Lithuania’s 2024 elections: a turning point in political stability?

Until recently, Lithuania had not been named among countries facing democratic backsliding. Governments alternated between center-left and center-right coalitions, but no far-right, far-left, or populist anti-establishment parties had come to power. Even when such scenarios arose, such as in 2003-2004 when Rolandas Paksas was president, Lithuania’s political system demonstrated remarkable resilience in maintaining its mainstream pro-EU and pro-NATO foreign policy.

The 2024 parliamentary elections in Lithuania were expected to reaffirm this trend and serve as a routine exercise in power transfer. Initially, everything proceeded as anticipated. The ruling coalition of the center-right Homeland Union–Lithuanian Christian Democrats (conservatives) and two liberal parties lost the election, while the Social Democratic Party of Lithuania secured an impressive 52 seats out of the 141 available in Lithuania’s parliament, the Seimas. As a result, the Social Democrats took on the task of forming a new government.

The reasons behind this electoral outcome are straightforward. The center-right coalition governed during most of the COVID-19 pandemic, the cost-of-living crisis, and challenges posed by Belarus weaponizing migration, all while navigating the repercussions of Russia’s war against Ukraine. Consequently, voters directed their frustration at the ruling parties. Lithuania’s mixed electoral system, where half of parliamentarians are elected proportionally and the other half in 71 single-mandate districts, also played a role: when a ruling coalition candidate faces an opposition candidate in the second round, voters instinctively vote against the incumbent. Unsurprisingly, the entire electoral campaign became a de facto referendum on the conservative party and its leaders: party head Gabrielius Landsbergis and Prime Minister Ingrida Šimonytė. Additionally, the conservatives lost support in their Vilnius and Kaunas electoral strongholds due to poorly managed reforms, self-inflicted crises, and scandals involving party members.

For those familiar with Lithuanian politics, this outcome was no surprise. Lithuanians generally distrust politicians, political parties, and institutions, and consistently vote against the ruling parties. In nearly 35 years of independence, no Lithuanian government has ever been re-elected. Mažvydas Jastramskis describes Lithuanian voting behavior as “hyper-accountable” characterized by dissatisfaction with democracy and negative economic evaluations. But this time, the formation of the ruling coalition veered off course.

The leader steps back

Shortly after the election, Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, leader of the Social Democratic Party and one of Lithuania’s most popular politicians, announced that she would not renounce her seat in the European Parliament and take on the role of prime minister—despite campaign promises to leave Brussels and lead the new government. This decision invited widespread public and opposition criticism. While Blinkevičiūtė cited age (64) and health concerns as reasons for stepping back, prevailing sentiment suggested she was reluctant to forgo her generous European Parliament salary and future pension. One street mural in Vilnius quipped, “Brussels money every day, keeps Blinkevičiūtė away.” Instead, Gintautas Paluckas, deputy leader of the Social Democrats, took on the task of forming the government.

The switch in prime ministerial candidates was problematic but not catastrophic. Lithuania has a precedent for governments being led by figures other than the party leaders forming them. For instance, Saulius Skvernelis, prime minister from 2016-2020, was not a member of the ruling Lithuanian Farmers and Greens Union. Similarly, outgoing Prime Minister Ingrida Šimonytė only recently joined the conservative party, with its leader Gabrielius Landsbergis serving as foreign minister. While such arrangements weaken governments politically, Lithuanians have adapted to this dynamic over the past eight years.

An unexpected coalition partner

The second surprise came when the Social Democrats invited the populist, nationalist, and anti-establishment party “The Dawn of Nemunas” (Nemuno Aušra, NA) into the ruling coalition. This was controversial, as the Social Democrats had explicitly ruled out such an alliance during the campaign.

The decision was particularly contentious because NA leader Remigijus Žemaitaitis had been found by Lithuania’s Constitutional Court to have violated the constitution and his parliamentary oath due to anti-Semitic comments on Facebook in 2023, which were deemed to incite inter-ethnic hatred. Žemaitaitis has not acknowledged any wrongdoing and continues to post inflammatory content on social media. Bringing NA into the coalition means cooperating with a leader stained by antisemitism.

Official explanations for this decision highlight a lack of alternatives. The Social Democrats’ primary coalition partner, “In the Name of Lithuania – Lithuanian Democrats,” led by former Prime Minister Saulius Skvernelis, refused to work with the Farmers and Greens Union, their former parliamentary colleagues. The liberal party would not support a redistributive agenda, and collaboration with the conservatives was a red line for the Social Democrats. Prime Minister Paluckas also argued that a strong parliamentary majority was needed to govern effectively. Together with Skvernelis’s party and NA, the coalition achieves a constitutional majority. 

However, several issues arise

First, the coalition faces ideological conflicts. While the Social Democrats advocate increased redistribution and defense spending (to 3.5% of GDP), NA opposes reforms of any kind. NA’s election platform was minimal, focusing primarily on halting reforms and auditing defense spending. Already, the Social Democrats have abandoned their human rights agenda, including civil unions for same-sex couples, to appease NA. How are the social democrats planning to implement reforms by having on board an anti-systemic partner driven by resentment towards all institutions?
Second, NA’s inclusion protects Žemaitaitis, who exploited a legal loophole to avoid impeachment and a 10-year ban from elected office by resigning from the previous parliament before the process began. This decision not only shields him but also rewards him with political power.  This sends a bad signal not only for Jews but for other ethnic minorities or marginalised groups in Lithuania: if Žemaitaitis can gain power by inciting hatred towards Jews, why others cannot do so by targeting Poles, Russians, Belarusians, Ukrainians, Roma or Muslims?

Third, the coalition agreement, coupled with Blinkevičiūtė’s withdrawal, further damages public trust in politicians. Lithuania already suffers from low levels of social trust , and this development exacerbates the problem. As psychologist Paulius Skruibis warns, “Those playing with trust we need to ask, don’t you think that a day might come when you will have to address the people with words that you are here and you are not going anywhere? The way Ukraine’s president spoke to his country a thousand days ago. Will we be able to take your promises seriously without thinking that after a few days you will come out with another, maybe completely different message?” 

Finally, NA’s presence in the coalition raises concerns among Lithuania’s allies. Germany, sensitive to antisemitism, is committed to stationing a military brigade in Lithuania on a permanent basis as part of NATO deterrence, but the German parliament still has to vote on two laws related to this agreement. Might the inclusion of NA into Lithuania’s ruling coalition force a change of heart among some German parliamentarians?

A precarious future

The Social Democrats now face whether the price paid for a constitutional majority was worth it. Given the current international and domestic challenges, a minority government or even an unprecedented coalition with the conservatives might have been better options.

Lithuania’s entry into the club of countries with populist, anti-establishment parties in power raises concerns. Looking for similarities to the Lithuanian situation, one may look at the case of Slovakia. Just like there, Lithuania’s party system is made of progressive center-right parties, and more traditionalist center-left parties. This paradoxical divide is most visible in the case of same-sex unions: the conservatives and liberals are in favor, whereas the social democrats and S. Skvernelis’s party are hesitant. The low levels of social trust in Lithuania are comparable to Slovakia. One might even see some similarities in the voters of Slovakia and Lithuania: socially conservative compared to Western and Northern Europe, slightly parochial, pro-EU, cautious when it comes to foreign policy. Finally, there are some echoes between the rhetoric of Slovakia’s Robert Fico and Lithuania’s new rulers. G. Paluckas says that the critique coming from the USA, Germany, and Poland towards including NA in the ruling coalition is the work of internal opponents , while R. Žemaitaitis signals the need to overhaul the public broadcaster .  Moreover, there have been media reports that during the electoral campaign, Paluckas met with representatives of companies exporting Belarusian fertilizers . Officially, they were “discussing the implementation of sanctions”, although EU and US sanctions prohibit any export or transit of Belarusian fertilizers via Lithuania.

However, significant differences remain: Lithuania has a semi-presidential system, and President Gitanas Nausėda has tools to counter harmful government decisions. Moreover, public fears of Russia are likely to keep foreign and security policies stable. Finally, there are no signs from any members of the newly formed ruling coalition of attempts to capture the state or purge its institutions.

The Social Democrats are already in crisis mode, with post-election polls showing voter disapproval of their broken promises. All this paves the way for the opposition conservative and “Liberals’ movement” parties to regain their strength.

While the 2024 elections followed expectations in terms of winners and losers, the resulting coalition introduces uncertainty and instability. NA leader R. Žemaitaitis shows no sign of calming down. It seems the nature of his political project – anti-establishment, focused on mobilising protest voters, distrustful of state institutions and disenchanted with democracy – drives him to constantly rock the boat of the government, no matter who creates it. This raises the likelihood that G. Paluckas may be the first Lithuanian Prime Minister since Gediminas Kirkilas in 2007-2008 not to serve the whole 4-year term. If so, Lithuania may soon join other European nations navigating the stormy waters of political turbulence.

The views and opinions in this article do not necessarily reflect those of Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung Warsaw.