Although the massive mobilization of aid for Ukraine seen in 2022–2023 has given way to emerging friction points in Warsaw-Kyiv relations—such as historical disputes and agricultural policy—and polls reveal a challenging shift in public sentiment, military, humanitarian, and political support continues unabated.
Observing the Polish public debate and social moods, one can increasingly get the impression that Poland has ceased to be a country friendly toward Ukraine and Ukrainians. Questioning the rationale for supporting Ukraine in its fight against Russian aggression is perhaps not yet universal, but it is no longer a niche occupied only by marginal pro-Russian politicians and their sympathizers. Unfortunately, a negative attitude toward Ukrainian refugees has also become more widespread. During election cycles (the 2023 parliamentary elections and the upcoming 2025 presidential elections), politicians have instrumentalized these sentiments, amplifying narratives hostile to Ukrainians. Furthermore, Russian disinformation and propaganda are responsible for a portion of these narratives.
Polls confirm these shifts. In October 2025, a CBOS survey reported the level of acceptance for Ukrainian refugees in Poland at 48 percent. This is the lowest level since 2014. In March 2022, 94 percent of Poles supported accepting Ukrainian refugees. Moreover, in a study from autumn 2025, half of those surveyed said the aid provided to this group was excessive. In June 2025, IBRIS asked Poles about their support for Ukraine joining NATO and the EU. Support for NATO accession stood at 37 percent, while support for EU entry was 35 percent. As many as 42 percent of respondents were against Ukraine joining both NATO and the EU. The same poll asked about attitudes toward military aid for Ukraine, and 46 percent of participants said it should be halted. For comparison, in a 2022 Kantar survey, 71 percent of respondents supported assisting Ukraine in the face of war.
Financial assistance
Given the clear shift in social sentiment, it is easy to overlook the fact that since 2022, Polish governments have consistently viewed aggressive Russian imperialism as the primary threat to Poland, and support for Ukraine’s defense as a strategic task. Although Poland—following the massive mobilization of aid in 2022–2023—now recognizes problematic areas in Warsaw-Kyiv relations (such as historical issues or agricultural policy), it has not ceased providing military, humanitarian, and political support.
In 2025, Polish authorities published a report summarizing the aid Poland provided to Ukraine in 2022 and 2023—the period of unprecedented mobilization for the attacked country. From 2022 to the autumn of 2025, Poland delivered 46 military aid packages consisting of various types of weapons and ammunition, with further packages in preparation. In 2022 alone, the value of military aid reached 7.23 billion PLN, followed by another 5.63 billion PLN in 2023–2024.
The Polish Army also conducts regular training for Ukrainian soldiers under the EUMAM (European Union Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine) mission, initiated in November 2022. Tens of thousands of Ukrainian soldiers have participated in these programs held at Polish military ranges and training centers. Additionally, Poland covered the costs of Starlink terminals, which provide essential connectivity for the Ukrainian military and civilians in frontline areas, sponsoring a total of 19,500 units.
According to information from the Polish Ministry of National Defense, the total value of military aid—including training and logistics—amounted to 18 billion PLN as of March 2025.
Polish Diplomacy in the War Against Russia
Poland also plays a key role as a transport corridor through which support from other nations reaches the fighting country. According to Polish government estimates, approximately 90% of military equipment reaches Ukraine via Poland. In this way—as highlighted by a Polish government report—Polish territory has become a strategic depth for Ukraine, enabling the replenishment of military resources under safe conditions. In this context, the special role of the airport in Rzeszów deserves mention; it has become a global transport hub for Western aid. Due to the suspension of air traffic over Ukraine since February 2022, Ukrainian officials also utilize this airport for their official diplomatic travels.
When Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine broke out, Poland was among the nations that immediately provided political and military support, unequivocally calling on other allies to do the same. Poland remains a loyal advocate for Ukrainian statehood on the international stage. Although Poland is not as actively involved as Germany, France, or the UK in high-level peace negotiations between Ukraine, the USA, Europe, and Russia, Polish state representatives maintain a consistent policy, supporting international (mainly European) initiatives for aid and sanctions against Russia. Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski became well-known for his assertive stance toward Russian representatives—for instance, during UN sessions, where he skillfully debunked the Russian ambassador's falsehoods.
In March 2022, the Polish Parliament passed a resolution by acclamation supporting Ukraine's efforts to join the European Union and calling on EU institutions to admit Ukraine as quickly as possible. Even though Polish government representatives now frequently speak about Ukrainian accession with skepticism or even issue ultimatums—for example, conditioning support on the resolution of historical grievances—officially, Poland has not withdrawn the declaration made in 2022.
The Ukrainian side, after a period of friction and difficulties in relations with Poland, seems to understand that while certain issues are played out somewhat brutally for the sake of Polish domestic politics, they do not change the Polish state's fundamental position regarding Ukraine, Russia, and Russian aggression. It is in Poland's strategic interest for an independent and strong Ukrainian state to exist.
Humanitarian and Development Aid
Beyond military and political support, Poland provides Ukraine with humanitarian and development assistance. This aid also peaked during 2022–2023 amid broad social and political mobilization. Currently, Ukraine is the largest beneficiary of Polish development aid, which is directed toward immediate reconstruction from war damage and economic support. Poland also participates in the EU’s Ukraine Facility (EU4U), contributing €25 million to this cause in 2024.
Furthermore, various large and small-scale initiatives by NGOs and private individuals continue. These groups conduct regular financial and material collections to support Ukrainian civilians and the military, supplying units with items such as vehicles, food supplies or drones.
One of the most well-known initiatives is led by the popular writer Szczepan Twardoch, who consistently supports and lobbies for aid for Ukraine and its soldiers.
Reluctance Toward Refugees and Mobilization for Kyiv
The status of and social support for Ukrainian refugees who arrived in Poland in 2022 and subsequent war years stir the most emotion in Poland. This issue was one of the key themes of the 2025 presidential election campaign. Both main candidates consistently declared a need to limit aid for Ukrainians living in Poland. In February 2026—four years after the outbreak of the full-scale war—while signing the act terminating the 2022 special law on support for Ukrainian refugees, President Karol Nawrocki spoke of organizing financial matters and restoring fairness by limiting "unconditional privileges." At the same time, he emphasized that Poland "invariably stands by Ukraine in its fight against imperial Russia."
Polish society once again demonstrated its solidarity in the winter of 2026, when Russian shelling of energy infrastructure led to a humanitarian crisis in Kyiv. Within a few days of a fundraiser announced by the Stand with Ukraine Foundation, Poles raised 10 million PLN for generators for the residents of the Ukrainian capital, who were deprived of electricity and heating. The Polish authorities also provided separate support, delivering 379 power generators and 18 heaters from the Government Strategic Reserves Agency, while financing an additional 447 generators using EU funds. Direct assistance was also provided by the city of Warsaw, which sent 90 generators to Kyiv.
In the years 2022–2023, Poland provided Ukraine with aid worth €25 billion. It is estimated that during this period, Polish society contributed €5 billion toward Ukraine's needs. The aid provided in subsequent years still requires calculation and summary—not out of an expectation of gratitude, but to ensure greater efficiency and alignment with needs. This is not non-rebound aid motivated by pity, but a concrete investment in the security of Poland and Europe.
The views and conclusions contained in the text express the author's opinions and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Heinrich Böll Foundation.