Since regaining independence in 1991, Estonia has undergone a rapid and determined transformation, embracing modernization, democracy and western integration. Yet its path to NATO membership and security reform was anything but straightforward, as it was shaped by regional geopolitics, western hesitations, and the lessons of Nordic neighbours.
Social modernization has been unrelenting since Estonia restored its independence in 1991. During the 1990s and early 2000s, Estonia, like many other post-communist aspirants for European Union and NATO membership, was criticized by its western neighbours for following an overly “modernist” security policy outlook. Re-establishing the armed forces and consolidating border controls dominated its early outlook sometimes at the expense of civil defence, crisis management and cooperative security then prioritized in the West’s shifting post-Cold War security mindset. This was an era when the western powers, the consent of whom was vital to enable both EU and NATO enlargement, no longer perceived Russia as a threat to European security. “Democratic enlargement” was a slogan synonymous with President Bill Clinton’s US foreign policy. However, by the mid-1990s, the wider situation in Europe’s east still presented many tricky dilemmas for US strategists.
Role model
The Baltic states viewed their omission from NATO’s 1999 enlargement round with disappointment, even if their inclusion at this time was never raised as a serious policy prospect. Nevertheless, as the geopolitical tide began to turn in their favour, this was also a time when the Baltic states’ originally rigid “modernist” outlook on security began to evolve. For Estonia, the account that emerges over the next 30 years is an impressive success story where comprehensive security was established. This is a system allowing a small state with limited resources to make the most of all civilian and military capacities to benefit national defence and resilience. This was hardly Estonia’s forte immediately after it regained its independence, but it certainly became its forte having learned some important lessons from others while matching this advice with policies best suiting its specific cultural strengths.
Owing to geography, linguistics and economics, Finland was an important “role model” as Estonia began to design its security policy in the 1990s. Finland had unexpectedly evaded the most oppressive rigours of the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, running contrary to the experiences of the Baltic states and Poland. Finland had effectively mobilized its population and utilized smart military tactics to devastate Soviet encroachment during the Winter War from November 1939 until March 1940. The pragmatic peace Helsinki agreed with Moscow soon thereafter saw it cede territory in eastern Karelia and further north along its border with Russia, but it had crucially retained its sovereignty.
Geopolitical constraints imposed a strict neutrality on Finland during the Cold War. Despite this, Helsinki managed to avoid Sovietization, mixing some foreign policy accommodation of Soviet preferences with a strong independent defence capacity. Backed by conscription and its military reserve, Finland’s conventional posture numbered 700,000 at its Cold War height. This model was termed “total defence” but is broadened to “comprehensive security” in Finland today. It had many admirers among Estonia’s defence leaders in the 1990s and 2000s.
The 1990s were defined by Clinton’s “Russia-first” policy aiming to accommodate Moscow’s wish to remain an independent great power but with opportunities to partner closely with the West. A preference to avoid provoking Russia created reluctance in the US and western European to provide the Baltic states with military training or arms purchases. A dearth in Tallinn’s options for military modernization was even at the origins of the eventual collapse of the Prime Minister Mart Laar-led government that had jubilantly restored Estonian independence. US and European reluctance to sell defence equipment had left purchasing weapons from Israel as a rare option helping Estonia towards its distant aspiration of joining NATO through military compatibility with Western states. However, Laar’s government was forced to resign in 1994 when some dubious payments were discovered in this transaction.
The same westernizing desire against some stern geopolitical odds is also evident in the turbulent tale of the Estonian government’s efforts to find a chief of defence, or CHOD, to support its NATO ambitions during the 1990s. Aiming to dismantle the legacy of Soviet cultural influence on its military, the Estonian-born but retired US Army Colonel, Aleksander Einseln, was approached to assume the CHOD position as one of few Estonians with senior command experience in a western military. Einseln initially declined these advances, but, with the Estonian Defence Forces in desperate need of reform, he eventually accepted the offer in 1993.
The defence force was small, backward and feeble. Einseln’s appointment represented an attempt to make progress in western integration. Nevertheless, his presence caused concern in Washington, with US diplomats aiming to pre-empt Russian complaints. The US government contemplated personally censuring Einseln for undertaking this duty, threatening to suspend his military pension and reactivate his US military service so that he could be disciplined or even have his citizenship revoked. The prospect of such punishment was eventually dropped and Einseln continued to lead attempts to reform the Estonian forces until 1995. This was thanks to the intervention made by some US senators, most notably Senator John McCain.
In a low-key manner, Finland stepped up to provide military training, aiming to assist the professionalization of Estonian forces to a level where a dysfunctional military would not be a risk to its reestablished state. Training was funded by Finland’s ministry of defence and provided by retired Finnish military officers to active Estonian service personnel at facilities in Finland. This arrangement was formalized into the Viro-Projekti (the Estonian project) between 1996 and 2003. Overall, the importance of the Viro-Projekti has probably been overlooked in the history of Estonia’s defence. This and broader security assistance from Nordic neighbours was a lifeline when additional western support for security modernization was in short supply.
Window of opportunity
Around the mid-1990s, this cautious western emphasis on managing relations with Russia risked leaving the Baltic states as a liability for security in Northern Europe. In Estonia, homicide rates were high, and organized crime was a blight on society. The Nordic states moved into this breach for realist reasons, not wanting to see destabilization spread from a neighbour. However, the Nordic “whole-of-society” approach to security proved a good match for long-term Baltic aspirations. Financial assistance and training provided by the Nordic states reaped dividends and improved Baltic capacities in civil defence, emergency response and border protection. The 1990s and early 2000s were high points for Baltic security cooperation, as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania combined their modest resources to demonstrate their suitability for EU and NATO membership. With support from western governments, the Baltic Air Surveillance Network (BALTNET) was established. This became a vital enabler for NATO’s Baltic Air Policing from 2004 onwards.
A joint Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTRON) and a joint Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (BALTBAT) were less successful. While national units from BALTBAT were deployed for different overseas United Nations-mandated peacekeeping missions, it never deployed as a full battalion. However, under Nordic tutelage, BALTBAT was an important receiving point for western-standard training and donated defence equipment, helping to ease the West’s geopolitical concerns about providing these resources to the Baltic states.
Lennart Meri, president of Estonia from 1992 until 2001, often referred to a limited “window of opportunity” for Estonia to gain NATO membership. This “window” began to open slowly by the late 1990s. Perseverance with the hard political choices determining the Baltic transition to liberal democracy and market economics was now finally receiving serious attention in Brussels and in Washington, further galvanizing the “democratic enlargement” message.
The US-Baltic Charter was agreed in 1998. While not formalizing any security guarantees, the US signalled that it was willing to engage in a closer security partnership with the Baltic states. NATO’s Membership Action Plan was first devised at the Alliance’s Washington Summit in 1999, offering a roadmap for entry through criteria for political, economic and military reform. With the Baltic three receiving their action plan at the summit, it has been compared to a “final exam” to achieve safeguards from NATO membership.
Combining with strong Baltic domestic performances in meeting the criteria for this “final exam”, global geopolitical realignment after the September 11th attacks on the US in 2001 was also briefly but crucially in the Baltic states’ favour. A brief rapprochement followed in US-Russia relations. Aiming to make a clean break from Cold War hostility, Washington and Moscow attempted to focus cooperation on combatting transnational terrorism. NATO membership for the Baltic states scheduled for 2004 was confirmed at the NATO Prague Summit in 2002 without too many Russian protests. The flawed rewriting of history where NATO enlargement had been an existential threat to Russia was not unveiled to western ears until President Vladimir Putin’s infamous speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2007.
Fast modernization
In its official security policy documents, Tallinn has subscribed to NATO’s broader strategic agenda outlining that threats like global terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and destabilization in neighbourhoods proximate to the Euro-Atlantic area must be addressed. Estonia began contributing to the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan in 2002. Estonian forces were deployed alongside those from the US, the United Kingdom and Denmark in Helmand Province after 2006.
Violent Taliban destabilization soon spread to Helmand and Estonia suffered nine soldier fatalities by the mission’s end. These troops were serving in an important part of this western mission to prevent Afghanistan falling back to a “haven” for terrorist networks. The overall Afghan operation failed, but participation held some benefits for Estonia’s defence development. The experience put its defence forces on a fast modernization track in a “real” combat environment. It improved interoperability with the US, UK and Denmark – all important NATO allies for Tallinn. The return of NATO’s deterrence focus to Europe might have been more abrupt than expected, as it happened with Operation Atlantic Resolve immediately in response to Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. This year coincided with the conclusion of International Security Assistance Force.
Ready to contribute to NATO’s expeditionary operations, Estonia remained vigilant about threats emanating from an increasingly authoritarian Russia. The year of Putin’s Munich speech, 2007, was also an early landmark in what has today been popularized as Russia’s “hybrid warfare”. A decision was taken to move a monument commemorating the Red Army in the Second World War, as well as the bodies of fallen soldiers buried underneath, from central Tallinn to a graveyard elsewhere in the city in April 2007. With over 20 per cent of Estonia’s population classified as ethnically Russian, moving this Bronze soldier monument triggered several nights of rioting focused on that community. Tensions were stoked by Russian media propaganda and some brazenly subversive diplomatic interventions from Moscow. Estonia suffered a significant cyber-attack on its e-governance infrastructure soon afterwards, a landmark in modern warfare sometimes referred to as “Web War One”.
Russia’s English-language propaganda outlet, Russia Today, was still in its infancy, but its platforms carried regular content distorting Estonian authorities as sympathizing with Nazis. Only three years after Estonia’s accession to the EU, this was a Russian effort to play “divide and conquer” within the bloc, aiming to discredit and marginalize Estonia in the eyes of its new partners. Estonia prioritizes a technology-driven state and economy. This was key to its departure from its poverty during early re-independence. Estonian policymakers were more astute than others in understanding that cybersecurity would become a prominent 21st-century battleground involving non-state actors and even great power geopolitics. Plans for the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) in Tallinn were already afoot before the 2007 attack. This is where Estonia turned an important corner to being a producer of security and not just a consumer. An early arrival to this policy sphere, the astute knowledge and expertise held by Estonia’s government has boosted NATO’s readiness against evolving cyber threats, contributing to stability in the global cyber domain.
Developing national defence
Russia’s military aggression in Georgia in 2008 is an understated landmark in Estonian defence transformation. As a very small state that must make the best of limited resources, Estonian policymakers had grappled with the dilemma to retain conscription for its reserve-based defence system or focus more investment on smaller but specialized and professionalized military forces to support NATO’s collective defence.
Events in Georgia settled this argument. Estonia’s conscription system was revitalized. Remnants of Soviet military culture remained soon after independence where harsh and unfair treatment was rampant and where aimless but punishing exercises were common for conscripts. Military service was perceived as a waste of time by many. Estonia’s military leaders had gradually reversed these impressions, but its conscription-based defence system has been strengthened at speed since 2008. Participation, motivation and morale supporting national defence have risen. In peacetime, Estonia’s standing military numbers 7,7000 personnel with 3,500 being conscripts. This number can swell quickly to 43,000 in a crisis when rapid response units from the reserve are mobilized. Estonia’s voluntary Defence League (Kaitseliit) has 18,000 members. This force structure combining active-service personnel, conscripts and reservists is integrated with NATO’s multinational Forward Land Forces (FLF).
Estonia wasted little time in strengthening its readiness after Russia’s aggression in Crimea in 2014, with major exercises, either Siil (Hedgehog) and Kevadtorm (Spring Storm), taking place each spring since 2015. With the latest edition in May 2025, Siil occurs every 3-4 years to test Estonia’s rapid response mobilization and usually consists of around 16,000 personnel. Kevadtorm takes place every spring when Siil is not staged and focuses on both tactical manoeuvres and Estonia’s interoperability with NATO forces. Kevadtorm also serves as an important passing out exercise for conscripts. Siil 2025 included a strong focus on crisis protection for Estonia’s civilian population. Preparations for civilian evacuation, responses to cyber attacks on civilian infrastructure and medical support for evacuating civilians were practiced.
Concerns regarding the Russian-speaking community
The status of Estonia’s Russian-speaking minorities receives consistently high levels of global media attention. A rudimentary narrative sometimes discusses these populations as a “fifth column” that might be mobilized by Kremlin propaganda against Estonian national interests. Such outlooks usually come with significant flaws.
Estonia’s Russian-speaking populations are far from a uniform group. Some are fully bilingual Estonian citizens. Conversely, others, often from older generations, are less integrated. Economic prospects are substantially better in Estonia when compared to the directly bordering western regions of Russia. Nevertheless, some problems with integration remain. According to 2024 statistics, approximately 60,000 Estonian residents were non-citizens, numbering 4.5 per cent of the population.
Colloquially referred to as “grey passport holders”, these residents moved to Estonia during the Soviet occupation but have not yet acquired Estonian citizenship. Moreover, approximately 80,000 Russian citizens reside permanently in Estonia. Concerned about the risk that these populations could potentially pose in the future, Estonia’s constitution was amended in 2025 to remove the right of non-EU citizens residing in the country from voting in local elections, with “grey passport holders” receiving a grace period until October 2025.
The vote in the Riigikogu, Estonia’s parliament, consisted of 93 in favour, seven against and one abstention, with many proponents of this change arguing that those wishing to vote in Estonian elections retain the opportunity to apply for Estonian citizenship. While many Russian speakers in Estonia might still follow Russia’s propaganda through media consumption, most see improved economic and social benefits from living in Estonia. Some inter-community tensions are set to rumble on. This must be addressed as a concern even if it is not the severe risk that some foreign commentators exaggerate it to be.
Overall, the accomplishment of Estonia’s sophisticated and specialized comprehensive security system reformed from the dire post-Soviet circumstances left immediately after 1991 impressively underscores its national resilience. Nevertheless, challenges remain, with social cohesion relating to Estonia’s Russian-speaking minority a high priority.
This research is part of the Reignite Multilateralism via Technology (REMIT) project, funded by the European Union’s Horizon Europe research and innovation programme under Grant Agreement No. 101094228.
The views and opinions in this text do not necessarily reflect those of the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung.