A German perspective on security and stability in the Baltic Sea

From Germany’s perspective, Sweden and Finland’s NATO accession strengthens security and stability in the Baltic Sea region in at least three ways. Each point is ultimately a function of how the two new members bolster NATO’s strategic posture in the region and strengthen the transatlantic alliance at large.

A German perspective on security and stability in the Baltic Sea

As seen from Berlin, Sweden and Finland’s accession to NATO significantly enhances security in the Baltic Sea region and the wider Euro-Atlantic area. This is especially true given the renewed uncertainty and geopolitical tensions in the region as a spillover from Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. With the return of a logic of competition to the Baltic Sea region, and with the growing risk of a wider conflict between NATO and Russia, the Baltic Sea has once again become an area of strategic importance for Germany. Consequently, Sweden and Finland’s membership bids were unequivocally welcomed by Berlin, a sentiment reflected in the Bundestag’s near unanimous ratification of their accession protocols.

From Germany’s perspective, Sweden and Finland’s NATO accession strengthens security and stability in the Baltic Sea region in at least three ways. Each point is ultimately a function of how the two new members bolster NATO’s strategic posture in the region and strengthen the transatlantic alliance at large. 

First, Sweden and Finland’s membership significantly strengthens NATO’s strategic posture in the Baltic Sea region and more broadly in North-East Europe. With their robust military capabilities, both are considered “net contributors” and thus valuable additions to the Alliance. Moreover, in certain respects, both are seen as models in current debates about necessary reforms aimed at restoring Germany’s ability to defend itself (Wehrfähigkeit). Examples include Sweden’s approach to conscription, which, referred to as “the Swedish model”, has served as a major reference point in the German debate about the re-introduction of conscription, or Finland’s approach to civilian protection. 

Second, from Berlin’s perspective, Sweden and Finland’s membership alters the strategic context in the Baltic Sea region significantly in NATO’s favour. In practical terms, their integration into the Alliance greatly simplifies NATO’s defence planning for North-East Europe, particularly concerning the defence of the Baltic states. As the framework nation for NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence in Lithuania, the Alliance’s ability to respond to a “Baltic scenario” (as a German expert recently coined it) is of critical importance to Germany. By qualitatively taking their cooperation with the Alliance to a new level, and with NATO now being able to reliably count on their contribution to the defence of the Baltic states, Sweden and Finland’s accession solves several strategic challenges that the Alliance has faced in the region. These include the lack of strategic depth, the ability to maintain critical maritime connections, and, should circumstances require, move in reinforcements and supplies. Against this background, many observers in Germany consider the Baltic states the main benefactors of these developments.

Additionally, with Sweden and Finland, Germany sees NATO better positioned to counter hybrid threats in the Baltic Sea region, including attacks on critical infrastructure. The second point has become increasingly important amidst growing tensions with Russia and, in light of several high-profile incidents, including the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines, such attacks have recently become a key concern for Germany.

Third, looking beyond the immediate regional context of the Baltic Sea, Berlin welcomes Sweden and Finland’s membership as it contributes to the strength of the transatlantic alliance itself, not least by fostering cohesion. Politically, their accession to NATO reinforces the centrality of the transatlantic alliance as the core pillar for security and stability in Europe. Furthermore, considering the capabilities they bring to the Alliance, their membership is seen to strengthen NATO’s European pillar and, by extension, to contribute to transatlantic burden sharing. Finally, since both are stable democracies firmly rooted in the European mainstream, they are also seen as reinforcing NATO’s democratic core at a time when the Alliance’s internal cohesion has increasingly become a concern for Berlin.

Thus, from Germany’s vantage point, Sweden and Finland’s accession to NATO is unequivocally considered a strategic gain and a welcome contribution to stability and security in the Baltic Sea region. Against the backdrop of rising tensions, Germany sees their membership as bolstering NATO’s strategic posture in the region, enhancing its European footprint, and strengthening the Alliance at large. While Sweden and Finland’s accession aligns with German interests in the region and creates a favourable strategic context, it remains to be seen whether Berlin can capitalize on these developments and, by adopting a more active, and indeed more potent, role, deliver the Zeitenwende in its engagement with the Baltic Sea region.

The views and opinions in this text do not necessarily reflect those of the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung.