Reviewing the Polish presidential elections

The result

The 2025 presidential elections in Poland were held, as usual, in two rounds, as none of the 13 eligible candidates achieved an absolute majority in the first round. The first round took place on May 18, 2025, with a turnout of 67.31%. Rafał Trzaskowski, was considered the favorite according to polls, started as the candidate of the Civic Coalition (KO), the party that currently leads the government, emerged as the frontrunner with 31.36% of the vote. He was closely followed by Karol Nawrocki, the candidate supported by the Law and Justice Party (PiS), who received 29.54% of the votes. Both advanced to the runoff election.

More surprising were the results of the candidates outside the established PiS and KO duopoly. Third place went to the right-wing extremist Sławomir Mentzen of the Konfederacja party with 14.81%. Grzegorz Braun, who started out in the same party camp but was expelled for standing as a separate candidate and thus ran for the Konfederacja Korony Polskiej party, came fourth with 6.34% of the vote. Szymon Hołownia of the Polska 2050 party, an alliance of centrist-liberal forces and the Farmers' Party, received 4.99%, while the left-wing candidates, Adrian Zandberg from the Razem party, which is part of the opposition, and Magdalena Biejat, who ran for the Nowa Lewica party, which is part of the government, received 4.86% and 4.23% of the votes, respectively. The other candidates each received less than 2%.

The decisive runoff election took place on June 1, 2025, with an even higher turnout of 71.63%. Karol Nawrocki narrowly defeated Rafał Trzaskowski and was elected president with 50.89% of the vote. Trzaskowski received 369,591 fewer votes, or 49.11%. The Chamber for Exceptional Control and Public Affairs of the Supreme Court, which according to the ECJ and ECHR ruling is not considered independent due to its composition, confirmed the election results as after the 2023 parliamentary elections. Nawrocki's inauguration is scheduled for August 6, 2025.

Why did Rafał Trzaskowski lose? 

Sociologists Przemysław Sadura and Sławomir Sierakowski examined the presidential election in their study "A new duopoly overturns this system." To this end, 1,000 representative participants were interviewed by telephone in the week after the runoff election, and focus group discussions were held with 70 voters who had voted for Braun and Mentzen. The authors found that dissatisfaction with the government's work, in particular a lack of reform, was a factor why voters who had voted for the current government in the 2023 parliamentary elections refused to vote for Trzaskowski this time around. The authors diagnose the KO's mistake in the election campaign as having once again fallen into the PiS's trap of scandal resistance, as it did in the 2019 parliamentary elections. This refers to the numerous damaging scandals that came to light during the election campaign involving the PiS-backed candidate, the frequent references to these scandals, and even the KO's exploitation of this weakness, which they believe drove voters to support Nawrocki. The consolidation of the right was reinforced by prominent figures, commentators, and ordinary citizens who expressed arrogance and contempt toward the PiS candidate and his voters. The decisive factor in Nawrocki's narrow victory was the voters who had supported Mentzen and Braun in the first round. According to exit polls, they accounted for 34% of Nawrocki's votes in the second round.

The "New Right" and the "New Left"

Sadura and Sierakowski refer to this electorate as the "New Right." In the case of Konfederacja (Mentzen), 64% of the electorate is male and 47% (in the case of Konfederacja Korony Polskiej, Braun 26%) are between the ages of 18 and 34. In both cases, 29-33% of the electorate has a higher level of education and 23-29% lives in larger cities. These characteristics distinguish them from the PiS core electorate, the "Old Right." In this group, only 15% are between 18 and 34 years old, and the majority lives in small towns or rural areas.

The "New Right" can be roughly divided into three groups: libertarians (45%), nationalists (35%) and critics of the system (20%). For libertarians, the vision of a radical transformation of the Polish economy towards greater entrepreneurial freedom is particularly appealing. They demand drastic tax cuts, deregulation, and the withdrawal of the state from the economy. The second bloc consists of nationalists, a group that combines market economy principles with a strong focus on national identity and historical politics. This voter segment is closest to the traditional right, but criticizes social policy measures. The third group consists of radical critics of the system who demand the dissolution of state functions and harbor a deep distrust of any form of organized politics. The common denominator of libertarian and anti-system voters is the reduction of the state: for some, this is a blow against economic interventionism, for others, a blow against the elites.

According to the authors of the report, similar to the “New Right”, the "New Left" longs for politicians who ‘tell the truth’ and are ‘not part of the system’ and rejects the current and previous governments. In terms of ideological orientation, however, the "New Left" differs greatly from the "New Right." It is less skeptical of Ukraine and the EU, distances itself most strongly from all other voter groups from the PiS, and rejects authoritarianism strongly. In addition, there are few divisions among the voters of the three left-wing presidential candidates. They merely wavered as to which of the three they should vote for.

How will the election result affect the political landscape?

According to sociologists' analysis, the loss of support for both parties of the long-standing duopoly, KO and PiS, and the simultaneous increase in votes for the "New Right" and the "New Left" indicate that a new duopoly is emerging on the horizon. In the polls, the political center is disintegrating, with the PSL (Peasant Party) and Polska 2050 also performing poorly recently. This is undermining one of the prerequisites for the continuation of Donald Tusk's government. The government's program needs to be better communicated and continued. Measures such as border closures and deregulation are aimed at weakening the right wing. However, given the widespread demands for systemic change and radical reforms, this seems hardly sufficient.

In addition, the new president will make it difficult for the government to push through its reforms, whether by interfering in public debate, using his veto, or referring legislative proposals to the Constitutional Court. 

According to Sadura and Sierakowski, the Tusk government would need a miracle to halt the negative trend. If the political center continues to fragment and more and more parties fail to meet the threshold, the KO could try to absorb their electorate. Only a few spectacular successes, such as infrastructure expansion or social transfers, could give the cabinet new momentum.

The Confederation is banking on comprehensive criticism of the system and the disintegration of the government, as is Razem under Adrian Zandberg. The next elections, whether early or regular, could bring a coalition of PiS and the "New Right" to power. It is equally conceivable that the "New Right" will leave PiS running into the void, leaving it with a minority government and exploiting its weakness to become the dominant force itself.

Razem, in turn, will try to exploit the failure of the old duopoly. Within one or two election cycles, the Konfederacja could govern and Razem could rise to become the leading left-wing opposition force. However, low voter turnout and limited programmatic flexibility could limit this strategy. Only a strategic shift toward pragmatic politics could enable Razem to become the leading opposition party.
 

This article summarizes the new study "A new duopoly overturns this system" by Przemysław Sadura and Sławomir Sierakowski. The Heinrich Böll Foundation in Warsaw gave the financial support for the surveys, group interviews, and publication of the study. The views expressed therein do not necessarily reflect the position of the Heinrich Böll Foundation.

The full report is available for download in Polish here