirtier and deeper?

25

Figure 19: Venezuelan Orinoco Belt extra-heavy oil projects

Project Name

Foreign partners

Status

Capacity (kb/d)

Planned start

PetroAnzoategui (PetroZuata)

None (100% PDVSA)

Producing

120

n.a

Petrocedeno (Zuata)

Total (30%)/Statoil (10%)

Producing

200

n.a

Petroplar (Hamaca)

Chevron (30%)

Producing

190

n.a

Petromonagas (Cierro Negro)

BP 17%

Producing

110

n.a

Sinovensa

CNPC

Producing

80

n.a

Total producing

700

Junin 2

Petrovietnam

Announced

200

2012

Junin 5

ENI

Announced

240

2013

Carabobo 1

Repsol/India/Petronas

Announced

480

2015

Carabobo 3

Chevron/Inpex/Mitsubishi/

Announced

400

2015

Suelopetrol

Junin 4

CNPC

Announced

400

2017

Junin 6 (Petromiranda)

Russian companies

Announced

450

2017

Junin 10

Total/Statoil

Under negotiation

200

Total proposed

2 370

Total producing + proposed

3 070

Note: Dates and production capacity are somewhat uncertain, as PDVSA, which owns e majority interest in all projects, does not publish detailed plans.

Source: World Energy Outlook 2010195

crude bitumen requires the same kind of “energy located in Soledad, a town on the Orinoco river opposite

intensive extraction processes and pre-processing” as in Ciudad Bolivar.205

Canadian tars sands, resulting in “GHG [greenhouse gas]

emissions several times greater than that for extraction of

Toxic solid waste products (an estimated 67,800 tons of

conventional crude oil.”198

sulphur and 52,250 tons of coke per day) will be transported

by rail to the Orinoco River and then by barge to the coast

The IEA notes that “production from the Orinoco will at Punta Cuchillo. Liquid waste will be sent through a

face similar challenges to those of in-situ Canadian oil-

new 432 km pipeline to the Araya Peninsula and stored in

sands projects, notably the availability of energy for steam terminals with an initial capacity of 800,000 b/d.206 This

generation, the availability of water and CO2 emissions” complex transportation network will run through river and

while highlighting that there is “very little information sea networks and forested areas.

available on current performance and future plans for

reducing the environmental impact.”199 For this reason,

Venezuela is one of the ten most biodiverse countries in

the IEA advocates “open, joint work between PDVSA and the world, with the Orinoco resource lying upstream from

environmental non-governmental organizations” to an eco-region described as “a globally important wetland,

obtain this information.200

and a critical habitat to a number of endangered species.”207

According to UNESCO: “A great biological diversity

It should be noted that accurate emissions data on characterizes the terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems of

Venezuela’s ultra-heavy oil production is less readily the Delta del Orinoco.”208 The area is already under threat

available than for Canadian tar sands. NETL currently from “water diversion and damming, oil drilling, and

estimates a mean value of 95 kg CO E/bbl, lower than human populations.”209 Population density overall is

2

that of Canadian tar sands (112 kg CO E/bbl).201 However, low, “although many small villages of the native Waraos

2

in terms of a lifecycle analysis, this still means that Amerindians live along the riverbanks. An exception is the

“Venezuela bitumen, Canada oil sands, and Nigeria stand city of Tucupita and its surrounding towns.”210

out as having high GHG emissions compared to other

sources,”202 with Venezuelan bitumen having emissions

It is reportedly a constitutional requirement in

of 30.8kg CO E/MMBtu LHV diesel, second only to that of Venezuela for all extractive projects to produce an

2

diesel processed from Canadian oil sands (see Figure 20).

environmental impact assessment, within a framework

of environmental protection that includes consultation

In terms of local impacts, the Belt’s development will for any project impacting indigenous communities.211

require “a huge investment in infrastructure.”204 A national However, one Venezuelan source commented that there is

media source states that the development of the Junin and a lack of oversight of existing oil developments, including

Carabobo license areas will involve the construction of of implementation of environmental regulations, and

five upgraders and a refinery project (to be undertaken by little oversight of protection mechanisms for indigenous

ENI) and that the upgraders for the Carabobo block will be peoples’ rights.212

26

Marginal Oil - What is driving oil companies dirtier and deeper?

Figure 20: Emissions of diesel by source

Crude Oil

Crude Oil

Diesel Refining

Finished Fuel

Total

Crude Oil Source

Extraction and

Transport

Operations

Transport

Well-to-tank

Pre-Processing

kg CO E/MMBtu LHV diesel

2

Canada Oil Sands

19.0

0.9

13.2

0.8

34.0

Venezuelan Bitumen

16.314

1.1

12.5

0.8

30.814

Nigeria

22.0

1.7

5.1

0.8

29.7

Mexico

6.6

1.0

15.7

0.8

24.1

Angola

14.0

1.9

6.3

0.8

23.0

Kuwait

2.8

2.7

13.2

0.8

19.6

Iraq

3.3

2.7

11.8

0.8

18.7

Venezuelan Conventional

4.1

1.1

12.5

0.8

18.6

Baseline WTT15

6.6

1.3

9.5

0.9

18.4

Canada Conventional

6.0

0.9

10.3

0.8

18.0

Ecuador

5.3

1.7

9.9

0.8

17.8

Saudi Arabia

2.3

2.7

11.6

0.8

17.4

Domestic

4.2

0.7

7.7

0.8

13.5

Algeria

6.0

1.5

4.0

0.8

12.4

14 The GHG emissions estimate for extraction and pre-processing of Venezuelan bitumen has greater uncertainty than other crude sources due to limited

data availability. Uncertainty analysis provides a 90% confidence interval of 11 to 20 kg CO E/MMBtu LHV diesel for extraction and pre-processing and 25

2

to 35 kg CO E/MMBtu LHV of diesel for the WTT GHG emissions. The total effect of this uncertainty on the baseline WTT is less than 1%.

2

15 The baseline includes imported transportation fuels to the U.S. in 2005 and does not incorporate the new Venezuelan upgraded bitumen acquisition profile. The impact of the new Venezuela profile on the 2005 national average baseline WTW GHG emissions profile for each fuel is less than 0.5%.

Source: US Department of Energy, 2019203

Overall, Venezuela is a classic “resource curse” country. Angola, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Around 95 percent of export revenues and “about 50 percent (DRC).217 Four of these countries are already notorious

of the federal budget revenue” derive from oil,213 and the “resource curse” countries.

country is not diversifying away from its oil dependency.

In addition, according to press reports, PDVSA’s profits and

Media and other reports suggest that of the five,

production are falling, while its debts are increasing.214

Madagascar holds the tar sands and heavy oil resources

most likely to be developed in the near future,218 although

Lack of transparency over the management of oil to date, research and advocacy on tar sands investment in

revenues and the contractual terms agreed for oil extraction Africa has mainly focused on ENI’s prospection over a 1,790

also appears to be an issue. According to one source: “In km2, largely rainforested area in the RoC.

Venezuela there is no public access to contracts between the

oil companies and the government because the agreement

Madagascar’s Bemolanga tar sands resource has an

operates through the constitution of a mixed company, estimated 16.5 billion barrels in place with around 10

owned 60 percent by PDVSA.”215

billion barrels recoverable. French oil company Total has

a 60 percent equity stake in the project, which is operated

From a brief survey of media sources, there has by independent company Madagascar Oil. Given the

been little public debate to date relating to the Orinoco resource is close to the surface and thus likely to be

development. However, there appear to be growing mined, exploration and operational costs would probably

concerns about the social and environmental impacts of be lower than in Canada, with one analyst estimating in

extractive activities in the country more generally, namely 2007 that prices would have to remain “at about $60 a

disputes over land titles, encroachment by extractive barrel to make a decent profit on the investment.”219 More

companies on indigenous lands, and the actual/potential recently, at an oil price above $80 per barrel, operator

impacts of project activities (for instance, conflict over Total has stated that Bemolanga “could produce 200 kb/d,

demarcation of traditional land and plans for coal mining with mining technology.”220

in the Sierra de Perija region).216

There is little evidence that Madagascar will have the

2.2 Tar sands in Africa

institutional capacity or governance context to turn new

extractive investment into desperately needed sustainable

Resources of bitumen or extra-heavy oil are reportedly development while avoiding the outcomes suffered by other

present in the RoC (Brazzaville), Madagascar, Nigeria, producer countries in the region, particularly given the

Marginal Oil - What is driving oil companies dirtier and deeper?

27

current political turmoil.221 The World Food Programme The Nigerian NGO Environmental Rights Action/Friends

classified 60 percent of the country’s population as of the Earth Africa raised concerns as early as 2003

“extremely poor” in 2006.222 Given the population’s existing over the lack of community consultation over bitumen

vulnerabilities, the weak governance situation and the exploration and its potential negative environmental and

potentially damaging impacts of such a development social impacts.232

– Madagascar is one the most biodiverse countries in the

world – this investment is environmentally, socially, and 2.3 Marginal oil in sub-Saharan Africa: Onshore and

politically high-risk.

offshore “frontier” oil

ENI’s exploration in the RoC is in its early stages and it is Both West and East Africa are a focus of “frontier” exploration

not clear yet if the project is commercially viable, nor if ENI for conventional oil, both onshore and deep offshore. DRC

has the technical means to deliver the resource. However, and Uganda are targets for conventional onshore prospecting

ENI has already shown itself unwilling to address the that is high-risk in technical and/or social, environmental,

genuine concerns raised to date over the project’s potential and political terms, particularly in the case of DRC. The

impacts by Congolese and international civil society country already produces 25,000 bpd offshore and new

groups.223 In the case of both the Congo and Madagascar onshore exploration is currently targeted on the Albertine Rift

investments, it is also worth considering the potential Basin straddling the border with Uganda.233 London-listed

impacts at the local level in light of the IEA’s assessment SOCO International has also been exploring on the onshore

that “none of [these resources] are large enough to have a Nganzi block in the Western Bas Congo (now Congo Central)

significant impact on world oil supply.”224

province bordering RoC and Angola234 while in August 2010

ENI announced that it had obtained 55 percent of the Ndunda

There is little public information regarding bitumen block (also in the Bas Congo).235 There are reportedly plans for

resources in DRC and Angola. According USGS data from licensing in the Cuvette and Tanganyika basins.236

2005, Angola has 4.65 billion barrels of original oil in place

and 465 million barrels of reserves,225 and DRC has 300

Also in the sightlines of IOCs are the prospective

million barrels in place and 30 million barrels of reserves.226 resources of the Horn of Africa – “one of the last remaining

To date, neither country has been a focus for exploration. untapped frontiers” for conventional oil. The region is

In August 2009, ENI announced an agreement with the being targeted by several smaller IOCs, including the

DRC government to carry out feasibility studies “for the United Kingdom’s Tullow Oil, currently carrying out a “joint

development of both conventional and non-conventional regional exploration campaign” in Ethopia.237 Ethiopia’s

hydrocarbons, [and] gas valorisation in the eastern areas Ogaden Basin is the “western half” of the East African

of the country.”227 However, it is not clear what kind of Karoo Rift Basin (the eastern half being the Morondava

unconventional resource is referred to. DRC also appears to Basin in Madagascar). Prospecting is also occurring in

have oil shale deposits, located in the Bas Congo region.228

the 60,000 km2 Jimma Basin in South Central Ethiopia by

the Ethiopian government and local (Hong Kong listed)

Nigeria’s bitumen belt straddles the states of Ondo, Ogun, company SouthWest Energy.238

and Edo and the resource is potentially much larger than in

Madagascar or Congo, estimated at 27 billion boe, according

Nigeria is also experiencing increased interest in its

to the Nigerian Ministry of Mines in 2009, although proven deep offshore, along with Angola, with whom it vies for

reserves are only 1.1 billion boe.229 There has been a push by position as sub-Saharan Africa’s top oil producer239 (see

the Ministry to attract foreign investment, after mining laws below). West Africa overall is the “third-biggest deepwater

were revised in 2007 to create an “enabling environment,” area [in the world] with Angola and Nigeria working a

including corporate-friendly fiscal regimes. It is unclear combined 25–30 fields and continuing to add prospects in

whether any licenses were awarded in a bidding round ever-deeper seas.”240

on two blocks announced in 2009, although reportedly

companies from the United States, Canada, Nigeria, South

Ghana is also the centre of a potential new oil boom, with

Africa and China expressed interest.230

around 600 Mb of proven reserves.241 Oil and natural gas

from Ghana’s giant Jubilee field could bring the country as

Although at present development of Nigeria’s bitumen much as $20 billion by 2030, but civil society organizations

block appears stalled, the social and environmental are already sounding alarm bells about inadequate fiscal

destruction resulting from existing oil production in transparency controls and lack of environmental protection

Nigeria is well documented.231 Expansion of investment that could lead to a repetition of the “resource curse.”242

beyond the Delta to new “frontier” regions - not only

for bitumen exploration but deepwater (see below) Oil shales are “fine sediments containing kerogen.”244

– raises huge concerns about the further locking-in of According to the IEA, global oil shale resources in place

the “resource curse” in Nigeria and the impacts of new are estimated at 5 trillion barrels, with more than 60

developments on local communities previously not percent located in the United States, followed by Brazil,

affected by oil activities.

Jordan, Morocco, and Russia (see graphic), with around 1

trillion barrels potentially recoverable.245 Oil production

In the case of the bitumen resource, for instance, there from shales is environmentally destructive and extremely

have been references by tribal authorities to communities energy- and carbon-intensive. The shales must be mined

being displaced to facilitate exploration of the resource. (or, for deeper deposits, exploited in situ) using similar

28

Marginal Oil - What is driving oil companies dirtier and deeper?

Figure 21: Global oil shale deposits

currently make forms of marginal oil investment other than

Distribution of World oil shale deposits by

oil shales a more attractive bet in the short- to medium

continent / region

term for companies and investors. Nevertheless, as noted

in Section One, oil shale was reportedly “the biggest piece

Russia

of (Shell’s) R&D budget” in 2007.251 A breakthrough in

production technique could potentially put oil shale at the

Asia

centre of development plans for companies such as Shell

and Exxon that have been experimenting with developing

China

the resource for decades.

Ausralia- Pacific

2.4 Deepwater investments

Europe

Deepwater production forms an increasing share of the

revenue stream of IOCs and other producers, as discussed

Africa

in Section One. As The Washington Post puts it:

South America

“The strategy of continuing to exploit the economic

opportunities of deep-water wells, even as the

North America

hazards they represent become clearer, is being

pursued the world over. Other countries [than the

Distribution of 3.3 trillion bbls shale oil in place from Dyni (2003)

and Russell (1990)

USA] – including Brazil, Canada, Nigeria and Angola

Source: Exxon Mobil, 2007243

– are also moving forward with drilling, lured by oil

reservoirs they are discovering that are two to six

times as big as the average Gulf of Mexico reservoir

techniques as those used for Canadian tar sands projects

and taking advantage of new opportunities offered

and the kerogen must be heated to between 350°C and

by the U.S. moratorium.”252

450°C in order to transform it into oil.246

According to media reports, 17 countries are currently

For this reason, the EIA in its Annual Energy Outlook producing oil from deepwater fields and another 29 are

2010 comments in relation to US oil shale production that, potential producers (see Figure 23 below). According to one

due to the still experimental nature of in-situ extraction source: “Brazil takes the top slot, with deepwater production

techniques and “because the underground mining and topping 1.5 million b/d last year from about a dozen fields

surface retorting process is unlikely to be environmentally mostly in the outer Campos Basin. It should consolidate

acceptable, […] oil shale liquids production projections this lead in the next couple of years as the Tupi area and

should be considered highly uncertain.”247 The IEA concurs surrounding fields in the Santos Basin start up.”253

that “[l]arge-scale development of the Green River deposits

in the United States is likely to face strong opposition on

One view is that “countries [such as Nigeria and Angola]

environmental grounds.”248

stand to gain from the uncertainties in the United States

prompted by the disaster in the Gulf of Mexico,” which

Project costs, estimated to be in the range of $50 to $100 resulted in a moratorium on drilling off the US coast, with

per barrel, are also similar to Canadian tar sands projects some evidence of companies moved to divert rigs away from

– the IEA at the end of 2010 stated oil shales exploitation the United States to other deepwater locations.255 However,

would be commercially viable with a price of $60 per barrel other reports state that a large exodus of drillers to other

at current costs. However, such projects would also be regions did not materialise.256

vulnerable to any carbon-pricing measures and demand

reductions. In this kind of scenario, “the lower oil prices

Nevertheless, the Deepwater Horizon incident will lead

and higher prices of CO [would] make oil shales marginal to “renewed concerns about safety and environmental

from an economic point of view.”249

protection,”257 and specifically to increased insurance

premiums for companies: “Early reports indicate a 15–25

For these reasons, oil shale is unlikely to be a major percent rise for rigs operating in shallow waters; and up

new source of oil supply, without significant technological to 50 percent for deepwater rigs.”258 Some analysts also

breakthroughs or government intervention. As the IEA puts cautioned that the accident would result in a slowing of

it: “There is a long way to go from pilot projects producing deepwater investment globally, with governments shying

a few thousand b/d to an industrial scale activity able to away from opening them up, or companies deeming them

produce quantities that are significant in terms of world oil too risky, as increased technical and regulatory risks were

supply.” Concretely in relation to Shell’s Green River project added onto other geopolitical and fiscal uncertainties.259

in the United States, a decision to exploit is unlikely before

2015 and the project would take a further decade to reach

In contrast to this view, it can be argued that heightened

commercial production.250

regulation and higher risk premiums in the Gulf could

make deepwater exploration in other regions, particularly

Thus, their geographical location, technological those with weaker environmental regulation such as West

challenges, production costs, and environmental concerns Africa, more attractive.260

Marginal Oil - What is driving oil companies dirtier and deeper?

29

Figure 22: Oil and gas wells drilled by leading companies in water

depths of 400 meters or more – number of wells in parentheses

Deepwater Wells Around the World

Region

Existing Producers

Potential Producers

North America

United States (1,814)

Canada (21), Mexico, Greenland

West Africa

Angola (195), Nigeria (158),

Gabon (6), Ghana (6),

Congo (Brazzaville) (70),

Sierra Leone (1), Namibia

Mauritania (21), Equatorial

Guinea (20), Cote d’Ivoire (4)

South America

Brazil (622)

Trinidad (2), Colombia (1), Cuba,

Suriname, Guyana

Asia

Indonesia (175), Australia (150),

Thailand (21), Brunei (11), China

India (77), Malaysia (74),

Phillipines (25)

Europe/FSU

Norway (119), UK (115), Italy (33)

Ireland (15), Faroes (4), Spain (5),

Portugal, Russia, Ukraine, Turkey

North Africa

Egypt (53)

Lybia (1), Morocco (1)

East Africa

Kenya (1), Mozambique (1), Tanzania

Middle East

Israel (1), Yemen (1)

Total countries

17

29

Source: Deutsche Bank/Energy Intelligence254

In contrast to this view, recent moves to open up the UK the new pre-salt resources (part of a huge overall capital

continental shelf along with BP’s historic deal with Rosneft expenditure plan of $224 billion by the company from

to explore in the Russian Arctic show no lack of appetite on 2010–2014).270

the part of IOCs and governments to slow down the drive

into risky deep offshore prospects.261

Brazil will also have to manage the sectoral challenges

of structuring and regulate exploration, drilling, and

Brazil is set to become one important new deepwater the potential for a large influx of foreign investment,271

production centre and its pre-salt resources also represent along with the wider potential economic, social, and

an important new technological “frontier.”262 The pre-salt is environmental impacts of becoming a major petro-state.

found at a depth of up to a maximum of 7,000 metres under Oil development in the country is seen as a national energy

a 2,000 metre layer of salt in an area around 800 km long and security priority and the government appears to be trying

200 km wide located around 300 km off the Atlantic coast to learn the lessons of the “resource curse.” For instance,

of Brazil263 (see Figure 23). Estimated reserves in place are the Brazilian Congress has passed legislation to create a

up to 100 billion barrels, and state oil company Petrobras social fund to channel 50 percent of the pre-salt revenues to

claims that production is viable at $35–45 per barrel.

support socioeconomic development programmes.272

The company plans to produce 5.7 million barrels of

In 2009, Brazil’s Green Party candidate in the

oil and gas per day by 2020 (more than half the current presidential elections, former Environment Minister

output of Saudi Arabia).264 This would make state company Marina Silva, showed a clear understanding of the climate

Petrobras “one of the five largest integrated energy and developmental implications of Brazil’s current and

companies in the world.”265 However, the challenges are future energy path: “In terms of the model of development,

formidable. There are serious logistical issues and high obviously, in the first place, it must be clear that the energy

infrastructure costs involved in accessing the resources266; systems of [industrialising] countries cannot follow the

while Petrobras is considered “world class” in deepwater same course as that of the developed countries. We have

exploration with a “state-of-the-art safety, environment to understand that if developed nations need to move from

and health programme,”267 the company “currently has the fossil to renewable fuels, then in our case we must put the

skills to drill roughly one-third the depth to reach the pre-

emphasis very clearly from now on renewable fuels.”273 In

salt deposits.”268

terms of oil development, Silva stated interestingly that

the pre-salt resources should be “leveraged” by “investing

Petrobras also currently employs the same methods for heavily in innovation and technological development that

dealing with spills as its peers in the Gulf of Mexico and leads to a replacement of the model itself.”274

will have to “invest heavily in developing new technologies

and methods to deal with potential spills, such as an

According to the IEA, heavy oil projects are “active or

improved blowout preventer, which means operating costs planned in Brazil, in the North Sea, in the Neutral Zone

may escalate to unknown levels.”269 This will be in addition between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and several other places

to the current cost estimate of $19 billion+ for developing in the world.”275 The remote Western Amazon region, which

30

Marginal Oil - What is driving oil companies dirtier and deeper?

Figure 23: The Brazilian pre-salt deposit

O

SANTO

MINAS GERAIS

ESPIRITO

BACIA de

ESPIRITO SANT

SÃO PAULO

RIO DE JANEIRO

Rio de Janeiro

POS

Fields

Sao Pãulo

Exploratory Blocks

de CAM

Pre salt

Limite Oéste do SAG Carbonatico

BACIA

Charneira

PARANÁ

CATARINA

Limite L’este do Sal BACIA de SANTOS

covers parts of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and costs and shut down many parts of the country for drilling.

western Brazil (see Figure 25), is one region coming under Incumbent President Juan Manuel Santos will reportedly

increasing scrutiny by oil companies interested in accessing ensure that environmental regulations “do not pose a

its large reserves of oil and gas, many yet untapped.

barrier to exploitation of natural resources” and also

“clarify the process for consulting ethnic communities

According to one study, the region is “the most affected by drilling, which have become more demanding

biologically rich part of the Amazon basin and is home to a in negotiations with oil companies as the government

great diversity of indigenous ethnic groups, including some expands areas under concession.”282

of the world’s last uncontacted peoples living in voluntary

isolation.”276 Unlike the eastern Brazilian Amazon, it is still

a largely intact ecosystem. Growing global oil demand is Figure 24: Frontier developments in the Amazon –

leading to “unprecedented exploration and development in the Western Amazon region

the region.”277 The type of oil resource is conventional, with

heavy oil slated as a major source of future production in

Peru and in Colombia.

Recent examples of this drive to expand oil activity in

the region include, firstly, the announcement in May 2010 by

Petroperu (the Peruvian state licensing agency) that 25 new

blocks will be offered for oil and gas exploration over a million

hectare area. The government is reportedly encouraging oil

and gas exploration in a bid to become an energy exporter

as well as meet growing domestic demand.278 This drive will

open up 75 percent of the Peruvian Amazon to exploration

and Peru’s national Amazon indigenous body, AIDESEP, has

described the move as a new threat to indigenous peoples.279

Although oil revenues make up a relatively small part of

Colombia’s budget (around 30% of exports280), the country

is further ahead than Peru in terms of its hydrocarbons

infrastructure and investment plans. Colombia is described

by one source as having been “a honeypot to oil and gas

companies over the past decade as the country adopted

market friendly fiscal and regulatory policies.”281 However,

Columbia tightened its environmental regulations under

the Álvaro Uribe Presidency, which increased upstream Source: Save America’s Forests, 2008303

Marginal Oil - What is driving oil companies dirtier and deeper?

31

Figure 25: Oil blocks in the Western Amazon region

gross oil revenues before production costs are accounted for.

Producers will be paid a flat fee for production.289 According

to one analysis, as a result some foreign firms are expected

to seek a negotiated exit from the country.290

Foreign companies currently operating in Ecuador

include Repsol and also NOC Petrobras. Another company

present is Andes Petroleum, a joint venture of CNPC

and Sinopec. It was also reported in July that Ecuador

was in negotiations with China for a $1 billion loan in

exchange for supplying 36,000 barrels of oil or fuel per

day to PetroChina.291 In addition to restructuring the oil

sector, Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa is promoting

the Yasuni-ITT Initiative. This proposes not exploiting

an estimated 850 million barrels of oil located in three

underground deposits – the Ishpingo, Tambococha, and

Tiputini (ITT) – in the Yasuni National Park.292

Yasuni is one of the most biodiverse areas in the world,

covering 982,000 hectares of Amazonian rainforest. It

is claimed this project will save emissions of around 40

million tons of CO2, in return for an annual payment to

Ecuador of $350 million over 10 years.293 The initiative is

reportedly supported by 75 percent of the population.294

However, there are concerns about the government’s

contradictory stance of allowing extractive activities to

Source: Save America’s Forests, 2008304

continue in the Yasuni (and in the Amazon region more

widely) while at the same time promoting the Initiative.295

The country is thus set to step up oil and gas exploration, Some observers viewed Correa’s rejection of the structure

with the mining minister claiming that investment in the of a UN Development Programme (UNDP) trust fund to

mining and energy sectors, including biofuel projects, was administer the financing in January 2010 (on the grounds

expected to reach $57 billion over the next five years.283

it did not give Ecuador a majority say over how the money

would be spent) as masking a move to abandon the Initiative

In July, a licensing round for 225 new oil and gas blocks in favor of renewed oil drilling.296

in Colombia received bids for 96 of the blocks, with state-

controlled Ecopetrol winning rights for 14 of them.284 Rights

The Yasuni-ITT project also initially had difficulty

were also awarded to IOCs, including Shell and Talisman, finding the required level of funding from international

although most awards went to smaller companies. There donors.297 However, on August 3 2010, Ecuador signed a

are potentially 35 blocks in the Amazonian Putumayo deal with the UNDP, and countries including Germany,

Basin, which contains heavy oil285: Talisman and another Spain, France, Sweden, and Switzerland have reportedly

Canadian company, Pacific Rubiales Energy, were awarded committed an estimated $1.5 billion to a trust fund.

rights in three blocks in the Putomayo area.286

The fund “will be used to protect 4.8 million hectares in

Ecuador’s other national parks, to develop renewable

In terms of Ecuador and Bolivia, new exploration may be energy sources and to build schools and hospitals for

less likely in the short term, as recent resource nationalism in indigenous communities.”298

both countries has increased state control over the sector and

is likely to discourage an influx of new foreign investment.

However, some indigenous and environmental groups

remain concerned that the Yasuni deal “may provide cover

In 2005, Bolivia nationalized its oil and gas production, for the Ecuadorian government to open up other areas of

with IOCs (Petrobras, Repsol YPF, British Gas and BP, the Amazon to exploitation.”299 Indeed, the same week as

Total, and Exxon) obliged to hand majority control to the deal was signed, the government announced it would

state-owned Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos open up areas of Ecuador’s “roadless, pristine southeastern

(YPFB).287 One view is that Bolivia’s oil production over the Amazon region, as well as re-offering older oil blocks that

period 2009–2010 will fall (by 2.7%, with crude volumes were unsuccessful due to indigenous resistance.”300

peaking in 2011/2012 at 65,000 bpd, before falling steadily

to 56,000 bpd), while gas production will rise (Bolivia has

Nevertheless, the Yasuni-ITT Initiative in Ecuador is

the second-largest natural gas reserves in South America, an important test case for an alternative model of “leaving

after Venezuela).288

oil in the ground.” Ecuadorian civil society pressure on

the Correa government and its campaign to raise the

Ecuador has just passed a law that would make the state international profile of the Initiative were critical to the

the sole owner of all oil resources, receiving 25 percent of deal finally reaching fruition.

32

Marginal Oil - What is driving oil companies dirtier and deeper?

3 Conclusion: Protecting the global climate,

local communities and ecologies

This paper has discussed the macro drivers of increasing to the economic distortions and social and environmental

investment in marginal oil and surveyed some potential damage associated with fossil fuel extraction. Potential

new developments outside North America. Increasing resources range from the tar sands of Madagascar to

demand for oil, primarily from emerging economies, those located in the depths of the Atlantic and the pristine

together with a decline in conventional and easy to rainforests of the Amazon.

produce resources, is driving development of these most

environmentally and socially destructive and expensive

Indeed, in an atmosphere of heightened competition,

resources. Continued restricted access by IOCs to the oil companies may regard host countries with zero or

remaining “easy oil” in OPEC countries is forcing them to minimal governance and a weak regulatory framework as

push harder into the frontiers.

more appealing investment centres.301 Moreover, reducing

demand for oil will not by itself – without other policy

This combination, along with a lack of appropriate policy changes – address the environmental and social injustices

incentives from governments globally to reduce demand, endured by local communities affected by oil development.

means that it is likely that marginal oil will expand beyond

its current centre in North America, with companies pushing

For these reasons, and even when considered primarily

to open up ever-more risky and challenging resources. This through the lens of climate protection, both sides of the

expansion will inevitably have negative consequences oil equation – supply and demand – need to be tackled in a

for climate protection, for economic and energy security coherent way. As commentator George Monbiot highlighted

globally, as well as for local communities and ecologies at in a speech to the 2009 KlimaForum in Copenhagen, there is

the sharp end of this relentless trend.

an inherent contradiction in governments promoting global

policies aimed at mitigating emissions by reducing fossil

Given the particularly carbon-intensive techniques fuel demand while at the same time seeking to maximize

associated with developing unconventional resources, the supply of such fuels, for short-termist national security

combating further investment in these “dirtiest” forms reasons, further undermining the political and economic

of oil development is an important step. It is essential to case for clean energy sources.302 As Monbiot and others

prevent us accelerating faster down the wrong energy path have pointed out, it is still unclear what proportion of

but it is also essential to highlight the underlying structural remaining global reserves of conventional oil – let alone

problems with the “business as usual” scenario.

unconventional resources – can be extracted without

breaching the 2ºC temperature rise “safety barrier.”

Ultimately, the climate crisis can only be addressed by

reducing demand for oil from whatever source, not just the

Thus, for reasons of both climate protection and

riskiest and dirtiest forms. From this perspective, to the environmental and social justice, it is crucial that, along with

threat of increased investment in tar sands projects must strenuous efforts to reduce oil demand, new marginal oil

be added the growing number of “frontier” conventional investments are challenged and the voices of potential host

oil projects – whether they are deepwater projects in Africa, communities are supported. Otherwise, further irrevocable

Brazil and the Arctic or onshore exploration in the Amazon damage will result to local communities and ecosystems.

or East Africa.

Finally, it is important to question the wisdom of states

Furthermore, even if demand-reduction policies are becoming “locked in” – financially, technologically, and

rolled out with strong government endorsement and are politically – by such investments to a retrograde carbon-

successfully implemented – which currently looks unlikely, intensive, export-driven resource extraction model. In

for instance, at the federal level in the United States – developing countries, this model has led in the past to

demand for oil looks set to increase in the short- to medium extremely poor human development outcomes. Without

term, justifying further investment in marginal resources.

radical governance changes, the evidence points to states

hosting such investments falling into, or becoming further

This expansion will likely include countries with weak mired in, the “resource curse” trap, making their transition

governance frameworks that are particularly vulnerable to a sustainable development path even more difficult.

Marginal Oil - What is driving oil companies dirtier and deeper?

33

Endnotes

1

Arthur D. Little Management Consultants, “New Business

Energy Studies, 2007, p. 1.

Models for the International Oil Company,” in Prism, January 2010,

28 T.W. Wälde, “Renegotiating Acquired Rights in the Oil and Gas

http://www.adl.com/prism.html?&no_cache=1.

Industries: Industry and Political Cycles Meet the Rule of Law,”

2

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

Journal of World Energy Law & Business 1(1), 2008, pp. 55–97.

(OECD)/International Energy Agency (IEA), “What is Unconventional

29 P. Stevens, “National Oil Companies,” pp. 23–4.

Oil?” in World Energy Outlook 2010, pp. 145–46. The IEA’s definition

30 V. Vivoda, Resource Nationalism, p. 4.

of unconventional oil includes extra-heavy oil and natural bitumen (oil

31 “Exxon Barred from Jubilee Field,” Dailymarkets.com, August

sands) from Canada, extra-heavy oil from Venezuela’s Orinoco Belt,

19, 2010, http://www.dailymarkets.com/stock/2010/08/19/exxon-

chemical additives, gas-to-liquids, coal-to-liquids, and oil shales.

barred-from-jubilee-field/.

3

The authors would like to thank Kenny Bruno of Corporate Ethics

32 “Ghana: Split Decision on Who Wins Jubilee Field,” The Financial

International for his input.

Times, September 12, 2010.

4

OECD/IEA, World Energy Outlook 2010, p. 145.

33 P. Stevens, “National Oil Companies,” p. 28.

5

Ibid., pp. 145–46.

34 OECD/IEA, World Energy Outlook 2008.

6

EIA, Glossary, 2010, http://www.eia.doe.gov/glossary/index.cfm.

35 “Lower 48 USA” denotes all states except Hawaii and Alaska.

7

H. Campbell, The Top Frontier Oil Countries: Potential,

36 OECD/IEA, Medium-Term Oil and Gas Markets 2010.

Exploration Opportunities and Risks, Business Insights, 2010.

37 US Department of Energy (DOE)/Energy Information Agency

8 OECD/IEA, World Energy Outlook 2010, p. 165.

(EIA), “Canada,” Country Analysis Briefs, July 2009, http://www.eia.

9

“Energy-related CO emissions [if business as usual continues] rise

doe.gov/cabs/canada/Oil.html.

2

from 28 Gt in 2007 to […] 40.2 Gt in 2030,” which “leaves the world

38 OECD/IEA, Medium-Term Oil and Gas Markets 2010.

on course for a concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere of

39 “Behind the Ink,”Oil Sands Review, June 2009.

around 1,000 parts per million, implying a global temperature rise of

40 Chinese NOCs, Saudi Aramco, Petronas, and Petrobras, to name

around 6°C.” OECD/IEA, World Energy Outlook 2009, p. 167.

a few, now have deep pockets. The 2004–2008 oil boom generated

10 OECD/IEA, World Energy Outlook 2008, p. 257.

huge amounts of cash for these NOCs and current oil prices are more

11 Ibid.

than enough for them to reinvest their profits.

12 OECD/IEA, World Energy Outlook 2009, pp. 85–87. The IEA’s 41 “Petrobras Raises $70bn Despite Fears over State Role,”

definition of unconventional oil includes extra-heavy oil, natural bitumen

Financial Times, September 24, 2010.

(oil sands), chemical additives, gas-to-liquids, and coal-to-liquids. See

42 Arthur D. Little, “New Business Models,” p. 51.

OECD/IEA, World Energy Outlook 2008, p. 103.

43 Arthur D. Little Management Consultants, 2009. Time for

13 The World Energy Outlook 2008 states that non-conventionals, a Change: Oil Company Asset Management, http://www.adl.com/

excluding Venezuelan extra-heavy crude, will account for 8% of world

reports.html?page=1&download=451&file=ADL_Time_for_Change.

oil production in 2030. See IEA/OECD, World Energy Outlook 2008, p.

pdf&anchor=set451.

87. Table 3.9, World Energy Outlook 2008, p. 104.

44 For one definition, see http://www.investorwords.com/2504/

14 “Shell Boss Eyes Demand Crunch in 2015,” International Oil institutional_investor.html.

Daily, January 28, 2008.

45 See http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/reserve-replacement-

15 In this document, we are primarily referring to the major ratio.asp.

international oil companies: ExxonMobil, ChevronTexaco, Royal Dutch

46 Osmundsen et al., “Valuation of International Oil Companies: The

Shell, BP, and Total.

RoACE Era,” CESIFO Working Paper, No. 1412, 2005.

16 UK Energy Research Centre, Global Oil Depletion: An Assessment 47 “Shell Shares Dive as Reserves Cut,” BBC News, March 19, of the Evidence of a Near-term Peak in Global Oil Production, October 8, 2004. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3382045.stm.

2009, http://www.ukerc.ac.uk/support/Global%20Oil%20Depletion.

48 Royal Dutch Shell, Strategy Update, March 17, 2008.

17 Ibid.

49 Lorne Stockman, Reserves Replacement Ratio in a Marginal

18 OECD/IEA, Iraqi Efforts to Boost Capacity Face Headwinds in Oil World: Adequate Indicator or Subprime Statistic? Oil Change

Medium-Term Oil and Gas Markets 2010.

International, Greenpeace UK and Platform, January 2011, http://

19 Arthur D. Little, “New Business Models.”

priceofoil.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/RRR_final_A3spreads.pdf.

20 V. Vivoda, Resource Nationalism, Bargaining and International 50 2005–2009 average and excluding cost/price effects unless

Oil Companies: Challenges and Change in the New Millennium, otherwise noted.

Australian Institute of Energy, August 18, 2009, http://aie.org.

51 ConocoPhillips reserves are primarily in-situ resources. Figures

au/Content/NavigationMenu/OilGasSIG/InterestingUsefulArticles/

were primarily drawn from the company’s 2010 10-K filing. Based on

ISA09_Vivoda.pdf

a sample size of only three years in the five-year period.

21 Arthur D. Little, “New Business Models.”

52 We calculated 22% for tar sands additions 2006–2009 excluding

22 P. Stevens, “National Oil Companies and International Oil cost/price effects, and 20% for “heavy oil/tar sands” 2005–2009.

Companies in the Middle East: Under the Shadow of Government and

Here, we present the smaller of the two values. Figures for the liquids

the Resource Nationalism Cycle,” Journal of World Energy Law &

column were primarily drawn from the company’s 2010 and 2008 10-K

Business 1(1), 2008.

filings, and the company’s 2009 Financial and Operating Review.

23 Ibid., p. 11.

53 Including cost/price effects.

24 D. Painter, The United States, Great Britain and Mossadegh, 54 Based on assuming that the total five-year tar sands additions are Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University,

covered in the single number reported by Total SA in 2009.

Washington DC, 1993.

55 Based on a sample size of only two years in the five-year period.

25 P. Stevens, “National Oil Companies,” p. 17.

56 Calculated using [average annual TS additions] / [average annual

26 Ibid., p. 21.

total additions].

27 T. Fenton Krysiek, Agreements from Another Era Production 57 Reproduced from: L. Stockman, Reserves Replacement Ratio.

Sharing Agreements in Putin’s Russia, 2000-2007, Oxford Institute of 58 Excluding cost/price effects unless otherwise noted.

34

Marginal Oil - What is driving oil companies dirtier and deeper?

59 Calculated based on the percentages from Table 2, using the formula 90 “Devon Energy Announces $7.0 Billion of Property Sales to RRR * (1 – [tar sands as a percentage of total reserves additions]).

BP,” Devon Energy News Release, March 11, 2010, http://www.

60 Including cost/price effects.

devonenergy.com/Newsroom/Pages/NewsRelease.aspx?id=1401364.

61 Average “RRR” column includes BP; average of “RRR excluding 91 Shaun Polczer, “BP Strikes Another Oilsands Deal,” Calgary

tar sands” column excludes BP. RRR excluding tar sands is calculated

Herald, March 17, 2010, http://www.calgaryherald.com/business/strik

using [sum of total additions for each company] * (1 - 19.5%) / (sum of

es+another+oilsands+deal/2686881/story.html.

total production for each company).

92 Royal Dutch Shell, Strategy Update, March 17, 2008, http://

62 Reproduced from: L. Stockman, Reserves Replacement Ratio.

www.shell.com/home/content/media/news_and_media_releases/

63 OPEC, Annual Statistical Bulletin 2004, 2005, http://www.opec.

archive/2008/strategy_update_17032008.html.

org/library/Annual%20Statistical%20Bulletin/interactive/2004/

93 Ibid.

FileZ/definition.htm.

94 Report on Royal Dutch Shell Plc and Oil Sands, March

64 Royal Dutch Shell, Report on Royal Dutch Shell Plc and Oil Sands, 17, 2010, http://www.shell.com/home/content/ investor/news_

March 17, 2010, http://www.shell.com/home/content/investor/news_

and_library/2010_media_releases/report_oil_sands_17032010.

and_library/2010_media_releases/report_oil_sands_17032010.

html#subtitle_2.

html#subtitle_2.

95 http://phx.corporateir.net/External.File?item= UGFyZW50SUQ

65 Royal Dutch Shell, Strategy Update, March 17, 2008, http://

9Mzk0MjZ8Q2hpbGRJRD0tMXxUeXBlPTM=&amp;t=1.

www.shell.com/home/content/media/

news_and_media_releases/

96 http://media.corporate-ir.net/media_files/webcast/2010/mar/

archive/2008/strategy_update_17032008.html.

Exxon/final.pdf.

66 Minerals Management Service, Deepwater Gulf of Mexico 2008: 97 http://www.total.com/MEDIAS/MEDIAS_INFOS/3072/EN/

America’s Offshore Energy Future, 2008, http://www.gomr.mms.gov/

Total-2009-en-resultsoutlook-upstream.pdf?PHPSESSID=634a136e

PDFs/2008/2008-013.pdf.

5bb99d88d35a954580b50f3a.

67 Royal Dutch Shell, Building New Heartlands, March 2008.

98 http://www.conocophillips.com/EN/investor/presentations_ccalls/

68 Minerals Management Service, Deepwater Gulf of Mexico 2008.

Documents/ Analyst%20Meeting%202010%20Slides%20color.pdf.

69 Ibid.

99 Ibid.

70 Ibid., p. 9.

100 http://www.conocophillips.com/EN/investor/presentations_ccalls/

71 “Oil from a Stone,” Fortune: European Edition, vol. 156, issue Documents/ Analyst%20Meeting%202010%20Slides%20color.pdf.

10, November 26, 2007.

101 One definition is that: “A country is considered rich in hydrocarbons

72 IEA, forthcoming, :http://www.iea.org/papers/2010/Flyer_

and/or mineral resources on the basis of the following criteria: (i) an

RtoR2010.pdf.

average share of hydrocarbon and/or mineral fiscal revenues in total

73 Government of Alberta, Alberta Energy: Oil Sands 101, 2010, fiscal revenue of at least 25 percent during the period 2000–2003 or

http://www.energy.alberta.ca/OilSands/1710.asp.

(ii) an average share of hydrocarbon and/or mineral export proceeds

74 “Shell Puts Oil Sands Expansion Plans on Hold,” The Globe & in total export proceeds of at least 25 percent during the period 2000–

Mail, April 28, 2010.

2003.” International Monetary Fund, Guide on Resource Revenue

75 “SAGD: Spin vs. Reality; Eighty-Two Per Cent Of Alberta’s Oil Transparency, June 2005, Note 5, p. 5.

Sands Output Must Come from Wells, and the In-Situ Technology

102 World Bank, Fact Sheet: Extractive Industries Transparency

of Choice is SAGD. How Good Is It?” New Technology Magazine,

Initiative Plus Plus: EITI ++, World Bank, April 12, 2008, http://web.

September 1, 2007.

worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/ 0,,contentMDK:21727

76 “Rising Oil Sands Costs ‘A Worry,’” The Globe & Mail, March 5, 2010.

813~pagePK:64257043~piPK:437376~theSitePK:4607,00.html.

77 IEA, Medium-Term Oil Market Review 2009.

103 See for instance Michael Ross, Extractive Sectors and the Poor;

78 CERES, Canada’s Oil Sands: Shrinking Window of Opportunity, Michael Ross/Oxfam America, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” October

May 2010.

2001; Michael Ross, World Politics 53(3), April 2001, pp. 325–61.

79 OECD/IEA, World Energy Outlook 2010, pp. 145–46.

104 Ian Gary and Terry Lynn Karl, “Bottom of the Barrel. Africa’s Oil

80 Ibid., p. 142.

Boom and the Poor.” Catholic Relief Services, 2003, p. 22.

81 Canadian Energy Research Institute (CERI), 2009. Oil Sands 105 See for instance Global Witness, Time for Transparency, 2004, Industry Update: Production Outlook and Supply Costs 2009-2043, pp. 46–51 & “Alarm Bells Sound over Massive Loans Bankrolling Oil-November 2009; prices are in 2009 dollars.

Rich, Graft-Tainted Angola: UK’s Standard Chartered Bank Criticised

82 OECD/IEA, World Energy Outlook 2010, p. 159.

for Its Leading Role in $2.35 bn Deal,” The Guardian, June 1, 2005.

83 “Oil Exploration Costs Rocket as Risks Rise,” Reuters, February 106 See for instance “The Tragedy and Elusive Promise of Extractive 11, 2010.

Industry Wealth” in Ghana’s big test: Oil’s challenge to democratic

84 Greenpeace UK, The Risks and Potential Impacts of Oil development, Oxfam America / ISODEC, 2009.

Exploration in the Arctic, August 23, 2010, http://www.greenpeace.

107 Terry Lynn Karl, “Understanding the Resource Curse,” in

org.uk/files/pdfs/climate/arctic_briefing_gp.pdf.

Covering Oil: A Reporter’s Guide to Energy and Development, Revenue

85 CERI, Oil Sands Industry Update; CERES, Canada’s Oil Sands.

Watch Open Society Institute, 2005, pp. 21–6.

86 OECD/IEA, World Energy Outlook 2010, p. 151.

108 There is a wealth of literature documenting rent-seeking behavior

87 This section is reproduced from L. Stockman, Reserves and corruption in the oil industry. Examples of recent discussions of

Replacement Ratio.

specific cases include: Global Witness, “Angola: Private Oil Firm Has

88 http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/STAGING/

Shareholders with Same Names as Top Government Officials,” Global

global_assets/downloads

/I/IC_bp_strategy_presentation_march_

Witness media briefing, August 4, 2009; “Opacity Blamed for Bad Oil

2010_slides.pdf.

Deals in Africa,” Allafrica.com, November 19, 2009; Khadija Sharife,

89 Ed Crooks and Sylvia Pfeifer, “BP to Develop Canadian Oil “Sudan: Has China’s $20 Billion Investment in Oil Industry Paid Off?”

Sands,” Financial Times, November 29, 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/

Africa Files, May 4, 2010; Rafael Marques, “The Angolan Presidency:

s/0/b1ded2ac-fc08-11df-b675-00144feab49a.html#axzz16xb856Qc.

The Epicentre of Corruption,” Makaangola.com, August 4, 2010;

Marginal Oil - What is driving oil companies dirtier and deeper?

35

Human Rights Watch, São Tomé e Príncipe: Oil Deals and the New

first time,” BP, Statisical Review of World Energy, June 2010, p. 19.

Government: A Chance to Improve Life for Its People by Managing 132 Loans include: Russia $25 billion, Kazakhstan $10 billion, Resources Well, August 24, 2010; “Ghana and Other New African Oil Brazil $10 billion, and Venezuela $24 billion. “China: Keeping Supply

States to be Monitored for Corruption,” Vibeghana, August 25, 2010.

Diverse,” Energy Intelligence, July 9, 2010. Angola is currently the

109 African Economic Outlook 2007, AFDB/OECD, May 2007, p. number one source of Chinese oil imports. See for instance “China and

119. See also the work of Human Rights Watch and Global Witness

African Oil: Hungry Giant Provides Formidable Tools for Bargaining,”

documenting rent-seeking in the Angolan oil sector. Recent examples

The Financial Times, June 17, 2010.

are: Human Rights Watch, “Angola: Oil Wealth Eludes Nation’s Poor

133 “China’s Fears about Imported Oil,” Financial Times, January

Government Needs to Take Effective Action to Combat Corruption,

21, 2010. See also: Arthur D. Little, The Beginning of the End for Oil?

Mismanagement,” news release, April, 13, 2010; Global Witness,

Peak Oil: A Demand-side Phenomenon? February 2009.

“Angola: Private Oil Firm,”; Global Witness, “Link between Angolan

134 IEA, Oil Market Report, July 2010.

President’s Son-in-Law and State Oil Company Raises Questions

135 Ibid., p. 188

about Transparency,” Global Witness media briefing, March 13,

136 OECD/IEA, World Energy Outlook 2009, p. 183.

2010; see also the work of Angolan journalist R. Marques, “The

137 Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA), Oil Demand

Angolan Presidency.”

from Developed Countries Has Peaked, CERA, October 2009, http://

110 Michael A. Levi, The Canadian Oil Sands: Energy Security vs. press.ihs.com/article_display.cfm?article_id=4142.

Climate Change, Council on Foreign Relations, May 2009, http://www.

138 OECD/IEA, Medium-term Oil and Gas Markets 2010, p. 45. Note

cfr.org/publication/19345/ canadian_oil_sands.html?breadcrumb=%2

that the growth in aviation is the one area of oil use in North America

Fpublication%2Fby_type%2Fspecial_report.

set to grow significantly despite fleet and operational efficiency gains.

111 For instance American Petroleum Institute (API), Canadian Oil 139 Arthur D. Little, The Beginning of the End for Oil?

Sands: Enhancing America’s Energy Security, API, October 30, 2009, 140 “US Oil Groups Seek Easing of Drilling Curbs,” Financial Times,

http://www.api.org/aboutoilgas/oilsands/upload/ oil_sands_primer.pdf.

January 4, 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f313329c-1835-11e0-

112 Sarah Palin, “Drill, Baby, Drill: Obama’s Cap-and-Trade Energy 88c9-00144feab49a.html#axzz1CutprqJx.

Plan Threatens Our Economy and National Security. We Need to Tap

141 OECD/IEA, World Energy Outlook 2010, p. 121.

America’s Sources of Energy,” in The Guardian, July 14, 2009, http://

142 The position of some proponents of tar sands is that its supply to

www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2009/jul/14/sarah-

the United States is necessary to replace declining supplies of Mexican

palin-energy-obama.

and Venezuelan crude, and that it is a “bridge” fuel that is necessary

113 For instance A. Rowell, J. Marriott, and L. Stockman, The because the rate of supply is declining faster than even the potentially Next Gulf: London, Washington and Oil Conflict in Nigeria, Robinson highest rate of demand reduction. See for instance the presentation

Publishing, 2005.

given by IEA and CAPP at the Interamerican Development Bank’s

114 “Jordan Seeks Oil Riches from Shale Deposits,” Financial Times, Energy and Climate Ministerial of the Americas, Washington DC, April

July 6, 2009.

15–16, 2010.

115 OECD/IEA, World Energy Outlook 2009, p. 85.

143 BP, “Oil Sands Resolution and Response,” April 2010, http://

116 Ibid., p. 216.

www.bp.com/liveassets/ bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/

117 Ibid., p. 217.

set_branch/set_investors/STAGING/local_assets/downloads/pdf/

118 OECD/IEA, World Energy Outlook 2010, p. 143.

IC_AGM_oil_sands_resolution.pdf. Also Royal Dutch Shell, Report on

119 US DOE/EIA, OPEC Revenues Fact Sheet, http://www.eia.doe.

Royal Dutch Shell.

gov/emeu/cabs/OPEC_Revenues/ Factsheet.html.

144 OECD/IEA, World Energy Outlook 2009, p. 44.

120 OECD/IEA, World Energy Outlook 2009, p. 217.

145 Ibid.

121 http://www.strategywest.com/downloads/StratWest_Outlook_

146 Ibid., p. 216.

2010.pdf.

147 OECD/IEA, World Energy Outlook 2010, p. 144.

122 OECD/IEA, World Energy Outlook 2009, p. 119.

148 Ibid, p. 451.

123 The National Defense Council Foundation, Issue Alert: The Hidden 149 Ibid, p. 452.

Cost of Oil, An Update, NDCF, January 8, 2007, http://ndcf.dyndns.org/

150 Ibid, pp.106–13.

ndcf/energy/NDCF_Hidden_Cost_2006_summary_paper.pdf.

151 Scientific evidence now suggests that stabilization of greenhouse

124 IEA, Oil Market Report, December 2010.

gases a lower limit of 350 ppm should be reached as soon as possible.

125 OECD/IEA, World Energy Outlook 2008.

See FoE and the Stockholm Environment Institute, The 40% Study:

126 Canada’s Oil Sands Industry – Production & Supply Outlook, Mobilizing Europe to Achieve Climate Justice, 2009. FOE Europe and Strategy West, July 2010, http://www.strategywest.com/downloads/

the Stockholm Environment Institute, http://www.foeeurope.org/

StratWest_Outlook_2010.pdf.

climate/FoEE_SEI_40_study_summary_Dec09.pdf. For an overview

127 OECD/IEA, Medium-term Oil and Gas Markets 2010, p. 23.

of the latest science, see for instance: http://www.climateprogress.

128 OECD/IEA, “Table 1.3: Primary Oil Demand by Region in the org; http://climateprogress.org/2010/ 02/17/an-illustrated-guide-to-

Reference Scenario,” in World Energy Outlook 2009, p. 81. China’s

the-latest-climate-science/.

average annual demand growth is 3.5%.

152 OECD/IEA, World Energy Outlook 2009, p. 203.

129 According to the World Energy Outlook 2009, “[n]on-OECD 153 Based on BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2010; figures

countries account for all of the projected growth in energy-related

for 2009.

emissions to 2030,” with China accounting for 6 Gt, India 2 Gt, and the

154 Deutsche Bank, The Peak Oil Market, October 4, 2009.

Middle East 1 Gt.,. OECD/IEA, World Energy Outlook 2009, p. 44.

155 This is under IEA’s Reference Scenario; see World Energy

130 “China: Keeping Supply Diverse,” Energy Intelligence, July 9, 2010.

Outlook 2009.

131 Ibid. According to BP, “Most of the 2 million b/d increase in 156 “China’s Fears about Imported Oil,” Financial Times, January global refining capacity last year was also in China and India, allowing

21, 2010, http://blogs.ft.com/energy-source/2010/01/21/chinas-

installed capacity in the non-OECD to overtake that of the OECD for the

fears-about-imported-oil/. Also World Resources Institute, “China’s

36

Marginal Oil - What is driving oil companies dirtier and deeper?

Transportation Revolution,” China FAQs WRI, November 12, 2009,

www.ft.com/cms/s/0/fcab3374-16c7-11df-aa09-00144feab49a.html.

http://www.chinafaqs.org/

files/chinainfo/ChinaFAQs_China%27s_

184 “La Faja del Orinoco, desafío extrapesado,” PODER, March 2010.

Transportation_Revolution.pdf.

185 IEA, World Energy Outlook 2010, p. 162.

157 Ibid.

186 IEA, World Energy Outlook 2008, p. 216. In 2010, the IEA stated

158 Ibid., p. 2.

that while early projects “emulsified the extra-heavy oil with water to

159 OECD/IEA, World Energy Outlook 2009, p. 81.

create a mix, dubbed Orimulsion, which could be transported by pipeline

160 Our calculation, based on figures in the IEA’s World Energy and used as fuel oil in power generation […] all of the production is now Outlook 2009.

upgraded into synthetic crude oil (SCO) [….] Most of the announced

161 In the aftermath of BP’s Deepwater Horizon disaster, US projects involve the construction of upgraders, although they are not

environmental groups have called for responses ranging from moving to

always large enough to treat the full production. Deliveries will be a

zero oil consumption over the next 20 years (Sierra Club) to reducing

mix of SCO and extra-heavy oil diluted with light hydrocarbons,” IEA,

consumption by 4 Mbd by 2020 and 10 Mbd by 2030 (NRDC). US

World Energy Outlook 2010, p. 162.

Senator Mearkley also mooted an oil savings plan aimed at achieving

187 Quoted in World Energy Council, “Natural Bitumen,” p. 124.

a 8.3 Mbd reduction in consumption by 2030. On the latter, see http://

188 Ibid.

merkley.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Senator%20Merkley%20-%20A

189 IEA, World Energy Outlook 2010, p. 163.

merica%20Over%20a%20Barrel%200614101.pdf.

190 Jorge Pinon, former senior oil executive, and now energy fellow

162 Deutsche Bank, The Peak Oil Market, October 4, 2009.

with the University of Miami’s Center for Hemispheric Policy quoted in

163 Ibid.

“Venezuela Revels in Oil Reserves.”

164 Ibid.

191 “Gustavo Coronel: PDVSA’s Chief Rafel Ramizez Faces a Huge

165 Ibid, p. 262. This graph excludes extra-heavy oil from Venezuela Credibility Problem over His Investment Plans,” Latin Business Chronicle, and oil shales, according to the IEA.

August 3, 2010, reprinted in Petroleum World, August 8, 2010.

166 IEA, World Energy Outlook 2010, pp. 145–46.

192 “Venezuela Betting On Heavy Oil,” Investopedia, July 21, 2010.

167 Ibid., p. 143.

193 “Gustavo Coronel.” See also: “La Faja del Orinoco.”

168 FoE, “Tar Sands: Fuelling the Climate Crisis, Undermining EU 194 The EIA’s high price scenario assumes that “world oil prices Energy Security and Damaging Development Objectives,” May 2010, p. 9.

rise throughout the projection period, to $210 per barrel in 2035”.

169 Proved reserves are defined as “those quantities [of oil] that Annual Energy Outlook 2010 with Projections to 2035, US DOE/

geological and engineering information indicates with reasonable

EIA, 2010. See: http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/otheranalysis/aeo_

certainty can be recovered in the future from known reservoirs under

2010analysispapers/woprices.html

existing economic and operating conditions.” See BP Statistical Review

195 IEA, World Energy Outlook 2010, p. 163.

of World Energy 2010, p. 6.

196 See also FOE, “Tar Sands: Fuelling the Climate Crisis,” pp. 15–6.

170 Both bitumen and extra-heavy oil have an API gravity of less than 197 Total and Statoil also bid for Junin Block 10 but their bid 10 although “unlike bitumen, extra-heavy oil will flow in reservoirs,

was rejected.

albeit much more slowly than ordinary crude oils.”

198 US DOE/NETL, “Consideration of Crude Oil Source in Evaluating

171 IEA, World Energy Outlook 2010, p. 146.

Transportation Fuel GHG Emissions,” National Energy Technology

172 World Energy Council, “Natural Bitumen and Extra-Heavy Oil,” Laboratory, March 20, 2009, DOE/NETL-2009/1360, p. 6. Thanks to

in 2007 Survey of Energy Resources, 2007, p. 120.

Simon Mui of NRDC for pointing us to this data.

173 Ibid.

199 IEA, World Energy Outlook 2010, p. 162.

174 IEA, World Energy Outlook 2010, p. 164.

200 Ibid.

175 Ibid.

201 Ibid.

176 IEA, World Energy Outlook 2010, p. 146.

202 Ibid., p. 4.

177 Ibid., p. 121.

203 Ibid., p. 5.

178 USGS, “Technical Announcement: Venezuela Holds One of the 204 The Venezuelan government is planning a regional development Largest Oil Accumulations: New Research on How Much is Currently

called the “Orinoco Socialist Project,” aiming to invest around $26

Recoverable,” January 22, 2010.

million in service provision (education, health, transport, housing),

179 Ibid. See also USGS, “An Estimate of Recoverable Heavy Oil creation of around 100,000 new jobs and the establishment of a Resources of the Orinoco Oil Belt, Venezuela,” Fact Sheet 2009–2038,

“University of Hydrocarbons”; “La Faja del Orinoco.”

World Petroleum Resources Project, USGS, October 2009.

205 Source for this paragraph: “La Faja del Orinoco.”

180 IEA, World Energy Outlook 2010, p. 162.

206 Ibid.

181 “FACTBOX-Venezuela Development Plan for Orinoco Oil Belt,” 207 Encyclopedia of Earth, “Orinoco Wetlands,” accessed August 11,

Reuters, July 13, 2010.

2010, http://www.eoearth.org/ article/Orinoco_wetlands.

182 Ibid., p. 162. The IEA sounded a note of caution in December 208 UNESCO, “Venezuela: Delta del Orinico,” in MAB Biospheres 2010 that although “by early 2010, 133 billion barrels had been

Reserves Directory, accessed December 8, 2009, http://www.unesco.

certified, […] the Oil & Gas Journal currently reports only 60 billion

org/mabdb/br/brdir/directory/ biores.asp?mode=all&code=VEN+02.

barrels.” Other analysts have warned that figures provided by the state

209 Encyclopedia of Earth, “Orinoco Wetlands.”

oil company PDVSA on reserves are unreliable. In addition, government

210 Ibid.

figures on rates of recovery from the new Orinoco projects, projected

211 The requirement for an environmental impact assessment is

at 20% as opposed to the much lower 9% rate from current projects,

enshrined in the 1999 Venezuelan Constitution (articles 127–129).

are not audited. Francisco Monaldi, oil economist at IESA, Caracas,

Email interview with source, Caracas, Venezuela, February 24, 2010.

quoted in “Venezuela Revels in Oil Reserves, Challenges Remain,”

212 Ibid.

Reuters, July 13, 2010.

213 CIA World Factbook, accessed August 3, 2010, https://www.cia.

183 “FACTBOX-Venezuela,” Reuters; “Venezuela Auctions Off Two gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ve.html.

Major Oil Projects,” The Financial Times, February 11, 2010, http://

214 The company’s most recent published accounts show a 53–54%

Marginal Oil - What is driving oil companies dirtier and deeper?

37

drop in net profit in 2009, with revenues down to $4.39 billion in 2009

231 See for instance, most recently, Amnesty International, Nigeria:

from $9.49 billion in 2008. PDVSA’s revenue fell 41% last year while

Petroleum, Pollution and Poverty in the Niger Delta, June 2009; AFR

its debts rose to $21.4 billion last year, including $4 billion owed to

44/017/2009.3472009.

contractors, a tripling of debt since 2000. However, the company

232 See FoE “Tar Sands: Fuelling the Climate Crisis,” pp. 22–3; see

stated that its contributions to an off-budget development fund

also ERA.

(FONDEN) had fallen from $12 billion in 2008 to $3 billion in 2009

233 Recently, UK company Tullow Oil’s bid for exploration rights

(although Venezuelan newspaper El Universal puts PDVSA’s “social

for this acreage was controversially passed over in favor of two South

contributions” at $5.26 billion). “Earnings Drop at Venezuela’s

African start-ups, amid accusations of lack of transparency, “Oil Deal

State Oil Company,” AP, August 3, 2010; “PDVSA Profit Plunged

Switch is New Turn-off for Congo Investors,” Reuters, July 15, 2010.

53% Last Year on OPEC Quotas Cut,” Bloomberg, August 3, 2010;

234 “Soco Farms Out 20 pct of DRC Block to Japan’s Inpex,” Reuters,

“PDVSA’s 2009 Financial Statements Show Lower Production and

July 15, 2010.

Increased Investment,” El Universal, August 6, 2010; “Venezuelan

235 “Italy’s Eni to Take Share in Congo Oil Block,” Reuters, August

Oil Production Declines as Reserves Grow,” VOA, August 6, 2010;

16, 2010.

“Venezuela’s Oil Wealth Powers Social Programs, Drives Divisions,”

236 Breaking the Congo Curse,” Upstream, November 7, 2008.

VOA, August 13, 2010.

237 “Horn of Africa is on Tullow Radar,” Upstream, December 4, 2009.

215 Email interview with source, Caracas, Venezuela, February 11, 2010.

238 SouthWest Energy website, accessed July 2010, http://www.

216 See for instance Survival International, “Bari Indians Speak sw-oil-gas.com/executive_summary.htm. It was reported in December

at Landmark Supreme Court Hearing,” March 11, 2010, http://

2009 that SW Energy was about to sign a production sharing agreement

homoetnatura.blogspot.com/.

with the Ethiopan government, “Horn of Africa is on Tullow radar.”

217 World Energy Council, “Natural Bitumen,” p. 131.

239 Angola’s oil minister recently claimed that the country could increase

218 This is the view of the Wall Street Journal article “Madagascar, production to 2 Mbpd in 2011, “Angola Could Raise Oil Output to 2 mln

Cambodia and Ghana Are Leading Frontier Oil Exploration Geographies

bpd in 2011,” Reuters, July 23, 2010; see also “Angola: An Emerging Oil

and Will Drive Capital Investment Spending for Major Integrated

Power without the Baggage,” Energy Tribune, July 19, 2010.

Producers,” Oil and Gas Production and Distribution Report, Wall

240 “Perspective: Macondo’s Impact on Global Supply,” Energy

Street Journal, June 2, 2010.

Intelligence, June 18, 2010.

219 Oil Industry Ready to Gamble on Alternative Energy, The 241 “Ghana Prepares for Oil Boom,” www.OilReviewAfrica.com, Financial Times, February 18, 2007.

undated; “Ghana: Investment Opportunities Amid the Oil Boom,”

220 IEA, World Energy Outlook 2010, p. 164

Business Monitor, August 5, 2010.

221 Madagascar scrapes into the top third of countries in the 242 Oxfam America and Isodec, Ghana’s Big Test: Oil’s Challenge World Peace Foundation’s Index of African Governance; for human

to Democratic Development, February 13, 2009, http://www.

development the country almost falls into the bottom third of countries

oxfamamerica.org/publications/ghanas-big-test.

(Madagascar is ranked 17 out of 53 countries overall and for human

243 Exxon Mobil, “Enabling Unconventional Resources,” presentation

development, 34th); World Peace Foundation, Strengthening African

at 8th U.S.-China Oil and Gas Industry Forum, San Francisco, USA,

Governance: Index of African governance, October 2009, pp. 18 and September 9–11, 2007.

227, http://www.worldpeacefoundation.org/african-governance.html.

244 IEA, World Energy Outlook 2010, pp. 165–8.

222 World Food Programme, Madagascar: Comprehensive Food 245 Ibid., p. 217.

Security and Vulnerability Analysis, Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping

246 Ibid., pp. 165–8.

Branch (ODAV), April 2006, p. 20, http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/

247 EIA, Assumptions to the Annual Energy Outlook 2010, April 9,

groups/public/documents/ena/wfp108512.pdf.

2010, http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ aeo/assumption/oil_gas.html.

223 See Heinrich Böll Foundation, Energy Futures? Eni’s Investments 248 Ibid., p. 168.

in Tar Sands and Palm Oil in the Congo Basin, 2009.

249 Ibid., p. 169.

224 IEA, World Energy Outlook 2010, p. 164.

250 Ibid.

225 USGS, Discovered original oil in place refers to “the volume of 251 “Oil from a Stone,” Fortune.

oil (natural bitumen/extra-heavy oil) in place reported for deposits

252 “As U.S. Suspends Deep-Water Oil Drilling, Other Nations Move

or parts of deposits that have been measured by field observation”

Ahead,” The Washington Post, July 22, 2010. Deepwater definitions

whereas Reserves is “those amounts of oil […] that are anticipated to be

vary, but 400 meters (1,300 feet) is the typical dividing line between

technically (but not necessarily commercially) recoverable from known

shallow and deep, with ultradeep starting at 1,500 (5,000 feet).

accumulations [….] The term reserve, as used here, has no economic

253 “Perspective: Macondo’s Impact,” Energy Intelligence.

connotation.” 2005. World Energy Council, “Natural Bitumen,” p. 131.

254 Ibid.

226 Ibid., p. 133.

255 For example, Republic of Congo; see also “As US Suspends Deep-

227 Eni, “Eni Signs Strategic Agreement with the Democratic Republic Water Oil Drilling,” The Washington Post.

of Congo,” August 12, 2009, http://www.eni.com/en_IT/media/press-

256 “Drillers Sit Out Gulf of Mexico Moratorium,” Energy Intelligence,

releases/2009/08/2009-08-12-strategic-agreement-congo.shtml.

August 9, 2010.

228 African Development Bank, Democratic Republic of Congo 257 Ibid. Canada has begun a comparison of its regulations with US

Economic and Sector Work: Regional Economic Development in Bas

rules, and Brazil’s national petroleum regulatory agency has asked

Congo in the Context of Decentralization in the Democratic Republic of

firms drilling in its waters to reassess the chances of an accident taking

Congo (DRC), October 2009, p. 11.

place off its shores. In Nigeria, President Goodluck Jonathan, a former

229 FoE, “Tar Sands: Fuelling the Climate Crisis,” pp. 22–3; Nigerian environmental official in the strife-torn, oil-rich Niger Delta, is looking Ministry of Mines and Steel Development, Tarsands & Bitumen:

for lessons from the United States.

Exploration Opportunities in Nigeria, 2010, http://mmsd.gov.ng/

258 “Oil Lessons for Brazil,” Oxford Analytica, February 7, 2010.

publications/publications.asp.

259 “Perspective: Macondo’s Impact,” Energy Intelligence; “Shell

230 FoE, “Tar Sands: Fuelling the Climate Crisis,” pp. 22–3.

Fears Year-long Delay over Alaska,” Financial Times, January 13, 2011.

38

Marginal Oil - What is driving oil companies dirtier and deeper?

260 “Unlimited Liability for Gulf Spills Would Kill Development,” 283 “Colombia Expects $57 Billion Oil, Mining Investment in 2010–

Financial Times, July 28, 2010; “Spill-Liability Fight Could Kill the 2015,” Colombia Reports, July 22, 2010.

Energy Bill,” The New Republic, July 28, 2010. “EPA Board Stops

284 Ibid. See also “ANH is Pleased with Licence Round Results,”

Shell’s Arctic Clean Air Permits,” AP, January 3, 2011; “Greenpeace

Upstream, June 25, 2010.

Sues UK for End to Shetland Oil Drilling,” The Daily Telegraph, January

285 Finer et al., Save America’s Forests.

29, 2011.

286 Pacific Rubiales Energy Corporation, “Pacific Rubiales Scoops

261 “BP in $16 bn Share Swap with Rosneft,” Financial Times, Up 6 Blocks in Colombia,” Rigzone, June 23, 2010.

January 15, 2011; “Greenpeace Sues UK,” The Daily Telegraph.

287 “Bolivia Gas under State Control,” BBC News, May 2, 2006; see

262 “Oil Lessons for Brazil,” Oxford Analytica.

also C. Zissis, “Bolivia’s Nationalization of Oil and Gas,” Council on

263 Ibid; see also “Offshore Challenge Looms for Brazil,” Financial Foreign Relations, May 12, 2006.

Times, September 15, 2010; Petrobras, “What is the Pre-salt?”

288 “Bolivia Oil and Gas Report Q1 2010,” Business Monitor

accessed February 2011, http://www.petrobras.com.br/minisite/

International, December 3, 2009.

presal/en/ questions-answers/default.asp.

289 They would also have to pay a 25% income tax, invest 12% of

264 “Petrobras Releases Capital Spending Plans for 2010–14,” net earnings into local development projects and pay another 3% to oil

Energy Intelligence, June 22, 2010.

workers; “Ecuador,” Energy Intelligence, July 5, 2010; “Ecuador to Keep

265 Petrobras, “About Petrobras,” Petrobras website, accessed Oil, Pay Companies Flat Fee,” The Associated Press, July 27, 2010.

August 2010, http://www2.petrobras.com.br/ Petrobras/ingles/visao/

290 Ibid.; see also “Ecuador Sees Tough Talks Ahead with Oil

vis_index.htm.

Companies,” Reuters Africa, July 27, 2010; “Ecuador Delays Handing

266 Stratfor, “Brazil: Strategic Planning for Pre-Salt,” reproduced Over New Contracts,” Reuters Africa, August 10, 2010.

in Energy Source, Forbes Blog, July 8, 2010.

291 “Ecuadorian Official Confirms Talks with China on Oil Loan

267 “Oil Lessons for Brazil,” Oxford Analytica.

Deal,” China Knowledge, July 19, 2010.

268 “Brazilian Pre-Salt Reserves Bring Role of Oil Industry into 292 “Correa Pushes Yasuni Oil Pact,” Upstream, January 14, 2010; Question,” Oil & Gas Financial Journal, July 31, 2009.

Amazon Watch, “Ecuador Signs Historic Yasuni-ITT Deal with UNDP to

269 “Oil Lessons for Brazil,” Oxford Analytica.

Keep Oil in the Soil and CO2 out of the Atmosphere,” August 3, 2010. The

270 Ibid. Although “Petrobras will benefit from the offshore drilling total $3.5 billion figure is around half of what Ecuador would gain by selling moratorium in the Gulf of Mexico, which will likely put downward

the oil at current prices.

pressure on daily rental rates for offshore rigs”; “Petrobras

293 “Correa Pushes Yasuni Oil Pact,” Upstream. This $3.5 billion

Releases Capital Spending Plans,” Energy Intelligence.

figure is around half of what Ecuador would gain by selling the oil at

271 “Brazilian Pre-Salt Reserves,” Oil & Gas Financial Journal.

current prices.

272 Stratfor, “Brazil Strategic Planning,” Energy Source. In order 294 “The Current State of the Yasuní-ITT Intiative (Part III),” The to avoid concentrating too much power in the hands of Petrobras,

Globalist, June 25, 2010.

Brazil has also created a new state-owned company, Pre-Sal Petroleo,

295 Ibid.; “Ecuador to Leave Oil in Ground,” Green Left Weekly,

to manage new projects and to “run a new contract system that allows

August 7, 2010.

the state to implement production-sharing agreements that would

296 Ibid.

direct more of the oil windfall to the state than to the oil companies

297 Ibid.

whenever the price of oil goes up.” See also comment by Presidential

298 Ibid.; “Ecuador’s ‘Amazon Bonds’: How to Raise $3.6bn for

Chief of Staff Dilma Roussef in “Roussef backs new regulations,”

Doing Nothing,” The Telegraph, August 4, 2010.

Upstream, August 6, 2009.

299 “Ecuador to Leave Oil in Ground,” Green Left Weekly.

273 Interview with Marina Silva, The Financial Times, October 5, 300 Amazon Watch, “Ecuador Signs Historic Yasuni-ITT Deal.”

2009; “Brazil’s Presidential Poll Heads for Run-off,” The Financial

301 In the case of Eni’s exploration for tar sands in Republic of Congo,

Times, October 4, 2010.

for instance, the company’s Chief Operating Officer for Exploration and

274 Ibid.

Production initially claimed that one of the main benefits of the project

275 IEA, World Energy Outlook 2010, p. 164.

was its much lower capex relative to the cost of such projects in Canada

276 M. Finer, C.N. Jenkins, S.L. Pimm, B. Keane, and C. Ross, “Oil because Eni would not have to pay for water supplies or for energy and Gas Projects in the Western Amazon: Threats to Wilderness,

generated from a new electricity plant also to be built by the company.

Biodiversity and Indigenous Peoples,” in Save America’s Forests,

However, Eni has since shown a reluctance to repeat these claims or

2008. This report explains in detail the Amazonian license areas and

extrapolate on them publicly. See Heinrich Böll Foundation, Energy

the exploration picture as of 2008.

Futures? pp. 18 and 21.

277 Ibid.

302 George Monbiot, 2009, http://www.youtubecomwatch?v=CDa7

278 “Savia to Invest US $120 Million in Oil Exploration in Peru,” nuHK2uc; http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OKRDusvoFOg.

Livinginperu.Com, July 17, 2010.

303 See research article: M. Finer, C.N. Jenkins, S.L. Pimm, B.

279 “More of the Amazon Opened to Oil Development,” mongabay.

Keane, and C. Ross, “Oil and Gas Projects in the Western Amazon:

com, May 24, 2010.

Threats to Wilderness, Biodiversity and Indigenous Peoples,” in Save

280 “Colombia: Same Direction,” Energy Intelligence, June 25, 2010.

America’s Forests, 2008. http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi

281 “Initial Interest High in Colombia Round,” Upstream, June 25, 2010.

%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0002932

282 “Colombia: Same Direction,” Energy Intelligence.

304 Ibid.

Marginal Oil - What is driving oil companies dirtier and deeper?

39

Acknowledgements

Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung

Friends of the Earth Europe

Schumannstr. 8

Mundo-B Building

10117 Berlin

rue d’Édimbourg 26

Germany

1050 Brussels,

Belgium

T +30 - 285 34 - 0

F +30 - 285 34 - 109

T +32 2 893 1000

F +32 2 893 1035

info@boell.de

www.boell.de

info@foeeurope.org

www.foeeurope.org

The Heinrich Böll Foundation is part of the Green political Friends of the Earth Europe campaigns for sustainable and just

movement that has developed worldwide as a response to the societies and for the protection of the environment, unites 30

traditional politics of socialism, liberalism, and conservatism. Our national organisations with thousands of local groups and is part

main tenets are ecology and sustainability, democracy and human of the world’s largest grassroots environmental network, Friends

rights, self-determination and justice.

of the Earth International.

With 29 foreign offices we are active on Ecology, Democracy,

and Human Rights worldwide.

Edited by the Heinrich Böll Foundation, May 2011.

Report written by Lorne Stockman and Sarah Wykes

Design by: Alex Quero

Published under the following Creative Commons

License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-

nd/3.0/. Attribution — You must attribute the work

in the manner specified by the author or licensor (but not in any way that

suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work). Non-commercial

— You may not use this work for commercial purposes. No Derivative Works

— You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work.

List of Abbreviations

boe

barrels of oil

NETL US National Energy Technology Laboratory

bpd / Mbpd barrels per day / million barrels per day

NOC

national oil companies

CNPC

China National Petroleum Corporation

ppm

parts per million

DRC

Democratic Republic of the Congo

RoC

Republic of the Congo

EIA

US Energy Information Administration

RRR

reserves replacement ratio

GTL

gas-to-liquids

SAGD steam-assisted gravity drainage

IEA

International Energy Agency

SEC

Securities and Exchange Commission

IOC

international oil companies

SPR

strategic petroleum reserves

ITT

Ishpingo, Tambococha, and

TR

total resources

Tiputini deposits

USGS US Geological Survey

MENA

Middle Eastern and North African

WEC

World Energy Council

40

Marginal Oil - What is driving oil companies dirtier and deeper?

Back cover: The PS10 solar tower plant at Sanlucar la Mayor outside Seville, Spain on April 29, 2008 in Seville, Spain. The solar

tower plant, the first commercial solar tower in the world, by the Spanish company Solucar (Abengoa), can provide electricity for

up to 6,000 homes. Solucar (Abengoa) plan to build a total of 9 solar towers over the next 7 years which will raise the electricity

capacity for an estimated 180,000 homes. © Markel Redondo / Greenpeace